

the christian SCHOLAR



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THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

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The Christian Scholar

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Editor's Preface	87
THE CRISIS OF VOCATION <i>Carl Michalson</i>	89
"ILLUMINED" LIBERAL EDUCATION <i>Richard N. Bender</i>	101
SEGREGATED FRATERNITIES IN OUR COLLEGES <i>Joseph M. Hopkins</i>	109
RELIGION AS A GOAD TO PHILOSOPHY <i>Alburey Castell</i>	114
THE BEAUTIFUL AS SYMBOLIC OF THE HOLY <i>F. David Martin</i>	125
MARKS OF AN EDUCATED MAN <i>Kermit Eby</i>	134
SOME SHOULD BE * * * TEACHERS <i>William R. Mueller</i>	138
CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY AND HIGHER EDUCATION <i>Nels F. S. Ferré</i>	142
THE INARTICULATE ROOTS OF FREE VALUES <i>Peter Viereck</i>	159
SCIENCE AND RELIGION <i>John Garhart</i>	163
BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS	167
REPORTS AND NOTICES	179

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THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

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Both *THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR* and the *Faculty Christian Fellowship* are departments of the Commission on Higher Education of the National Council of Churches. The purpose of the Commission is to develop basic philosophy and requisite programs within its assigned field, to awaken the entire public to the conviction that religion is essential to a complete education and that education is necessary in the achievement of progress, to foster a vital Christian life in college and university communities of the U. S. A., to strengthen the Christian college, to promote religious instruction therein, and to emphasize the permanent necessity of higher education under distinctly Christian auspices.

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The Editor's Preface

"The universities today have not only a *mission* but a task in the contemporary world." This important distinction, recently made by a wise educator in a conversation concerning higher education in a world so much of which is caught up in rapid social development, seems to be of striking significance the more one reflects upon it. In newly emergent lands of the earth, where the quest for liberation from external powers is threatened anew by super-nationalisms within, where political necessities of development are at the same time economically difficult, where movements toward peoples' unities are imperilled by the aberrations of provincialism, and where traditions of enlightenment in law and society are undermined by intense emotional identifications — in such situations the question posed for higher learning is whether it can assist creatively in the providing of patience, of long-range vision, of a clear acknowledgment of the facts, of reasoned apprehension of the present and anticipation of the future. Can the universities be instruments of humane reason and of the human spirit? Equally so, though in a different way, the question posed for higher learning in established or older societies is whether the universities can provide more than antiquities, whether they can be more than museums, i.e., whether they can provide insights and incentives essential to continued change and a dynamic sense of human history. Can the universities be instruments of inspiration and new human thrust, rather than the complacent institutions of

societies threatened by the ebb-tides of historical consciousness?

Such questions as these are relevant for various types of higher educational institutions. They can challenge the traditional universities, as well as "Christian colleges" and even technical institutes, to reappraise anew the basic tasks of higher learning today. To be sure, colleges and universities have an enduring mission wherever they are — a mission with respect to man's knowledge of truth in all spheres of disciplined rational inquiry: the mission is to search it out, to transmit it anew and revise the old in light of the new, and to provide some of the skills and techniques for its humane application to the whole range of human needs. Colleges and universities are called upon, moreover, to perform their mission as part of a total community of the intellect and academic life, to practice the standards of excellence, to have respect for the spoken and written word, and to interrelate learning and living. These are component aspects of their mission, their perennial duty, and their means of livelihood with respect to society.

These elements in the mission of the academic community are set, nevertheless, within the context of a task, i.e., of what the Bible speaks of as a "vocation" or calling. In this context it is called upon to see itself in a particular moment of time and within the concreteness of a given place. The pressing task of colleges and universities is their immediate calling — to see their mission

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

in terms of relevance for human anxiety and need and to appraise their mission anew each day against the background of a vital sense of history. It is in this light that they may renew a sense of urgency and meaning. In Asia, Africa, and the Middle East they may impart a relevant sense of patience; in America they may yet be able to instill a "vision of greatness" and have students become excited again about the living issues of human life.

This is the great mission seen as the indispensable task of the present. Can it be realized? Perhaps not totally, for colleges and universities do not fully determine their cultural environments. They are, in part, subject to conditions

which they reflect but can not completely mold. But they can be aware of the need to recover a sense of the urgent present. Despite the fact that the university's tradition is hallowed and ancient, there can be communities within the academic world whose sense of the total task is quickened. We may well hope and pray that Christian scholars and Christian communities of scholars will be found among those who hear and respond to not only the perennial mission of learning but also to the vocation from man and God to be faithful to their task. What is more basic to such a sensitivity than the knowledge of God's work in history wherein through Christ he has called us into the liberty of being his sons?

The Crisis of Vocation

CARL MICHALSON

. . . The fears we know are of not knowing. Will night-fall bring us some awful order — keep a hardware store in a small town. . . Teach science for life to progressive girls —? It is getting late. Shall we ever be asked for? Are we simply not wanted at all?

— W. H. Auden, *The Age of Anxiety*.

You fool! The best job is the one you have.

— Martin Luther, *Sermon on Luke 2:8-20*.

Our daily work is an arena in which our justifiability as men is being continually tested. This is not always known or acknowledged because the demands of earning a living seem so much more paramount. Almost anyone can earn a living. But in order to do so he must invest the majority of his waking hours. Into the product of his labor a man must pour what Karl Marx called "congealed working time." That is why most working people are clock watchers. Their lives are like a talisman, a magic skin which they hold in their hands. At every stroke of the clock you can feel the skin shrink, and when the skin is gone, life will be over. One pours his life into his job. That is why the paramount question pertains not to earning a living but to vindicating one's investment of his life. You can appreciate, then, that it is not simply grimness which causes the Frenchman Arthur Rimbaud to cry out, "Human toil! That is the explosion which lights up my abyss from time to time."

Many of the explosive crises in vocational life are utterly situational. Given a little prudent adjustment of the conditions surrounding our work or a little plastic accommodation of our attitudes, the critical element vanishes.

There are clashes of circumstance, for instance. The fact that work is now being widely considered as a universal right bespeaks the deep-seated need of men for a vocation. Let a general situation of unemployment arise, and this basic need to work expresses itself not simply as a fear of starvation but as a frustration of one's essential humanity. Retirement affects men in the same way. A recent advertisement in *The New York Times* for part-time workers brought hundreds of applications from retired men. Strike threats evoke widespread anxiety for the same

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THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

reason. The loom of industry is the womb of a nation's psychological security. Man is a working animal whose very being is at stake in his handiwork; and when he cannot work, he cannot esteem himself.

Another circumstance is the popular situation where vocational preferences collide with all sorts of distasteful vocational by-products. One does not mind his job so much as the tedium and long hours: what Joseph Conrad once called the "prosaic severity" of daily work. He likes to tinker with motors but not to wash his hands. He likes to sell groceries but he does not like to stack the shelves. He likes to make contacts but not to fill out the reports on his contacts. He likes to do research but not meet classes. He likes to preach but not to call. Or, as in the special case of women, they would like a career but they would also like marriage and motherhood. Vocational life is a kind of package deal: one takes the bad with the good.

Likewise there is a fatiguing competitiveness in vocational situations. He must compete first of all for the job he wants. Once in the job, he must compete with his fellow workers for status on the job. Worst of all, he must compete with himself for the realization of his own ambition for himself. Occasionally the competitive situation is ambushed from deep within one's past where the expectations of one's parents have so dominated one's vocational mind that any independent direction weighs one down with the guilt burden of a patricide.

At times the circumstances of work become such as to raise the question of personal suitability. When this question is raised, the talisman grows taut in our hand and we can peek more deeply into the abyss of our lives. For instance, one may feel deeply destined to be an artist; but who can live on the income of most artists? Or to be a doctor; but who can become a doctor who is not already affluent enough to put himself through medical school? There are not many bank tellers who can escape their cage for a life of aesthetic abandon in the South Seas. But what is the alternative to that for a man whose spirit beats like the wings of a bird against the confinement of his job? He must settle for amateur status in the vocation for which he feels destined to be a professional. As James Agate has said, "A professional is a man who can do his job when he doesn't feel like it. An amateur is a man who can't do his job when he does feel like it."

But what if our sense of destiny is nudging us into a vocation for which we lack the abilities for distinction? Our destiny is then a devil sentencing us to the most acute confrontation with the fear of failure. Many a young man in a burst of idealism has said to himself, "I would rather be a second-rate lawyer than a first-rate clerk!" There is no quicker way to shrivel the talisman than that. The realities of our talents must be gauged to the demands of a vocation or we disintegrate ourselves with the constant sense of falling short.

THE CRISIS OF VOCATION

Another critical clash which enters into vocational life has to do with moral values. Every worker is by the nature of his job suspended midway between the question of the profit of the employer and the question of the welfare of the employee. In some well-ordered enterprises this is no alternative, for the conditions are synonymous. To serve the employer is the best way to serve yourself, or to serve yourself is the best way to serve your employer. There are still many instances, however, where vocational circumstances are such as to encourage the mutual exploitation and depersonalization of employer and employee.

Values also clash when one is forced to choose between a life of service to others and a life of socially acceptable self-interest. Teachers face this in deciding between serving needy, small country schools at less salary and status, and serving relatively well-equipped urban schools at more salary and status. Doctors face it when they must decide between a practice among low-incomed groups receiving inadequate medical attention and high-incomed groups accustomed to the best and able to pay for it. Everyone faces the decision in choosing between gainful enterprises and service enterprises notoriously unrewarding from a financial standpoint.

Once on the job, one discovers a set of mores and morals that jogs his tidy idealism. The office secretary must say "He's not in" when he is. The statesman must declare war, buy favor, and support unsavory riders for the sake of wholesome legislation. The laborer must "slow down" and go out on strike or isolate himself from organized labor which in many respects is industry's conscience.

Probably the most popular clash in all vocational crises is the one that has developed out of society's sheer vocational inertia. According to the Old Testament, work is the device by which God has punished mankind for his unfaithfulness. Since the sin of Adam, man is sentenced to earn his bread by sweat. (Genesis 3:17-19; Ps. 90:10; Job 7:1ff; Ecclesiastes 6:7) Whether God would do a thing like that will be debated by theologians, but there is no room for doubt that much daily work today answers to the description of a punishment. The sheer biological demands of staying alive, or, more lately, of living well, have dominated the history of work. Hence, the question of what the work can do for the spirit of the man emerges too late to answer it efficiently. Men with strong individualistic tendencies get caught in rigid vocational systems. Men with a fine feeling for personal relations suddenly discover themselves being victimized by automation. Men with deep-seated passions to serve their fellow-men come to themselves in jobs whose ends are not apparent beyond the thickly impersonal walls of their offices or factories. Like a dirge, the words of the poet Hölderlin echo through the hollow chambers of these lives:

And the wheel of stale usage
Day by day wears away the soul.

Hell is a job in which a man who lives by his lungs is forced to work under water.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

It is almost as if the Old Testament were right about work as a penalty. As Simone de Beauvoir has said, "There is no more obnoxious way to punish a man than to force him to perform acts which make no sense to him."

The harrowing crises in vocational life, however, emanate from the deep, subconscious anxieties, the failure to know who we are, the setting up of a lie about ourselves and attempting to prove the lie a truth through the medium of our chief life-time occupations. And if the lie does not come off? The same medium we used as a testing grounds of the validity of our lie we turn into a torture chamber for punishing the guilt of our detected lie.

A person who enters into vocational life as if it were the scale of his success courts the gravest spiritual perils. One who requires his vocational life to vindicate his very being asks of the vocation something it was not meant to give. Students should know about this tactic. Odd how after submitting a paper or completing an examination the student cannot rest with his knowledge of his intellectual acquisitions. He is ridden by curiosity as to how he has done, and he haunts his professors with the question, "How did I make out?" Pride of achievement outreaches achievement and even cripples the faculties by which achievement is come by. The tactic should be familiar to everyone because it was the main device used in childhood. The joy in approbation from one's peers was more pleasant than the thrill of the achievement itself. When a student looks into the eyes of a professor with the same panic eagerness for approval with which a child searches out the eyes of his parent, we have a ridiculously anachronistic situation. But when the same immature demand for the satisfaction of the pride ideal is carried over into vocational life, the anachronism becomes acutely critical. Is that not the pathos in Auden's lines:

. . . To be young means to be all on edge, to be held waiting in a packed lounge for a Personal Call from Long Distance, for the low voice that defines one's future. . . . The fears we know are of not knowing. Will night-fall bring us some awful order — keep a hardware store in a small town. . . . Teach science for life to progressive girls —? It is getting late. Shall we ever be asked for? Are we simply not wanted at all?

Is this not also the tragedy in Conrad's *Nostromo*? As Senora Teresa gasps to Nostromo in her dying moments, "Always thinking of yourself and taking your pay out in fine words from those who care nothing for you." But Nostromo can only reply, "I am engaged in a work of very great moment. . . . I am needed!"

Vocational crisis is in the making when one needs to be needed. The sign of the crisis is the compulsiveness in work. How else account for the mild symptoms called "Sunday neurosis?" Away from the emotional support of vocational approbation, a man is at his wit's end. He may have neatly arranged his time so that it would pass rapidly before he returns to work on Monday. He may have planned the day at a double-header. But it rains. He is lost. He needs to be needed; the

THE CRISIS OF VOCATION

Sabbath affords no self-laudatory work; he will anesthetize himself against his need with baseball; the rain washes away the magic drug.

If employed people feel this lack of support on their day off, fancy the torture which retirement inflicts upon the vocationally compulsive. Even worse, can you comprehend the trauma incipient in the disability of a younger person who has put all the eggs of self-vindication in the single basket of vocational life. Case histories are replete with instances of persons unable to pursue their line of work by virtue of a crippling disease or accident, who have taken the attitude that life is no longer worth living.

See, then, the toll that is taken upon the personality when vocational life is set within the pride system. The rebellious seems to aim too high. He entertains only the picture of himself as a success and will resist any suggestion that he is not. He is smugly satisfied with his achievements because they were indicated in his talents from the beginning. The truth is that it is not his achievements which satisfy him but the way in which they vindicate his pride ideal. He can be crushed by failure, not because any particular failure is objectively ruinous, but because failure in any degree is utterly alien to his view of himself. Failure is taken not as vocational defeat but as self-defeat. More often, however, he will not accept the verdict of failure. He will blame the circumstances. He did not "get the breaks"; he did not know the right people; he was victimized by unscrupulous associates, etc. Like everyone else, he has too much to do at work. But he generally is not fatigued because he needs much to do in order to certify his concept of himself as omniscient.

The recessive, on the other hand, seems to aim too low. He does so not out of lack of ambition. Actually he keeps himself down so as not to offend others whose approbation he dearly desires. His aim in life seems modest not because he lacks high ideals but because all his ideals are *too* staggering, and in self-defense he must compromise with them. Success depresses him. Hence, the instance of the novelist who, on the day it was announced that his book was a best seller, took his life. Failure cannot hurt him, for when it comes he is prepared to receive it in philosophical self-deprecation. "I am no good," he will say. Not because he believes he is no good, but because he must take that attitude toward himself in order to spare himself the worse punishment of having to hear it for the first time from someone else. He is always fatigued. He should be, for he takes on anything that is asked of him. He needs to be needed. The result is over-work. He will work hard and do many things, but he will reject offers of major responsibility. Like the Texas carpenter, asked to step into the post of foreman, he will decline, saying "Nope, I just want to hue out from the neck down."

The resigned does not aim at all. He is a free lance, a playboy. He is a vocational opportunist, resists the regimentation and routine implicit in vocational life,

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

and seemingly cannot maintain the continuity of responsibility required for holding a job. He may seem well adjusted to his work, because when he is off the job he can play with abandon. He does not take his work home with him. The truth of the situation, however, is that he is simply a playboy. His work is so oppressive to him that he cannot wait to get off the job to flounder freely in undemanding occupations so amply provided by our culture in the world of entertainment and recreation. He is an attractive type because he will not seek his self-solution as the rebellious and recessive do, in such complete seriousness about work. His fault lies in his building his life upon the strategy of detachment from those devices, with nothing genuinely liberating to take their place. He is like a man who is continually breaking jail, but never vindicating himself and settling down.

Now, what is the point of dragging you through this lengthy pathology of the vocational life? Simply to observe what a gap exists between the black swamp of self-torture and aimlessness which one can make of his working life and the view of oneself that is available in a life of faith. The word "vocation" in the history of man has become a synonym for something from which you can hardly wait to get a vacation. "Vocation" in the history of Christianity, however, was the word for salvation. Vocation in the New Testament is God's call to man which delivers him from the assorted tyrannies of the world — sin, death, and the devil — and ushers him into a life of joy and peace. What has come in between to distort the meaning of vocation?

What has happened in the history of Christianity is somewhat parallel to what happens in the Old Testament account of how work came to be a thing to dread. God created man in His own image, and God, the creator, was a worker. Man, in God's image, was therefore designed to be a worker. But, according to the Old Testament, sin entered. Man chose his own image of himself and attempted to negotiate life in that image. He saw himself no longer responsible to God but rather as being like God, with the knowledge of good and evil. The image just could not be carried off. It was not the truth about man, but a lie. One who lies about himself creates a situation where the needs for camouflage and rationalization are so demanding that the opportunities for wholesome self-development are tortuously confined. This tension began to show in man's work. He worked no longer as a gardener, as God originally employed him. He worked for bread, by sweat. Gardening is an occupation in which there is no difference between the professional and the amateur status. But when one must enter the sacred fields and forests with the acquisitive instincts which the struggle for survival forces upon him, the sweat of his brow becomes a vile perfume to remind him, if he has the nose to smell, that he is somehow living against his true vocation.

The New Testament used the word "vocation" to signify man's salvation. It did not yet apply this word to daily work. In fact, the New Testament heralded

THE CRISIS OF VOCATION

the coming of God's kingdom which would supplant the world in its present phase, and, with the world, the daily work required in it. Hence, no great emphasis was placed on worldly work in a day when the world was regarded as doomed.

The Middle Ages began to adopt a different attitude toward work. The kingdom of God, it believed, had already come in a sense in the form of the church. Therefore, those who worked for the church were doing saving work, holy work. They had a vocation in the New Testament meaning because what they were doing represented the redeeming call of God producing in their lives the effects of joy and peace. Those who were not working in the church had a worldly work, and their redemption was contingent upon the holy work of monks, nuns, and priests. The first systematic presentation of this attitude toward work was given by Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century. But the attitude had prevailed in the thinking of the church for a thousand years. In summary, the attitude involved two positions toward work: First, worldly work is the punishment for sin. It cannot be regarded as having a redemptive dimension. Second, the holy work is a higher kind of work.

Martin Luther, with no reputation for tact, tolerance, or temperance, broke down the wall between worldly work and holy work with the blasphemous claim that men who worked in the world with their hands were redemptively *more* significant than the so-called holy men, the monks. Luther based his blast upon a hitherto neglected verse from the letters of Paul, I Cor. 7:20. In this verse Paul enjoins the early Christians to stay within the calling whereunto they are called. In saying this, Paul apparently uses the same word for one's worldly work as he uses for the divine election to salvation. According to Luther, this is Paul's way of saying that not everything that is holy goes on at church, and with that tiny wedge from the New Testament he broke through the "conceit of the walls" of the church and allowed the church to break into society at this point of very great relevance, the vocational life.

Hear these lines from one of his Christmas sermons, based upon the text from Luke about the shepherds: "And there were in the same country shepherds abiding in the fields, keeping watch over their flocks by night."

That was a mean job, watching flocks by night. Common sense calls it low-down work, and men who do it are regarded as trash. But the Evangelist lauds the angels because they proclaimed their message only to shepherds watching their flocks by night. . . . And what did they do? . . . They stayed in their station and did the work of their calling. They were pure in heart and content with their work, not aspiring to be townsmen or nobles, nor envious of the mighty. Next to faith this is the highest art — to be content with the calling in which God has placed you. (Roland Bainton's Translation)

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

Now four things should be said rapidly and pointedly about Luther's handling of this text from Paul. First, his exegesis is wrong. Paul does not say what Luther says he does. Paul only applies the word calling to the life of salvation, not at all to daily work. Second, Luther's position about remaining in one's worldly work became a kind of theological justification for feudalism, with its rigid vocational caste system still so central to the economies of European countries. Third, the Roman Catholic Church has since the Protestant Reformation redefined its position in the direction of Luther's. (See *Rerum novarum* by Leo XIII in 1891 and *Quadragesimo anno* by Pius XI in 1931.) Fourth, John Calvin found it possible to introduce the dimension of saving significance into worldly work without the help of Luther's dubious exegesis.

The fourth point is the important point. The Protestant Reformation helped to make it clear to Christians who were pouring their lives into their daily work that their life of faith was not suspended during working hours. Their vocational life was the arena in which God's calling was to be worked out. The consequence of that perspective was a repristination of work as divinely significant, a concept of the worker not as the victim of evil but as a steward in God's garden.

It is my conviction that when the worker understands himself in his work as one who is in the image of God, under responsibility to God and receiving the benefits of God's mercy in his working life, the crises that come to a head in his vocational experience are sizably reduced. In the main, he learns that his vocation is not the arena for his self-vindication. To think that it is may be bad theology, built upon a doctrine of the fall of man which has not yet heard that God has overcome the power of evil and that there is therefore now no condemnation. It may also be bad psychology, tempting man to seek the gratifications of life from his work, whereas the opposite relation is the more wholesome. One has a satisfactory relation to his work when the worker is a satisfied man.

One who understands himself vocationally as in the image of God will adopt several attitudes of crucial importance to his well-being as a worker. For one thing, he will understand *the essential democracy of all vocations*. The dignity of work does not inhere in the nature of the work. Therefore, people cannot enhance their sense of self-esteem by comparing jobs. The dignity of work inheres in the way in which God is related to the work. As Martin Luther has said, every kind of work has its necessity and meaning in "the command of God." And as Calvin concurred, we are to do everything including our work for the glory of God.

Einstein was wrong, then, to say that if he had his life to live over again he would "rather choose to be a plumber or a peddler" than a "scientist or scholar or teacher." He was, of course, engaging in justifiable hyperbole as an attack upon government security procedures which were crippling scholarly research. He was wrong in the first place to imply the hierarchial inferiority of some work to others. He was

THE CRISIS OF VOCATION

wrong in the second place because one does not hold his work as something he has chosen but as something for which he has been chosen. He can only choose his being chosen, and it seems clear that Einstein and others are chosen to be scientists. The father who says, "My son will be a carpenter!" is only kidding. He knows he cannot choose his son's vocation: that would be a contradiction in the term. And he is actually only expressing the disillusionment with professional life which his own frustrations have forced upon him. There is, of course, a kind of hierarchy among vocations based upon adaptability, which vocational aptitude tests are benevolently designed to help us determine. As Alexander Miller says in *Christian Faith and My Job*, "Many heaven-sent mechanics, born in Christian homes, have been turned into doctors to the public danger because of the false status given to the professions." The personal dangers to a vocational misfit are as great as the dangers to the public. Hence, one must applaud the wisdom of Sancho Panza's wife, Teresa, in *Don Quixote*. Sancho, led on by the Don's fancies, confides to his wife intensely, "If I did not expect to see myself governor of an island before long, I would drop down dead on the spot." Or, as most people say, I will become somebody or die in the attempt! The consequence is often a slow process of psychological self-deterioration brought on by failure, the fear of failure, and the corrosive effect of self-accusation. But Teresa wisely replies, "Nay, then, husband, . . . you came out of your mother's womb without a government, you have lived until now without a government, and when it is God's will you will go, or be carried to your grave without a government. How many there are in the world who live without a government, and continue to live all the same, and are reckoned in the number of the people."

In a day when the public mind gauges one's worth by his vocation, there is psychological and spiritual health in knowing that in God's eyes no vocation is worth more than another. "The best job is the one you have." Or, as Luther also says, "Do not say, 'if I were'; say, 'I am'."

Does this mean that God is utterly indiscriminating when it comes to varieties of work? Calvin answers that in his comment on I Cor. 7:20: "Let no one use this saying to perpetuate modes of life which are plainly impious and immoral." Which means, you do not encourage a bartender, a bricklayer, or a banker to change his job. You simply ask him to take God into it. If there is room, God stays and he then may stay.

Does this mean that God does not call men to specific vocations? It means virtually that. The calling of God is a calling to salvation. It comes to you where you are. The priority, then, is not with the question as to what you should do but with the question as to whether you will admit God into what you are doing. Finding God's will for one's vocational life is like finding His will for anything else. It is plainly difficult, considering the slowness of our spirits, the complexity of life's issues, and the hiddenness of God. The most important thing is not to know God's

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

will but to know that God's will is the most important thing. As the Roman Catholic monk, Thomas Merton, has said in his sensitive way, "Our vocation is not a supernatural lottery but the interaction of two freedoms, God's and ours."

Another redemptive perspective upon vocational crisis is given us in the promise of *deliverance from the moral burden* with which some work ladens us. Nothing so binds us to this world as our work. But the world is a morally ambiguous place, constantly diluting our purest ideals. There are several types of Christian solutions to the world relation, all applicable to our work, but not all adequate. For instance, one may compromise with the world. In this case he will resolve the tension between his standards and the demands of the world by leaving faith out of his worldly work. He will become the economic man, the worldly man. One cannot adopt this solution and still be in the world for *God's* sake.

Or, one may renounce the world. His conflict with the infection of worldly life will be solved by sealing himself off from the infection in some kind of hermetic sanitation. He will do "religious" work; or he will establish colonies for "Christian economics." In doing this, he qualifies as a Christian in the respect that he is not "of the world" but he defaults as a Christian because he is no longer "in the world." A Christian ought not sell out to the world; but neither ought he allow the world to run its course independent of Christian influence. It is obvious that a man may solve his private problem by withdrawing from business or politics, but this kind of monasticism does little to solve the problems of business and politics.

Or, one may attempt a utopian revolution of the world. He will not be a worldly man and he will not be a monk; he will be a martyr. That is, he will demonstrate that he can live in the world of business and politics in open competition with less principled bases of life, endeavoring always to implement the pure ideals of the Christian kingdom. This, of course, sounds like the most heroic and admirable of all the possible positions. It is the "harmless as a dove" strategy, lacking only in the "wise as a serpent" method. Pure ideals in an impure world are precariously brittle. They can be broken in the collision. That, indeed, would be martyrdom. But martyrdom in which the pure ideal is broken by the impure world while the impure world is allowed to move ahead unchanged is socially uncreative. The point about life in the world is not simply to hold high ideals but to change the world. A politician who overplays his high ideals to the defeat of the party may have lost the very implement by which idealism is introduced into society. A businessman who overplays his high ideals may find himself insolvent. Not only is he left without the means for influencing the business world. He is made ironically dependent upon its relief agencies.

Is there a fourth way? Is there an alternative to compromise, monasticism, or martyrdom in one's daily work? There is. One who knows himself as the image of God can know two things about himself: one, that he is designed for work in the

THE CRISIS OF VOCATION

world; the other, that even when he is unacceptable to himself, God accepts him. This kind of self-understanding in one's work is the way of justification by faith. One stays *in* the world, willing to be damned by the world for the glory of God, firmly grasping the implements of the world as devices for turning back the world's evil, even at the risk of being compromised and infected by those very implements. Luther's slogan is the battle cry of this method: "Sin bravely!" One can be courageous about his conflict with the world because, as Luther said in his letter to Melancthon, he can "believe firmly" in the willingness of God to accept even those who are unacceptable. This is not simply a strategy of compromise because it has as its goal the changing of the world. It is obviously not monasticism because it knows it must use the implements of the world in order to effect the change. It is not martyrdom because it knows that most dead men do not move things. One who understands himself as justified by faith, as living by the righteousness of God, knows that it is his obligation to change the world when he can. And when he cannot? He must sin bravely *until* he can change the world and in order to change the world, or until God changes it for him.

Finally, one who understands himself as in the image of God may bring to his work a kind of meaningful life which he ought not expect his work to provide for him. This is what might be called *the internalization of an external necessity*, to adapt a phrase from Erich Fromm. Man is a worker. That is ineradicable. And the nature of work is not always pleasant. It is routine, irksome, and often meaningless. Men who seek their self-vindication in their work, therefore, often starve themselves psychologically and spiritually.

In the present complicated phase of society one cannot always guarantee that work will be meaningful. Nevertheless, Paul's command to the Thessalonian church still holds for us: "If any one will not work, let him not eat." (2 Thess. 3:10) Socially necessary work must proceed even when it is psychologically unrewarding. But then, as Meister Eckhart has said, "Work does not make us holy. Instead, we must make the work holy." This is what the psychologist means by internalizing an external necessity. We must let our duty become our desire, not depending for the meaning of our life upon our work, but letting the meaningful lives *confer* meaning upon our work. Self-realization was not meant to be the result of work. It is the indispensable presupposition of work.

Can you sell that idea to the man who stands at the same machine day in and day out tightening bolts on an automobile chassis? Or even to a school-teacher, about whom Strindberg has said, "Teaching is decidedly harder than standing by a screw or the crane of a machine, and equally monotonous." A man's work is his life, and no man wants to die for eight hours a day. Yet he stands by his machine which raps out its meaninglessness to an iambic rhythm,

Slip turn slip turn
Slip turn slip turn

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

His whole spirit surrenders to the beat of his work, and his life takes on the aspect of a dirge.

O curse the day
That ever I
Was born for this!

But if a dirge, why not a lyric?

She loves me
She loves me not!

Yet lyricism is a form of day-dreaming which merely gives in to one's work or dulls one's senses against its ill effects. It does nothing to transform the moment of work with a meaning that is not implicit in the work. I propose, rather, that the way to transform work with meaning is to let the rhythm of work beat out the meter for a liturgy. Something out of the Psalms, for instance, such as:

The Lord's my shepherd I'll not want
He makes me down to lie. (Scottish Meter)

The principle is sound. T. North Whitehead defends it in the essay "Meaningful Jobs for Whole People:"

In our modern industrial civilization it seems inevitable that most people should be paid workers, and it is of the very first importance that their jobs should be meaningful to them. But I suggest that we shall not get much farther in our thinking if we fix our eyes too narrowly on the job, because what has to be made meaningful is not just the job by itself, but the lives of the workers, both when they are on the job and at all other times. (*Labor's Relation to the Church and Community*, Liston Pope, Editor)

If a man's life is not whole with meaning, there is little his work can do to supply that wholeness. For wholeness of meaning comes when a man understands who he is, the image of God, responsible to His being and the beneficiary of His mercies. *Without* that meaning, the mature demands of our work will only expose the echoing emptiness in our life, or at best, stuff it momentarily with the unacoustical packing of sheer business. *With* that meaning, even the most irksome requirements of work can be transformed into an act of daily worship. The times in which we feel our life diminishing like a talisman can be redeemed by the sense of our affiliation with the only reality which time does not fade.

"Illumined" Liberal Education

RICHARD N. BENDER

Surely it is evident to all who are likely to think seriously upon the question that the Church related college must be first of all a good college. No responsible educational leader representing any major Christian communion would justify academic incompetence in the name of piety. To say that the Church related college must be a good college means that it must be good according to the criteria by which any educational institution must be evaluated: a faculty of first-rate scholars and teachers; adequate library, laboratory, and classroom facilities; a curriculum well-conceived to articulate the goals of the institution; reasonable admission and graduation standards; students of average or better capacity; adequate student personnel and guidance service; administrative competence; financial stability. Yet the Church related college must be more than good by these general criteria.

I

The need for this kind of institution roots in the deepest concerns of our time. Contemporary events are demonstrating the brokenness of society, the destructive power of human sin, and a frustration in personal life which our multiplication of gadgets and creams serves only to underline. Indeed it would seem that the very mind-set and the socio-economic patterns requisite to technological achievement (the value of which none should discount) have intensified the problems of the person and society. Minds and institutions limited to thinking in terms of mathematical formulae, to measuring quantitatively, and to equating verification with experimental method are ill-suited to deal with problems of value, responsibility, purpose, significance, fulfilment, and salvation. The impersonality of urbanization tends more and more to turn persons into units to which such fundamental virtues as integrity, guilelessness, trust, charity, and forbearance seldom have meaning.

To this condition of contemporary culture the Christian faith is relevant. The Christian is bold enough to speak in faith to a scientific age because of the dilemma cited above — the unscientific character of the most deep-lying problems we have to face. This faith is fundamentally a commitment to live in love as children of a Father-God whose own love empowers one so to live. Within this faith a new dimension is added to the quest for wisdom about the meaning of life — the divine-human dimension. Likewise within the faith one is introduced to a whole new quality of category for taking hold of human problems; among these are the categories of sin, repentance, forgiveness, incarnation, grace, redemption.

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THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

The role of the Church related college is to be a scholarly community unique for its central intention to foster an educational program to which the divine-human dimension is indigenous. Here the quest for truth about man and his problems is broadened to include the categories of the Christian faith as well as those of the physical and social sciences.

The Church related college need claim no monopoly on this kind of education. It can and does occur in state and private institutions. The uniqueness of the Church related college will be the extent to which such a goal will be a "central intention" of the entire institution, beginning with the trustees, including the administration, specifically expressed in the professional work of the faculty, and extending to the students as rapidly as they can be incorporated into this kind of community. The state institution by its nature cannot hold such an intention central, and the private institution which has no working relationship to any body of the Christian faith is unlikely to do so consistently. They have their essential contributions to make to the needs of our culture and so, also, does the Church related college.

The term "Christian education" is a slippery one, and for this reason I hesitate to use it to describe the role of the Church related college. I can come more precisely to what I am attempting to say by following E. Harris Harbison in speaking of liberal education which is "illuminated" by Christian insight. Certainly the educational program of the Church related college must be liberal in the sense that it is "free, broadminded, catholic, sensitive to new facts and open to new truths."¹ Illumination comes through openness to the divine-human dimension of the task and through appropriation of the categories of the Faith to questions for which they are relevant.

There is no one "program" nor should there ever be. Each college must determine the content of its own program in light of its own tradition, constituency, and nature under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. Yet enough honest searching and experimentation have gone on already to make it possible to state in broad outline some characteristics of liberal education illuminated by the Christian faith:

1. Careful and scholarly study of the Judaeo-Christian religion, centering upon the Bible and indicating the influence of this religious heritage upon Western culture.
2. A faculty-wide concern to bring students face to face with the persistent questions of life and death and purpose to which the great religions speak.
3. Abandonment of the artificial pose of professorial neutrality on questions which by their very nature demand involvement and decision.
4. Creation of an on-going, campus-wide conversation regarding the relevance of the Christian faith to the questions with which, by its very nature, the academic community must come to grips.

¹E. Harris Harbison, "Liberal Education and Christian Education," in *The Christian Idea of Education*, ed. Edmund Fuller. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957, pp. 61-62.

"ILLUMINED" LIBERAL EDUCATION

5. Cultivation of aesthetic sensitivity and major attention to the arts and their capacity to communicate levels of insight not available to verbal symbols.
6. A regular experience of college-wide worship in which administrator, teacher, and student feel themselves indeed called of God to the work of the scholar.
7. Opportunities for significant Christian social action which will entail the appropriation of the knowledge and skills found in the college to real personal and social problems.²
8. A quality of recreational and social life which is at once consistent in motivation with the nature of the institution and satisfying to the entire person.

Two characteristics indispensable to a college in which such an educational program is to succeed are rather unique in the educational world. One of these is a willingness to experiment in the development of new kinds of courses which often obliterate old departmental lines and lead to a continuing conversation regarding common problems. Another is a sense of the sacramental nature of scholarship dramatized by the corporate worship life.

What is being described here is almost unavoidably a liberal arts education. There will be some few local sets of circumstances justifying a more technical or vocational type of education, but the major contribution of Church related education will be through liberal arts. Within this framework the three classical divisions — science, social science, humanities — all will have their rightful places. Impoverishment in any of these areas will leave the graduate less able to live in the modern world.

Any liberal arts education undertakes to pass beyond mere transfer of information to understanding. It may be held with considerable foundation that an alliance with a community of faith is most directly in the interest of such an objective.³

II

The Church relationship of this kind of college is essential to its purpose and a clue to its uniqueness, not a fact for embarrassed apology. Understanding the significance of their relationship depends upon adequate understanding of the Church.

The Church is the necessary community of those who have been captivated by the love of God. It is fundamentally a community of commitment, expressing its common life in corporate worship, in Christian nurture, and in co-operative

²For instance, cf. the program in Community Dynamics at Earlham College under the direction of William W. Biddle.

³To pursue this contention through its various ramifications would carry us far away from the central focus of the present discussion. What is being suggested has to do with the *conceptional* nature of all "facts" and with the importance of *involvement* both in the critical judgment of factual allegations and in the measurement of their relevance to values. Both conceptionalization and involvement may be facilitated by participation in a community of faith, even though the emerging "understanding" be in need of continual critical re-examination.

Christian action. It is tangible evidence of the social interdependence of persons even for the fulfilment of their highest ideals. It is evidence also that the love of God must express itself in and through human community. Only through permissive, forgiving, self-sacrificing fellowship of the loved is the love of God first known. The Church is called to be the "beloved community" through which personal and cultural reconciliation with God may be accomplished.

If the Church is to be this kind of fact in experience, organizational structure and division of responsibility are necessary. Because the Church is a human community every specific example of it falls far short of the ideal to which it aspires. Every organized church must be clearly distinguished from the spiritual Church. The specific college falls far short, also, of the ideal of "a community of masters and scholars in quest of knowledge." Yet to understand the Church and the college and the unique relationship upon which they have entered, each must be seen against the perspective of what at its best it aspires to be.

The kind of college I have been describing above must be sustained by the fellowship, the prayers, and the service of the Christian Church. No educational institution can exist in a vacuum. Its existence is made possible by a productive alliance with a community of common concern. The alliance with the Church is the tangible tie to an existent community which is willing and able to sustain the life of the college. The Christian Church is the only contemporary community whose own purposes and resources are capable of systematic support for an educational program "to which the divine-human dimension is indigenous."

There is another side to the coin. The Church desperately needs the college. When the Church has been at its worst was when it had lost the capacity to accept criticism from within and from without. By training, a devoted community of free Christian scholars can maintain the capacity for constructive self-criticism better than any other group within the Church.

Another and perhaps even more essential need for which the Church must depend on the college is the need for cultural leadership at once skilled and devout. If the Church takes seriously its role as mediator of the love of God to a culture seeking to recover meaning and direction, this kind of leadership is indispensable. The late Justice Robert Jackson observed in his final summation as chief prosecutor of the Nuremberg War Crimes trials, "The most serious crimes against civilization can be committed only by educated and technically competent people." Conversely, even the highest motives will be frustrated without technical competence. The Church related college is a major instrument through which Christian commitment is linked to trained and disciplined abilities.

The Church related college is sustained and made relevant through its alliance with the Christian Church. It renders to the Church those services that only a scholarly community can provide. Its essential contribution to the higher educa-

"ILLUMINED" LIBERAL EDUCATION

tional world stems from its central intention to demonstrate the relevance of the divine-human dimension to the educational task.

III

Fulfillment of the role of the Church related college in contemporary culture is dependent upon the entire community of which it is composed: the supporting Church, the board of trustees, the administration, the faculty, the student body, the alumni and general constituency. Since the central task of the college is education, the professional work of the faculty is the focal point through which the goals of the institution find concrete expression. The development of the kind of educational program I have described as central to the nature of the Church related college is certainly a faculty responsibility.

The goal must be a faculty of unusual erudition. It is seldom possible for the average small Church related college to enlist more than a few scholars who already possess such qualifications. It is possible however for a group of competent teachers who share a vision of what their institution might be to become such an unusual faculty. This could only occur as a result of co-operative, persistent effort on the part of both administration and faculty.

It is clear that the large majority of faculty members in the Church related college should be Christian. It is otherwise meaningless to speak of a community of scholars who regard the Christian categories as relevant. Elsewhere, I have developed in some detail what I mean by the term "Christian Professor."⁴ For me this does not involve precommitment to one body of propositions as against all others. Rather it has to do with a commitment to live in love in responsible community with a sense of divine vocation in teaching, with being nurtured in the brotherhood of the Christian Church, with concern for integrity as scholar and as Christian, and with witness to the faith within the common task.

The Christian teacher does not claim access to special data for scholarly research. He need not (I would say *cannot*) speak of "Christian knowledge," "Christian physics," "Christian literature," or "Christian psychology." He does not claim exemption from the dilemmas which arise within the complexities of personal and social life. What he does believe is that the fundamental need of himself and of all men is for a new relationship to God in Christ. He believes that this relationship casts new horizons around the entire intellectual enterprise and that it has metaphysical, epistemological, and valuational entailments. He believes that the reality of God in human experience introduces a new and relevant variable into every social situation and a new motivational factor into all personal behavior. He believes that history portrays the participation of God in human affairs sometimes in the birth of a babe called to a special service, sometimes in the fires of

⁴Cf. Richard N. Bender, "On Being a Christian Professor," *The Christian Scholar*, June 1957, pp. 117-125.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

judgment. He believes these matters in freedom and in conviction that the weight of the evidence is on their side.

There should be no question regarding intellectual freedom in the Church related college. Without such freedom there is no scholarship, nor personality.

The primary roots of man's need for intellectual freedom lie in the fundamental fact that he actually is free — as observer, inquirer, critic of his environment and of himself. . . . The demand for intellectual freedom, therefore, is not merely a demand that strong human impulses shall attain satisfaction. It is even more fundamentally a demand that artificial restraint of one sort or another shall not be permitted to contradict the primary reality of human existence.⁵

The recruitment of the faculty for a Church related college is of fundamental importance. Many problems regarding intellectual freedom will be avoided if faculty recruitment is well handled. Often discussions of this topic seem to presuppose that for every faculty vacancy there is a sizable number of equally qualified applicants and that the principal problem is to select from this group those who are "Christians." Nothing could be more unrealistic. The fact is that often there are no applicants, and none who might reasonably be approached have given much if any thought to what it means to be a Christian professor. Unfortunately, academic qualification is not always accompanied by a well-developed Christian commitment. There is no basis on which one could justify the selection of a genuinely pious but incompetent chemist to head a chemistry department. Sometimes it is possible to enlist a competent scholar who is also in the finest sense a Christian. Fortunate is the college that can identify and attract its fair share of such teachers. Nevertheless the faculty recruitment policy must take account of the realistic necessity of accepting a large proportion of teachers who are at best only casually Christian if at all.

When negotiations with a potential member of the faculty are under way, the unique nature of the Church related college should be a major topic of discussion. This presupposes that the college community has clearly defined its own nature and articulated its goals and that these are important in the development of the educational program. As a minimum, an invitation to join such a faculty should be extended only on assurance that the candidate believes in this kind of education, that its goals are valid, and that to teach in such an institution would be an opportunity to do the kind of teaching he most wants to do.

In the absence of such minimal assurance of compatibility, it often would be preferable to bear the inconvenience of leaving a post unfilled for a year or more. Even in situations where employment of an instructor is imperative, only temporary

⁵Robert Calhoun, "The Historical Relation between Religion and Intellectual Freedom," in *Religion and Freedom of Thought*. New York: Doubleday and Co., 1954, p. 26.

"ILLUMINED" LIBERAL EDUCATION

arrangements should be made until someone likely to be a constructive part of the Christian community may be found.

On the teacher's part, he cannot with integrity accept an invitation to teach in such an institution if he holds serious reservations when the minimal points suggested above are faced. The very fact that one chooses to teach in a Church related college should be an expression of freedom and responsibility.

Granting that the faculty must be predominantly staffed by Christian professors, does this mean there is no place for a member of another faith or an agnostic? My own conviction is that there are many serious liabilities entailed by any attempt to enlist *only* Christian professors. For one thing there is no accurate way to decide in the process of selecting a faculty just who is a Christian and who is not. This can so easily become a denial of intellectual freedom or a magnification of sectarian trivia. It is more effective to attempt to arrive at a feeling of mutuality and common appreciation of the Church related college with the candidate. For the most part the nature of this kind of education and what it entails for the professor will help both the college and the candidate to understand whether or not he belongs. Additionally there is the fact that some professors who in all honesty cannot regard themselves as Christians could still appreciate the Church related college and its goals and make constructive contributions to it.

Quite obviously this will necessitate bringing all candidates to the campus and allowing them to meet and converse with administrators and potential colleagues. While such procedure is expensive in time and money, there is no better investment for the Church related college which takes seriously its educational role.

When once the new member of the faculty has begun his teaching duties, he must be assimilated into the college community. This means far more than getting his family involved in Church and the social life of the town, important as these may be. Basically it means helping him to become oriented to the college and its goals, to share in its intellectual and spiritual fellowship, and to be encouraged to make his own contribution to the growth of this community. The orientation and assimilation of new faculty members are worthy of much time and effort. Of great importance is the informal give and take of conversation that escapes banality and centers upon real concerns of serious educators. Roland Frye has written with keen insight:

We cannot assume that our customary emphasis on "good teaching" alone will accomplish this result when, as is often the case, we overburden teachers to the point where they become pedants as surely and as swiftly as do the myopically productive scholars. We must seek means not only to train but to sustain faculties which are made up of men of thought, men of humane wisdom, not mere counters, measurers, and diligent graders, but men concerned with significance, men who are assessors of life. There

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

must be constructive leisure with a premium on contemplation, on good talk and on good art, all of which are so often ignored in our culture.⁶

This "contemplation" should include much attention to basic assumptions upon which contemporary culture is built and to the value commitments which help to determine personal and social action. Such a faculty should seek some sophistication regarding the Judaeo-Christian religious heritage and major contemporary theological thought. The faculty in the Church related college cannot legitimately segregate itself from the faculty Christian movement, both because of what the movement can do for a faculty and because of what such a faculty can give to the movement.

In addition to "good talk" much can be accomplished in well-planned faculty retreats and seminars in which the articulation of the educational goals of the institution is the point of focus. Many new teachers who begin with only a minimal acceptance of the validity of Church related education can be led to new insights through interaction with a Christian faculty community. This is the Church functioning at its best in the educational context.

The only proper rein upon intellectual freedom is scholarly responsibility. No really mature scholar thinks of himself as performing in splendid isolation. He understands that he is engaged in a community enterprise of education; that this community has a nature and goals to which he has given at least tentative approval by his presence; that if these goals need changing, this is a function of the community itself in which the professor participates constructively and by which he grows; that he has not confirmed his own freedom until he contributes through his devotion as scholar and teacher to the fulfilment of the common enterprise.

In the Church related college whose educational program is in the hands of free and responsible scholars there should be no closed questions. To live in the creative tension between faith and the critical spirit is the calling of the Church related college. Only then can the Faith be refined and scholarship illumined.

Of such, I believe, is the role and the responsibility of the Church related college in contemporary culture. That the legitimate goals of this kind of college are directly relevant to the deepest needs of our era is increasingly clear. If the task seems staggering, close to impossible, that is a hopeful sign. Small vision and small plans deserve only small success. If the church related college can envision a strategic contribution to contemporary life and can demonstrate its capacity to fill such a role, it will find unprecedented support and a nearly unlimited opportunity to shape the future of our common life.

⁶Roland M. Frye, "The Church College and Humane Learning," *The Christian Scholar*, June 1957, pp. 98-99.

Segregated Fraternities in Our Colleges

JOSEPH MARTIN HOPKINS

A glaring paradox on the current educational scene is the segregated fraternity on the otherwise integrated campus. At many institutions Negroes, Jews, and Orientals are admitted freely to all other phases of college life but are denied membership in the Greek-letter social organizations. Ironically, a majority of undergraduates would gladly open their doors to these minorities but are prevented from doing so by alumni-dominated national hierarchies which are determined to preserve their outmoded tradition of racial snobbery in defiance of the integration trend.

A growing number of racially integrated colleges and universities, recognizing the inconsistency of permitting campus social groups to frustrate their avowed policy of non-discrimination, have insisted that these organizations eliminate criteria of race, color, and creed from their membership requirements. The list of educational institutions which have taken such action is impressive: Amherst, Colorado, Columbia, Dartmouth, Middlebury, Minnesota, Vermont, Wisconsin, and the State University of New York, among others. But Church related colleges are conspicuously absent from this list. The denominational schools, committed to the Christian ideal of true fraternity, might logically have been expected to blaze the integration trail. But not only have they failed to pioneer, they have neglected to follow the leadership of the so-called "secular" institutions.

Is it possible that the consciences of state and privately controlled institutions of higher learning are more tender at this point than those of the purportedly Christian variety? Why this reluctance on the part of Church college administrations to provide equality of opportunity for all their students? They cannot argue that it is contrary to policy for them to interfere in the private lives of their students; for they *do* interfere in the areas of drinking, gambling, and sexual immorality. To assert control in these instances but to deny responsibility for racial prejudice — is this to assume that the former evils are more reprehensible than the latter?

It has been argued that tax-supported universities, since they derive the burden of their income from the state, are under legal compulsion to guarantee equal privileges to all students without discrimination. Those defending the inaction of Church colleges contend that anti-discrimination rulings by state university officials have stemmed from political rather than moral motivation. Which is tantamount to saying that Christian imperatives are less binding than those of the state! But it is hardly fair to impute false motives to these officials, many of whom have acted courageously and conscientiously in the face of severe criticism. When the State

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THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

University of New York outlawed national fraternities in 1953, after vain efforts to counter evasion and subterfuge by national groups making a pretense of conformity, President William S. Carlson justified this measure in these words:

It would be sophistry for the State University to vigorously combat discrimination in its admissions and academic policies and, at the same time, condone these practices among the extra-curricular organizations which it recognizes. The extra-curricular and the academic programs intertwine to such a degree in educating and molding a student that they cannot be severed and each judged by contradictory standards.

With regard to the private colleges and universities which have joined tax-supported institutions on the fraternity integration front, it has been cynically observed that many of these organizations, being heavily endowed, can afford to be more independent in their pronouncements than most denominational schools. The latter, harassed by financial difficulties, must at all costs maintain the good will — and the annual gifts! — of their more affluent alumni, many of whom are diehard fraternity men. The president of a Christian college, it is thus rationalized, wouldn't dare speak forth boldly as did President John Sloan Dickey of Dartmouth in 1948:

This college neither teaches nor practices religious or racial prejudice, and I do not believe that it can for long permit certain national fraternities through their charter provisions or national policies to impose prejudice on Dartmouth men.

Many college administrators, preferring the course of expediency to that of ethics, either remain discreetly silent on the issue or mincingly declare that the fraternities are autonomous with respect to their membership practices. The principle of Christian brotherhood, apparently, is expendable in the interest of harmonious student and alumni relationships.

But some educators, while favoring integration, are not convinced that administrative fiat is the best way to secure it. Brown's position, as delineated in an article by Vincent Heath Whitney, is illustrative of this view:

Discrimination can no more be justified in the University than in any other aspect of American life. The trend of the times is in an opposite direction and barriers to full participation of minority groups are falling one by one. The University will not set deadlines which will attempt to legislate the degree of liberality of its students but it will strongly encourage every fraternity to be "urgent but patient," to take every possible step to alter and to end selective barriers in national constitutions through legal means within the framework of the organization.

This plan of operation looks good on paper; but experience has shown that when reform is left up to the fraternities themselves discriminatory practices usually

SEGREGATED FRATERNITIES IN OUR COLLEGES

remain in force. Alfred McClung Lee, in his penetrating report *Fraternities Without Brotherhood*¹, concluded that

Only where college administrators support the regulation of fraternities can students translate their beliefs into campus-wide accomplishment. Regardless of student interest and activity, effective decisions concerning campus policy rest — by action or default — with the academic administration and ultimately with the board of trustees.

That students, if given ample authority, would eliminate bias practices is indicated by the Elmo Roper 1949 poll of college students, which disclosed that 60 per cent were opposed to any rejection based on artificial criteria of race, color, or religion and that only 20 per cent favored present discriminatory restrictions. The remaining 20 per cent expressed approval of a quota system, limiting minority-group membership to 10 per cent. Commenting on his findings, Mr. Roper explained:

We found that men students felt slightly stronger about this than did women students. And we also found that students in the Far West had a more liberal attitude than students in any other part of the country. But, significantly, there wasn't a single section of the country, including the South, where a majority of students wanted fraternities restricted.

Lee's investigation of the nation's 125 leading fraternity colleges (those having 12 or more fraternity chapters) led him to observe that college administrations generally have been reluctant to take action even when requested to do so by students. At Michigan, for example, the administration vetoed a student-faculty resolution requesting a deadline for removal of discriminatory barriers. At Westminster College (New Wilmington, Pennsylvania) a petition signed by 33 campus leaders (including 9 of the 10 fraternity and sorority presidents) and endorsed unanimously by both the faculty and the student council invited the trustees to co-operate with students and faculty in studying the problem of Greek-letter discrimination. The petition was denied.

It is naive to suppose that the national fraternities, if given enough time, will accomplish self-integration. The optimistic picture suggested by the caption of an article in *U.S. News and World Report*, "Now It's 'Integration' on Fraternity Row" (November 9, 1956), is misleading. It is true that only 10 of the 61 national fraternities comprising the National Interfraternity Conference and 1 of the 32 sorority affiliates of the National Pan-Hellenic Conference have retained restrictive clauses in their constitutions. But repeated experiences have indicated that this outward conformity is in most cases sheer hypocrisy. Even the *U.S. News* article admits that only 40 or 50 Negroes have been integrated into formerly all-white fraternities. According to Lee, although discrimination "has disappeared from formal documents, Aryanism has not died out; in most cases it is very much alive even though underground."

¹Boston: Beacon Press, 1955.

Many nationals, while outwardly modifying their membership criteria under duress from college and university administrations, are perpetuating snobbishness and bias through unwritten tacit agreements. This statement by an undergraduate at the University of Missouri is a case in point: "No by-law of our fraternity prohibits our admitting specific persons, but precedent does; and precedent says that we don't admit a Chinese, Jew, or Negro."

But although a number of fraternities have made overt concessions while secretly continuing discriminatory practices, the National Interfraternity Conference has maintained an attitude of open defiance. In its July, 1954, meeting, the executive committee of the NIC condemned interference by college administrations and adopted unanimously a resolution which stated in part that "more unified action, such as the withdrawal of all charters at an institution, may be necessary or desirable as a means of self-preservation." By 1954, according to the American Civil Liberties Union, 40 chapters had been suspended or withdrawn by their national organizations. Since that year others have been dropped, the most recent (September, 1957) being the Amherst chapter of Theta Xi — the fourth fraternity chapter at that institution to be suspended by national officers following the pledging of a Negro.

Efforts of individual chapters to alter national policy are in most cases discouraging, if not altogether futile. In 1954 the Westminster College chapter of Alpha Sigma Phi instructed its delegate to the national convention to campaign for the elimination of the fraternity's restrictive clause. The motion for integration was snowed under by a 51-3 vote. In 1956 the Alpha Nu chapter again petitioned the national for change; but again the integrationists could muster only 3 votes. The following spring an official from national headquarters, during a routine visit, announced expansion plans calling for the formation of a number of new chapters on southern campuses. The implications of this announcement were unmistakable. A fraternity officer during undergraduate days and faculty adviser during recent years, I tendered my resignation to the executive secretary, explaining, "I personally am not content to sit idly by while present and future generations of minority-group students continue to suffer discrimination at the hands of a vestigial racism imposed upon our students by off-campus 'fraternal' organizations."

It is clear, then, that national fraternities generally are in no mood to abandon their tradition of snobbish exclusionism. Reform efforts by individual chapters have been thwarted, and acts of defiance have resulted in prompt expulsion. But whereas a number of chapters have surrendered their charters rather than knuckle under to national discriminatory demands, many more, while sympathetic with integration, have hesitated to go this far. Some find their hands tied by house mortgages which are held by the national office. Others simply feel that the severing of national ties would result in loss of campus prestige, and that the continuing "local" would be seriously handicapped in competing for pledges against big-name national fraternities which have not paid the price of conscience.

SEGREGATED FRATERNITIES IN OUR COLLEGES

These groups need encouragement more than criticism. It would be unnecessary for any individual sorority or fraternity chapter to "go it alone" if students and administration would agree upon campus-wide removal of exclusive practices. When Christian college administrators realize how un-Christian is the anomaly that Jesus Christ Himself, being a Jew, would be ineligible for membership in the white "Christian" fraternities, then perhaps they will act. The question resolves itself to this: upon whom does the responsibility for effecting decisions governing educational policy and student conduct ultimately devolve — the college administration or the transient undergraduate fraternity men?

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ARTICLES

William Ernest Hocking, **Fact, Field and Destiny: The Inductive Element in Metaphysics.**

James F. Anderson, **Some Disputed Questions on our Knowledge of Being.**

James O. Nelson, **Knowledge of Remote Existence.**

Clive Ingram-Pearson, **Our Knowledge of Things in Themselves.**

CRITICAL STUDIES

A. Boyce Gibson, **Plato and After.**

H. S. Harris, **Hegelianism of the 'Right' and 'Left'.**

John Wild, **Weiss's Four-Fold Universe.**

David L. Miller, **Sinnott's Philosophy of Purpose.**

David Braybrooke, **The Expanding Universe of Political Philosophy.**

EXPLORATION

Andrew J. Reck, **The Philosophy of Andrew Ushenko: II.**

BOOKS RECEIVED

Robert Tredwell and Staff, **Summaries and Comments.**

ANNOUNCEMENTS

INDEX

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Religion as a Goad to Philosophy

ALBUREY CASTELL

I

During the last quarter-century or so there has been a marked increase in undergraduate interest in the things of religion. This is in part an intellectual interest, a desire to know more about religion, a desire to overcome "religious illiteracy." Courses, programs, departments have blossomed where none grew before. Back in the twenties the undergraduate attitude toward the things of religion ranged from indifference to hostility. Today it does not. It ranges from respectful curiosity to genuine concern. It used to be considered smart to have an attitude toward the things of religion which was compounded of Lucretius and Lucian and Hume and Voltaire and Anatole France and Freud. Today it is not. It used to be considered that only the weak students planned their undergraduate work with a view to proceeding to seminary. Today this is no longer the case.

I do not know what has brought about this change. But I do know that it enables a department of philosophy to offer a course in the philosophy of religion and expect the course to pay its way. To the degree that an undergraduate's interest in philosophy is parasitic upon his interest in something else, you have a situation which departments of philosophy do well to explore. They want philosophy to play a wide role in the life of the college. Now philosophy makes it most effective contact by way of those matters upon which its customers have deep and lively concern. You cannot secure a hearing for philosophy of science or philosophy of art among students who profess indifference or hostility to science or art. It is sometimes said that they must first know some science or some art; and indeed they must. But it goes further than that. They must feel genuine concern. Given just knowledge of a certain matter to work with, the attempt to get people to think philosophically about that matter may die on the vine. The reason, I suppose, is to be found partly in the fact that when you invite a student to think philosophically, you invite him to do something which he finds to be difficult and confusing. He finds it so because it confronts him with ideas which are abstract and general. If he has no deep and lively concern to start with, he has given no hostages to fortune. You may find him cancelling out or memorizing your notes or wondering why he ever took the course in the first place. Your efforts to interest him in philosophy have begun to encounter failure. This is what I meant when I said that an undergraduate's interest in philosophy is frequently parasitic upon his interest in something else.

Most people need to be "goaded" into philosophy, even after they have enrolled for a course. A department therefore wants to know what "goads" it has at its disposal. Science is one such goad: we speak readily enough of "the philosophy of science." But there are others. In the sense in which science can be a "goad to philosophy," one can speak also of morals, politics, history, art, education, as

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goads to philosophy. You can add religion to this list. From involvement in these areas of human concern a man can find himself goaded into philosophical conversation with himself or with another person similarly circumstanced. Among the goads to philosophy it seems to me that science and religion and morals have been the most potent. To the degree that a person is goaded into philosophy by involvement in these matters, you have to say that his interest in philosophy is parasitic upon his interest in them.

When I was an undergraduate the phrase "philosophy of," in such phrases as "philosophy of science" or "philosophy of art," did not occur in our studies and conversations. We spoke of the philosophy of Plato or the philosophy of Kant but rarely of the "philosophy of" some particular field of human interest or activity. We spoke of metaphysics and epistemology, of logic, ethics, and aesthetics, but these were thought to have subject-matters of their own. We spoke of "types" of philosophy, e.g., materialism, idealism, realism, pragmatism, and these "isms" were sometimes thought to carry possible commitments with respect to such matters as science or art or religion, but they were not thought of as "philosophies of" such matters. The phrase, "philosophy of," has in recent years become more modish. For a time I regarded it with suspicion. It seemed to me a way of raiding philosophy on the part of persons who were not "really" philosophers or who had not come up the hard way — a species of academic gate-crashing. But experience is inclining me to believe that while this is sometimes so, it is not always so. The term is loosely used upon occasion, as when one speaks of the "philosophy of" something which seems not strong enough, not vital enough, not autonomous enough, to sustain its own "philosophy of." But this loose usage is not necessary. There are matters which can generate and sustain "philosophies of" themselves; I have mentioned science, morals, history, education, law, art. Religion is also a case in point. I am convinced that it makes sense to speak of the "philosophy of" religion.

II

Whatever we may decide the task of philosophy of religion to be, I would like to suggest four things which it is not.

(1) Its task is not to propound or teach religion. This is not an exhortation to indifference but to neutrality. Its task is not to make converts in the sense of converting people to religion. Its task is certainly to make converts in the sense of converts to philosophy. But I do not think that a *convert* to philosophy of religion is therefore a *divert* from religion any more than a convert to philosophy of science or art is therefore a *divert* from science or art. I see no reason that conversion to "philosophy of" something must mean disenchantment with regard to that something. I would like to make sure that we understand each other on this point. The task of philosophy of religion is not to teach religion. In the sense in which I am accustomed to use the word "teach," I doubt that you can teach religion. To be sure, you can teach *about* religion, but that is not the same thing as teaching religion.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

To teach a person about religion is to liquidate his ignorance about religion. In this enterprise philosophy can lend a hand.

(2) The task of philosophy of religion is not to "debunk" religion, not to disillusion with regard to religion. I do not mean that it should make no difference in the way a man holds to his religion. I think that philosophy of science and philosophy of art make a difference in the way a man holds to science or art. But I have seen no reason, in their cases, to diagnose this difference as disillusionment. I think we have here one mark of a subject able to generate and sustain a "philosophy of" itself: namely, that to think philosophically about it shall not mean to think less of it.

(3) Philosophy of religion should not be confused with history of religion nor with the comparative study of religion. It may be that some knowledge of the history of religion or some knowledge of different religions is useful to philosophy of religion. On this point my mind is not made up. It may be that knowing one religion well, in the sense of believing in it and living by it, is more useful to philosophy of religion. If the essence of religion is contained only in its historical development or manifested only in its numerical diversities, then historical and comparative knowledge is essential to philosophy of religion; but essential or not, it should not be confused with philosophy of religion.

(4) The task of philosophy of religion is not to exhibit the "place" of religion in some so-called philosophical position. The sort of thing I am seeking to rule out is most easily exemplified in the case of metaphysical idealism. Frequently when I read what metaphysical idealists write about religion, I feel that their primary concern is to show the "place" of religion in their "philosophy," to show where and how they "fit it in" alongside other matters such as science or art. This seems to me to get the cart before the horse. I don't think the job is to have a "philosophy" and then to see where religion "fits into it." You want to discover what philosophy there is in religion. To get at the philosophy of religion is to get at something which is already in religion. You may have here one mark of a subject able to generate and sustain a "philosophy of" itself, namely its autonomy — it is not a "part of," not "dependent on" or "derived from" anything else. It is its own man. Science and art seem to me to possess this kind of autonomy. To ask "What has materialism to say about science?" or "What has idealism to say about art?" seems to me to be no more sensible than to ask what these "isms" have to say about religion.

III

To get at the philosophy of religion is to get at something which is already in religion. What does that mean? What is a person trying to do when he is working out his "philosophy of" a certain matter, say science or art or education or history or religion? I would suggest at least three lines of inquiry which are being attempted: (1) you are trying to diagnose which concepts are basic in your thinking and doing; (2) you are trying to diagnose what first principles are active in your

RELIGION AS A GOAD TO PHILOSOPHY

thinking and doing; (3) you are trying to diagnose what presuppositions are ultimate in your thinking and doing.

What concepts are basic in science, in art, in education, in history? This question sets the problem for the philosophy of those matters. (I use the word "concept" in the sense of "grasper." It is derived from a Latin word meaning grasp or seize.) What do these basic concepts enable you to grasp? Do these concepts form an implicative set or are some independent of others? What principles are active in the selecting and rejecting which goes on when you are "sciening" or "arting" or "historizing" or "educating?" Principles are active when we discriminate and evaluate. When you are carrying on as a scientist or artist or historian or pedagogue, what principles guide you? Is there one principle and a set of derivatives? Or more than one principle? If the latter, how do they get on together when there is trouble in the family? A principle is not the same as a presupposition. The distinction could be illustrated by these two questions: (1) On what principle do you distinguish between right and wrong? (2) When you criticize a person for wrongdoing, do you presuppose that he could have done otherwise? It is one thing to speak of the principles of, say, scientific thinking, and another to speak of the presuppositions of scientific thinking.

When you speak of the "philosophy of" something, you mean the concepts, principles, and presuppositions connected with that thing. It is in this sense I would speak of the philosophy of science or art or history or education. And in this same sense I would speak of the philosophy of religion. If a man says "I am a Christian," it makes sense to ask him, "What *qua* Christian are your basic concepts? What principles guide your thinking and acting *qua* Christian? What presuppositions do you find it necessary to make *qua* Christian?" The kinds of self-knowledge which you are asking him about constitute his "sophia." And provided his heart is in his work, he will cherish his concepts and principles and presuppositions. There will be an element of "passionate concern" in his thinking about him. The "passionate concern" which I discover in myself *qua* pedagogue carries over to the concepts and principles and presuppositions which I seek to formulate when you ask me for my "philosophy of education." I would expect to encounter this note of "passionate concern" in a man's "philosophy of religion." The word "philosophy" is derived from two Greek words, one of which means "passionate concern."

I have made this detour into the term "philosophy of" because I desire to make clear what in my judgment philosophy of religion invites a student to try his hand at. The course says to him "You are familiar with religion or familiar with a religion. Perhaps you are more than familiar. Perhaps you believe in it and live by it. Perhaps it is for you an object of passionate concern. Now, extend and deepen your self-knowledge in this matter. What are your basic concepts here? What principles guide your thinking and acting when you live out your religion? What presuppositions do you find it necessary to make in the name of your religion?"

IV

It is important to bear in mind that this invitation to philosophize is issued to the typical sophomore or junior in an American undergraduate college. He is not Saint Augustine or Saint Thomas or Pascal or Kierkegaard. He is not a candidate for a doctor's degree. He is not headed for graduate work in a seminary. He is not going to write articles for the journals. He is, largely by accident of birth, a Jew, a Catholic, or a Protestant. He is a major in history or psychology or sociology or speech or English or political science or some other department in the college. Or he may be a "pre-professional," planning to go into law or education or medicine or business administration or some other professional school in the university. He may have had no preparatory work in your department and he may take no follow-up courses in your department. All you know about him is that he has seen fit to enroll in your course. You have him on your hands for a quarter or a semester. You have designs upon him. You propose to get him to think about religion, or his religion, with reference to its concepts, its principles, and its presuppositions. Your problem is not religious or philosophical as you get under way. It is primarily pedagogical: how shall you capitalize on his interest in religion to goad him into philosophizing about religion?

You want to get him to extend and deepen his self-knowledge in certain directions. I would mention one or two things which I would not do. I would avoid dealing with the situation "head on." Thus I would not say: "We are to be interested in concepts, principles, and presuppositions. Now what is a concept? And what are your concepts in religion?" With luck you might talk that way at the end of the course; but you do not touch off a person's ability to ferret out his concepts, principles, and presuppositions by telling him to go ahead and do just that. Nor will he fare much better if you cause him to learn the answers to these questions propounded by great thinkers in the past. You may thereby increase his erudition, but it is by no means as sure that you have deepened and extended his self-knowledge. If at the end of your encounter he does not know his own mind any better than when you began but does know the minds of authors you tell him about or have him read, you have flunked the course even though he gets an "A." Be sparing then with your erudition. I would say the same of your powers of dialectical criticism, whether you exercise these upon your hapless student or upon distinguished writers in the field. You are not trying to impress him. You are trying to get him to know himself better in a certain way. Bear in mind that he is new territory to himself. Avoid using words that end in *ism*, such terms as empiricism, rationalism, mysticism, pragmatism, idealism, positivism, nominalism, realism. For you these may be tonic, for him they are toxic. They produce a subtle poison which misleads him into thinking he has extended his self-knowledge when all he has done is add to his academic vocabulary.

You want topics and materials which will keep his mind on religion, indeed on his religion, but in a way that will move him in the direction you have marked out

RELIGION AS A GOAD TO PHILOSOPHY

for him, namely, a clearer understanding of his concepts, his principles, his pre-suppositions. I am going to suggest three topics, three areas of conversation, lecturing, and reading which I have found useful: (1) religious experience; (2) theological belief; (3) ecclesiastical organization. These topics are usable pedagogical wedges. They open things up for self-examination. They lead eventually to scrutiny at the level of primary concepts, first principles, and absolute pre-suppositions.

V

What does your student understand by "religious experience?" Has he ever had an experience which he would designate as a religious experience? What is the content of religious experience? Does he agree with Dean Inge that the primary evidence for the truth of religion is religious experience? Does he find any use for Martin Buber's distinction between religious experience and experience of religion? What can you learn from religious experience? What can you verify by an appeal to religious experience? Does he think that the distinction between veridical and illusory, which applies to so much of our experience, applies also to religious experience? Does he think that other people have experiences which he would designate as religious? How does religious experience differ from other kinds of experience? What in his judgment is the relation between religious experience and theological belief? Does he base his theological beliefs upon his religious experience? Or does he think that his theological beliefs "condition" in some way his religious experience?

I would confront him with two or three of the mystics, e.g., Plotinus, John of the Cross, Teresa, perhaps an oriental. Is that what he means by religious experience? Would he limit it to that? I would have him supplement his reading here with commentary by William James or W. E. Hocking or Professor Stace. I think religious experience is a good first topic because undergraduates are great believers in experience. They are natural born empiricists. They have greater initial interest in religious experience than they have in either theological belief or ecclesiastical organization. I think the mystics are a good first assignment because for most undergraduates they are new and fresh and intriguing and compelling. Undergraduates are predisposed to give them a hearing, to show them greater initial respect and friendliness than they feel toward theologians. I find them inclined to believe that God had more of a hand in the experiences of the mystics than in the reasonings of the theologians or the decision-makings of the ecclesiastics.

I would move from religious experience to theological belief. I would begin with the questions, "What makes a notion theological?" and "What theological notions can the student mention?" I think he should be confronted with a considerable number and variety of theological terms. He does not possess many. They will add depth and range to his feeling for the topic under discussion. Such terms as creation, sin, incarnation, miracle, trinity, eternal, immortal, revelation, prayer, and redemption are already known to him. Add another dozen or so. Does each involve

a reference to the notion of God? Confront him with a brief statement, say up to 30 or 40 pages, of the essentials of Christian theology. How much of this is he aware of as forming part of the Christian tradition? The question here is not how much of it does he accept or reject. It is rather how much of it does he know about? Most undergraduates are theologically illiterate. It does no harm and, so far as I can see, some educational good to liquidate some of this ignorance.

At this point open up the distinction between revealed theology and rational theology. For your student this is the distinction between two sorts of beliefs that differ in respect to their evidence. On behalf of the one he will say that the case rests ultimately on the fact that God has said that it is so. He has revealed it through a man or a book. On behalf of the other he will say that it stands to reason that it is so. You may find these notions of revelation and reason to be crude and unsophisticated; but he doesn't, and for the moment that is what concerns you. In one way or another you are likely to encounter genuine resistance in connection with this concept of revelation. But it is a matter upon which he must be persuaded to tip his hand. It will goad him along the path you have marked out for him.

Where he sits light to revealed theology, he expects much from rational theology. He may have disappointments in store for himself here, but if so, he must discover that fact himself. You want to let him find out what theological beliefs, in his judgment, do or do not "stand to reason." The existence of God, the occurrence of miracle, the immortality of the soul, the communicative character of prayer are almost sure to crop out. Your student will be grateful if you let him clear his mind on these matters. Let him figure out what he believes and why he believes it; and leave him alone while he is trying to do so. You have set him his long-range problem, namely to run down his concepts and principles and presuppositions. He cannot do this job for himself if you do it for him. Depending on your temperament, you will find this part of the enterprise the most exasperating or the most rewarding. Every class in philosophy has its "awkward squad," and the class in philosophy of religion will be no exception. You must remember that Socrates was not only a gad-fly but also a mid-wife.

One way to keep a check-rein on yourself is to distinguish between the central question and ancillary questions. Thus the central question may be "Does it stand to reason that God exists?" "Does it stand to reason that miracles occur?" "Does it stand to reason that a person survives the death of his body?" Keep away from these questions yourself. They are the concern of your student. But there are pedagogically valuable ancillary questions that can be invented to go along with each central question. Their job is to make sure that the student realizes what he is doing when he decides for or against the central question and offers his reasons for his decision. Work at these ancillary questions while he is working at the central question by himself and doing whatever reading you have assigned on that question. I would emphasize this matter of ancillary questions. They are to be thought of as "setting

up" exercises. They invite you to flex intellectual muscles which you may want when you turn to the central question. That is all I would ask of them.¹

There is, I suppose, a place somewhere for the opposition to be heard from. This is a matter upon which I am not so firmly convinced as I used to be. Freud or Hume in what they have to say about religion and theology provide examples of what I mean. Let me take Hume's "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion" or his essay, "On Miracles," as cases in point. It will be urged that no handling of rational theology has been done right by if Hume is not given a careful hearing. This is not as clear to me as it used to be. It is not that I would "protect" any American undergraduate from Hume's skepticism. I long ago gave up protecting anybody against anything. My point is partly that on this matter, and on anything else for which his name may stand as a symbol Hume has become the center of a cult, and I am suspicious of cults. My point is partly also that I am not clear about his relevance. A person professes an interest in philosophy parasitic upon his interest in religion. He wants to know what *his* concepts, principles, and presuppositions are in this matter of religion. He wants to know what he himself thinks. Will Hume tell him? Will Hume help him to clarify to himself what it is that he (the student) thinks in regard to the matters mentioned? Where Hume is assigned with a view to altering the student's ideas, he is being used as propaganda. Where he is assigned with a view to enabling the student to learn by contrast what his own views are, the procedure seems to me to be unnecessarily circuitous and time consuming. Where he is assigned because the student is already a skeptic and Hume will make clear the intentions which are already implicit in the student's own thinking, I see the

¹Consider the following questions as ancillary to the central question, "Does a person survive the death of his body?"

Are there any questions on which it is the mark of wisdom to let belief outrun evidence?

Would you get a bigger jolt from discovering that you do or do not survive the death of your body?

On what conditions would you accept or refuse such survival?

Which: (a) We have no evidence for such survival, or (b) We have evidence that there is no such survival.

Would you distinguish between (a) psychological causes of, and (b) logical reasons for, believe in such survival?

Is there any necessary connection between such survival and the existence of God?

Is belief in such survival a presupposition of any other belief?

If such survival is a property of minds, is it a necessary or an accidental property?

We encounter dead bodies. Why do we never encounter dead minds?

Why does ordinary language distinguish between a person and (a) his mind, (b) his body?

"I changed my mind." "I give my body to be burned." To what does the "I" refer?

Why discussion of the central question leads frequently to a discussion of (a) materialism, (b) empiricism. Are those two beliefs (a,b) compatible?

Make a tape-recording of a person reasoning aloud. Play the tape back. Does it do any reasoning? Did it do any learning?

An astronomer is investigating the solar system. There are three sets of processes going on: (a) in his mind, (b) in his brain and nervous system, (c) in the solar system. In what respects do these processes differ? How are they related to each other?

point and go along with it. I am not seeking to rule out the opposition. Far be it from me in these days of touchy academic liberalism to make any such suggestion. My point is that it has ceased to be clear to me that you make most progress in philosophy, as I am proposing that term, by making a fetish out of the opposition. My point is not to defend rational theology or any other kind of theology. My point is that most undergraduates I encounter in philosophy of religion are, or think they are, interested in rational theology as a live alternative to revealed theology. My job is neither to confirm them in their ways nor to get them to change those ways. It is to enable them to get to know what those ways are at the level of concepts, principles, and presuppositions. It is not wholly clear that the opposition is needed to facilitate this enterprise. I have found C. S. Lewis's book, *On Miracles*, and his book, *The Problem of Pain*, more productive of relevant discussion than I have ever found Hume's books to be. Similarly, I think William James more relevant than Freud. There is, I think, more feeling for the heart of the matter in James's notion that in religion we exercise our "will to believe" than in Freud's notion that in religion we are victims of adult infantilism.²

I would move on from religious experience and theological belief to ecclesiastical organization. I would proceed by posing four questions here: (1) Why is a church necessary? (2) As between a church governed from above by a hierarchy and a church in which ultimate control is vested in the congregation, is choice merely a matter of preference? (3) The church is one institution. The state is another. What relation between these two institutions is the student prepared to

²You will encounter the question: Should a person *be* religious if he is to teach philosophy of religion? Should he be well-disposed to religion, rate it as high, as important, as those rate it who are themselves religious? Should it be for him the locus of genuine commitment, of passionate concern? I used to think the answer to this question was "Not necessarily: it is enough if he knows about religion. It is not necessary that he know religion, know it at first hand in the sense in which a person knows religion if he is religious." Indeed you will hear it suggested that, if a man is to get at the philosophy of religion, get at the concepts and principles and presuppositions in religion, he might better not be himself religious. The point would be: if he is himself a man of genuine religious commitment, he has given hostages to fortune, he can no longer be objective, his mind is incapable of the intellectual detachment necessary to philosophizing about religion. This may be so, but I am coming to doubt it; and that for three reasons. First, people don't talk that way about philosophy of science, philosophy of art, philosophy of history, philosophy of education. Why then should they talk that way about philosophy of religion? People don't recommend a man to busy himself with philosophy of science if he thinks science is an illusion, if he is ignorant of science, if he lacks all first-hand experience of what it is to be a scientist. When a person convinces me that he has this sort of external relation to education, I do not recommend him to busy himself with philosophy of education. Second, I notice that people who talk this way, who see nothing paradoxical in an irreligious man trying his hand at philosophy of religion, are usually themselves ignorant of religion or indifferent or hostile to it. If this is so, may they not also have given hostages to fortune? Thirdly, it is possible that a relevant question is being confused with an irrelevant one. It would be relevant to ask "Does a man care for philosophy? Does he have the cast of mind that finds satisfaction in preoccupying itself with questions of basic concepts, first principles, ultimate presuppositions?" If he is indifferent or hostile at this point, he had indeed better stay away from philosophy of

RELIGION AS A GOAD TO PHILOSOPHY

endorse? (4) The church is one institution. The school, or educational system, is another. What relation between these two institutions is the student prepared to endorse? I shall not elaborate these four questions here, beyond saying that, if you come at them by way of time spent on religious experience and on theological belief, they pay their way in the enterprise. They generate instant and lively discussion. The discussion pulls on what has gone before and soon reaches out into politics, education, and social reform. These four questions of ecclesiastical organization catalyze the two topics which precede them. Eventually, with the weight of the other two topics behind them, they raise for most students the question of the "power to endure." Neither religious experience nor theological belief, as topics for discussion, will do this or do it as effectively as ecclesiastically organization. The point is, I suppose, that religions endure as organized enterprises. But however that may be, they do manifest this power to endure. They are old. They have an unusually tenacious hold on life. They possess and repossess astonishing vitality. They have, as few other things have, "the power to endure." Now the question is "Whence this power to endure?" Where do religions come by it? Is the source of this "power to endure" to be sought in a concern on God's part that they do not die out? Or is it to be sought in something in human nature? Or is it to be sought in their truth? Is their "power to endure" to be taken as evidence that they are true? Wherever it comes from, it is there. And it is an excellent peg on which to hang one or two concluding sessions of the course.

VI

Let me remind you, by way of conclusion, that our subject has been religion as a goad to philosophy. I have mentioned three topics: religious experience, theological belief, and ecclesiastical organization. I have recommended them as means to getting an undergraduate to think philosophically about religion. To that end, these three topics are useful goads. If you reflect on religion, you will find that it contains one or more basic concepts, one or more first principles, one or more ultimate presuppositions. The task of philosophy is to ferret these out. Not to know your own mind with reference to such matters is to be naive. Naivete is a form of self-ignorance. Philosophy is the attempt to dispel that recurring quantum of naivete with which each generation begins its life. It addresses itself directly therefore to an important and perennial aspect of *la condition humaine*. There is no great harm in being naive. However, to know your basic concepts, principles, and presuppositions is to achieve sophistication. Philosophy is the attempt to achieve sophistication; not the sort which one displays at a cocktail party but the sort that is required by an alert and criticized point of view. So conceived, it is an essential ingredient in the life of the mind. You could almost say that it is the inner citadel.

religion or "philosophy of" anything else; and particularly stay away from the taxing business of trying to teach it.

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The Beautiful as Symbolic of the Holy

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO GRUNEWALD'S CRUCIFIXION

F. DAVID MARTIN

Artists, art historians, critics, laymen, even aestheticians, are convinced that certain works of art in some sense are religious. General agreement even reigns concerning even specific works, such as Dante's *Divine Comedy*, Amiens Cathedral, Michelangelo's "Pieta", Bach's "Mass in B Minor", Grünewald's "Crucifixion" in the Isenheim Altarpiece. It would seem that art or the beautiful can symbolize the religious or the holy. Yet how is this accomplished specifically?

An object that commands "contemplative" or "intransitive" attention because it is intrinsically interesting and expressive¹ may be said to be "beautiful." For contemplative attention to an object to be possible — for sensitive, trained and mature observers — the object must possess aesthetic or sensory quality, form, and content. Sensory quality can only be immediately experienced or intuited and cannot be defined. They [sensory qualities] are in themselves immediately attractive or repugnant to primitive aesthetic sensitivity. For example, the hue, clarity, depth, intensity, or 'value' of a color may be intrinsically satisfying irrespective of the shape or immediate environment of the colored areas. . . .² Objects lacking sensory quality, although they may be noticed for practical or communicative purposes, will fail to attract contemplative attention because they lack intrinsic interest. Objects lacking form will fail to hold attention, for if a part is not inter-related to the other parts and to the total inter-relationship of the whole, meanings disconnected and thus irrelevant to the object as a whole will distract attention. Objects lacking content, that is, the interpretation of some aspect of the values in human experience, will fail to command attention intransitively because the mature mind is a curious mind. Because the curious mind is concerned about truth, content gives, especially when it is believed to be true, an immediate sense of significance that intensifies the aesthetic experience.

Since the major contention of this paper is that some works of beauty have a symbolic significance with respect to the holy, it is necessary to consider briefly the nature of the symbolic function. A sign is a mark, object, or event which has reference. There are three major types of signs: signals, conventional symbols, and

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¹ For the precise meaning of the terms "expressive" and "expression" as used in this essay see the author's "On the Supposed Incompatibility between Expression and Formalism," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (September 1956), p. 94.

² Theodore Meyer Greene, *The Arts and the Art of Criticism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940, p. 6.

natural symbols. A signal invites overt action, whereas a symbol invites consideration. Thus the primary reference of a stop signal is a cue to action, and conditioned reflexes will serve the purpose. The primary reference of a symbol on the other hand is ideational and therefore must be understood. The meaning of a conventional symbol is arbitrarily attached to it by individual fiat or social convention, as in the case of words other than onomatopoeic words. A natural symbol or icon embodies characteristics similar to those of the referent for which it stands; the signific function is grounded in a resemblance between symbol and referent. "Anything whatever . . . is an Icon of anything, insofar as it is like that thing and used as a sign of it."³ Thus the sound of the word "buzz" resembles the sound of a bee or referent, and because of this similarity the word signifies its referent. The similarity or parallelism between an icon and referent is not necessarily a physical resemblance, although generally this has been the traditional usage. Actually a great many meaning situations cannot be exhaustively analyzed when "iconicity" is restricted to physical resemblance.⁴ For example, the color white in certain contexts may refer to sacredness. Yet the idea of sacredness has no physical properties, and therefore the reference of whiteness to sacredness cannot depend upon physical resemblance. It can be argued that the reference is simply a matter of convention, but this is not a complete explanation because it fails to explain why white is chosen for such conventional usage in many disparate cultures.⁵ Muddy brown has never been used to refer to sacredness, and these facts suggest that underneath heavy accretions of conventional symbols lies an iconicity dependent upon psychosocial factors not yet clearly understood. Thus whiteness causes an emotive response resembling the emotive response to the idea of sacredness, and this similarity in the psychological responses rather than in the physical aspects of the symbol and referent accounts for the origin of the meaning function. "Iconicity" will be used in the following analysis to include not only physical parallelism between icon and referent, but also the parallelism of emotive responses to icon and referent. The former will be called a "physical icon" and the latter will be called an "emotive icon."

The less intrinsic interest conventional symbols possess the more likely the success of unambiguous reference, an ideal most nearly achieved with the symbols of mathematics. "A symbol which interests us *also* as an object is distracting. It does not convey its meaning without obstruction. . . ."⁶ Natural or iconic symbols may also have little intrinsic interest, as in the case of this stickman †. However, when the iconic character is vividly embodied in the symbol, intrinsic interest is aroused,

³ *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Pierce*, eds. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932, Vol. 2, p. 143.

⁴ I owe this idea to my colleague, Professor Jerome Richfield.

⁵ See, for example, Charles Hartshorne's *The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934, p. 170.

⁶ Suzanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942, p. 61.

THE BEAUTIFUL AS SYMBOLIC OF THE HOLY

for attention must be centered on the symbols themselves if their meaning is to be experienced. Beautiful objects possess this kind of iconicity.

The precise manner in which iconicity functions in any major work of art is usually very complex. Thus in the "Crucifixion" by Grünewald⁷ the figures and objects, for example a man and the cross, are physical icons of shape or diagrams. Their shapes are parallel (isomorphic) to the shapes of their referents, and thus signify or suggest these objects and associated meanings. The cross, however, is in addition a conventional symbol, for meanings have been attached to it by the fiat of the Christian Church. These meanings are not natural or iconic; an observer unaware of the Christian tradition would not understand them.

The color white is used only with conventional religious symbols — the loin-cloth of Christ, the robe of the Virgin, the Bible, the lamb, and the inscription on the top of the cross. These symbols refer respectively to sacrifice, virginity, revelation, discipleship, and kingship. The restriction of white to just these symbols deepens the idea of sacredness common to them all. Likewise, the other colors are variously combined with conventional symbols and icons of shape. The pink-flesh color of Magdalene, iconic of sensuality, by contrast enhances the spiritual values of the white. The unearthly greenish tonality of the landscape gives to this spiritual-secular (white-pink) contrast added tragic seriousness. These colors are emotive icons of quality, arousing emotions resembling the emotions aroused by their referents — sacredness, sensuality, and tragedy.

Christ is much larger than the other figures, especially the tiny Magdalene. In nature and human relationships the scaling of sizes may imply the idea of power. The scaling in the picture parallels this kind of relationship and symbolizes — by an emotive icon of power — the idea of the power of the divine over the finite.

Interwoven with these various kinds of symbols are emotive icons of structure. For example, the cross is placed slightly to the right of the visual center of the picture and the body of Christ is on the right side of the cross. The tension of this off-centerness charges the otherwise inert body of Christ with dynamic specified by suggesting the idea of the life-restoring power of the divine, further specified by the outstretched fingers of Christ appealing to God — the implied source of light in the picture. The distorted finger of the Baptist, electric in intensity, seems caught and stretched by the divine current, as is the body of Christ. These icons of structure primarily refer to relationships between parts of a work of art, whereas icons of shape primarily refer to the individual figures and objects. The distinction is one of degree, since in the dynamic context of the aesthetic experience as controlled by the work of art all symbols should be completely integrated.

⁷ Color reproductions of Grünewald's "Crucifixion", centerpiece of the Isenheim Altar, may be seen in *The Sixteenth Century*, edited by Lionello Venturi (Editions d'Art Albert Skira, 1956) and in the March 28, 1951 issue of *Life Magazine* which includes the entire altarpiece and other work of the artist. The original polyptych altarpiece of nine paintings now stands in the Musée d'Unterlinden at Colmar, Alsace.

Iconicity is a less obvious relationship than might at first appear. In the first place, the degree of likeness necessary for an icon to signify is not a function simply of imitative accuracy but involves the characteristic aspects or perspectives. A Mexican sombrero seen from directly above suggests a doughnut more than a hat. Yet it is a faithful reproduction obtainable photographically from a third floor hotel window. Secondly, an icon is always presented in a context or environment that partially controls the reference. In Degas' *Millinery Shop* the above-mentioned shape probably would signify a lady's hat, whereas in Grünewald's *Crucifixion* the iconic reference, if present at all, probably would be to halos.

The governing content of Grünewald's picture and thus the context which controls the reference of every icon within it is the holy. The picture as a totality is a symbol of the holy. Religious art is marked off from non-religious art on the basis of whether or not the holy is the governing content. This is usually recognized by most critics although often without explicit awareness of its basis. Moreover, the demarcation line between religious and non-religious art cannot be drawn sharply. Religious art is more than the presentation of religious stories and conventional symbols. The holy may be expressed without them, although this is not generally recognized. In any case, Grünewald's *Crucifixion* is universally accepted as a work of religious art. If we can understand how the holy is symbolized here, a basis for generalizations concerning less clear examples will be established.

What is meant by the "holy"? Everyone familiar with William James' *The Varieties of Religious Experience* is impressed by the amazing diversity of religious beliefs. Yet even the "pluralistic" James was able to find a common nucleus. It consists of two parts: 1.) An uneasiness; and 2.) Its solution.

1. The uneasiness, reduced to its simplest terms, is a sense that there is *something wrong about us* as we naturally stand. 2. The solution is a sense that *we are saved from the wrongness* by making proper connection with the higher powers.⁸

The holy is the higher power or powers, and holiness is the manifestation of the holy. The holy is believed to be real, "more real" than the reality of secular experience. To make "proper connection" with the holy requires a sense of absolute dependence (Schleiermacher) or ultimate concern (Tillich). "The secular is the realm of preliminary concerns. It lacks ultimate concern; it lacks holiness. All finite relations are in themselves secular. . . . But . . . the holy embraces itself and the secular. . . . Everything secular is implicitly related to the holy. . . . Everything has the dimension of depth, and in the moment in which the third dimension is actualized, holiness appears."⁹

⁸The *Varieties of Religious Experience*. New York: The Modern Library, 1936, p. 498.

⁹Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, Vol. 1, p. 218. Also pp. 11-12: "Ultimate concern is the abstract translation of the great commandment: 'The Lord, our God, the Lord is one; and you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart,

THE BEAUTIFUL AS SYMBOLIC OF THE HOLY

Ultimate concern reflects man's existential anxiety about his finitude and the precarious nature of all his secular values. This anxiety presupposes, as the condition of its being sensed at all, an awareness of an infinite reality — at least unlimited in some respects — too vast and mysterious for perfect human understanding. Mystics claim experiencing the holy apart, an experience *sui generis*, but for most men the holy is experienced as the transcendental dimension enmeshed somehow with secular value — as the infinite support underlying, justifying, and transcending the inevitable tragedy such experiences as suffering, meaninglessness, guilt, and death. Ultimate concern is the subjective reaction of man either to his immediate awareness of the holy or to his awareness of the final futility of all secular value.

The holy, perhaps, is most usually experienced as the depth dimension of the moral or good, but the mystery of infinity has often been felt to be a part of beauty and truth. Thus Einstein: "The most beautiful thing we can experience is the mysterious side of life. It is the deep feeling which is at the cradle of all true art and science. In this sense, and only in this sense, I count myself amongst the most deeply religious people."¹⁰

The mysteriously transcendent character of the holy, Otto's "the numinous," places the holy partially beyond rational categories.¹¹ The numinous is experienced as "mysterium tremendum": "... the hushed, trembling, and speechless humility of the creature in the presence of — whom or what? In the presence of that which is a *Mystery* inexpressible and above all creatures."¹² Nevertheless, the numinous is an objective datum, and the numinous experience or "mysterium tremendum" has describable characteristics related to corresponding properties of the numinous object. For example: corresponding to the wrath and terribleness of the numinous are such emotions as awefulness, fear, dread. The majesty and glory of the numinous causes abasement, humility, "creature-feeling." The urgency or energy of the numinous excites zest, will, impetus. The numinous as "wholly other" or transcendent strikes man with wonder, stupor, absolute amazement. As mystery the numinous fascinates, ravishes, transports.¹³

and with all your soul and with all your mind, and with all your strength.' The religious concern is ultimate; it excludes all other concerns from ultimate significance; it makes them preliminary." Contrast the lack of ultimate concern in the following statement by Renan: "St. Augustine's phrase: 'Lord, if we are deceived, it is by thee!' remains a fine one, well suited to our modern feeling. Only we wish the Eternal to know that if we accept the fraud, we accept it knowingly and willingly. We are resigned in advance to losing the interest on our investments of virtue, but we wish not to appear ridiculous by having counted on them too securely." Quoted by James, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

¹⁰ Albert Einstein, *Comment je vois le monde*, traduit par le Colonel Cros. Paris: E. Flammarion, 1934, p. 7.

¹¹ "The last step that Reason takes is to recognize that there is an infinity of things beyond." (Pascal).

¹² Rudolph Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, trans. by John W. Harvey. London: Oxford University Press, 1928, p. 13.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Chaps. 4-6.

Yet the holy undergoes a continuing process of rationalization and moralization. "To get the full meaning of the word 'holy' . . . we must always understand by it the numinous completely permeated and saturated with elements signifying rationality, purpose, personality, morality."¹⁴ "Almost everywhere we find the numinous attracting and appropriating meanings derived from social and individual ideals of obligation, justice, and goodness. These become the 'will' of the numen, and the numen their guardian, ordainer, and author. More and more these ideas come to enter into the very essence of the numen and charge the term with ethical content. 'Holy' becomes 'good,' and 'good' from that very fact in turn becomes 'holy,' 'sacrosanct'; until there results a thenceforth indissoluble synthesis of the two elements, and the final outcome is thus the fuller, more complex sense of 'holy,' in which it is at once *good and sacrosanct*."¹⁵ Religious revelations, dogmas, sacraments, and symbols invariably have their conceptual elements. Theologies of the theistic type and often philosophies attempt to give completely intellectualized accounts of the holy. Yet the holy can never be "spun out" as a theorem within a theological or philosophical system. A religion and a system may say much the same thing about the holy, but the numinous quality of the religious experience cannot be expressed systematically.

Similarly, a work of art that lacks expression of the numinous is not religious, for without the numinous the holy disappears into the cognitive-aesthetic-moral realm of the secular. That is why much of the so-called religious art of the Renaissance, for example most of Raphael's Madonna pictures, is not religious despite its use of religious stories and conventional symbols. The age tended to be too humanistic, rationalistic, and confident to provide the kind of setting that leads to sensitivity to the numinous aspect of the holy. The holy is not just another object among objects, but an Object beyond all other objects that commands awe, humility, reverence. If the holy is expressed, ultimate concern, as the subjective reaction to the holy, may be expressed explicitly or in any case implicitly.¹⁶ Finally, there may be expressed the attempt of man, as an ultimately concerned subject, to understand the holy and his relation to it through conceptual mediation.

Since in Grünewald's "Crucifixion" the holy, ultimate concern, and conceptual mediation are all explicitly expressed, its religious content is universally recognized. The transcendent mystery of the holy is expressed through the numinous, the effect of the holy on man is expressed through ultimate concern, and man's conceptual mediation or attempt to understand and relate himself to the holy is expressed through the conventional religious symbols.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

¹⁶ For Tillich ultimate concern has an ontological basis and is not a psychological or subjective counterpart of the numinous (*Systematic Theology*, Vol. 1, p. 214), nor is ultimate concern co-extensive with the numinous (*ibid.*, pp. 12-13). I am using the term in the narrower or psychological sense as more fruitful for the purpose of this analysis.

THE BEAUTIFUL AS SYMBOLIC OF THE HOLY

The numinous is expressed through such symbols as the emotive icons of structure previously described,¹⁷ the transcendent power of the divine transfiguring the scene. There is an unearthly terribleness expressed in this power, and with it a sense of numinous mystery. But the most essential condition for the expression of numinous mystery in the beautiful is the presence of the inexhaustibility of unrealized possibility.¹⁸ The beautiful is more than the "physically given" object. Immanent in the "given" of any work of art are possibilities suggested to the imagination that are fulfilled or realized physically elsewhere in the work. Thus a chord based on the dominant suggests and anticipates the possibility of the tonic chord. The perception of form in the beautiful depends upon this kind of anticipation and realization. Also immanent in the beautiful are possibilities only suggested and not physically realized. These unrealized possibilities, if through contrast they intensify the realized possibilities, are the source of the richness and intensity of the aesthetic experience. In Grünewald's "Crucifixion", for example, the significance of the off-centerness of the cross and Christ can be felt only if the unrealized possibility of "centerness" is imaginatively conceived and contrasted.

Every work of art must contain unrealized possibilities, but with great works of art unrealized possibilities apparently are inexhaustible. Thus we return to a masterpiece time after time, even after we have achieved complete comprehension of the physically realized object, and discover endlessly new potentialities. This unlimited character of "what might have been," involving the "whole" of a masterpiece, may be called an emotive icon of inexhaustibility. Such an icon suggests incomprehensibility, mystery, and infinity analogous to the sublime¹⁹ and arouses in us emotions analogous to the emotions aroused by the idea of the numinous. Through this parallelism of emotive effects the icon of inexhaustibility symbolizes the numinous. Masterpieces that are patently non-religious, because they lack other factors symbolizing the numinous, nevertheless are often felt to express an aspect of the numinous. When, however, the icon of inexhaustibility is combined with other symbols expressing the numinous, ultimate concern, and conceptual mediation, the icon of inexhaustibility functions as the necessary condition of the successful expression of the holy, the skeletal framework for the other symbols. Without these other symbols, this framework might suggest the bare infinity of, let us say, mathematics, rather than the infinitude of the holy.²⁰ Without this framework, the incomprehensibility

¹⁷ This analysis is not intended to be exhaustive. For example, the source of the light in the picture appears to be coming from great height. The suggestion of God in a high place is a factor in expressing the numinous component. For an excellent study of height and light as symbols of the numinous, see Edwyn Bevan, *Symbolism and Belief*, Chaps. II, III and IV.

¹⁸ "Unrealized Possibility in the Aesthetic Experience," *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 52, No. 15 (July 1955).

¹⁹ Cf. Otto's point: "In the arts nearly everywhere the most effective means of representing the numinous is the sublime." *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 68.

²⁰ It is interesting to note, although the point cannot be developed here, that the more radically particular and in this sense finite work of art, the more unrealized possibilities it is likely to suggest. Significant unity in a work of art demands significant individuality in the parts,

of the holy is not adequately suggested. Religious art demands masterpieces. Anything less seems unworthy and unsuccessful in a way not so clearly demanded by other kinds of content. It is the icon of inexhaustibility above all other factors that accounts for the numinous character of Grünewald's "Crucifixion."

The expression of ultimate concern, for anyone who has experienced this painting, needs little comment. The hushed inward sorrow of the fainting Mary, the contrasting overt terror of John, the utter humility and awe of the kneeling Magdalene are magnificently expressive of the absolute dependence of preliminary concerns upon the holy. This is a grief that can have only the holy as its object.

Complementing the expression of ultimate concern by the group on the left stands the quiet Baptist on the right symbolizing conceptual mediation. The Latin inscription behind the distorted finger and hand of the Baptist reads: *Illum oportet crescere, me autem diminui* ("He must increase, but I must decrease," John 3: 30). The Baptist, compared to the group on the left, is relatively detached from the Crucifixion, as of course he was historically. The Bible, the Latin inscription, the lamb, and the chalice are closely associated with the Baptist on his side of the cross. These symbols are heavily overlaid with conventional meanings of Christian theology expressing the attempt of man's reason to understand the holy. The divine becomes the Logos. The expression of ultimate concern and conceptual mediation fuse throughout the picture, as in fact they usually do in the religious experience, but the dominance of ultimate concern on the left and conceptual mediation on the right is one of the reasons for the dynamic balance of the totality. Without the numinous, the grief of the group on the left would be that of a finite tragedy, and the conceptual mediation would lack the necessary transcendental reference.

The expression of the numinous aspect of the holy is the *sine qua non* of all religious art, of the beautiful as symbolic of the holy. When the numinous is directly and powerfully expressed, ultimate concern is implied even when it is not directly expressed. ElGreco's "View of Toledo" contains no living being to express directly ultimate concern, yet El Greco's concern, the observer's concern, all mankind's concern is understood. The numinous character of the architecture of Amiens Cathedral — excluding everything that directly expresses ultimate concern, like the awe-struck figures in some of the windows — implies the "I am nought, Thou art all."

Conversely, the numinous may not be directly expressed and yet be implied when ultimate concern is directly and powerfully expressed. Thus Rouault's clowns are sometimes taken to be Christ. Thus Thomas Wolfe, who despite his insatiable curiosity never seemed aware of the holy or religion, indirectly expressed the

and this accounts for the uniqueness of every work of art. Hamlet's individuality makes the possibilities open for his actions far more extensive than the less individualistic Othello. There may be some connection here with Tillich's argument that "... the holy needs to be expressed and can be expressed only through the secular, for it is through the finite alone that the infinite can express itself." *Systematic Theology*, Vol. 1, p. 218.

THE BEAUTIFUL AS SYMBOLIC OF THE HOLY

numinous through his growing sensitivity to the absolute precariousness of all secular values.²¹ At the very end of his last work, *You Can't Go Home Again*, he explicitly expressed the numinous in the most beautiful lyric he ever wrote:

"To lose the earth you know, for greater knowing; to lose the life you have, for greater life; to leave the friends you loved, for greater loving; to find a land more kind than home, more large than earth . . . Whereon the pillars of this earth are founded, towards which the consciousness of the world is tending — a wind is rising, and the rivers flow."

Conceptual mediation is religiously meaningless, as in Parmigianino's *Madonna Della Rosa*, unless the numinous is either directly expressed or implied through ultimate concern. Within the context of the numinous, however, conceptual mediation, as in Grünewald's "Crucifixion," may strengthen the expression of the holy. When either the numinous or ultimate concern is explicitly symbolized, there seems to be an inevitable need for the expression of some kind of conceptual mediation, for example, Eliot's movement from the ultimate concern of his early works, such as *The Waste Land*, to the inclusion of conceptual (theological) mediation in his later works, such as the *Four Quartets*. Conceptual mediation is not necessarily theological. The twentieth-century artist, when he expresses conceptual mediation at all, is more likely to derive his concepts from philosophy, as Mann did in *The Magic Mountain*, or he may avoid obvious systematic derivation entirely by reliance upon myth, as Joyce in *Finnegan's Wake*, or seem to rely upon common sense, as Warren in *All The King's Men*.

But most modern artists cannot find any kind of conceptual mediation. They are too lacking in confidence in human reason and too disdainful of past solutions. Kafka's *The Castle* expresses explicitly both the numinous and ultimate concern, but there is no conceptual mediation. Indeed, for Kafka the tragedy of existence is that conceptual mediation is impossible and yet man cannot help seeking it. The old theologies and mediations are unacceptable and no substitute seems to be available. This is the religious dilemma of modern man and thus of the modern artist. But this does not make his work necessarily non-religious. Too much confidence in conceptual mediation takes the numinous out of the holy and the ultimacy out of concern, as happened in much of the so-called religious art of the Renaissance. Lack of confidence in reason, at least to some degree, is the prerequisite for sensing the numinous and experiencing ultimate concern.

The sensitive artist of today cannot help experiencing the precariousness of secular values, the doubt about the capacity of reason to solve man's despair, and the mystery that always seems to stretch beyond man's grasp. He may deny a conceptual mediation, but he may express the holy in the beautiful through this very denial.

²¹ See the author's "The Artist, Autobiography, and Thomas Wolfe," *The Bucknell Review*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (March 1955), p. 28.

Marks of an Educated Man

KERMIT EBY

I believe that "the educated man is he who can see the consequences of his acts in the sum total of their relationships." The mature man is he who knows what he believes, gets a base in organization, and proceeds to implement his belief.

Now I admit that the two ideas do not permit many combinations. But I insist that two are twice as good as one and much, much better than none at all. The question I ask myself more often than any other is: How did I happen to come to the conclusions aforementioned? I am convinced that the simplest, most determining influence in bringing these conclusions into focus was the world of my childhood and youth. Every personal and institutional experience from age one to twenty-one repeated and stressed that man is put into the world for a purpose, and if God's will is to be accomplished, it is through us.

To this day it would seem that I can escape almost everything in my heritage except this abiding curse. The curse is doubly tragic, for my world is ever so much bigger and more complicated than the circumscribed one of my youth. I am the son of Mennonite and Brethren background (sects of withdrawal) thrust into a world in which there is no longer a place or point in time to which to withdraw. No matter how urgently I look for islands, I cannot find any place where the coca-cola machine or the A-bomb had not been before me. Not being able to live in a world which no longer exists, I am driven to create a world more consistent with my memory of that long-ago Brethren life. If I "identify downward," it may be because I was nurtured by a minority group. The Mennonite and Brethren of my youth were the Plain People, the queer people, bearded and solemn. Our language was Pennsylvania Dutch, and I learned my first English in school. In my heritage Caesar was given only the bare minimum necessary. We paid our taxes but seldom voted. We wanted to be left alone to live out our New Testament ethic. I was a minority boy linguistically, culturally, and religiously. As I look back on my grade school days and recall my closest friends, they include Johnny who wasn't very bright, Charley whose parents were Belgian and therefore foreigners, and Norris, the "adopted" son.

Perhaps it was this identification which prompted Malinda Wentz (one of the finest and most creative teachers I ever had) to assign to me the negative in a classroom debate on the pending exclusion acts of 1924. Be that as it may, it was the incident which stimulated my interest in the Orient and influenced my graduate school decision to specialize therein. In graduate school I developed the arguments to support the peace witness of my heritage. I learned among other things that tariffs — particularly the Smoot-Hawley tariff — were more than domestic concerns. And contrary to national opinion, our immigration legislation involved others, particularly Orientals, more seriously than ourselves. Understanding, com-

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MARKS OF AN EDUCATED MAN

plete and terrible, came to me in a traumatic way. In 1933 when I was in the Orient with a Friends' goodwill mission a young and sensitive Japanese asked me to explain why "you in America send us Christian missionaries to teach the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of man and deny it in an exclusion act?"

At that moment my definition of the educated man — he who can see the consequences of his acts in the sum total of their relationships — came into focus.

I am supposed to know something about economics. But what I know about economics began with the economics of my father's farming. Dad was born at precisely the right time; he bought our home farm in 1911 for ninety dollars per acre. He paid for it and rebuilt all the buildings by 1918. However, I had an uncle who was not so fortunate. Ten years Dad's senior, he had his first farm paid for in 1918. To buy the second he mortgaged the first, which he promptly lost in 1923 when corn was selling for 10 cents a bushel and pigs for three cents a pound. My father became a model of thrift and prosperity and an example to the young; my uncle ended up a burden to his children.

But while Dad and Uncle Elmer rode the escalators of economic fatality in different directions, Uncle George Phillips went to jail as a C. O. He earned nothing at all while he witnessed for his conviction. I did not quite understand why the Church, which taught pacifism, could not bear the support for its young men as equitably as the government did.

Again, it was Japan that taught me. It was a long discussion on tariffs and population in which the gentle people maintained: "Give us land, and we will grow our own foodstuffs." But the impatient said: "Why did the white race pre-empt everything worth taking, and then join the church of the status-quo?"

Perhaps no single experience came home to me more deeply than the solution of the problem of mass unemployment. Remember that in spite of every effort of the New Deal 19,000,000 were unemployed in 1939. Then came September 3, the same year. Adolph Hitler marched into Poland. England, realizing her responsibility under a mutual assistance treaty, began to let ordnance contracts. Ordnance stimulated steel. As steel goes, so goes the nation, and the unemployed began to melt away. Lend Lease and Pearl Harbor did the rest. By the end of 1941 there was a shortage in the labor market. Nurtured by war or its preparation, we have been (with the exception of May 1950) on an ascending employment spiral ever since.

Neither the Communists, the Capitalists, nor the mixed-economy boys have been able to produce a full employment economy without the stimulation of the arms race. America alone is so rich that it can afford to give its people guns and butter at the same time. The other peoples have their guns at the price of hunger, cold, and fear.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

In 1946 we were attempting to democratize Japan by fiat, and I was a member of the education mission to Japan. I asked my young Japanese interpreter what he had done during the war. "I was a student and then a flyer, training as a Kamakazi." "But the Kamakazi flew only one mission — to their death! Why did you do this?" "To show the white race that, if I could not be equal in life, I could at least be equal in death."

So you see why economics to me can never be a science and why statistics frighten me. For behind the figures there are always men and women, quite often men and women in a bad way. Every time there is a Cicero riot, a Trumbull Park, a Till murder, I cringe. For we who claim so much for our system and way of life must expect that the price of our claims is constant surveillance, constant judgment.

But why must he who knows what he believes get a base and go to work?

I remember the impact of the outside world on our sheltered Mennonite and Brethren islands. I recall two very old newspaper headlines as vividly as if they were bannered only yesterday; "The Titanic Sinks"; "Franz Ferdinand Shot at Sarajevo." Even then I somehow understood that we in Elkhart, Northern Indiana, were not unrelated to both events. It was the sequence which followed the shooting of the Archduke that took our sons to war or to jail, raised the price of our corn and hogs, and brought us Brethren the condemnation of the patriots who daubed our church with yellow paint because we refused to buy war bonds.

I questioned an uncle who was then in college, and he described for me the balance of power, the Great Alliance so delicately balanced that a single shooting of an archduke could plunge the world into war.

For me, high school and college came in their proper order, and books and more books. In between, we debated and spent our weekends talking peace to already converted Brethren congregations, congregations which were becoming more and more involved with Caesar and secularism. By 1924 I knew that if there were another war, the Brethren youth would take their places in uniform. And during World War II only about seven percent of that youth kept the pacifist witness of the church.

I did not find the answers in a Brethren college, so in 1929 I came to the University of Chicago. And here again, although I learned much, I could not find the answers. For I was reminded that I might become a scholar someday, if I would keep reform off my mind. But by 1931 I had landed in Michigan, where I plunged into organization and politics. It was here that I discovered that it was in the implementation of my ideals that I found fulfillment.

The world in which I grew up stressed the sins of omission almost equally with the sins of commission. He who failed to provide for his own, failed specifically to pay his debts, to cut his thistles, or to fill his mudholes, was as sinful as he who

MARKS OF AN EDUCATED MAN

committed a positively wrong act. Yet the sins of omission ended with the personal and not the social responsibility. And although we did not like Caesar's war and Caesar's tax, who were we to challenge Caesar's will? And yet increasingly, I believed that we who failed to challenge Caesar's will were as guilty of the sins of omission as the lazy farmer who let his thistles go to seed.

I came to the conclusion that I must attempt to convince my friends, my church, and ultimately Protestantism, of the necessity of working for peace as the Brethren originally taught that peace should be. Integrity, peace, and brotherhood. Now one of the ways that this can be brought about is through politics. Therefore I teach that man is a political animal, that politics exists in every institution, that the politician is a catalyst, and that we need to accept politics as one of our first responsibilities.

Since politics in our society is a matter of voluntary as well as involuntary organization, I tell my students that they should find a place in a voluntary organization and work from within the structure. I have accepted the responsibility of power because I insist that decision will be made by someone and that the real choice lies in the value-pattern which the decision-maker brings to the task. And one of my deepest resentments in the CIO was against those who asked self-righteously, "What are you, a Brethren minister, doing in a labor union?" To which I replied, "Not that I'm so good, but that the alternatives are so awful."

Therefore, as a teacher, I want to encourage young people to examine what they believe, get a base, and go to work to advance their belief. It is only step by step and hurdle by hurdle that the good life can be built, and the world of brotherhood and justice achieved by the educated who not only see relationships but act on what they have seen.

Some Should Be . . . Teachers

And his gifts were that some should be apostles, some prophets, some evangelists, some pastors and teachers.

— Ephesians 4:11

WILLIAM R. MUELLER

I. The Matter of Education

And God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good.

— Genesis 1:31

As college and university instructors and professors, the matter of our profession is God's created universe. Our calling is to profess what is true about the earth and the waters, about the firmament, and about all living creatures, their arts, sciences, and institutions. Diverse as our disciplines are — we have among us teachers of art history and agricultural engineering, of English literature and animal husbandry — all of us come under the general classification of educators. The classicists among us will remind us that "to educate" means "to lead from, or out of, something," and as educators we are charged to lead some of those living creatures already mentioned, creatures of a peculiar species known as *in imago Dei*, out of either a void, a horrendous nothingness, or a chaos, a formless mass of misinformation. By the time most of our students reach us, they have been transported from a state of void to one of chaos, and we are called upon to dissuade them from some remarkably imaginative misconceptions, called upon to persuade them that Commodore Dewey was neither a progressive educator nor a governor of New York, that "Lycidas" was not written in memory of Milton's friend and monarch King Edward, that Cain and Abel are not a current cinematic comedy team, that Boyle's Law has nothing to do with the temperature of water and Grimm's Law nothing to do with fairy tales, that Moby Dick was neither a Shakespearean villain nor a cousin of the Rover boys, that Adlai Stevenson did not write *Treasure Island*, and that Sodom and Gomorrah were not an adulterous couple who peopled the earth with a generation of vipers.

Whether we profess chemistry or physics, geography or geology, sociology or psychology, history or economics, literature or art or music, our task is to try to make clear the truth about one aspect of God's world. We may profitably recall Monsieur Jourdain, that entertaining character from Molière's *Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme*, who undertook the formal study of language in his adulthood and was

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amazed to discover that he had been speaking prose all his life. Let us not wait until we are professors emeriti to make the thrilling discovery that the matter of our profession is God's own handiwork, from the earthworm to the harmonious music of the celestial spheres. We may learn from the Psalmist that "the earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof, the world and those who dwell therein," and we may know that that which is the Lord's is all-inclusive. Whether our matter be the nature and structure of the mineral kingdom, the vegetable kingdom, the animal kingdom, or the highly complex human kingdom with its social institutions, its scientific hypotheses, its metaphysical postulates, and its artistic achievements, our matter is the Lord's matter.

We are told that in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth; that He made the light and separated it from darkness; that He separated the waters and the earth; that He caused the soil to bring forth fruit; that He placed the lights in the firmament; that He made the creatures of the sea, the birds of the air, and the beasts of the earth; and that, on the sixth day, He made man in His own image. At the end of the sixth day of creation, "God saw everything that He had made, and behold, it was good." This goodness, the fall of this goodness, and the redemption of this goodness shapes the matter of education. The matter of our profession, of education, is God's created universe.

II. The Sowing of Education

Son of man, can these bones live? — Ezekiel 1:3

Professing is not without its discouragements, and all of us are tempted occasionally to mutter through our teeth something about pearls and swine; if we are perceptive enough to carry our analogy through to its logical conclusion, however, we will see ourselves as something of an oyster. It is disheartening though, is it not, to face at eight o'clock on some dreary morning what seem to be twenty or so absolutely vacuous and lifeless faces? "Son of man," we ask ourselves despairingly, "can these bones live?" If we are really devoted to life, then it becomes us to try some form of respiration; we might possibly cause breath to enter into what is seemingly the most unpromising and unlikely subject.

We might liken ourselves to the sower who went out to sow. The seeds may fall along the path for some of our students; that is to say, their minds may have become just as hardened as was Pharaoh's heart — they may have unseeing eyes and unhearing ears. For others the seeds may fall on rocky ground; there is an immediate and joyous flurry of response, but the seeds have not taken deep enough root, and the tribulations and persecutions of arduous intellectual discipline are just too much. To sleep or to study, that is the question, but it is a question easily and

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

quickly resolved in favor of the former. For still others the seeds may fall upon thorns. I shall probably not soon forget one of my students for whom this was so, a sloe-eyed blonde named Millie. September had come and gone, as had October, November, December, January, February, and March — seven months and no sign of life. Millie had sat imperturbably and fixedly, a fascinating cross between the Mona Lisa and the Sphinx; in my spare moments, I placed bets with myself as to whether she or it were flesh or marble. With April came D. H. Lawrence, and the spark was struck; a reading of Lawrence brought her new life — of a sort. I can still remember that gratifying conference. Millie, her exquisitely chiseled frame now pulsing with activity, had dropped in to tell me of her exciting discovery. Lawrence had given life meaning for her, and her every moment thenceforth was to be devoted to him (her next project, she told me feverishly, was to read *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom*!); it appeared, indeed, as if Lawrence were to be canonized anew. But the cares of the world and the delight in riches, all centered in fraternity row, were too much. She soon resumed her status as sloe-eyed blonde; the throbbing woman, exhausted and debilitated by her exposure to literature, became metamorphosized once again into a very beautiful and quite dead marble statue.

Some seeds, happy to relate, do fall on good soil, soil which initially may have seemed unfertile. The roots go deep and the yield is great, sometimes a hundred-fold, sometimes sixty, sometimes thirty. The parable of the sower, first narrated by a man who knew the discouragements of teaching, may serve to encourage us. "Son of man, can these bones live?" Strange as it may sometimes seem, they can; and when they do, the day is a joyful one. This is the day for which the teacher lives, the day which assures him that his own bones are nourished with the dew of life.

III. Potter or Horticulturist

*So neither he who plants nor he who waters is anything,
but only God who gives the growth. — I Corinthians 3:7*

Irony came early in the biblical world. The setting was Eden; the time, long ago; the *dramatis personae*, Eve and the serpent. The serpent, bent on the lady's seduction, was effecting all kinds of sleight-of-hand dazzlers and digging well into his bag of tricks. It was too much for Eve when he told her what a grand reward disobedience would bring: "You will be like God." Not only was the promise an irresistible temptation; it was also a fine bit of dramatic irony: it was a true statement, but true in a way quite unforeseen by Eve. At the moment of disobedience, Eve did become like God in that, and only because, she became her own god. Her defiance came at a high price, as she eagerly arrogated to herself the divine prerogatives of will and judgment — "not thy will, but mine," the parody read.

SOME SHOULD BE . . . TEACHERS

Choosing to follow her own will rather than that of Jahweh, she set up a frail and willowy suzerainty, bowing down to herself in suicidal self-idolatry. Most of us like to play god too. We don't even bother to avow our intentions and declare ourselves candidates for the office, don't even write courteous, judicious, inquiring letters of application.

In what ways do we play god as teachers? We do so primarily when we seek to create or re-create our students in our own image; *in imago meo* is so much more lovely and original and gratifying than *in imago Dei*. Or, if our inclination is to be a little more modest, we may content ourselves with trying to mould our students into other shapes and patterns which may suit our fancy. We may turn to them with zealous blasphemy and orate: "Behold, like the clay in the potter's hands, so are you in my hand, O house of English majors." But the potter analogy, if it is applicable any place is applicable with God alone.

The teacher's role is not that of potter but of horticulturist. Paul knew this. When the Corinthians were divided in allegiance, arguing among themselves as to whether they belonged to Apollos or to Paul or to some other Christian teacher, he called them sharply to know the true function of the teacher: "I planted, Apollos watered, but God gave the growth. So neither he who plants nor he who waters is anything, but only God who gives the growth." Knowing our own role, let us repeatedly impress upon our students the fact that, if we are planters and waterers, they are plants and not sponges. A sponge absorbs water, retains it for a while, and then drips it out in a miserably undigested form on a final examination. A plant, on the other hand, is nourished and vitalized by the water, becoming transformed into something precious. When our students leave us, it will be to our shame and their poverty if they file out as blurred carbon copies of ourselves, as globs of ill-wrought clay, or as wizened, shriveled sponges. Let each one be that unique plant which is the realization of his own inner being; let each one be what he was meant to be — himself.

Contemporary Theology and Christian Higher Education

NELS F. S. FERRÉ

Higher education is especially important during periods of rapidly changing culture. Then teachers of higher education have a peculiar opportunity to help chart civilization. Major discoveries of fact and decisive new contexts of interpretation eventually remold the basic assumptions for culture. In both manner and intensity our age is exceptionally transitional and consequently open to significant impact from higher education. Our assigned task is to survey and to appraise the field of contemporary theology for its capacity for constructive impact on higher education. Even a sketch can be of value if it highlights what is important; conciseness can gain the power of concentrated focus.

I

Furthest on the right stand the Fundamentalists. A few years ago even mention of this position might have seemed quite irrelevant to the problems of higher education both because of Fundamentalism's external standard of authority and because of its belonging to a bygone era. As far as the first of these liabilities goes, there is always a natural chasm between Fundamentalism and higher education. Fundamentalism accepts literal biblical authority; higher education requires an open inquiry. No cleft was apparent, radically and finally, until scientific method and the historical consciousness showed us that truth separates literalism and open inquiry. No matter what minor concessions to the historic conditionedness of the Bible Fundamentalism might make, because of the nature of its authority its basic position must remain: "We know what we believe; don't confuse us with facts!" But Fundamentalists are changing rapidly. In one of its periodicals, *Christian Life*,¹ a strongly representative group of its forefront young leaders signed an article saying that they no longer want to be called Fundamentalists or to be tied down to a narrow interpretation of inspiration but that they want to be called Evangelicals who make Christ as holy love their final authority. Similarly in *Christianity Today* article after article disclaims obscurantism and calls for an honest facing of intellectual issues. Insofar as this tendency continues we can conclude only that Fundamentalism as a position shows itself less and less tenable to those competently educated. Resurgence to conservative Christianity in our day seems to be accompanied by its maturation. While respecting its devotees in higher education for their intention of integrity and for their loyalty to an intrinsically impossible situation, we must nevertheless maintain that there is no *inherent* relation between higher education and Fundamentalism.

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¹The issue of March 1956. Illustrative of the best offering of this group for higher education is *Christian Education in a Democracy* by Frank E. Gaebelein.

CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY AND HIGHER EDUCATION

Let it be said, however, concerning Fundamentalism that with regard to its main positive Christian contentions it stands in the solid line of historic Christianity; and it may even be that in the far future we may come to see that liberal accommodationism could not get rid of true evangelical supernaturalism because of the intransigence of Fundamentalism. Therefore we honor it while we recognize that our task goes beyond it: to find a theology that both maintains the heart of the full Christian faith and communicates constructively in give and take with higher education.

II

The theological tendency that is the strongest throughout the world today is Kierkegaardian Neo-Calvinism as represented in different ways and degrees, for instance, by Barth, Brunner, and Torrance. Basically this position is Calvinism as reinterpreted through Barth after his immersion in Kierkegaard and consequent conversion by him from liberalism. Actually through Kierkegaard it is also touched by a strain from Luther as well as by existentialism. This drive differs vitally from other returns from liberalism, as for instance that of P. T. Forsyth who maintained throughout an understanding and appreciation of God's work in human reason, in human conscience, and in the order of creation as a whole which Neo-Calvinism rejects.

Nevertheless, this leading theological position is both right and needful in its main affirmations. It claims at its center that the Christian faith in its biblical position is ultimate and cannot, therefore, be classed as a religion or compared with other religions. In the Bible, focussed and fulfilled in the Christ, God has revealed himself, and only there. This revelation is not a matter of ideas but of God's mighty acts, of saving events. Revelation is not propositional truth. Neo-Calvinism furthermore claims that such faith cannot be verified in terms of reason, experience, metaphysics, or history. The less certain and the less real cannot demonstrate or prove what is absolute and eternal. It proclaims that God is not to be found in man or in nature, for God is "wholly other," eternally different from these, and is in no way part of what is created. Barth has backed away from his own most extreme position in the second edition of *Römerbrief* most markedly by his publication of *The Doctrine of the Word of God* (1927), his book on Anselm, *Fides Quaerens Intellectum* (1936), and astonishingly his recent booklet, *Die Menschlichkeit Gottes* (1956). Some of his followers have also become modified "Barthians," but the movement as a whole owes its distinctive nature and power to the emphases we have noted. Throughout the world it is maintaining and in some places gaining strength.

While right and essential in its main contentions, Neo-Calvinism suffers from a false all-or-none analysis. Its primary either-or lacks a secondary both-and. The Christian faith is ultimate; revelation cannot be reduced to propositions; God cannot be proved by anything less than himself; and God is ever other than the creature. Therefore we must ever live by faith in loving obedience. On the other hand Neo-

Calvinism is wrong in its repudiation of reason in its rightful place and legitimate manner. Albeit revelation is a matter of God's self-revelation in events, in history, and supremely in a Person, so that revelation cannot by its very nature be equated with propositional truth; nevertheless revelation must be apprehended, understood, and communicated by means of concepts and propositions. How can people believe unless they have heard and heard the proclaimed word? Barth's theology can perhaps best be called the Theology of the Word, the Word transcending all meaning, surpassing all understanding, and yet also it must be recognized, communicable within and for faith by means of inescapable concepts and sentences.

As for reason's incapacity to prove God, reason does not exist either to create or to establish revelation but to find it, to clarify it, and to apply it. God reveals himself; that is God's part. Man responds to revelation in faith by reason; that is man's part. Revelation and reason are on different planes. One cannot take the place of the other. There is a positive relation between revelation and reason or between reality and man's need. In order to discover this relation man must first decide for and develop integrity of the whole man in actual life and thereafter study as best he can to find what is true and false revelation. In his able *Fides Quaerens Intellectum* Barth goes so far as to accept the inferential use of reason from the basis of revelation. Such acceptance assumes that revelation has a nature that lends itself as a total context for knowledge or to a central focus of perspectives. Beyond this expansion of his standpoint he should have gone on to see that from within this perspective man has the competence, by reason on its own plane, to check and to challenge candidates for revelation and even to be creative in the interpretation of truth. Unless this is so, the cord between revelation and all other truth is cut and we are left with completely arbitrary faith judgments or with a Spirit of Partiality who gives revelation to some and withholds it from others. Man's reason then cannot either create or establish revelation. But reason can help "test the spirits" whether or not they be of God. Similarly by means of experience, history, and nature man cannot prove God, but God's revelation can be self-authenticating in terms of these, providing for us the only true light of what ultimately is, what ought to be, and the road between them. God's revelation through events can therefore provide a meaningful total context for interpreting our existence, values, and aims not only intellectually but especially in terms of judgment and salvation.

Similarly Neo-Calvinism is wrong in its denial of God's presence and revelatory work on the level of creation. Its transcendence does not allow for God's both being himself in a peculiar way and coming into history in his unique Presence while also being present in man and history in a preparatory and pedagogical way. This all-or-none view has too little understanding of the nature of Spirit to remain self-same and yet be capable of different modes of adaptation by means of which God creates and preserves inviolate the conditions for man's self-being and freedom.

The main contribution of this group to higher education is the existentialist grasp that truth in terms of ultimates or of overall contexts is more decisional than

CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY AND HIGHER EDUCATION

informational. It cuts to shreds the pretexts of an objectivist, rationalistic metaphysics or of any system of ethics that fails to see and to heed the fact that there is no presuppositionless thinking and that in matters of total contexts, configurations, and dimensions of knowledge we live more by faith than by knowledge. This genuine and vital contribution we accept gratefully. All-or-none transcendence, however, pulls down the curtain of irrelevance between the Christian faith and higher education. Higher education cannot by field or function deal with revelatory realities within a merely redemptive context. It deals with a world of actualities and problems which it must interpret and on which it must throw concrete light. There must be a real measure of continuity between revelation and education or else they are irrelevantly related. Complete or even basic continuity between them however is not necessary. It is not even possible if revelation is on a different plane from reason.

Neo-Calvinism lacks contextual relevance (in terms of explanation) as well as a relevant standard of judgment. There is no organic relation between revelation, redemption, and creation or between faith and reason that allows for a fruitful exchange between the Christian faith thus interpreted and higher education. Brunner's *Christianity and Civilization* comes the closest to providing a meaningful focus for looking at the problems of civilization and to offering concrete help. But even here he fails to make available a central Christian pattern and to depict overall organic relations. With his comparatively recent acceptance of Agape as the distinctive and determinative motif of the Christian faith he is in position to move into such relevance, but if he does, he will also leave with finality a position of which he is even now only an ambiguous member.

The leading theological tendency of today has sacrificed far too much relational truth to social and religious relativism. When reason is repudiated, the result is relativity among claimed authorities. Therefore there is no basic hope for higher education from Neo-Calvinism. There is much activity within this position and many vital things are being said by its adherents about higher education. But at its heart Neo-Calvinism stands with Fundamentalism in creating an unbridgeable gulf of irrelevance between the Christian faith and higher education.

III

Another movement that has been gaining ground in recent years is the Lund school, the kind of Swedish theology advocated especially by men like Aulén and Nygren. This theological position is best known in America through Gustav Aulén's *The Faith of the Christian Church* and Anders Nygren's *Agape and Eros*.

Nygren shows us how Kant's Copernican revolution of critical philosophy was decisive for consequent thought. Critical philosophy after Kant was seen to deal not with realms of ultimate reality but with principles of validity; not with the region of the transcendent but with the reality of the transcendental; not with a supernatural world beyond this one but with necessities and universalities within experience and

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

for experience. Critical philosophy deals with the preconditions for experience, those necessities without which experience itself is unthinkable. As unconditional necessities, they are not beyond our realm of experience because they do not exist, nor can they be *in* experience and remain unconditional; they are rather the presuppositions unconditionally *of* and *for* experience. Kant found three such realms of experience: the theoretical, the practical, and the aesthetic, each with its own kind of transcendental forms. Not all normativeness for experience in his thought therefore was rational, but there were different types of unconditional categories of and for experience. Nygren accepts Kant's position and builds on it. He goes back of Kant's analysis critically to a category of categories, to an ultimate unity of logical necessity, "the category of eternity." The all-inclusive, ultimate presupposition of experience is therefore the religious category of eternity.

This category of the absolute presupposition for experience however is forever inaccessible to rational metaphysics. Reason cannot deal with ultimate reality, only with principles of validity; not with any transcendent realm, but only with transcendental necessity. Therefore according to Nygren's analysis, choice of ultimates must be made from within experience, from the stuff of history. In history choice must be made among religions that are seen to be organic wholes, with centers from which each religion must be understood. Each religion has a regulative pattern, an organic wholeness from a center, a foundational or *Grundmotiv* in terms of which alone its distinctive and determinative nature can be understood. The center of Judaism is *Nomos* or law; of Hinduism, *Karma* or deed (and consequence); of the Christian faith, *Agape* or God's unconditional, spontaneous, uncalculating, groundless Love creative of fellowship, centered not in the worth of the object but in the unceasingly forgiving nature of the Subject, pictured most vividly in the forgiveness of and redemptive love for enemies.

The task of Christian theology according to this method is not to build a system of search for God from experience, not to construct a metaphysics nor an apologetics but to find in history by a faith judgment which is invulnerable to reason the *Grundmotiv* of the Christian faith which actually is *Agape* and to describe the implications of this motif as they have been developed concretely by the faith of the Church throughout its history. Theology according to the Lund school is as objective, scientific, and intellectually acceptable as physics or biology. The theologian never judges what is ultimate truth or reality nor does he ever defend the faith rationally but merely describes it as competently as possible. No concrete confession of faith as such can be proved necessary to history, but faith itself is inescapable. Therefore faith should choose true revelation by the eyes of faith but never make the mistake of thinking it can or ought to be proved by reason. Can any method be more scholarly and congenial to higher education?

The strength of this position is obvious. Kant rightly pointed out that the traditional arguments for God in the end fell back on the ontological in some form

which simply assumed the identity of thought and being in line with classical thinking.² The evidence however does not support conclusively such an assumption. Therefore rational metaphysics in the traditional sense, especially theological metaphysics, is impossible. At this point the Lund school stands on firm ground. They also maintain correctly that faith selects its religious content from history. Decision among historic faith-judgments is determinative for faith. Practically always however, except in the case of the founders of new religions, the contents of faith are found in concrete historical religions. The Lund school contends convincingly that religions are organic in nature, having concrete centers from which they must be viewed, and that therefore theology in a decisive sense is the description of historic faiths from within their own distinctive and determinative natures.

The faults or shortcomings of this method however are grave. As in the case of Neo-Calvinism, the method cuts all rational relation between the transcendent and the transcendental. The filling of "the category of eternity" by content from history becomes entirely an arbitrary affair. We are once again left with complete religious relativity in the realm of knowledge. The living cord between religion and truth is cut. Consequently higher education is left with a choice for or against a religion that has no rational claim on education and provides no empirical foundation for it.

Then again, although the distinctiveness of faith is valuable for the contextual ordering of knowledge and communication, the distinctiveness of the Christian faith according to the Lund theologians consists in God's revelation of Agape. This is a heavenly reality come into history. But no account is taken of the realms of Eros or Philia (seeking and mutual love respectively), the realms of our actual problems, and no way is opened to account for these realms or to relate the heavenly to the historic. The relation is cut between the realm of redemption and that of creation. The whole aim of the Lund school is to distinguish the Christian faith at its own genuine center from all other religions and human thinking, *not* to relate the faith by providing a context of explanation, judgment, or renewal. Therefore this method does not lend itself naturally to become the framework of meaning for Christian higher education, but it *could* if the aim of the method would become relational, contextual, and renewing.

It should be added, moreover, that the new generation of scholars with Gustaf Wingren as their leader are cutting off the philosophical preamble to Lundensian method.³ Dew-fresh creations, moreover, are still possible from within this movement. It has much to offer contemporary theology, but apart from its radical reconception it is hard to see in it a real hope for a full and organic relation to Christian higher education.

²See Arthur Lovejoy's excellent discussion of this assumption in his *The Great Chain of Being*.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

IV

Analytical linguistic philosophy or verificational analysis is not theology! Even so it should be included because of its immense importance for both modern theology and higher education. It has challenged us to a radical rethinking of Christian language, method, and the relation of Christian faith to other subjects in the curriculum. Incidentally it has kept countless good students from entering the ministry or undermined the vigor of their faith. The pre-ministerial students have seen no way around its claims that theological language, if not the whole enterprise, is meaningless.

Nevertheless, we must understand this movement sympathetically. It arose, primarily perhaps, because the special sciences took over all the fields of knowledge. In giving birth to and bringing up these children, philosophy made itself a superannuated mother with nothing to do. Kant's critical philosophy, for these thinkers, furthermore, debarred it from metaphysics; and plain humility (or loss of nerve) kept it from tackling the job of synthesizing all the data from all the sciences. Analytical linguistic philosophy that actually started as logical positivism accepted as its premises that philosophy is empirically uninformative, that it deals with meaning as its sole province, and that meaning is not to be dealt with psychologically as the denotation of particular words as such but logically within propositions. The task of philosophy became the analysis of the meaning of language, for language was its field and analysis its method. Meaningful truth, this position claimed, must be either certain, that is, totally analytical or tautology, or probable in terms of experienced sense data. Verification by sense data became a basic principle, even criterion, of true philosophy. The ideals of mathematics in analysis and of inventory in the realm of experience underlay the whole movement. It is nominalism carried to its full extreme. Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic*, especially in the first edition, and Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* illustrate generally the earlier stage of this point of view.

In the second edition of his book (1946) Ayer has come out for a different kind of verification principle. He now admits a permissible inference from sense experience like the study of the past from manuscripts and all the necessary inferences of modern physics. "Tough" verification has given way to "weak" or "soft" forms of it. Wittgenstein, again, has shifted from verification to "usage" philosophy in his posthumously published *Philosophical Investigations* (1953). In this view language is not so much a convention to be cleansed by analysis as an organic growth which must be considered for legitimate use. Verification is only one test and kind of usage. The disciplines of analysis and verification in other words have taken on wider contexts.

The appraisal of this point of view in relation to Christian higher education is not easy. It has done us all a service by cutting the ground from under a rationalistic,

³ Cf. his *Theology in Conflict*. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1958.

CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY AND HIGHER EDUCATION

objectivistic metaphysics. This method severed reason from faith, truth from life. It has also focussed philosophy on its main task: the study of meaning. But above all it ought to help us to cut down much unfounded and foolish theological speculation. A flabby faith uses much slippery thinking. Most Christian apologetics is too weak-minded and soft-hearted to pass the bar of competent, fair-minded thinking. We should be well and lastingly rid of it.

On the other hand linguistic analysis provided a convenient refuge from the kind of faith that is properly related to reason. Men seek concealment both against and through their own knowledge. They found it in logical positivism and its successors. One way of reasoning God away, for instance, was the following: certainty has to do with logical propositions or with analytical truth only; all existential truth is contingent; therefore the claim that God exists, that a necessary being exists, confounds logical categories and is literally meaningless. Some even tried to prove the non-existence of God by such logic! Philosophical analysis, in the second place, also removed faith from truth, religion from knowledge, and led to the full extreme, the split between the realm of form or thought and fact or experience. This bifurcation is perhaps the gravest cause today of our lack of religious and social leadership in intellectual realms. Christian higher education with its need for synoptic vision and contextual wholeness is therefore definitely threatened by this severing faith from truth and by this depicting of religion as entirely arbitrary and not subject to knowledge and legitimate education.

What can we do about this position with reference to theology and higher education? The answer is partly that it is itself changing and becoming self-critical. Its advocates need only keep on extending the realm of experience to be explained far enough and they will find themselves right in the midst of theological problems and methods! The experience out of which the analysis comes in the first place is contingent! Therefore the all-or-none split between logical certainty and empirical probability is itself impossible for human beings. With that insight collapses the brittle bifurcation *at its heart*. Or we can show that not only can we not experience "the whole," the world, God, or any other such category completely (one of the main contentions against theology on the part of verificational analysis) but no scientific theory is ever experienced completely, like the salinity of the ocean or the law of gravitation. The position has the appeal of the cleanliness of limited data and of a preconceived and confined method, but after its first intoxicated blindness to the fuller problems of truth, it is already beginning to sober up and will doubtless gradually return to the central concerns of the relation of man's meanings to his existential problems. Christian higher educators can learn much from linguistic analysis without being either floored by it as the destroyer of theology or fooled by it as a revolutionary reorientation of man's total knowledge.

V

Liberal theology is presently under a cloud. It should not be "more than others." Its advocates were great in faith and scholarship. Little apology needs to be made for

old line Liberals like Rauschenbusch, Clark, Brown, and Brightman or for new line Liberals like Bennett, Calhoun, and Walter Horton. Liberalism is characterized by an openness of spirit that is urgently needed. My former colleagues, Roger Shinn and Langdon Gilkey, have pointed out how dangerous can be the people who pass from Fundamentalism into Neo-orthodoxy without the mellowing influence of Liberalism. Liberalism stands for fairness, for understanding and appreciation of other positions than one's own. Liberals at least profess to believe that we are to learn from others, not only fight them. Liberalism stands also for unity of truth both within and between all levels of it, as for instance between faith and reason and between confession and conduct. Liberalism has also evinced an emulable social concern. Men like Rauschenbusch, Gladden, and the Niebuhrs in their early years illustrate this natural combination between the liberal emphasis on truth, reason, experience, love, and social responsibility. Evangelicals of the middle of the Nineteenth Century evinced both social vision and concern, but the overwhelming credit for the acceptance of the organic relation between Christian faith and social ethics must be given to the Liberals. For them social improvement, especially through education, became second nature. What are more important to higher education than an open spirit, respect for truth, and concern? Christian higher education owes a debt of gratitude beyond estimate to its liberal spirits, even its radically non-theological liberal spirits like Dewey and Meiklejohn.

Liberalism failed, all the same, because of its omissions and mistakes. Idealistic in attitude, the Liberals for the most part never took keenly enough to heart man's actual sinfulness. Therefore they developed a theory of objectivity of knowledge that fails to take into account the fact that, as far as ultimate and personal involvements go, men tend to rationalize rather than to reason, that is, to use reason primarily as a means of self-justification, defense, and attack. "The cult of objectivity," as we now see, was largely an ideal. Men will not readily see the saving truth when it is also the demanding judge. There was also a false continuity of method in Liberalism where the ultimate nature of faith (of there being, for instance, no presuppositionless thinking in ultimate matters, of the selective truth's being more real than the aggregative truth, of decision being often more important to education than information) was not clearly perceived and applied. Nor was there a vivid, positive zeal among most Liberals who were more interested in fighting backwardness and narrowness than in paying the costly price of positive zeal, particularly when this meant resolute opposition to partial and killing causes. Liberals were too willing to please. They lacked an effective principle of exclusion. To oppose, to refuse, to deny, to take the persecution for the commitment to absolute causes — such decisive action seems intolerance to easy-going good will. But at many of these points the Neo-Liberals have changed while also preserving some of the best features of Liberalism. We can hardly be thankful enough for its good points, but educationally we never dare to forget that an absolute demands *decision* for the pursuit of a certain course no matter what. Educationally, too, growth is mostly the persistent following of such a course.

VI

One of the most important theological movements for Christian higher education is Neo-Naturalism. In one form or another this drive in theology is best represented by men like Whitehead, Daniel Day Williams, Wieman, Tillich, and Bultmann. These men accept the best in science and aim for adequacy of thinking through philosophy, acknowledging besides the need for mystery as the penetrating counterpart and the constant companion of knowledge. Whitehead, Wieman, and Williams believe that religious thinking must wait on scientific data and philosophic interpretation for intellectual adequacy. Tillich and Bultmann also insist that religious knowledge must not be pre-scientific. For all of them the organic and relational stress of knowledge is of critical importance. Religion as an evaluative response to reality is part of personal, social, and cosmic experience. The stress of the first three thinkers on the organic nature of reality and of knowledge, on the fact that no subject can find its fullest truth apart from the consideration of its relation to other subjects and to the whole, on the togetherness of reality and of value, and on the synoptic approach in general have made their thought of inestimable importance to higher education while their stress on integrity of knowledge, life, values, truth, and the religious life has resulted in the creation of a very high form of religious thought.

Along with Whitehead, Tillich is at the very front of constructive thinking. His elucidation of the Christian faith, his expounding of philosophy, his grasp of historical thought, his understanding of non-Christian religions, his at-homeness in art and culture generally, his immersion in depth psychology, and his capacity to communicate with even hostile spirits in the secular university sets him apart as a minister to higher education. President Pusey of Harvard has related how completely he won over a group of Harvard professors who came to meet him with pronounced skepticism with regard to his religious position. Tillich is more than a profound thinker, however; he is both a prophet and a systematic pioneer. At a time of confusion or regression in constructive thinking Tillich has forged ahead with both deliberate care and accelerating speed. The center of Tillich's position is the relation between the unconditional and the conditioned. Religious reality is the dimension of the unconditional. God does not exist as a Being among beings, but is the unconditional Reality, nowhere existing as such, yet everywhere available as the power to resist non-being and to make for harmony of being. The central scene for Tillich is history where meaning is translated into concrete experience through freedom. Christ is the center of history as the picture in history of the Unconditional. Thus essence and existence meet in him, not in such a way that the Unconditional becomes conditioned but so that the conditioned becomes completely transparent to the Unconditional by the full acceptance of the right relationship between the Unconditional and the conditioned. The Cross is the symbol and power of this relation; and the Resurrection is the declaration in history of the victory in life of Eternity. Eternal life is the releasing and creative participation in this Reality. Love is the symbol that most fully explains and makes available true power and justice. Protes-

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

tantism is the realistic power for self-criticism and creative renewal. The Church is community in the full, inclusive sense revealed in Jesus as the Christ, but all community whether secular or non-Christian exists and has its reality in the true community of the Church as the representative of the Kingdom of God. The theologian must live and think within the circle of a concrete religion, but he lives also in the total life around him. Therefore he mediates between religious and secular thought. The secular world has enough moral and spiritual sense even to be the conscience of the empirical church which is always tempted by idolatry and self-adulation. Between theology and the secular world, therefore, there can be creative co-operation.

Tillich's theology relates itself exceptionally well by its very nature to higher education. His exposition of the faith is centrally Christian in a descriptive and creative sense. It has a piercing quality of first-hand insight. His faith in the general presence of the *logos* provides us with unitive meaning and synoptic vision without reduction of differences, and yet, even so, all meaning is subject to the infinite mystery of the Unconditioned. Few theologians have fuller or truer appreciation of secular learning and culture than Tillich.⁴

Bultmann represents the existentialist kind of Neo-Naturalism. Ontologically he is basically at one, he claims, with existentialist philosophers like Kamlah, Jaspers, and Heidigger. The real difference between them consists in the fact that, whereas the philosophers believe man can make a free positive decision, Bultmann understands that man must rather accept passively "by grace" the working of God in human life. God is the power available to man in the ultimate mystery of being who through man's acceptance of grace can relieve him of anxiety and give him a free decision for the future. Christ exhibited this reality in the Cross and in the Resurrection. These are not objective events in the sense of bare historic occurrences but are rather meaningful events that can and should be re-enacted in the present in response to the proclamation of the Gospel. Christ saves insofar as we know for ourselves the present reality of the losing and finding of self by the overcoming of anxiety and the reception of faith freely open to the future. Insofar as they are meaningful, past and future are both part of the present tense, of the moment for acceptance. Those who have found this reality of overcoming anxiety by the power not themselves are "in Christ," "in faith"; what counts is the original reality of the experience of Jesus and of His Disciples. They interpreted these experiences, to be sure, in objective supernatural terms of a God beyond this world who literally came to earth and paid for man's sin by the shedding of His own blood and by literally rising from death. Modern man trained in science, Bultmann holds, rejects such primitive thinking, but the *original* rather than the *objective* reality of the New

⁴Surprisingly Karl Barth also has such appreciation, but it does not come as the natural outgrowth of his central theological position.

CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY AND HIGHER EDUCATION

Testament Gospel remains: "to offer man an understanding of himself which will challenge him to a genuine existential decision."⁵

The Early Church succumbed however to Stoicism and made a world-view out of the Christian faith. This intellectualizing of the faith was a basic mistake. The New Testament speaks genuinely of a Gospel of Christ's death and resurrection as the power of a new kind of life and community "in Christ" or "in faith." *Weltanschauung* is no part of the Gospel. Bultmann's theology therefore has no contextual capacity for higher education; its power rather is to break down static structures of interpretation imposed on experience in the past that hinder the creative activity of the spirit in its constant need to appraise happenings, to decide concerning their significance, and to provide freedom from anxiety and the motivational connection with "the stream" of reality of which Bultmann speaks in his *Essays, Philosophical and Theological*.

What should be said of Neo-Naturalism in its relation to Christian higher education? Already we have stressed its high and significant relevance. We have also emphasized how profoundly and seminally Christian it is on its descriptive side, especially in the case of Williams, Tillich, and Bultmann. Why, then, can we not come to rest in the Neo-Naturalist position? The real problem is created by Christian theology and concerns the nature of transcendence. This term can be found in their writings or else its obvious equivalents. None of these men is a humanist. Saving reality, God, is radically more than human experience or effort. Nor are they reductionistic Naturalists in the sense of employing a limiting scientific method. The closest to such a view of science is Bultmann, but he goes beyond scientific Naturalism in the narrow sense even in his ontology. They all reject unequivocally, however, the supernaturalism of Christian classical theology. God, for none of them, is the supernatural Creator, the self-sufficient Ruler of plants and planets who is other and more than the best we know both in human experience and in cosmic description, the One who from beyond the world became Incarnate in it, who died for man's sin in His full identification with man and who rose victorious over sin, law, and actual death by the deathless power of His supernatural Love. Classical Christianity with its objective supernaturalism can be treated as symbol or myth but never as factual.

Is this shedding of supernaturalism however not a riddance and relief for honest faith and competent education? Does it not remove from the Christian history or as true ontology. Tillich and Bultmann are most emphatic on this point. theology of today its largest false obstacle separating it from higher education? Has not the demythologizing of the Bible been our biggest task for several generations, now at length recognized and effected? Is it not also true that many who confess to belong to other theological tendencies in fact belong here ontologically? Modernity of assumption is more pervasive of the inner man of education than appears on the surface of confession.

⁵Rudolph Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology," in *Kerygma and Myth* (edited by W. Bartsch), p. 16.

VII

The real problem is not admittedly whether Neo-Naturalism is genuinely biblical or Christian in the historical sense. If it is true, we should all come to it. Radical translation of terms is then justified and we have no right to accuse these men of dishonesty in their use of them. Has not Kant, furthermore, made it impossible ever again to show critically that supernaturalism is true? Kant himself of course is a complex problem at this point, considering the whole history of his writings, and to try to refute him easily is foolish, but the following line of reasoning makes me believe that at its heart classical Christian supernaturalism is not only biblical and historical but actually true. At least I find no equally convincing alternate for faith.

I grant that along the usual lines of thinking Naturalism has a right to say that any thought, experience, or fact, human or cosmic, may be defined as natural. Aside from these facts furthermore we can know nothing. What is revealed, Naturalists say, are only the fuller dimensions of human nature and of the cosmos in which we live. In terms of human experience or thought as such therefore there is no proving of a world beyond this one or of a Being beyond natural beings. Naturalists also have a right to say that trust in unexamined revelation is completely arbitrary and eventuates in intellectual relativism, a choosing of ultimates at will without check or challenge from evidence or reason. Along such lines of procedure Kant of the First Critique remains unanswered; and supernaturalism is mere primitive thinking or at most precritical philosophy.

There are objective facts however that Kant was in no position to consider. We are not left with the choice of either disavowing the cosmological proof entirely or of assuming the ontological along with it. This Kantian cornerstone of modernity is not hewn out of granite of fact nor is it built on marble of reasoning. The facts according to science itself are that we live in a cosmic process that has come to be over unimaginable long ages, by means of new levels of development which, as they become added to previous process, are found not only to fit into it organically but to fulfil it. To believe that such an accumulative series of appearances that have added up to an organic unity of the universe and of the universes has come to be and come together without cause and without reason is to believe in miracle with uncontrolled credulity. When the astounding fact is added that from the point of view of life, personality, and creative community (our relevant data for the criterion of meaningfulness) this process is almost brand new, the abruptness of the process becomes overwhelming. Sir James Jeans has calculated that the time since creation may be compared to Cleopatra's Needle (the obelisk in London); the time of life to a penny on top of it; and the time of civilization to a postage stamp. However many ways there are of approaching or of explaining these facts, they are pivotal for any thinking concerning ultimates. They break all reductionistic Naturalisms except as these are accepted either as ignorant assumptions or as credulous faiths. These facts also forbid all easy assumptions that the description of present process best indicates

the nature of reality. Such a freezing of the process goes contrary to the overwhelming indication of process as on the move, awaiting further development. There are therefore solid facts, indeed, which bridge the gap between the cosmological reasoning and the ontological.

Where, however, does this insight leave us? There is no returning to a rationalistic inductive or deductive reasoning that "proves" God. Kant is right that all reasoning from experience to ultimate reality in the end in some way uses the ontological "proof." Kierkegaard also correctly contended that nothing relative (historical, ethical, or metaphysical) can ever prove God. That the less certain should prove the more certain is obviously logically false. Dorothy Emmet therefore in *The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking* has well dismissed deductive and hypothetical analogies, retaining only those that are existential and co-ordinating. She dismissed too quickly, however, projective analogies. In case the projective analogies are merely the absolutizing of something in history which is obviously relative, Kant and Kierkegaard stand guard against such projective thinking. When the actual bridge between cosmological and ontological reasoning stands forth strong, however, then project thinking changes its intent, status, and effectiveness.

In such a case the entire problem is altered. To make no deliberate choice of ultimates, if a person is mature enough to make such choice, is to retreat from reality and from responsible intellectual and religious leadership. But *all* thinkers have assumed presuppositions, some stance towards reality, some configuration of experience that indicates what they actually consider to be most important and most real. The right response to reality is consequently to have as true and effective interpretation of ultimate reality and meaning as possible.⁶ All have to live by faith, the only question is by what *kind* of faith they live. William James is right that there are live, forced, and momentous options among which we must actually take our choice. Brand Blanshard in his Presidential Address to the American Theological Society, 1956, made a strong reply to William James, however, to the effect that it is unethical ever to go beyond the facts, to make any leap of faith at all not warranted by the facts, for such choice is actually the confusing or substituting of faith for knowledge. At this point we all have to be utterly scrupulous and critical. No leap into ultimates gives us new knowledge. Such a leap may put us into position to receive new knowledge from beyond present process. After all, new knowledge *has* come into process in the past and we are in no position to deny that new facts do appear or that new insights might throw fuller or different light on ultimate questions. Since no leap gives us knowledge however, we can say no more than that we *must have* some co-ordinating presupposition on presuppositions for thinking, for the total configuration of life, and that therefore we should choose the one that seems least arbitrary.

We are then led back again to our facts concerning the origins of the world we know. Not to acknowledge a creative Ground of cause and reason behind, before, or inexplicably within process which is more than present process and which accounts

⁶This argument is worked out at length in my *Faith and Reason*.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

the least arbitrarily for it is to be facing the past by infinite reduction or to be parochially frozen within the present. When our faith stands in whatever best accounts in process for its development, its unity, its meaning, and its fulfilment, it is the least arbitrary. Not that we have therefore cleared up the mystery of the new or of creation! But transcendence⁷ becomes the least arbitrary content of our faith if it can be shown to have organic relations to the other levels and if it can be seen to explain inclusively the meaning of the total process with the richest explanatory adequacy we can find.

Translated into theological terms this means that incarnation and eschatology are primary to thinking. Knowledge of ultimates must be had from within experience and process. God becomes man, enters human experience and process to reveal Himself. It means also that knowledge is eschatological in the sense that incarnation points forward towards the consummation of creation. The redemption of creation by means of incarnation takes place in time directed toward the future. Such theology springs out of our actual knowledge situation. We Christians believe in the Incarnation, that God came in Christ as the fullness of time. In such a case eschatology becomes the fulfilment inclusively of what has come once for all conclusively in Jesus as the Christ. God is the personal Spirit who is holy Love. We do not know Him in His eternal glory, but we do know Him as such Love from within our bounds of time and space. Furthermore it is important for education that the Holy Spirit is biblically defined as the Spirit of Truth. When God came in Jesus Christ as the personal Spirit who is Holy Love, He came as the personal Event that is also the center of meaning. The living Christ then becomes the context, judge, and transformer of all knowledge. If this is correct theology, how does our analysis refer to all the contemporary tendencies we have described and evaluated?

VIII

In the light of our analysis we can see that it is possible to keep the Fundamentalists' emphasis on "evangelical supernaturalism" without their obscurantist literalism of biblical inspiration and of propositional revelation that shuts them off from the open inquiry of higher education. We should also rejoice in the Neo-Calvinist stress on the transcendence of God and on His revelation in events, particularly in the history of salvation and in the Christ, without accepting its pitting of redemption over against creation and event over against meaning. As a protest movement to establish the primacy of the transcendence of God and of His self-revelation in the Word, we have needed this movement, but now it is time to see how transcendence and incarnation are related to God's ubiquity and to His work in creation and history. The Lund school of theology can teach us about the distinctiveness of the Christian faith by means of its dominant and determinative motif, *Agape*, and the need for patience and critical care in the description of what is truly


⁷Obviously, transcendence need not be conceived of *directionally*, only dimensionally.

Christian, but we need not with them deny to reason its proper place of interpreting and of relating the faith. If we release the full power of the Christian faith, however, we shall in all three of these movements find a classical Christianity which while remaining itself can be related both contextually and motivationally to the needs of Christian higher education.

In the case of the last three movements discussed — Linguistic Analysis, Neo-Liberalism, and Neo-Naturalism — the problem has been a forfeiting of the transcendence or the distinctiveness of the Christian faith. We have seen, however, how it is possible competently and honestly to go beyond the strictures on faith inherited from Kant. We share with the Linguistic Analysts their revulsion to slippery Christian apologetics and covet their drive for cleanliness of thought. We believe too that the day of an objective rationalistic metaphysics as a legitimate approach to ultimate questions is over, but we know that their position is the extreme illustration of a false bifurcation between thought and fact and that fact cannot be tied down to sensationalism. We are therefore hopeful that beyond their function as a cleansing fire, the Analysts will become creatively constructive within the bounds of their genuinely critical insights. The Liberals need to encourage us to openness of spirit, width of view, and the unity of truth both in thought and in life. Their accommodation of spirit makes for co-operative inquiry with those in higher education, but we need not on that account lose decisiveness of truth nor distinctiveness of theological method.

The Naturalists we have already appraised by means of our own constructive analysis. Their lack is an effective method for the understanding and pointing to adequate and effective transcendence. They, above all others, are offering higher education relevant stimuli and contextual suggestions. Whitehead's influence should grow in the field of higher education and there are some indications to this effect. Tillich's *Dynamics of Faith* shows how very much a dynamic and creative religious thinker can offer motivationally as well as intellectually to Christian higher education. Daniel Day Williams is one of the most effective speakers in the Faculty Christian Fellowship. We share with these thinkers their horror for an arbitrary revelationism, unsupported by genuine data and by reasoning from within the processes of our modern educational activities. These processes can be opened up to the truth of classical Christianity precisely by the use of legitimate reasoning about the facts already established by modern educators. We need primary thinkers to do this.

Creative Christian higher education is a high challenge during these days of rapid intellectual and cultural transition. No facile solution will do and no fixed formula will ever satisfy the constantly dynamic enterprise of education. I am convinced, however, that a new age of constructive leadership for civilization can come if we appropriate the universal truth of the Christian revelation in Christ and apply this with both experimental caution and bold creative courage to the ever expanding and deepening problems of higher education. Only such a constructive undertaking can entitle us to use the name Christian higher education.



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The Inarticulate Roots of Free Values

PETER VIERECK

"The trouble with conservative literature," remarked Henry Seidel Canby, "has been that one had to be a liberal in order to write it!" His remark is often quoted to score a point against conservatives. Let us applaud his remark insofar as it gives a healthy jolt to their frequent smug stupor; Mill called conservatives "the stupid party," and conservatives are the first to agree, their stupid inability to theorize in a vacuum being the source both of their weakness and of their strength. But let us partly qualify Mr. Canby's remark insofar as it attacks conservatives not merely for being stupid but for being inarticulate. The pride of conservatives, from Coleridge on, has been that their philosophy is inarticulate, inexpressible,¹ an organic history-rooted growth, not an ideology nor a conscious economic or political program.

It is only fitting that nimble-minded, logical liberals should be the ones who (in Canby's words) "write conservative literature." So doing, they and they alone give conservatism a program, a clearcut ideology. The ideology they give to conservatism has only one little fault: it is incorrect. For it has nothing to do with the real spirit of conservatism. Except for this imperceptible drawback, their clearcut ideologizing of conservatism has all the major "literary virtues": it is what editors call well-organized; it lends itself to being classified in some neat pigeon-hole; it provides the comfortable feeling of presenting to you, black on white, everything Marjorie Jane needs to know about conservatism on her fourteenth birthday, complete with diagrams and glossary. Examples of such articulate conservatives — that is, such liberals of conservatism — are those who advocate conservatism as a program or party. Most of those current tomes will tell you less about the conservative spirit, its strength and its weakness, than these thirteen casual words recently retorted by a Conservative M.P. when chided for imprecision: "If I could define my views with precision, I wouldn't be a Conservative."

Self-respect resists being pigeon-holed. The mania for categories (What is your civil service rank? Are you a sadist or a masochist?) does as little to explain the seamless unity of reality as does that "precise defining of your terms" so dear to semanticists. On the contrary: imprecise necessities — like the words "conservatism," "freedom," "religion" — ought to be used imprecisely. Reality itself is unsymmetrical, ungeometrical, imprecise.

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¹Sometimes it takes conservatives, from Coleridge on, a thousand articulate pages to express how inarticulate, how inexpressible they are.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

It may be generalized that the conservative mind does not like to generalize. Conservative theory is anti-theoretical. Cardinal Newman defined Toryism as "loyalty to persons," liberalism as loyalty to abstract slogans. Liberalism argues, conservatism simply is. When conservatism becomes argued, systematized, self-conscious, then — like some French conservatives but no British ones — it resembles the liberalist rationalists it opposes. It then becomes a mere liberalism of conservatism — meaning: a mere doctrinaire theorizing of conservatism. The mentality of liberal rationalism consciously articulates abstract programs; the mentality of conservatism unconsciously embodies concrete traditions. Hence the wise stupidity, stupor, stolidity of the inarticulate conservative temperament. It is a temperament so stupid that it never invented brilliant, irrefutable utopias sending millions to the guillotine; so stupid that it never joined the most advanced reasoners of its age in donning French "Liberty caps" in the 1790's or signing pro-Soviet manifestos of the misnamed League Against War and Fascism in the 1930's.² Because conservatism embodies rather than argues, its most valuable insights are not sustained theoretical works nor well-organized, clearly presented, and geometrically consistent treatises, as in the case of liberal rationalism. Rather its most valuable insights are the quick thrust of epigrams, as in the writings of Metternich, Disraeli, Tocqueville, Burckhardt, Churchill, or the nuggets concealed within the disorganized, wonderfully helter-skelter jottings of Coleridge, the most imaginative, most incoherent conservative of them all. To support the above position against that majority of readers who want a "message" organized, consistent, and edifying, let us recall one warning from Yeats, one from Emerson.

Yeats: "Man can embody truth, but he cannot know it." Poetry tends to embody truth, prose to know it. Conservatism tends to embody truth, liberalism to know it. Hence conservatism more often occurs among minds of artistic imagination, liberalism among analytic scientific minds. Because conservatism stresses concrete emotional loyalties more than allegiance to abstract syllogisms, it overlaps more frequently with poetry (that crystalization of the emotional and the concrete) than do any other political isms. The most important conservative minds of nineteenth-century England were also leading poets — Coleridge, Wordsworth, Newman, Arnold — or else at least literary figures of a primarily poetic imagination — Carlyle, Disraeli. A comment similar to Yeats's occurred in Emerson's journal of 1838 (because himself no conservative, note that the liberal Emerson first con-

²Apropos conservatives being too stupid to appreciate the brilliant abstract blueprints of communism, the statistics of the Roper and Gallup polls of 1945 and 1946 about Russia are worth recalling. In both polls the educated American tended to trust Russia's peaceful intentions while the uneducated, the ill-informed, the very poor, were far more skeptical about Russia. The latter groups, to quote Roper's analysis, "inclined to charge Russia with dark and sinister intentions," while the educated classes and "those who knew something about Russia" leaned, on balance, "strongly toward friendly understanding." Whereupon a more sarcastic editor commented in 1952: "to predict accurately in 1945 that Russia would act as Russia has acted, you had to be as dumb and poorly informed as an ox."

THE INARTICULATE ROOTS OF FREE VALUES

sidered as "a defect" what the conservative Yeats considered a strength): "Once I thought it a defect peculiar to me, that I was confounded by interrogatories and when put on my wits for a definition was unable to reply without injuring my own truth; but now, I believe it proper to man to be unable to answer in terms the great problems put by his fellows: it is enough if he can live his own definitions."

The liberal and prosaic rationalist defines his life; the conservative and poetic intuitionist "lives" (in Emerson's phrase) his definition. Both seem necessary; the fact that the liberal rationalist wins any logical, verbalized debate does not make him the more necessary of the two. Leading the right life is not the same as being right in a debate. Defending a free society is not the same as defending syllogisms about freedom.

According to a Burkean definition by the contemporary Chicago scholar, Stanley Pargellis: "The rationalist or the liberal frames his political decisions in accordance with some theory derived from an abstract notion of universal truth; the conservative takes into consideration an extremely wide variety of [concrete] acts . . ." In the light of this distinction, let us contrast a typical British approach and a typical French approach and then contrast their possible consequences on the battlefields of 1940.

The traditionalism of the British expresses both the dreadful inefficiency and the wonderful deep-rootedness of their old winding roads, their old non-decimal weights, measures, coins. These seemingly silly old relics the rationalist is itching to straighten out by introducing the admittedly more efficient French metric system of decimal weights, measures, coins. If the latter could be taken by themselves alone, they would be improvements. But you cannot adopt these quintessences of French rationalism without also adopting the mentality of abstract blueprints that produced them and accompanies them. The metric system, in place of the awkward local traditional systems of measure, was adopted in every country conquered physically or spiritually by the invading armies of the French Revolution; it was not adopted by those awkward, traditionalist islanders who alone held out uncompromisingly from start to finish against revolution. They thereby saved the liberty of Europe, in the 1790's as in 1940.

The word "metric system" is being used here as a shorthand, symbolizing all the other rational but deracinating changes that tend to accompany it, such as reorganizing the old, loyalty-encrusted provinces into impersonal, geometric-shaped departments. This latter sacrifice of biology to mathematics, of history to abstraction was likewise rejected in England, adopted in France. Every culture must choose between a conservative inefficiency that has historic continuity and an efficient rationality that lacks historical continuity. England pays a high price for its choice: the lack of a modern coherent system of weights, measures, coins, departments, roads. But that loss is compensated for many times over by the following gain: in

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

time of crisis, a concrete-minded country stands deep-rooted and firm for its ancient concrete liberties at some glorious Battle of Britain, while an abstract-minded country, blest with efficient metric systems and with new universal Rights of Man, falls rootless in some Battle of France. Who the devil wants to die fighting for a geometric-shaped province?

Such considerations make G. K. Chesterton's "The English Road" not only a delightful poem in its own right but a perfect crystallization of the conservative nature of liberty:

Before the Roman came to Rye or out to Severn strode
The rolling English drunkard made the rolling English road,
A reeling road, a rolling road, that rambles round the shire;
And after him the parson ran, the sexton and the squire. . . .
I know no harm of Buonaparte and plenty of the Squire,
And for to fight the Frenchman I did not much desire;
But I did bash their baggonets because they came arrayed
To straighten out the crooked road an English drunkard made.

Among Slavs, this distinction between traditionalist England and rationalist France repeats itself. Scorned by liberals for their backwardness, but thereby being able to maintain their historic continuity, the inefficient, religious, superstitious, bigoted peasants of Poland battled against Hitler's tyranny more heroically and also more effectively than the efficient, rational, unbigoted, modern-minded tradesmen of Czechoslovakia. You cannot revel too joyfully in the superior logic of your scientific roads and your inorganic geometric institutions without giving up your organic historic continuity; and who gives that up gives up the first foundation of free values. Bigoted old prejudices, stubborn hereditary ignorances may seem the loathsome dung of history to the enlightened progressive, but from that dung the tree of liberty draws its tempest-resisting fortitude. Again and again in history it is not abstract liberals, with fine sentiments and irrefutable syllogisms but the stubborn bigoted traditionalists who risk their necks to stop the Hitlers, the Stalins, and our own little Huey Long's and McCarthy's.

"A virtue to be serviceable," said Samuel Butler, "must, like gold, be allied with some commoner but more durable metal." For "virtue" substitute "civil liberties;" the durable metal, without which the gold of liberty is unserviceable, is the concreteness of irrational ancient custom.

Science and Religion

Which Way Rapprochement?

JOHN D. GARHART

Since the days when John Thomas Scopes was the most famous ex-school-teacher in America the shooting war between science and religion has been much abated. And while the intellectual scene has lost a certain excitement in the process, it probably is just as well that truth no longer has to suffer the slings and arrows of the more wildly outrageous partisans of Moses and Darwin. Unfortunately the shooting war was replaced, not by some fecund association between the erstwhile opponents, but by the withdrawal of both parties into a sort of tolerant neutrality.

Only within the last decade has there been a broad and systematic effort to meet what the Danforth Foundation and the Pennsylvania State University have joined in calling "the need for some real rapprochement between the field of science and the field of religion." In 1953, '54, and '55 these two organizations endeavored to meet this need in the standard pattern of Danforth Seminars. A group of college teachers of science was brought together with leaders from the field of religion and the relations between these two areas were studied. In 1956 this pattern was changed and the professors of religion met to discuss these problems under the guidance of scientists.

The chief and permanent member of this group of guides was Dr. Harold K. Schilling, Professor of Physics and Dean of the Graduate School of the Pennsylvania State University. To his established reputation in science Dr. Schilling has added in recent years a growing reputation as an interpreter of science to theologians and vice versa, through his leadership in groups of this kind.

At the end of this seminar Dr. Luther Harshbarger, Penn State chaplain and chairman of the seminar, asked for our suggestions for the next year. We had barely made a beginning at our topic: "The Natural Sciences: Their Nature and Relation to Religion." Consequently most of us favored a continuation of the study the following summer with the majority of the new group recruited from our own seminar and from the three seminars of science teachers that had preceded it. Our thought was that such a group would have the necessary background to go deeper into the subject and to arrive at some conclusions.

This proposal was put into effect at Penn State on June 16, 1957. Dr. Schilling and Dr. Harshbarger were with us once again. With them, to provide guidance in theological thought, was Dr. John Dillenberger, Professor of Theology at the Har-

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THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

vard Divinity School. The leadership was splendid and the members of the group were both competent and congenial, but at the end of the session the hope of the previous year's optimists had vanished. We had no significant conclusions. Why?

While they were without doubt valuable educational experiences, the previous seminars had not produced the broad base of common understanding between the two fields that we had expected. In most cases neither the scientist nor the theologian was entirely clear as to what the other thought he was doing or the way in which he proposed to go about doing it. The seminar was to explore "the nature, content, and methodologies of both disciplines and their inter-relationships." But it took us so long to reach a minimal understanding with regard to nature and methods that we had no time for effective exploration of the inter-relationships.

Progress also was delayed while inter-discipline rapport was established. Some of the scientists approached theology with a caution reminiscent of Houdini visiting a seance. And some of the theologians seemed prepared to greet the scientist's effort at theology with amused condescension. Only the development of friendships outside of our formal meetings exorcised the curse of professional parochialism. All in all, it took more than half the time we were together to reach the point at which some of us had fondly imagined we were going to start. The moral of this is that there is a genuine gulf between science and religion as they actually are carried on today; no amount of good will or vague generalization will make it go away.

A second major obstacle to our progress toward conclusions was the unfocused nature of our discussion. Dr. Schilling and Dr. Dillenberger had found it impossible to meet together to co-ordinate their lectures, and their efforts to remedy this through correspondence, while laudable, were not particularly successful. But the difficulty in bringing our thought to some focus stemmed primarily from the diffuse nature of the question with which we were trying to deal. Our concern for a rapprochement between science and religion naturally raised the question of their nature and inter-relation. But unless this sort of question is cut down into bite-size pieces, ten days of discussion is not going to do much with it. The seminar, however, in approaching the problem that confronted it, seemed to aspire to ubiquity.

In addition to revealing these difficulties the seminar also pointed the way to improving the situation. This was particularly true of the problem of developing understanding between the representatives of these two disciplines. The answer is to expose people to science and religion in actual operation. We had the opportunity to see research being carried on last summer at a nuclear reactor and to visit the laboratory of Dr. Erwin Müller, inventor of the ion emission microscope. Seeing science being done at close quarters provided us with a kind of understanding that our talk about science had lacked.

In our discussion it had been asked whether Dr. Müller *really* photographed atoms. But discussing the proper definition of "photograph" and "atom" does not lead to a satisfactory answer to a question of this sort. So we went and watched

what he did and saw his results for ourselves. Then "photographing atoms" became a convenient verbal symbol for our experience and ceased to be part of a proposition for debate. It is through direct contacts of this sort that the methods of science and the nature of its operational definitions become clear to men outside the field.

A similar sort of contact is necessary to understand religion. Here the obvious temptation is to draw analogies between visits to laboratories and the participation of our group in daily worship. But this was not the point at which the scientists had their difficulties. They had been in churches, but they had never been inside theology.

Dr. Dillenberger helped to remedy this almost by accident. One evening he wandered from his subject in search of an illustration and suddenly found himself at grips with the question of the theological necessity of the doctrine of the Virgin Birth. Previously he had been presenting us with answers at which he already had arrived. Now we were permitted to see the way in which he had labored to reach those answers. It became clear that for him this problem could not be solved by determining the ancient Hebrew usage of "almah" or by studying the latest laboratory reports on parthenogenesis. What was involved was a total structure of divine revelation in history and the witness of the religious community to which that revelation was committed. The primary concern was not the intellectual respectability of miracles but the religious experience of Christians. To the degree that this approximated an operational definition, Dr. Dillenberger was speaking a language familiar to scientists, and they gained insight into his thought.

In our efforts at rapprochement between these two disciplines we often pass out our conclusions with an almost reckless abandon, while doing very little to clarify our methods of reaching those conclusions. Thus each field tends to expect the wrong things from the other. Theologians are appalled by a lack of epistemological justification for experimental generalizations, and scientists demand in vain the experimental evidence for theological formulations. Simply multiplying discussions of the nature, content, and methodology of these disciplines will not overcome this difficulty. Interested members of each field must be given opportunities to see science and theology actually being done, if not to practice the techniques of both laboratory science and formal logic.

The peculiar quality of Dr. Schilling's leadership in these seminars stems from the fact that he knows both science and religion from the side of practical experience as well as from the side of theory and theology. The rapprochement we seek would be materially advanced if more men in both fields approximated his background of theory and practice in both. With the state of knowledge that exists today this would mean for the theologian that he should gain some first hand experience in the actual practice of laboratory science. In general it is at the point of the experimental method that he is weakest. And the scientist should seek direct understanding of the systematic structure and logical method that belongs to theology, because this seems to be his chief blind spot.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

A solution for the unfocused nature of our discussion of the inter-relationships between these fields cannot be illustrated so easily from the experience of the seminar. However, the recognition of the problem probably supplies the answer. Inter-relationship does not take place in general, but operates at particular points of contact. It is to the investigation of these specific areas that we must direct our attention. Two suggestions will illustrate this co-operative investigation.

The first suggestion is concerned with the importance of the created order within the doctrine of revelation. Do the works of creation actually "declare the glory of God"? And, if so, in what way, to what degree and with what effect? Here we might expect fruit from the collaboration of those who study the details of the created order and those who specialize in the nature of revelation itself.

Another useful discussion might center in the problems of methodology. The effectiveness of operational definitions in the field of science is well known. Historical theology also contains statements that are more nearly operational than logical. For example, a common Biblical description of God is in terms of the events in which He has been active within the history of His people, rather than in the abstract categories of ontology. Therefore, if each of these disciplines is going to make some significant appeal to experience and to the operations and events involved in it, it might be well for them to exchange notes on the methods that they use and the rules by which they test the validity of their conclusions.

The experience of our seminar indicated that such a common methodological enrichment is possible. As a member of the group we had Dr. Terence Penelhum of the University of Edmonton, a representative of those contemporary descendents of logical positivism who denominate themselves simply as analysts. When it became clear that Dr. Penelhum did not share the religious prejudices usually associated with Ayer and Carnap, his comments on the issues under discussion were sought with great interest, since he represented a viewpoint not precisely identified with either science or religion. Both scientists and theologians were impressed by the usefulness of the analytic methods in the examination of our problems. Subsequent gatherings might well include such a catalyst for the discussion.

The seminar ended with a mild sense of regret that we had not accomplished more in the way of specific conclusions. In spite of this, the dominant note at the time of parting was one of hope for the future. We had formed new friendships, gained new perspectives, and carried with us the conviction that seeds had been planted from which something of significance was likely to grow. We didn't arrive, but we offer the record of our travels with the hope that they form a part of the march toward a genuine rapprochement between the fields of science and religion.

Books and Publications

Literary Criticism: A Short History

By William K. Wimsatt, Jr. and Cleanth Brooks. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1957. \$6.95

This book is quite rightly to be regarded as a major work. It moves through the course of western criticism with learning and freshness; it works from pre-suppositions that are supple and flexible, yet without denying or distorting the basic position of the authors. It suggests intricacies of relationship which wear a very different guise from those usually suggested in the guidebooks. And beneath these various specific achievements there stands a wise and often witty harmony of judgment about the discord of critical history.

The job which Mr. Wimsatt and Mr. Brooks set themselves is, of course, uniquely difficult; for they move through the whole European tradition — not pretending to "cover" its detail but attempting (and I think successfully) to do something even less possible. The book is designed to give the sweep and motion of western critical thought and to suggest quite precisely what its major cruxes have been. Of the many aspects of the book which are worth special comment this seems to me the most remarkable — to fuse in one sustained insight the development of critical theory as the relative beginner needs to know it and the modification of that same theory as the advanced scholar needs to be reminded of it. The book has succeeded in making critical history coherent, in short, without making it inflexibly neat and tidy.

The secret of this success may lie in the fact that the most central and familiar issues of criticism are the ones seen most vigorously from a new point of view. The distinction between classical and neoclassical catharsis, for instance, or the concept of poetry as picture, or the interpretation of romantic imagination — in cases such as these the book is uniquely perceiving. The value of such insight, furthermore, goes beyond the individually "new" ideas themselves; it leads us to recognize again the power in a genuinely original perception of time-worn and presumably "settled" problems.

In other words this book is an exemplar of a particularly important way of using the mind — a way followed both in the chapters by Mr. Wimsatt and those by Mr. Brooks.

The intensity of the neoclassic crusade to see that the sinful protagonist suffered the death-penalty — and that no innocent character did — may obscure for us a reactionary but equally simplistic trend of that time toward the luxury of pity for innocence injured. The cases had much in

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

common, for in either the Aristotelian tension was resolved. And in either the Aristotelian catharsis of undesirably soft emotions (pity and fear) slides conveniently into a new and sentimentalized version of catharsis — such as that which Dryden in the Preface to his *Troilus and Cressida* adapts from Rapin: not catharsis (or "abatement") of fear and pity, but abatement of such aggressive and evil emotions as pride and anger through the *feeding and watering* of the soft-hearted emotions of fear and pity. Thus the most nearly amenable classic doctrine became, by a sufficient deflection, an authority on the side of the coming ethics of benevolent feeling.

Even in so brief a passage as this we can see the book's characteristic method — an almost oblique summoning up of those facts which should be commonly known (in this case the neoclassic attitude toward dramatized guilt and innocence), but a central emphasis on the meaning of mutation within the continuity of western thought (in this case the radical shift from *catharsis* as a hardening process to *catharsis* as a softening and mollifying process).

To this allusive structure the book owes its remarkable sense of inclusiveness — of range and depth without satiating detail. Mr. Brooks' way of achieving these qualities varies from Mr. Wimsatt's, of course, but they are equally central to his rhetoric.

As an instance of adequate metaphor Tate adduces "Ripeness is all," as spoken by Edgar in *King Lear*. This figure is not imposed upon the experience "as an explanation" of it. Rather

the figure rises from the depths of Gloucester's situation. . . . Possibly *King Lear* would be as good without Edgar's words; but it would be difficult to imagine the play without the passage ending in those words. They are implicit in the total structure, and concrete quality, of the whole experience that we have when we read *King Lear*.

One must be careful in assigning very precise meanings to phrases like "grow out of the material" and "implicit in . . . the whole experience," which are themselves figurative. But surely they seem to discountenance the view that the imagination is merely whimsical. They suggest that the imagination obeys laws implicit in the human psyche. They even seem to demand the assumption that all human experience is finally one.

Here the insight is "progressive" in the sense that each observation suggests a further one. We move in three sentences from a specific critical judgment to a hazarded general theory of personality and knowledge; we move from the outward sign of criticism to its center and source.

These two examples are not isolated; they suggest the tenor of the whole book — its willingness to judge but its lack of dogmatic arrogance, its true learning

modestly employed, its insight. I find it hard to overestimate the value of *Literary Criticism* as an instrument toward the forming of sound literary judgment. It does not pretend to teach "taste" or a method of analysis; it does something far more important. Implied in the history of western literary thought are the permanent critical questions. History for Wimsatt and Brooks becomes the instrument of that permanence, the revelation of enduring critical significance through change, distortion and partiality of the last twenty-five hundred years.

DOUGLAS KNIGHT

Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays

By Northrop Frye. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1957. 383 pages, \$6.00

Someone has recently remarked that criticism is at the moment the most cluttered and untidy of all the intellectual disciplines. The fact that ours has been an age of intense and often fruitful critical activity has made confusion inevitable. The more casual reader may be forgiven for sometimes thinking that the noises he hears emanating from the worksite of the house of criticism are actually incident to the building of a tower of Babel.

The attempts to tidy up the scene began some time ago. The standard work that orders and relates the various modes of literary study was (and, in your reviewers's opinion, remains) *Theory of Literature* by Rene Wellek and Austin Warren. But Northrop Frye's *Anatomy of Criticism* is a most ambitious and indeed a most impressive attempt at a synthesis of the various literary disciplines. Frye has read, one is inclined to say, just about everything, including the comparative religionists, Freud, Jung and the other depth psychologists, the anthropologists, philosophers like Cassirer and Langer and the other experts on symbolism, all the critics, and, what is very much to the purpose here, everybody who has contributed to Anglo-American literature from Beowulf to James Joyce.

The encyclopedic character of the book does not, however, make it solemn and portentous. It is lively, ingenious, and frequently very daringly argued. But since *Anatomy of Criticism* aspires to sketch out a complete system of literary scholarship, one has to expect the highly elaborate system of classification that goes with such a total scholarship. The four "essays" that constitute the book have to do with historical, ethical, archetypal, and rhetorical criticism. But to cite these titles is only to hint at the complexity of organization. For the four essays induct us into the theory of "modes," "symbols," "methods," "genres," and — to take only one of these — the theory of the symbol involves "Literal and Descriptive Phases: Symbol as Motif and as Sign"; "Formal Phase: Symbol as Image"; "Mythical Phase:

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

Symbol as Archetype"; and "Anagogic Phase: Symbol as Monad." Thus, as the term "anagogic" suggests, Dante's four kinds of poetic meaning join Aristotle's six aspects of tragedy (plot, character, thought, melody, diction, and spectacle), not to mention clusters of other terms developed from the time of Aristotle to that of Empson, in order to provide the elaborate terminology required to deal with the great manifold of notions which Frye sets before us.

Frye's tidying-up process does not mean to leave us with a room empty, swept, and garnished save for the furniture that he himself has put into it. On the contrary all the present furnishings are to be retained but neatly arranged in proper order. Frye aims at a "synoptic view of the scope, theory, principles, and techniques of literary criticism." He does not mean to attack any "methods of criticism." What his book does attack is "the barriers between the methods. These barriers tend to make a critic confine himself to a single method of criticism, which is unnecessary, and they tend to make him establish his primary contacts, not with other critics, but with subjects outside criticism."

As the last phrase indicates, Frye is zealous to preserve the autonomy of "criticism" (that is, the general study of literature) and yet to vindicate such study as a civilizing force and one which will even help us build a society of a special kind, "free, classless, and urbane." Whether his *Anatomy of Criticism* actually escapes the embarrassments of every other scheme which would make literature autonomous and yet at the same time fruitful for the human enterprise, I am not so sure. Those of us who emphasize the autonomy of literature usually end by being charged with asserting an irresponsible aestheticism. Frye's present effort seems to me to run the opposite risk of setting up the study of literature as a kind of substitute for religion, though Frye, to be sure, makes his disclaimers on this head.

The place that the "new criticism" is made to assume in Frye's scheme will throw some light on his aims and methods. Frye would prefer to call this variety of criticism "rhetorical criticism." I am not altogether happy about the substituted term but it certainly represents an improvement on the vague and misleading adjective "new." At any rate, since this kind of criticism has had its prominence in our time, Frye adverts to it again and again.

Some of his comments represent acute and perceptive judgments: "The critics who tell us that the basis of poetic expression is irony, or a pattern of words that turns away from obvious . . . meaning, are much closer to the facts of literary experience . . ." (p. 81), "Thus the metaphor turns its back on ordinary descriptive meaning, and presents a structure which literally is ironic and paradoxical" (p. 123); but in other passages he seems to acquiesce in the view that "rhetorical criticism" is preoccupied with mere detail and has no concern for the larger structures (p. 140). At any rate Frye would add to what he regards as its characteristic lyric focus, a concern for plot and action; to its focus on the literary artifact, a concern for history and biography; and to its stress upon the unique work, a concern for

literary conventions and genres. If a person of my critical sympathies has been inclined to take this kind of filling out and completion for granted, there is, it must be admitted, something to be said for spelling it out. And if one means by "criticism," as Frye does, the total concern for the literary process, then much which one has subsumed under the varieties of scholarship must be fitted into an "Anatomy" of criticism. (With regard to the general relation of "new" or rhetorical criticism to genre theory, it will be interesting to the reader to turn back to what Wellek and Warren said on the subject some ten years ago in their *Theory of Literature*.)

Frye's ambition is to develop criticism in the direction of a science, a kind of "social science," and in accord with this view, he consistently plays down value judgments as incorrigibly subjective and really unnecessary. He is surely right in distinguishing between the history of taste and criticism proper. He is right again in pointing out how frequently our prejudices and ethical judgments dominate our value judgments in literature. But ought criticism to "show a steady advance toward indiscriminating catholicity"? If the study of literature is developed toward a social science, can it ever become a "value-free" social science, and if so, is it desirable that it should become such? I could wish that Frye had developed this point more fully and more clearly. He does write that "the critic will find so, and constantly, that Milton is a more rewarding and suggestive poet to work with than Blackmore." But substitute other names, and the issue is not so clear. And if the issue in this instance is clear, could one not ground the judgment in something objective? Frye uses the obvious superiority of Milton to Blackmore to suggest that one won't want to waste time "in belaboring the point." Blackmore is certainly a very small lion and one that is much too dead for one to waste bullets on. But there is plenty of live game: there are discriminations to be made and presumably worth making. A criticism that finds it beneath its purposes to "criticize" has moved far toward a neutral and "scientific" scholarship.

Though Frye has insisted that he merely wishes to relate *all* the various kinds of criticism to each other, it is his treatment of archetypal criticism that gives the special character to his book. Certainly it is of archetypal imagery that he writes with most zest and brilliance, and in his general ordering of the various disciplines archetypal criticism is assigned a very special role. Indeed, Frye gives first importance to archetypal criticism in the task of breaking down the barriers that separate the various kinds of criticism.

The subtitle of his section on archetypal criticism is called "Theory of Myths." Frye finds that there are four narrative categories: the romantic, the tragic, the comic, and the ironic or satiric. These he associates with the four seasons of the year. Romance, for example, is the mythos of summer. In romance there is something of the wish fulfillment dream — there is a persistent nostalgia for some kind of golden age. The complete form of the romance is the successful quest. In the completed quest can be discerned three main stages: the perilous journey, the crucial struggle,

and the exaltation of the hero. The hero of romance is analogous to the mythical messiah who comes from a divine world; his enemy is analogous to a demonic power. The enemy is associated with winter, darkness, and moribund life; the hero with spring, dawn, and fertility. The heroes of romance include such figures as St. George and Perseus and Moses and Beowulf. Frye writes that the four *mythoi* (comedy, romance, tragedy, and irony) may now be seen as four aspects of a central unifying myth. It is, of course, the myth of the year god.

The quest romance had analogies with the rituals as characteristically examined by Frazer and the dreams analyzed by Jung. "Translated into dream terms the quest-romance is the search of the libido . . . for a fulfillment that will deliver it from the anxieties of reality but will still contain that reality.

Thus far, however, we have done no more than hint at something of the amplitude and complexity of Frye's speculations on this rich topic. To go a bit further: romance, Frye insists, has six isolatable phases: the first three are parallel to the first three phases of tragedy, and the second three to the second three phases of comedy. (These are flanking *mythoi*, since comedy is the *mythos* of spring and tragedy the *mythos* of autumn.) I can do little more than indicate what the six phases are, with only one or two instances of the many examples that Frye cites. The first phase is the myth of the birth of the hero. (Compare the birth of Beowulf or Moses.) The second phase brings us to the innocent youth of the hero. (Compare Johnson's *Rasselas*.) The third phase is the normal quest theme already discussed. The fourth phase is the maintaining of the integrity of the innocent world against the assault of experience. (Compare Milton's *Comus*.) The fifth phase gives a reflective idyllic view of experience from above. (Compare Hawthorne's *Blithedale Romance*.) The sixth phase marks the end of a movement from active to contemplative adventure. (Compare Yeat's "The Tower.")

How complex Frye's complete scheme is becomes plain when we remember that the *mythoi* of the full four seasons will yield some twenty-four phases. But Frye's resourcefulness is equal to the demands put upon it. He is bright, perceptive, nearly always plausible, and quite frequently convincing as he manipulates these sub-categories. Indeed Frye resembles nothing so much as the scientist filling out Mendelyev's table, predicting from the vacant place in the table the properties of the element to be discovered and assigning a descriptive name to it. For example, in his theory of genres, one can find Frye saying, "Our next step is evidently to discover a fourth form of fiction [he has already treated the novel, the romance, and the "confession"] which is extroverted and intellectual." This turns out to be the "Menippean satire," striking examples of which are to be found in *Alice in Wonderland* or *The Water-Babies*. Indeed one of the most useful things about Frye's book is that he does devise or refabricate new genres that the literary critic is indeed in need of. Moreover by establishing so many intermediate points between his various genres (and various myths, for that matter) Frye does much to take


BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS

the curse off of the rigidities of genre criticism. The demarcations between the classes become not much more than useful points of orientation, the family groupings often prove illuminating, and the shadings can be made so minute as to allow one to deal with the actual contours of the work in question.

What such criticism as this ultimately comes to, it seems to me, is a classification of the various kinds of literary "materials" — of the various possible narrative sequences, patterns of action, themes, psychological clusterings, etc. Long before Sir James Frazer and Freud and Jung, men had noticed the resemblances between the myths of the gods and the basic plot situations and the general patterns through which the human mind functions — and even made some attempts to relate them to literary types. (A striking anticipation of Frye's combined classifications occurs in the seventeenth century with Thomas Hobbes' combining three levels of "matter," court, town, country, with two modes of presentation, dramatic and narrative, to produce six genres.) To say this, of course, is not to belittle the truly great achievements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in cultural anthropology, comparative religion, the theory of symbolism, and depth psychology. Our age has learned enormously in these fields. That we can ever learn enough to do without a criticism that makes evaluative judgment, I doubt very much. The ultimate difficulty of archetypal criticism is that it cannot tell us the difference between a good work and a bad, since an inferior novel, for example, may on occasion make use of the richest archetypal material and yet remain an inferior piece of art. This is the point that Jung has already made: *Moby Dick* is a great novel and Rider Haggard's *She* is not, but they both incorporate archetypal material. Indeed, what literary work does not? In so far as Frye has really classified all the possibilities of narrative structure, all the varieties of the hero, all the symbolic progressions, it will be impossible for any fictional product of the human mind not to find its proper pigeon-hole.

But to enter these reservations does not alter the fact that *Anatomy of Criticism* is indeed a remarkable book. The author's incidental critical judgments, it ought to be stressed, are frequently brilliant. He is not merely a system builder but a critic of real power. But he is certainly a most resourceful system builder. And the system itself, considered simply as an intellectual feat — a critical *tour de force* — is astonishing. One predicts that *Anatomy of Criticism* will have an emphatic impact upon our literary studies, and, for good or ill, will exert a continued influence.

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VISIT YOUR BOOKSTORE SOON

Abingdon Press

Emotion and Meaning in Music

By Leonard B. Meyer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957, 307 pages, \$5.75.

Of the few authors in recent times who have had the courage and patience to tackle the subject suggested by this title, Mr. Meyer is one of the most successful in delineating the problem. Although the author's treatment of the topic is incomplete as he readily admits, and is also uneven as we shall attempt to explain, his is a painstaking and systematic attempt to penetrate a dark and confused area that succeeds in many ways where others have been vague and unsatisfactory or have failed altogether.

Attention should be called at the outset to the fact that the title itself is misleading because it leads one to expect too much, certainly more than would be humanly possible within the limits of a book of such modest size. This is one reason why the book fails to live up to the expectation aroused by its title. Part of this disappointment may be due to the temptation to misread the title, for which the author cannot be blamed, but there is an implication that he is attempting to explain the meaning of music as well as meaning *in* music. The author evidently chose his title deliberately with this in mind but there is a strong undertone in the book of a desire to deal with both aspects of the problem and they are not the same. This ambiguity is indicative of the dilemma in which the author finds himself and from which he does not entirely escape.

The most valid criticism of the title is suggested by the author himself and begins by stating clearly and forthrightly what ground he intends to cover and what he does not intend to cover.

There is also a sense in which the title and, in fact, the whole book suggests and accomplishes more than perhaps the author intends in that it puts at our disposal new tools and sharpens old ones that are needed in working toward a more meaningful design for the patterns of life and culture in a world threatened by futility and meaninglessness.

There are many valuable insights scattered throughout the book and the first chapter on *theory* is the most significant since it provides the basis for the author's subsequent exposition as well as indicating ways in which music is related to the whole of human culture. The first chapter is solid stuff and takes some doing to digest its varied and rich content; in fact, unless one makes a serious attempt to assimilate the ideas contained in the first chapter, the rest of the book loses much of its meaning and effectiveness.

Mr. Meyer begins by stating what he intends to do and this deserves close attention: he states this succinctly on pages three to five. In lieu of quoting these pages in full we shall attempt a digest of his analysis of the traditional approaches to

his topic. First, there is the "absolutist" position, based upon the assumption that musical meaning is confined to the context of the musical work itself. Then there is the "referentialist" position based upon the assumption that musical meaning comes through reference to the extra-musical world of concepts, actions, emotions and character. Mr. Meyer goes on to say these are not mutually exclusive, but his emphasis will be on the former. He would like to treat both points of view but admits that this would take another volume if he were to deal with both points of view adequately.

In addition to the "absolutist" and "referentialist" positions there are also those of the "formalist" and the "expressionist," and these he attempts to clarify. The "absolutist" position is not identical with the "formalist" nor is the "referentialist" position the same as the "expressionist." The "formalist" assumes that musical meaning is primarily intellectual: the "expressionist" assumes that musical meaning is also emotional. The author adopts the combined position of "formalist" and "absolute expressionist." In adopting this position he recognizes the difficulty of the "absolute expressionist" point of view and asks how one can account for the processes by which perceived sound patterns are experienced as feelings and emotions and recognizes the difficulty of dealing with the emotional response to music. Part of this difficulty, he says, comes from our lack of information about response to stimulus, particularly in the realm of the arts, and especially in music. We have the testimony of composers, performers, conductors, critics and audience but we know almost nothing about the nature of the response to the musical stimulus and its effect upon the listener.

Our most serious lack, according to Meyer, is a theory of emotion as related to the arts, as an integral part of aesthetic theory. His thesis about the role of emotion in aesthetic response is that emotion is aroused when a tendency to respond is arrested or inhibited, but that this theory does not tell us what an emotion is. Further, we are led to believe that much emotional behavior is undifferentiated since it is basically not a natural but an acquired response through social conditioning and the desire to share and communicate common experiences or to conform, and all these factors are interrelated. The author goes on to say that in the particular theory of emotions which he adopts there are no pleasant and unpleasant emotional experiences since the pleasantness of an emotion seems to lie not so much in the fact of resolved tension as in the belief that a resolution is forthcoming. The resolution of tension in a pleasant emotional experience is due also to our ability and desire to share and communicate this experience.

This theory of emotions is related to musical experience in that emotion is aroused when an expectation or tendency to respond, activated by a musical stimulus, is temporarily inhibited or permanently blocked.

Mr. Meyer faces a more serious difficulty in attempting to establish an equally satisfactory theory of "meaning" in music, since, as he maintains, "meaning" must

BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS

have the same signification in all realms of experience and he immediately rejects two common fallacies, first, the tendency to locate meaning exclusively in only one aspect of the communicative process and, second, the tendency to regard all meaning as involving symbolism of some sort. This casual reference to symbolism is disappointing since it leaves one in doubt as to the author's real attitude toward the place of symbolism in his theory of meaning. He does not discuss the implications of these two fallacies but proceeds immediately to the definition of "meaning" which he proposes as the basis for his work. This theory is that "anything acquires meaning if it is connected with, or indicates, or refers to something beyond itself, so that its full nature points to and is revealed in that connection": thus "meaning" is the product of the relationship between the stimulus and the thing it points to or indicates.

The issue is confused by the author's attitude toward "designative" meaning and "embodied" meaning with his admitted preference for the latter as a tool in explaining meaning in music. He says (p. 35) that since "most of the meanings which arise in human communication are of the designative type, employing linguistic signs or the iconic signs of the plastic arts, numerous critics have failed to realize that this is not necessarily or exclusively the case. This mistake has led even avowed absolutists to allow designation to slip in through the secret door of semantic chicanery." This statement seems to obscure the author's position rather than clarify it.

Mr. Meyer's rather thin treatment of the theory of meaning is a serious weakness, especially in view of his more adequate treatment of the theory of emotion. This weakness is understandable but disappointing since it is the meaning "in" and "of" music that is of vital importance.

The most intriguing aspect of the book, since it is admittedly philosophical in its approach, is in the uncertainty of the author's starting point and objective. The whole tone of the book is "scientific" but it leaves one with a sense that music is what it is and we are free to choose our own interpretation of meaning and emotion in music. Our freedom of choice is still our inalienable right and it is good to have a new affirmation of this right supported by clear, logical thinking. And yet it is important to try to discover the author's premise about the nature of his subject and his attitude toward it not so much in what he says explicitly as in what is implied. He begins by reflecting hedonism, atomism, and universalism as well as other forms of philosophical monism in solving the problem of aesthetics. There are hints of determinism and positivism in the course of the author's development of his main thesis but there is an unmistakable strain of a stronger and more vital approach that reflects existentialist thinking more compatible with current needs. The author's impatience with separation of emotion from intellect and his recognition of the function of tension and paradox in aesthetic theory, as well as the

BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS

place of social conditioning and the function of faith and belief is a happy relief from an easy acceptance of more mechanistic and evolutionary theories of culture.

In spite of the author's implied bias in favor of existentialist thinking he is caught in the trap of abstraction made necessary by the treatment of music as an isolated phenomenon and by the attempt to treat problems of emotion and meaning from a "scientific" point of view. One example of this ambiguity is the author's criticism of Cassirer which is worth quoting in full. Meyer quotes Cassirer as follows (p. 18): "Art gives us the motions of the human soul in all their depth and variety. But the form, the measure and rhythm, of these motions is not comparable to any single state of emotion. What we feel in art is not a simple or single emotional quality. It is the dynamic process of life itself." Meyer, criticising this statement, says (Chapter L, fn. 20, p. 274): "This admirable statement like so many of its kind suffers at the end from an irritating vagueness in which an intangible 'the dynamic process of life itself' is substituted for a definite account of how and why the emotions of art are not comparable to any single state of emotion. It is for a solution to this problem that we are searching in the present discussion of emotional differentiation."

Meyer's criticism of Cassirer is indicative of the book's most serious weakness, in fact the weakness of all attempts to explain emotion and meaning as a part of aesthetic experience on a purely humanistic or rational basis, because this approach assumes the art product as an accomplished fact and avoids the prior and more important question of the origin of the creative act itself, and the impulse or stimulus that brought the art product into being in the first place, and it treats too lightly the materials out of which the art product was created and the creative powers that gave it content, form, shape, and vitality.

Even though the author acknowledges the limited scope of his treatment there is one final criticism that needs to be made and that is his indifference to the role of the active participant. This attitude is reflective of an aesthetic point of view that is becoming more typical in our culture, particularly in professional music circles, that music is something that exists in the abstract apart from life as an object of speculation rather than a living, breathing organism inseparable from flesh and blood that conceived it and produced it and from which its emotion and meaning is derived.

LOWELL P. BEVERIDGE

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Dr. Douglas M. Knight is President of Lawrence College and formerly a member of the Editorial Board of *The Christian Scholar*.

Reports and Notices

Vocation of the Christian College

The second quadrennial Convocation of Christian Colleges will be held at Drake University, Des Moines, Iowa, June 22-26, 1958, on the above theme. It is planned as a step beyond the first, held in 1954 on the theme, "What is a Christian College?" It is a response by the Commission on Higher Education of the NCC to the expressed desire on the part of member churches and their colleges for an opportunity to further clarify an understanding of and commitment to the colleges' distinctive character as Christian institutions of higher learning.

Discussions of the main theme will deal with: The Theological Foundations of the Christian College; The Relation of Church and Campus; The Responsible Christian Intellectual Community; The Responsibility of the Christian College for Personal and Social Values; The Christian College and the World Mission of the Church; The Student in the Christian College; and other addresses and special presentations.

Each college is urged to send a delegation representing the administration and trustees, faculty, students, and campus Christian workers.

General Assembly of USCC

The United Student Christian Council will hold its fifteenth general assembly at North Central College, Naperville, Illinois, September 5-11. It will bring together the official delegates from USCC's member movements and agencies for a week long conference of Bible study and ecumenical confrontation. The agenda includes study of the role of the Christian student movements in the changing American university, the socio-political task of the Christian student, and the ecumenical reformation and renewal of the Church. Extended attention will be given to the Life and Mission of the Church Program of the

World's Student Christian Federation and USCC's participation therein.

Sociology Section of FCF

One of the basic working groups of the Faculty Christian Fellowship composed of sociologists from several universities met in New York City, April 12-13, to continue work toward its basic purpose: "to undertake a thorough critical examination of basic sociological theory in light of the Christian faith." This will be the fourth meeting of this group during the past eighteen months. They would like to contact all Christians teaching sociology and allied fields in American universities and colleges. Chairman is Dr. Arnold S. Nash, University of North Carolina; other members are Howard Becker, Dwight Culver, Allan Eister, William Kolb, and Allan Stroup.

The FCF also has working groups in the fields of History, Philosophy, Physics, and Theology.

Political Questions

A conference on International Political Questions will be held September 2-5 by the United Student Christian Council. It will provide opportunity for American and foreign students to engage each other in study and conversation on the burning international political questions of the nuclear-space age.

International Journal

A special issue on Christian higher education was published, February 1958, by the *International Journal of Religious Education*, 257 Fourth Avenue, New York 10, N. Y.

The aim of nine comprehensive articles and a selected bibliography is to help pastors, directors of Christian education, Church school teachers, youth leaders, and parents understand the problems involved in the relation of higher learning and Christian Faith, so that they can give guidance to young people.

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American Uncial Type

JOSEPH C. GRAVES

The type used on the cover of *THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR* is the American Uncial design by Victor Hammer.

Practically all type faces presently in use are derived from hand-written letters of scribes active at the time of the invention of printing and for a century thereafter. Punch-cutters or craftsmen in the printing shops of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries took for their models contemporary script.

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For over a quarter of a century, Victor Hammer has been experimenting with the creation of a type for the communication of religious, philosophical, and poetical writings. He has followed the procedure of the early printing masters, copying the stately uncials and half uncials of the spiritually rich Medieval period of the Lindisfarne Gospels and the Book of Kells. About 1932, he undertook the rigorously exacting craft of punch-cutting: the engraving of letters in relief upon short rods of steel. Today, Hammer is the only printing craftsman in the United States who cuts type punches by hand in the tradition of the old masters.

During his residence in Italy, France, Austria, and the United States, he has sought to create a type with the even, cursive quality of uncial letters. Work on the American Uncial was completed in the nineteen forties. While this type has been used in books of a poetical and philosophical nature and is widely recognized by European and American typographers, this is the first time it has been used on the covers of a religious publication.

Mr. Joseph C. Graves, who designed the layout and supervised the work of hand-lettering and type-setting for the cover of this journal, is a merchant in Lexington, Kentucky. His great interest in the graphic arts has prompted him to collect many prints in the graphic arts and to give his time, avocationally, to teach in this field at Transylvania College and to lecture at the University of Kentucky and the University of Virginia. He has developed and operates the Gravesend Press for his own and his friends' pleasure.

Second Quadrennial Convocation of Christian Colleges

June 22-26, 1958
Drake University

Theme: *The Vocation of the Christian College*

This Convocation is planned as a second step to the Denison 1954 Convocation which dealt with the theme, "What is a Christian College?" It is a response by the Commission on Higher Education of the National Council of Churches to the expressed desire on the part of member churches and their colleges for an opportunity to further clarify an understanding of and commitment to the colleges' distinctive character as Christian institutions of higher learning. It is hoped that from the Convocation will come a document that will give some guidance to the churches and their colleges as to the unique vocation of the Christian colleges in these critical times. In preparation for the section meetings representative committees are preparing documents that will delineate the issues and raise the significant questions on the following subjects:

Section I. *The Theological Foundations of the Christian College*

Chairman: J. Edward Dirks, Yale University Divinity School

Section II. *The Relation of Church and Campus*

Chairman: Alexander Miller, Stanford University

Section III. *The Responsible Christian Intellectual Community*

Chairman: Howard Kee, Drew University

Section IV. *The Responsibility of the Christian College for the Student's Sense of Vocation*

Chairman: Howard R. Bowen, Grinnell College

Section V. *The Christian College and the World Mission of the Church*

Chairman: David Stowe, American Board of Commissioners

Section VI. *The Student in the Christian College*

Chairman: Bruce Rigdon, Wooster College

In addition to the workshops, there will be major addresses, panel discussions and presentations on such themes as:

The Christian College Today—Situation, Dilemma, Call

The Christian College in the Life of the Church

The Christian College and American Higher Education

A Fresh Look at the Vocation for the Christian College

Student Values and Perspectives—The Contemporary Search for Meaning

Evangelism and the College Campus

Major speakers include Kathleen Bliss, Franklin Clark Fry, Hilda Neathy, Jerald Brauer, George H. Williams.

Invited to share in the Convocation are the Christian Colleges of the United States and Canada with the expectation of representation from Christian Colleges in the Far East, Near East, and Africa. Each college is urged to send a delegation representing the Administration and Trustees, the Faculty, Students, and Campus Christian Workers.

For further information write to Cecil W. Lower

Commission on Higher Education, 257 Fourth Avenue, New York

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THE VOCATION OF THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE

Addresses and Reports of the
Second Quadrennial Convocation of Christian Colleges
Drake University, June 22 - 26, 1958

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Autumn 1958

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VOLUME XLI

SPECIAL ISSUE

AUTUMN 1958

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword	<i>Hubert C. Noble</i>	183
The Editor's Preface		185
THE TREASURE AND THE VESSEL	<i>Joseph Sittler</i>	187
THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE TODAY	<i>George H. Williams</i>	193
THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH	<i>Hilda Neatby</i>	210
CHRIST AND TODAY'S CAMPUS	<i>David J. Maitland</i>	223
THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION	<i>Jerald C. Braner</i>	233
CHRISTIAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN INDIA	<i>P. T. Chandi</i>	246
A FRESH LOOK AT THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE	<i>John D. Moseley</i>	254
CHRISTIAN COLLEGE AND CONTEMPORARY WORLD	<i>Kathleen Bliss</i>	265
THE CHALLENGE	<i>E. Fay Campbell</i>	268
STUDY SECTION REPORTS		
I. THE THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE		273
II. THE RELATION OF CHURCH AND CAMPUS		286
III. THE RESPONSIBLE INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY		299
IV. THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE AND THE STUDENT'S SENSE OF VOCATION		313
V. THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE AND THE WORLD MISSION OF THE CHURCH		321
VI. THE ONGOING ROLE OF THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE (STUDENTS) ...		333
RESOLUTION OF THANKS		340

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National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

Quarterly Publication of the
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National Council of The Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR is a journal devoted to the exploration of Christian Faith and thought in relation to the whole range of the intellectual life and to the total task of higher education in our time.

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Both *THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR* and the *Faculty Christian Fellowship* are departments of the Commission on Higher Education of the National Council of Churches. The purpose of the Commission is to develop basic philosophy and requisite programs within its assigned field, to awaken the entire public to the conviction that religion is essential to a complete education and that education is necessary in the achievement of progress, to foster a vital Christian life in college and university communities of the U. S. A., to strengthen the Christian college, to promote religious instruction therein, and to emphasize the permanent necessity of higher education under distinctly Christian auspices.

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Foreword

This report on the Second Quadrennial Convocation of Christian Colleges be seen in the context of the whole discussion of the "University Question" and in relation to the First Convocation held at Denison University in 1954. "Denison" was preceded by a series of regional workshops on the theme, "What is a Christian College?" and was significant for a number of reasons.

1. For the first time in their history, the Christian colleges of America in conference attempted to assess what they were and where they were going. It was common knowledge that Christian colleges were vastly changed from their founding days. The question was how had they changed? What is a Christian college as we understand it now?

2. At Denison there occurred the first systematic effort to apply to the Christian colleges the fresh thinking about faith and learning coming from the British Don's Movement and its American counterpart through the writings of Arnold Nash, A. J. Coleman, Howard Lowry, and *The Christian Scholar*.

3. Denison was the first conference to seriously discuss the nature and task of the Christian college in the intellectual atmosphere of the contemporary theological renaissance. What does it mean for education that liberalism is no longer the dominant theology? What does it mean positively to attack Dewey's attempt to construct a philosophy of education that ignored metaphysics? What does it mean for Christian colleges that Protestantism has a fresh understanding and grasp of its faith and a renewed concern for the Church? What is

the relation of faith and culture as represented by the university?

Discussion of these questions was stimulated in colleges all over the country. Thus it helped prepare the new climate of thought in which planning for the Drake Convocation took place. These questions were no longer new and strange; they were accepted as valid, which made urgent the need of seeking answers. Accepting this as the important task, the Drake planning committee aimed at a conference that would attempt to answer these questions concretely by working on the theme, "The Vocation of the Christian College?"

In preparation for this, advance study commissions composed of those competent in the field were set up in the five areas of the section reports. The sixth developed out of spontaneous student interest. These study commissions were asked to clarify the issues, raise the important questions, and, where possible, prepare papers that would constitute groundwork for the thinking of the delegates. In advance of the conference each delegate received the preparatory paper for his study section as well as copies of the report of workshops on *What is a Christian College?* and Williams' *The Theological Idea of the University*.

To discuss these papers, 383 delegates from 160 colleges and universities in the United States and Canada, related to 32 denominations, were assembled. Among these were 58 college presidents, 51 deans, 113 faculty from various disciplines, 46 chaplains, 41 students, 9 trustees, 22 public relations officers, and about 40 other college personnel. In ad-

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

dition there were present 24 denominational higher education executives, 14 staff leaders from the National Council of Churches, and others. One element of continuity was the fact that one-third of those at Drake had attended Denison.

The Drake Convocation was a working conference at which a responsible contribution to thought on the theme was attempted. The speakers brought information and perspective in terms of historical background and the contemporary scene. The addresses and section reports are here presented for the benefit of those who wish to share in the discussion. Their authority lies in the ideas and perspectives they contain. In this sense they are the chief fruit of the Convocation.

Another outcome was the inspiration, stimulation, and friendship of the delegates which contributed much to the creation of a growing "fellowship of concern" for Christian faith and learning. An increasingly identifiable community of these is emerging. As common understanding within this community develops, further steps become possible. Later perspective may well reveal that the most important outcome of the convocation was that here for the first time there became evident a sense of unity and common purpose among representatives of the Christian Colleges; that here was the turning point when the Christian colleges stopped trying to model themselves after the patterns set by secular higher education. This may have been the time when the Christian colleges began to develop a unique kind of education that grew out of the pre-

suppositions of the Christian faith. For leaders of Christian colleges to achieve a positive vision and clarity of purpose that takes them beyond the desire to justify their colleges in the eyes of secular educators to the desire to pioneer in a kind of education they believe in as Christians would indeed be exciting. If this happens, the Council of Protestant Colleges and Universities, formally approved at this convocation, will be a symbol not only of an institutional coming-together, but the birth of a spiritual and intellectual movement that could well lead to new directions in American higher education.

We commend the Student Section Report not only to students but also to their elders. On their own initiative students created a pre-convocation study commission and prepared a study paper. The report from their convocation study section reveals them as more than negative critics. Today's students are willing and anxious to assume positive responsibility.

This foreword would not be complete without an expression of thanks to all those whose thought and activity made the Convocation possible, and we call attention to the Convocation's "Resolution of Thanks" which may really speak for thousands of students who may in the future, God willing, be exposed to finer Christian education because the Drake Convocation occurred.

Hubert C. Noble
General Director
Commission on Higher Education
National Council of Churches

The Editor's Preface

In planning the second Convocation of Christian Colleges, held at Drake University, June 22-26, 1958, the various committees of Christian educators worked carefully in order that some advance be made in understanding and grappling with the problems facing the Christian colleges today. The choice of theme, "The Vocation of the Christian College," was intended to point beyond and to avoid repetition of previous discussions of the nature of the Christian college. The careful preparation for the study sections and the fact that the study materials had actually received careful scrutiny by the delegates was re-enforced by the first word which they heard on arrival: "This is a study conference." And the choice of speakers of vigor and intellectual resourcefulness heightened the seriousness which delegates to the Convocation brought to their task. Yet the *vocation* of the Christian college was little discussed (though the vocation of the Christian educator was often referred to); its *nature* received more attention, both defensive and critical; but a new tack was taken in perhaps an unexpected direction.

The addresses and reports published herein are evidence of the profound soul-searching of Christians today, in this case in the academic community, as to whether or not the Christian gospel has any vital significance for our life in this modern world. In the opening Convocation Sermon, Joseph Sittler stated the problem as the relation between the treasure (the light of the knowledge of the glory of God) and the

earthen vessel which bears this treasure but which can neither accredit it nor guarantee its delivery. And in the final address Kathleen Bliss pointed us away from the Christian colleges, our "legacies from the past," towards the world we live in with its "onward rush of a new universal culture, based on science and technology," in which "knowledge is power"; the world with its "primacy of the political (in the proper sense of the word) over all other human activities in society"; the world where not intellectualism but only passion can sustain life.

Often we hear that our colleges are too worldly and have compromised too much with the world. Certainly the American churches have generally set themselves over against the world (or once did) and have expected their colleges to protect the young and tender minds of students from the evils of the world. It is not surprising that many members of the community of higher learning have feared too close relation with the Church and have tended to avoid teaching in colleges which were very closely tied to a denomination. How can you care for the world enough to devote your life to teaching about it and at the same time protect the student from it without hypocrisy? How can you appreciate a field of secular knowledge enough to do responsible work in it and yet not be suspected of being an enemy of the faith? Many voices are raised today to say that the Christian churches are maintaining poor colleges. If this is so, it may be because the churches have turned their backs on the

world and have expected their colleges to do the same.

Perhaps it is time that both the churches and their colleges be more hesitant to say, "Lord, Lord"; Christian colleges and educators need to embrace once more the earthiness of their vessel, i.e., their essential identification of subject matter, methods, and ends with the pagans in the world of learning. This seemed to be the tendency of the Convocation where there was less interest in the *Christian character* of Church-related colleges and more attention given to the Christian idea of the college and university. The lead was taken by George Williams' address which concentrated on the root problem of the Christian scholar: Christ and culture, faith and knowledge. In many different ways he pointed up the question of whether the Christian college could be thought of in terms of Jerusalem the Golden, a bit of Paradise provisionally restored, or in terms of Jerusalem, the teeming city of fallen men. And just at this point is raised the crucial issue for the Christian college and the Christian scholar in our day. It is necessary to recognize the most potent forces in our lives to be politics and science and to acknowledge that life is driven first by passion and only secondarily guided by intellect; but the churches and their colleges have tried to keep a safe distance from these earthy facts, these worldly areas of study and action.

And it cannot be otherwise until the Fall be taken seriously in terms of aca-

denic life and work. It is not only that the Christian scholar, while justified by faith, has only a fallen, faulty reason; he also thereby finds solidarity with the pagan scholars and works on the same terms using the same methods as his colleagues of opposing faiths. We Christians are very worldly yet afraid of the world, believers in Jesus Christ but afraid to accept the freedom he gives. Many of us have tried so hard to be good Christians that we have alienated ourselves from the first work of God's grace — his creation, our world. Likewise many of us so appreciate the fruits of the Christian life that we have forgotten our own sinful situation on account of which we need grace in the first place. All the talk about the nature and vocation of the Christian college is vanity unless we see ourselves, as Christian educators, a part of this world with its hates and joys. And it is only by taking in full seriousness the fact of our present sin, individual and common, that Christians can maintain that essential commonness and empathy with the pagans of this world — the indispensable fact of our life — which makes it possible for the Christian to share without condescension in the open community of learning, to maintain true academic freedom, and to engage in honest intellectual inquiry.

We therefore commend for your attentive study these addresses and reports from the Second Quadrennial Convocation of Christian Colleges.

W.M.S.

The Treasure and the Vessel

JOSEPH SITTLER

Paul of Tarsus is a permanent embarrassment to all teachers of composition. There are, to be sure, sections of his writing which are tightly structured, integral, eloquently wrought; and these are in the anthologies of our Western literature. But the most of it is not like that at all; and this *most* is as powerful as the architectonic and the rhetorical.

It almost seems as if the man couldn't keep his mind on his work. What is actually the case is that his passionate mind was so absorbed by his work that the *style* is the uncalculated reflection of the passion. Buffon said that "... the style is the man himself"; and no man in the realm of letters comes through so loud and clear as Paul. The man had a big and a new and a revolutionary thing to say. He had, furthermore, to say it on the run. And not to a benign and well-conditioned religious culture, either; he had to speak in the angry and confusing criss-cross of organized and disorganized but pervasive powers that worked to distort and dilute his message or blunt the point of it by frantic attacks upon his person, his charter, his motives.

All of this was true of the Corinthian situation and true there with a vigor which served to heighten the very stylistic fact we are talking about.

This apprehension of the kind of man he was and this understanding of the kind of situation in which he had to do his declarative task make clear why it is simply impossible to preach from the Pauline Epistles by extracting from them a single text. For no matter where you start you find yourself in the situation of a small boy trying to eat taffy with his fingers and remain, betimes, presentable for the party! It's a bad job; it cannot really be done. Paul starts off on the development of a theme. Not far from the start he has to complicate the ordered development of it by stopping for a moment to beat off or beat down the crowding misapprehensions or carking distortions or literalistic reductions of what he is saying. And in the course of this rear-guard action he finds it necessary to play over against his theme a counter-theme from the Old Testament. The very richness of his allusive and vehement mind conflates the two, so that the first theme builds up, now enriched and complicated by the contrapuntal structure. *That* is why the style is not episodic but fugal. And that is why in part a generation whose popular model of prose is the fatuous obviousness of *The Reader's Digest* has difficulties with the apostle to the Gentiles.

Dr. Joseph Sittler is Professor of Systematic Theology at the Federated Theological Faculty of the University of Chicago, chairman of the North American Commission on Worship of the Faith and Order Commission of the World Council of Churches, and author of *The Doctrine of the Word*.

Our text is the seventh verse of the fourth chapter of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians. And we have only to look at the text to see that we cannot start with *it* and to illustrate further what I have been saying about the impossibility of making a responsible sermon of a thread from a whole fabric. "But we have this treasure in earthen vessels . . ." the text begins. Already we are in trouble. "But" indicates that something is about to be asserted over-against a previously stated position. Paul's argument is characteristically sprinkled with this way of opening a paragraph. "Therefore," he says, or "Well, then . . ." or "So" or "Now if—"! Such phrases are, as it were, a thumb back over the shoulder of the particular statement telling us that here is no epigram meant to shine in unreflected light or no statement extractable from a structured argument.

"But" he says; so let us follow the direction of the apostolic thumb and build in the background. Ideally we should go *all* the way back and begin with the opening of the letter and the first two chapters of it. For there we behold a tormented and an honest man making an almost pathetically loving apologia for misunderstood actions. His duties, which have kept him away from Corinth, have been interpreted as cowardice. And when he talks of the afflictions which have beset him he half-knows that this recital will be understood as boasting. At the end of chapter two Paul pulls himself up, as it were, above this preliminary mire of suspicion that he has had to deal with and in a sentence of wonderful gallantry acknowledges that the glorious content of his word is too fermentingly alive for the fragility of the vessel but affirms that he is nevertheless called to be a vessel and proposes to get on with the business! "For we are the aroma of Christ to God . . . a fragrance from life to life. Who is sufficient for these things? For we are not . . . peddlers of God's word: but as men of sincerity as commissioned by God, in the sight of God we speak in Christ."

Having thus cleared the decks, so to speak, Paul gets to the real problem which is the immediate context of our text, the immediate situation necessary for us here today if we are to understand his "*But we have this treasure . . .*"

The problem is this: by what right does this little Jew dare to displace a massive tradition, subsume the noble *old* under a fiery *new*, pile up the evidence for the role of the ethnic religions in their venerable antiquity, their cultural creativity — and in the name of one Event, Christ, both fulfil them and sweep them all aside!

Bold and astonishing is the answer! "You!" he says, "you yourselves are our letters of recommendation, written on your hearts, to be known and read by all men." You are literally letters from Christ to the world, delivered by me, to be sure; but not written by me. For the Spirit of the living God is not only the content of the message, he is the writer of it; and the warm tablets of your hearts announce to the world that a strange possibility has become an empirical actuality — a congregation of people in this dying world who, in the process of their finitude, ". . . have passed from death to life."

THE TREASURE AND THE VESSEL

Paul here is the complete pragmatist. Men can be given this faith-relation to God whereby death is overcome because men *have* been given it, and here we are! Problems of epistemology there are, to be sure, and they are not improper or trivial. But if they become the primary and normative way to inquire into the fact of faith they repudiate what the message says about God — that he is alive, that his Spirit is not a static idea to be only investigated, that because he is God he accomplishes what he purposes.

And that is why, continues the Apostle, we have the kind of confidence we have. Our confidence is not a sober assessment of our religious capacities or of our moral resoluteness; "not that we are sufficient of ourselves to claim anything as coming from us; our sufficiency is from God who has qualified us to be ministers of a new covenant, not in a written code but in the Spirit; for the written code kills, but the Spirit gives life."

So we come to the opening word of the chapter of our text. "Therefore, being engaged in this service by the mercy of God, we do not lose heart." May we not pause here for a moment and ponder whether that sentence might not be the banner to fly over this entire enterprise in the days ahead? "Therefore"! That says to us that in a profound sense we did not create the issue that brings us here; we are not the creators or stockholders of that in the world of men and culture which we propose here to discuss. "By the mercy of God," the text says. "I come to kindle a fire on the earth," says the Lord. And "I have been laid hold of," says the apostle — which is *his* word for *our* word *vocation*.

"Therefore, being engaged in this *service*" — Service has become a cheap word wherewith to set forth what is here said. The text reads, "*Dia touto, echontes ten diakonian*" — and *diakonian* is but weakly rendered *service*. We think of the service-industries, the T.V. repairmen, and the dry cleaners. It's a thud to realize that *diakonian* in the New Testament means most centrally *worship*, i.e., the entire response of the entire man to the convulsing reality of God in the historical Christ. "Therefore, being engaged (that is, caught up) in this worship by the mercy of God, *we do not lose heart*!"

The man doesn't lose heart for the single reason that the well he is pumping from is not the human, exhaustable, ambiguous, and vacillatory well of his own heart. He is not, in our terms, dependent upon the supply of his religious experience. Paul *had* a religious experience, to be sure. It made him an apostle; but it is not the content of his apostleship. It made his career; it was not the message of his career. It was the occasion of his being an ambassador; it was not the stuff in the portfolio. He got knocked off his horse by God, to be sure; but he never made a Gospel out of the excitement of being knocked off a horse.

What then is the event from God before which Paul is broken into a new being, disorganized into a new organization, known into a new possibility of knowing, and loved into a new fulness of loving?

In order to declare this event the apostle is compelled to reach as far back as the primordial event of all existence to find an analogy huge enough to set it forth. Hear now how he sets it forth! "For what we preach is not ourselves, but Jesus Christ as Lord, and ourselves your servants for Jesus' sake." "For it is the God who said, 'Let light shine out of darkness,' who has shown in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ Jesus."

Because that statement is the content of what Paul in the next sentence calls "this treasure," and because the having of this treasure in "earthen vessels" is the root problem of the vocation of the Christian college, it is necessary to be scientifically obedient to the religious particularity of the language Paul uses here. If this appears pedantic, recall that this sermon is not addressed to "the man on the street"; it is addressed rather to men who have in resolute purpose come in off the street with the announced intention of giving something beyond casual thought to a vexing problem.

"The light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ." Three things in that statement must be responsibly attended to. First, what is the nature of this knowledge? When biblical speech puts light and knowledge together this way, it intends to say that this knowledge is practical knowledge for the whole man to the end that his life shall be saved. It is not knowledge of nature, although interpretive of nature. It is not merely speculative knowledge, although it engenders and enriches speculation. It is not propositional truth, although it must seek to make affirmations having propositional integrity. It is a knowledge which has an absolute practicality because it illuminates man's central anxiety, lostness, and hurt; and because it heals what it reveals.

Second, what is the boundary of this knowledge? Observe that the apostle does not say, "... to give the light of the knowledge of God." He says rather, "... to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God." The term "glory" is not here either an homiletical fillip or an unconscious piece of semitic rhetoric. It is rather a deeply religious affirmation that God in His naked reality is not available to man. The term "glory" conveys a profound acknowledgment that the Ultimate who dwells in light unapproachable is nevertheless the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world and that this light unapproachable is nevertheless inescapable.

This glory is at once and always a lure, a burden, and a passion. It at once constitutes our manhood and relentlessly troubles our manhood with unextinguishable dreams. It is this glory which the heavens declare but do not deliver; it is this glory which, aflame between the cherubim and seraphim, crumples the young Isaiah with the antiphonal song, "Holy, Holy, Holy is the Lord of hosts; the whole earth is full of his glory." It is this glory to which Gerard Manley Hopkins points in his sonnet:

THE TREASURE AND THE VESSEL

The world is charged with the grandeur of God.
It will flame out, like shining from shook foil - - -
Because the Holy Ghost over the bent
World broods with warm breast and with ah! bright wings.

Third, what is the content of this knowledge? "The light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ." The face of Christ (*prosopo Christou*) here does not mean merely the look of Jesus or the sweetness or magnanimity or bearing of Jesus. It means rather the entire action of God in a man of earth who became obedient absolutely, so that in him alone we behold the absolute relation to the absolute and in him alone we have the locus and face of what it means to be a man.

So now we come to the summary statement which suggests how the three terms of our theme, Christian, Vocation, College — may be related. The treasure is given in the mercy of God in the gift of Christ. It is this treasure which is pointed to when we use the adjective Christian of our colleges; it is this treasure which troubles us when we ask the practical question of our obedience to our vocation. And all that comes out, in its promise and in its problems, when we confront the text, "But we have this treasure in earthen vessels."

In that word "But" is the entire problem of Christ in culture, the problem of the administration of the given treasure by the earthen vessels in which we have it, in which alone we can actualize it. This term "But" is the starting point of Christian theology — and its ultimate boundary.

There are, to be sure, two ways of getting around this built-in embarrassment. The first is to relax the clear meaning of the terms "treasure" and "vessel." Roman Catholic educational theory and practice is a possibility because the earthen character of the vessel is repudiated, and the glory of the treasure is postulated of the vessel. The authenticity of the treasure is extended to the declaration that the vessels which bear it forth are divinely accredited.

The other way around the embarrassment is so singlemindedly to adore the treasure as to ignore the fact that a vessel is for carrying, storing, pouring, making a thing available for use in the life of culture.

"But we have this treasure in earthen vessels. . . ." And we are here only because neither of these ways is open to us. And as we search for other ways, let us be aware of the temptation to suppose that by taking thought we can devise a vessel — philosophical, ethical, cultic, or curricular — which shall transcend the earthen character of all vessels. Some vessels are better than others; and to fashion these each generation must be inventively obedient. But no vessel can accredit a treasure or guarantee its delivery.

That we do so ardently long for an accredited vessel and that this longing is a temptation, let us clarifyingly acknowledge. Oh, that we might find a verifying

process or a clear, unambiguous way or an assured methodology wherewith to overcome the dialectic of an immeasurable treasure and the fragility but necessity of all vessels! With what envy do we all behold the steady refinement of methodologies in the sciences, physical and social, the ordered ways of philosophical enquiry, the tangibility of the research methods of the historian.

Perhaps the way of obedience is suggested to us if we hear Paul out to the end of the section. "But we have this treasure in earthen vessels, to show that the transcendent power belongs to God and not to us." How transparent that sentence is to all that pertains to the glory and the holiness of God! For through it we see God's entire way with man; a way that wins by losing, that redeems by dying, that lifts men up by going down. And is all of this not continuous with the glory of God in the face of Christ as we behold him lifted up, not upon an assured throne but upon the very shape of the dialectical?

Relentlessly stretched between the treasure and the earthly vessel, may we not in our time and for our generation and in many faithful ways bear embarrassed witness that the transcendent power belongs indeed to God and not to us? The stretching belongs to the faithfulness. The treasure can never be packaged, for it is God himself. These vessels can never resign, but he commands that they be, that they contain and convey, that they celebrate the treasure.

And as we come now to the end, hear how Paul does what he says, lives out in concrete career the stretched life between treasure and vessel. As we hear him speak of his own life in living words torn up by the roots from his own tormented and joyous existence, let us take heart! For why should we assume that, because we come to this place in pullman or aircraft, *we* can be disciples at second hand! "We are afflicted in every way, but not crushed; perplexed, but not driven to despair; persecuted, but not forsaken; struck down, but not destroyed; always carrying in the body the death of Jesus so that the life of Jesus may also be manifested in our bodies."

* * * * *

Grant us, O Lord, we beseech thee, to be faithful vessels of thy treasure. Give us the grace to know a treasure when we see it; the grace to be vessels when called; the discernment which keeps these from confusion; and the obedience which keeps these together. Amen.

The Christian College Today

Situation, Dilemma, and Call

GEORGE H. WILLIAMS

An alternative term for the Christian College has been the Church-related College or the Denominational College. Today we use the designation to cover almost all institutions of higher learning which may in varying degrees of denominational and confessional specificity proclaim either their Christian inheritance or relationship. The main group of institutions excluded from the designation as Christian colleges are the state and municipal colleges and universities wherein the American principle of the separation of Church and State insures the religious neutrality of instruction and campus life. At the same time, since there are large numbers of practicing and believing Christians on the faculties and among the students of these institutions who are, no less than those in the explicitly Christian colleges, concerned to clarify their Christian vocation, it would seem well to rephrase our main topic as: "The Christian Idea of the College and University." We are concerned with a Christian theory of higher education that takes account of the whole corporate character of that uniquely American educational institution, the College as a phase and way of life, with its governing boards, fraternities, alumni associations, its chapel and counseling services, in short, its extra-curricular activities, as well as its curricular patterns. Moreover, since we are gathered under the auspices of the National Council of Churches, though we salute our numerous sister Christian institutions of higher learning in America under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church, we must here be more specifically occupied with what may be a distinctively Protestant-Sectarian theory of the college and university. While Catholics and Protestants recently agreed in drawing up a notable text on the mission of Christian colleges,¹ there remain important theoretical differences.

Our topic is then "A Protestant-Sectarian Theory of the Institutions of Higher Learning in the United States and Canada." We shall first glance at the present situation of the Christian college and its historical background, then we shall look briefly but steadfastly at the dilemma of the Christian college in respect to the nature of religious knowledge, and then we shall make suggestions for the redefining of the mission of the Christian college and for the rephrasing of the call of the Christian scholar himself in both the Christian college and the secular university.

Dr. George Huntston Williams is Winn Professor of Ecclesiastical History at the Harvard Divinity School and author of *The Harvard Divinity School*. The "Excursus" from this volume has been reprinted as *The Theological Idea of the University* for the study of delegates to the Convocation.

¹ Printed in full in *Information Service*, XXXVII, No. 5 (March 8, 1958), p. 4.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

I. *The Situation and Certain Theological-Historical Resources for the Idea of Christian Learning*

Christian, that is, denominational colleges created the basic patterns of American higher education from colonial times to the founding of the great private and state universities after the Civil War. The profusion of Christian colleges, both those pregnant with a future and those weak from conception and destined to an early demise, is a major fact in the cultural history of the United States. Unfortunately in their confessional zeal and, one must add, in their overweening ambition many of them, especially in their initial phase, competed with each other in costly internecine strife and in consequence left considerable institutional debris and many casualties upon the battlefield. Moreover it often happened that when local denominations failed to acquire control or predominant influence over a newly formed state university, turning upon it as godless, they defiantly set up rival denominational colleges, sometimes in adjacent towns.

In time however even the primary and secondary schools were obliged, among other factors, by the increasing heterogeneity of the religious and cultural backgrounds of their pupils, to become as religiously neutral as the state universities which had originally aroused denominational fears, while somewhat more gradually many of the Christian colleges themselves in varying degrees reasoned their way to a severing of their connections with their sponsoring denominations.

These same secular influences are flowing, but today a counter-current has also set in. Many of the emancipated colleges are joining with others still under denominational control or influence in re-appraising their Christian heritage and in reexamining their Christian vocation.

But while these colleges are trying to reconceive their Christian character and their academic responsibility to their sponsoring denominations, the churches might well ask for their part the question whether they should not be turning *their* major attention and support to the larger group of American youth below the collegiate level. It is now in the high schools that our increasingly sophisticated and ethically bewildered young people are facing, largely without benefit of adequate Christian tutelage in their churches and during the most crucial and perhaps most vulnerable period of their lives, those intellectual, moral, and social temptations and challenges which formerly were thought by the churches to be concentrated in the college years, hence the past concentration on and the present vested interest in the colleges. Only the Roman Catholics and some of the Lutherans and a few others insisted in the nineteenth century on developing their own parochial schools at a time when most Christian bodies were taking for granted the communication of a basically Protestant ethos in the public school system.

THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE TODAY

The Christian colleges must therefore redouble their efforts to justify denominational support at the very moment in American cultural and social history when the churches are increasingly baffled by the spread of juvenile delinquency and are following with close attention the important changes going on in educational theory and practice in the public schools below the level of the college and at a moment when above the colleges the universities and graduate professional schools are raising new and challenging questions about vocation and professional responsibility in a Christian perspective, even in state universities which have hitherto been prevented on constitutional grounds from giving anything more than respectful attention to formal religious instruction and activity on the margins of their tax-supported precincts.

Now in order to redefine their goals, the Christian colleges must look to their past, not only to their recent past in the evolution of American culture but also to their ancient past as heirs of the Old World history of Christian learning and especially to the history of the theology of education and more specifically to what I have recently called *The Theological Idea of the University*.²

The theological problem of Christian education is the epistemological problem of the relationship between faith and knowledge or between grace and reason. The central constitutional problem of the Christian institution of higher learning is the relationship between the University and the Church or the professor and the priest; and for good measure we may say that the problem in its entirety is that of locating the College, as a semi-autonomous institution with its own laws and integrity, between the Christian Church and the now almost completely secular Commonwealth.

In the recent survey referred to I distinguished five recurrent themes in the history of Christian higher education which might be considered constituent motifs in the theology or the theological idea of the University. Just as we have a Chris-

² Published by the Commission on Higher Education of the National Council of Churches (New York, 1958). This is a slight enlargement and revision of what originally appeared as the "Excursus" in *The Harvard Divinity School* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954). For those consulting the reprint, the following are the most important typographical corrections to be noted. (An insert page of errata may be obtained from the publisher.) P. 5 instead of: *Books*,⁸ *Kirjath-Sepher*, read: *Books*.⁸ *Kirjath-Sepher*; p. 12 instead of: *Thought is worth reading*, read: *Thought it . . .*; p. 20 instead of: *enumerative*, read: *enumeration*; p. 45 instead of: *regalisation he hailed*, read: *regalization be hailed*; p. 50 instead of: *two usages are supposed reconcilable*, read: *two usages are supposedly reconcilable*; p. 59 instead of: *and medieval "Caesars"*, read: *and deferring to the Genevan Senate as heir to the high policy of the medieval Caesars*; p. 60 instead of: *abducted*, read: *adduced*; p. 60 instead of: *to unite his person*, read: *unite in his person*; p. 62 instead of: *successors Gelasius and Gregory*, read: *successors of Gelasius and Gregory*; p. 63 instead of: *One the issue*, read: *On the issue*; p. 64 instead of: *M. Strassburg*, read: *In Strassburg*; p. 64 instead of: *lectures in languages*, read: *lecturers in languages*; p. 71 instead of: *Calvinist reformation*, read: *Calvinist reformulation*; p. 87 instead of: *Quick unexpectedly*, read: *Quite unexpectedly*; p. 91 instead of: *Or in the Church with the University*, read: *Or the Church with the University*.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

tian doctrine of the Church, commonly called ecclesiology, and a Christian doctrine of the State, so we have at least the ingredients, strewn over the pages of its history, of a coherent and rather exciting theology of learning and of the Christian community of scholarship.

Now I know very well that no college president, no dean of men, no departmental chairman, registrar, campus-paper editor, or chairman of the board would choose precisely these terms with which to describe the current situation of the Christian college as it is or even as it may have been! But I hope you understand that by getting away from all the clutter of facts and proposals about Federal aid to education, quotas, tax exemptions on faculty housing, fund drives, inter-varsity athletics, religion courses, general education, required chapel attendance, class cuts, desegregation, parietal rules, etc., and by casting our problems in the quaint and sometimes obscure language of the theological history of the idea of a university, we may be induced to take a fresh look at the meaning of the Christian college in the light of its storied past. For these traditional expressions help us concentrate on the distinctively Christian aspects of higher education and, I believe, make clearer than might otherwise be the case the dilemma of Christian education in the situation we face today.

By far the most important of some five distinguishable university themes is the *paradise motif* which is that complex of theories, notions, and legends about the relationship between human *scientia*, arrived at by means of sensory data arranged according to the categories of frail reason more or less corrupted by the Fall of primal man in disobedience to the divine command not to eat of the paradisiac tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and the divine *sapientia* which Christian man may possess through baptismal regeneration, sacramental incorporation into the Second Adam, and sustained inspiration from the Holy Spirit in the community of self-discipline and the fellowship of Christian grace or love. On this view the Christian college campus is, so to speak, a bit of Paradise provisionally restored, a walled garden in which the fruit of knowledge may once again be savored by virtue of the work of Christ in the restoration of the clouded image of the divine in men.

Akin to the paradisiac impulse in the history of Christian education is the *military motif*. This martial theme is the tradition according to which learning is a kind of spiritual warfare that calls upon all the resources of bodily and spiritual discipline in order to withstand the onslaughts of Satan in the form of sloth, carnal temptation, and spiritual pride including heresy. On this view the Christian campus is, as in the original Latin sense of the word, the training ground of a Christian militia determined to engage in combat with error in the surrounding world.

And akin to the idea of Christian learning as spiritual warfare, requiring relentless training in self and group discipline, is the *transferrential theme*, the

THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE TODAY

notion that in the providence of God a community of seekers and custodians of the truth is recruited in each generation into that intellectual encampment which is the university, charged with the great responsibility of transferring to each generation the accumulated arts and sciences of the ages. The older notion of the *translatio studii* schematized the history of education as a succession of schools in which the torch of knowledge was handed down from the Schools of the Prophets in ancient Israel, through the Academy in Athens, the Palace School of Charlemagne that evolved in Paris into the fostering mother of the medieval universities, all the way to the colonial colleges of our own Eastern seaboard. For Christians aware of the storied account of the millennial transfer of knowledge from conscientious teacher to devout scholar, the college campus has been in a sense the beloved commons of a diminutive but venerable Republic of Letters which, by way of the archaic wording of its charter and academic custom, can trace its constitution and privileges back to the beginnings of civilization, a Republic of Letters with its own laws and liberties antedating not only the State conferring its charter but even the Church which has sponsored it.

And this brings us to a fourth motif, namely the *christological sanction* for the authority of the Christian teacher as prophet, discharging in relative autonomy one of the functions of Christ the eternal Prophet, Priest, and King. In this christological sanction may be grounded the relative independence of a Christian faculty from undue interference on the part of either the Christian or secular magistrate or of the sponsoring Christian denomination. John Calvin and the educational theorists in the Reformed tradition were from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries particularly significant in defining the office of the professor or teacher (*doctor ecclesiae*) as distinct from that of the three other ministers of the Church: the pastor, the deacon, and the ruling elder.

Unfortunately for the academic independence of the professor in the Christian college in the American nineteenth century, the faculty came more and more under the control of lay trustees, that is, lay trustees in the sense of being non-academic or non-professorial though in denominational colleges they might well be clergymen. The American college president, traditionally an ordained minister with tenure, with ever enlarged executive powers, and with an overriding concern for financial support from the business community preponderantly represented on the college board of trustees, has emerged as a distinctively American academic figure, with whom the one-year elective and often largely honorific rector of a typical European university can scarcely be compared. The emergence of lay control and the pre-eminence of the ministerial but often non-academic president are in part a consequence of the influence of the separation of Church and State on American collegiate education and in part a consequence of the transfer of the congregational type of sectarian churchmanship (with its lay call and dismissal of the preacher) upon the college constitutions even of denominations not in the tradition of congregational polity and lay control. Thus, despite the rather high conception of the office of the

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

teacher inherited from Calvinism, the theological theory of the American college professor as a prophet called of God to be bold in his asseveration of truth is scarcely a living memory even in colleges of Calvinist background. The increasingly large measure of academic freedom an American professor enjoys is instead traced more commonly to the influence of the *Lehrfreiheit* of the nineteenth century faculties of the German universities.

Nevertheless the christological sanction of the freedom of the university is a well-documented strand in the theological history of the university idea, and though it is no longer directly appropriable by American professors of our state universities, it can be especially useful in arguing for academic freedom in precisely Christian colleges where "lay" control, especially when it is ecclesiastical, often makes improper demands upon its professors and encroaches upon their Christian freedom in their Christian vocation of instruction and research. On this view the Christian professor, clear about his calling, is a minister or officer in the larger Kingdom of Christ; and for him, in contrast to the pastor or priest, it is precisely *his* vocation to deal forthrightly with faith in the context of reason, experimentation, hypothesis, and academic dialogue with colleagues who may not share his Christian convictions. In this ministry he should not be trammelled by ecclesiastical ties. It is sufficient, in order to be called and subsequently sustained by the sponsoring denomination of his college, that he profess that for him Christ is the *Veritas* which makes him free. As long as Christ is the avowed Lord of his life, he properly insists that he be free in the pursuit of truth. And hence on this view the college and particularly the university campus is, as it were, a replica of Jerusalem — not Jerusalem the golden which is above, but the teeming city of man with all its vested religious interests, its bustling bazaars, its untutored rabble. Christian faith must witness before its multitudes and on some occasion traverse its streets burdened by the scandalous cross of irrationality, destined perhaps to be subjected to mockery and to be adjudged at length pretentious and worthy of extermination if for no other reason than its divisiveness, for who in this broken world can presume to have the Truth?, ask one's colleagues scornfully. But the Christian teacher who feels in himself the inheritance of the prophets will not shrink from the ideal and will steadfastly turn his face toward that Jerusalem.

From this christological motif, which largely concerns the freedom and the responsibility of the Christian professor in the midst of the learned, we turn to a fifth university theme, the *critical* or *judicial* function of both the Christian faculty and indeed the university as such in the midst of the world. It was a medieval pope who eloquently summed up the millennial evolution of the corporate self-consciousness of a relatively independent university when he affirmed the critical function of the University over against both Church and State, declaring that

if of the middle [i.e., the University] the other two are deprived, they fall into extreme corruption, because power [in the State], unless it is

tempered by wisdom, luxuriates in presumption and gives itself over to arrogance, while [the] benignity [of the Church] too, if it is unsupported by knowledge, becomes amorphously degenerate and rendered akin to fatuousness.

On this view the center of the university is what in Europe is called the *aula* where on commencement day the university bestows its honorific hoods upon selected leaders of Church, Commonwealth, and College. It is the ceremonial court room where, as it were, spiritual men judge all things but are themselves judged by none save by *Veritas* itself which the Christian members of the faculty are also free to interpret as Christ, the Supreme Judge at the Great Assize.

The Christian college then has at its center, to use the traditional language of the university: a *green*, symbol of Paradise restored; a *campus*, for training of the spiritual militia of Christ; its surrounding *wall* or perhaps its commons, symbol of its autonomy as a Republic of Letters; a *chapel*, symbol of the earthly as well as the heavenly Jerusalem; and an *aula*, symbol of the judicial or critical role of the University in Church and State.

Perhaps the most accessible or obviously meaningful of these five symbols or themes is the christological sanction of the spiritual autonomy of the Christian professor. In fact all but one theme may readily be adapted and reinterpreted to make sense in the present reassessment of the role of the Christian college, although we would differ among ourselves on the degree to which some would find the effort merely amusing and others would find the effort theologically and constitutionally significant, that is, in the same way that a judge might enlarge the scope and application of legal precedents or a musician might turn a couple of rustic airs into a well structured sonata.

II. *The Theological Dilemma of the Nature of Christian Knowledge*

The one that presents us with real difficulties, indeed a dilemma, is the *paradisiac theme*. The paradisiac motif, so inextricably bound up with biblical myth, seems to flout the basic ideal of the academic community, namely the quest of truth, the search for solid facts. Moreover at the very outset it involves the Christian scholar and the Christian student in the dilemma of trying to clarify by means of a fallen, i.e., a faulty reason a faith once for all delivered to the saints. His consistently secular colleagues have no such lack of confidence in man's rational competence and repudiate on principle any formulation of a body of truth that would exempt it from continuous testing and revision. Moreover the paradisiac motif on principle separates human *scientia*, empirical knowledge, from divine revelation.

Now the secular scholar no less than the Christian will readily admit to the fragmented character of empirical knowledge, and both feel that it is their duty to

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

establish as much rational order as possible. Alike in this the Christian colleague is therefore reluctant to separate from his secular colleague and does not readily subscribe to any ecclesiastical stricture which would mark off any portion of knowledge, say biblical and ecclesiastical history and theological formulation, as inaccessible to the same methods of inquiry applicable in other fields.

But the dilemma is not this difficulty, which after all was faced and overcome to their own satisfaction by generations of Church Fathers, Schoolmen, and Reformers, but rather our inability (since we know so much more than they about history, the transmission of texts, and the evolution of life) to take the account of the Fall as an historic narrative and at the same time our reluctance quietly to drop the doctrine of the Fall as it might affect a Christian doctrine of knowing, since we realize that with the doctrine of the beclouding of reason goes the doctrine of the corruption of the will, the solidarity of mankind in the First Adam and in the atonement through the obedience of the Second Adam. If there was no unique historic act of disobedience, there seems less plausibility in a unique historic and universally redemptive act of fulfillment of the Law in the utter obedience of Jesus Christ in knowing and willing one thing.

Thus since both the Christian university in respect to fallen reason and the Church in respect to the corrupt will and man's mortality are alike grounded in the biblical narrative about Paradise, the Christian scholar must face up to the fact that the central doctrine of the Church, the Atonement — with all its doctrinal, sacramental, and constitutional explication — is ultimately implicated in any casual or accommodative decision he might make about the paradisiac motif in the realm of epistemology. Thus the redeeming Church and the Christian college are alike bound up with a conception of Creation and the Fall; and the Christian scholar must study its implications for his activity as scholar in library and laboratory no less than as a dutiful worshipper in the college chapel and as a sponsor of the Christian action group on campus.

The Christian scholar, while he accepts all the criteria and canons of research and exposition of his secular colleague on the faculty, must be made more than vaguely aware that something else is involved which cannot be covered or more than pointed to by such terms as "inspiration," "depth," "dimension," "context," "concern," "existential," "committed." He is called upon as a Christian scholar to be epistemologically more precise than this. Greater precision and an enhanced sense of relevance to the central enterprise of the academic community may be gained by rethinking the doctrine of the Fall and the beclouding of fallen reason in terms of the irrationality and the subtle rationalizations exposed by the modern psychologist, the disfigurements of reality perceived by the modern painter; the incongruities and vagaries now coming into view under the intent gaze of the atomic and the astro-physicist, and the fragmentation or fatuousness of philosophical and many theological constructs disclosed by the scrutiny of the logical positivist.

THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE TODAY

Like the professing Christian, the classical humanist on the faculty, especially when tinctured by liberalism, is aware of rational man's frailties and pretensions. The secular scholar in contrast, best represented today perhaps in the U.S.S.R. but also in the U.S.A. wherever a purely functional view of the university prevails, has no such qualms about the limits or pretensions of science. But while the classical humanist and the Christian humanist differ from the instrumental secularist (or scientific humanist) in their kindred reserve, precaution, and restraint, the two differ from each other in that the Christian humanist goes beyond the classical humanist in holding that grace operates not only in the realm of behavior and redemption but may also operate in the realm of knowledge, as at once a check upon rational pretension, irrational distortion, and ideological disfiguration and also as an occasional confirmation of that reason that reason knows not of.

At this point Christian humanists themselves divide: the Roman Catholics continuing to maintain that reason and nature are variously supplemented and sustained by grace mediated through the sacramental community of faith, while the Protestants have, without ever fully articulating it, a different ground for their theory of reason and nature and of the function of the community of scholarship relatively independent of the Church.

Roman Catholic theorists of education usually begin with a comprehensive system of revealed truth and considerable precision as to its relation to non-theological knowledge, whereas those of us in the various dissenting and even catholic (non-Roman) traditions have no such Thomist clarity about revelation and reason and are therefore a little handicapped in any systematic formulation by our preference for a biblical-Augustinian stress on event, on experience, and on the interpenetration of the realms of faith and reason.

Since many theorists of the Christian university are often tempted to refurbish the Catholic conception of an overarching system of revealed truth as it can be related to science, we shall henceforth concentrate on a distinctively Protestant-Sectarian view that is more at home with the provisional pluralism of our empirical grasp of truth and that at the same time is concerned to perpetuate or cultivate the fellowship and solidarity of both scholars and students who are called upon to gaze into the terrifying wilderness at the frontiers of knowledge.

III. *The Protestant Principle and the Sect Principle in the Vocation of the University and the Christian College*

Our Protestant principle places the work of reason and the rational schematizations of faith under the continuous judgment of *Veritas* and holds all institutions — alike the University, the Church, and the State — under the divine judgment.

At the same time most of us are not pure Protestants in the normative sense; for the Sectarian impulse, deriving from the Radical Reformation, has entered

strongly even into American denominations of the classical Protestant heritage; and, while almost all main-line American denominations have at length abandoned their Sectarianism in the sense of moralistic exclusiveness and doctrinal bigotry, we are still directly or indirectly heirs or beneficiaries of the Sectarian ideal of the gathered church of committed believers living in the fellowship of mutual correction, support, and abiding hope. When transposed to the realm of education, where admittedly it originally played a minor or even a negative role, the Sectarian principle can be transformed as a means of mitigating the strenuousness of our Protestant posture of being continuously provisional and contextual in our affirmations about faith and ethics. Moreover, by way of providing a theological foundation for a mutually supportive togetherness and fellowship of discipline, aspiration, and loving comradeship in the hazardous pursuit of truth (not only for the immature but also for those exploring on the brinks of knowledge), the Sectarian principle is also a perhaps indispensable "Protestant" compensation for the lack of that security provided in Catholic schools by ecclesiastical dogma.

We shall spell out the implications of the Protestant principle largely in terms of the scholar himself whether he be in a Christian college or a secular university. We shall spell out the Sectarian principle as the theological basis for the Christian college as a community of learning. Although "Sect", taken from the sociology of religion, would not on the face of it seem to provide us with an adequate theological construct, we should bear in mind that ecclesiology is not less theological than the high doctrines of Christology and soteriology. It is quite proper to draw upon the Sect idea in dealing theologically with corporate expressions of the pursuit and organization of truth.

A. The Protestant Principle and the Call of the Christian Scholar

To get our problem in focus, let us recall the biblical formulations of it. From the writings of the Old Covenant we have our basic text in Genesis 2:17, God's command to the first man: "Of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall die." From among the writings of the New Covenant, perhaps the most useful for our purpose is the passage from I John 4: 5-8, wherein distinction is drawn between the wisdom of the regenerate in Christ and the sterile knowledge of the world, the key text for the issue of secularism.

They are of the world. . . . We are of God. Whoever knows God listens to us, and he who is not of God does not listen to us. By this we know the spirit of truth and the spirit of error. Beloved, let us love one another; for love is of God, and he who loves is born of God. He who does not love does not know God; for God is love.

In the Old Testament passage only ethical knowledge was specifically at stake; and in the Johannine passage the only concern was with that portion of knowledge

which bears upon God. It is important to underscore the exclusively *moral* aspect of knowing which originally attached both to the story of the Fall and to the Johannine interpretation of the Restitution. Nevertheless the involvement of the whole of reason in the Fall (as in the Restitution) has been traditionally so amplified that some of the Fathers, of the Schoolmen, and of the Reformers have alike utterly disparaged it. Witness Tertullian's scornful query: What has Jerusalem to do with Athens?; the double-truth theory of some Nominalists; and Luther's denunciation of reason as "the whore of Satan." But a major tradition in Christian history has inferred from such passages as our Johannine text more than the gift of knowing how to do God's will in love as a consequence of the Restoration of his corrupted faculties in Christian regeneration. It has applied the texts to the whole realm of knowledge.

As early as the Apologists the universal *logos* or Reason was understood to inform the individual *logos* of the Christian philosopher, quickened by the Holy Spirit. At the same time against the Gnostics the Old Catholic Fathers contended that man is not saved by reason or *gnosis* but that reason, the clouded reflection of the divine image in man, must be saved. In the monastic tradition of learning, celibacy and continence were seen as self-disciplinary ways whereby the fault of the First Adam was rectified by the devout Christian's following the example of the Second Adam. The lion lying down peacefully with the monastic scholar Jerome was a symbol of the partial restitution of paradisiac harmony even within fallen nature. Augustine worked through the relationship of worldly *scientia* and that divine *sapientia* made available to believers through the Scriptures and the hovering testimony of the Spirit.

We need not trace again the whole account of the monastic-paradisiac motif in the theory and practice of the medieval university which survived even the Reformation era with its dismantling of monastic establishments and its inculcation of clerical marriage. In England the two universities preserved much of their medieval character and constitution including the faculty control over the interior life of the colleges. In Reformation Germany the universities were multiplied, partly as a consequence of the ambition of princes to found, in their diminutive territories, those centers of higher learning which before had been chartered solely by Pope or Emperor. In the nineteenth century these universities with their renowned *Lehr- und Lernfreiheit* became the universal paradigms of the learned world. But their virtues were never construed as distinctively Protestant or even Christian. These universities had their great faculties of theology, but methodology within them and without was the same. A distinctively Protestant theory of the university was never attempted in Germany. There was, to be sure, an effort to develop a Calvinist theory of higher education in Holland which eventuated in the establishment of the Free University of Amsterdam, and there were others in the Reformed tradition, but the major effort at a Christian theory of the university in recent times came from the Catholic side as the Church in the post-Napoleonic era endeavored to cope with

the rising tide of anti-clericalism. John Henry Newman's *The Idea of the University* (1852) was but one among several such formations. Sir Walter Moberly's now almost classic *The Crisis in the University* (1949) stands out among the more recent Protestant analyses. Since then there has been a great stirring. But the biblical-theological theme of fallen reason and *sapientia* restored by grace has not been central to the discussion since the seventeenth century.

Dean Douglas Horton made an extremely useful contribution to our thinking in this direction in his Lyman Beecher Lectures at Yale for 1958 when he drew upon Martin Luther's famous dictum in the ethical realm, characterizing the Christian justified by faith as *simul justus et peccator*, and fashioned his own felicitous dictum, characterizing each Protestant Christian in the context of the university as *simul certus et dubitator*. For Luther himself not only pointed to the regrettable persistence of sin in the Christian justified by faith but also acknowledged his own occasional doubt which he called *Anfechtung* and which he pilloried as a sin. We are properly reminded of this latter fact when we deal with the role of faith or theology as organized belief in the university. In any event theology is probably most usefully present today in the academic community, from the Protestant-Sectarian point of view, not as a would-be queen of the sciences but, as H. Richard Niebuhr has phrased it, as a servant of the other disciplines.

One might carry further the attempt at re-phrasing Luther. The Christian scholar, I would avow, is *simul praescitus et scrutator*. In Romans 8:29 Paul writes of those whom God *foreknew*, that He *predestined* them to be conformed to the image of His Son. It is in Paul's sense in this particular text that I would say the Christian teacher or student is at once foreknown of God (*praescitus*) and a researcher (*scrutator*) of God's ways among men and in creation at large. I shall have to admit to a certain flaw in my phrase, for in the history of theology those foreknown of God, the *praesciti*, became differentiated as the reprobate from the *praedestinati*, those predestined to salvation! But there is nothing in Paul's original phrasing, I hasten to say, to justify this distinction; and what I wish to convey by the dictum is that any of us who feel called or destined by family, church, or a special sense of mission to work and witness as Christians in the community of learning are no less seekers than the secular scholars and researchers on the same terms with and using the same methods as those of our colleagues who avow no such allegiance as we own. Just as Luther's believer *justificatus sola fide* remains a *peccator* but released from the toils of guilt and anxiety in the joyful fulfilment of his vocation in a fallen world, so by the same token we may say that in the more specialized realm of the life of the mind the Christian scholar, foreknown of God, assured of a Truth which is at the same time God's Love (humanized in an historic figure who called us even before we knew Him), remains nonetheless a *scrutator*, like any other scholar, but released from inhibitions about probing forthrightly even into the historic sources of his own faith — confident in the prosecution of his researches and tentative con-

THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE TODAY

structions amid the fragmentation, the incompleteness, and even the ambiguities of the ever expanding realms of knowledge. The Christian researcher is secure under the aegis of him who is the Truth that sets men ever free.

With this view of the Christian scholar as *simul praescitus et scrutator* it is possible to develop a theory of the mixed college or university in which the unbelieving teachers and students have as much a place as those who profess a Christian faith. Just as it was not the righteous Pharisee but the *peccator* on the Temple steps whom Jesus saw going down justified in the sight of God, so it may be that it is not always the professed Christian member of the faculty or student body but the researcher despairing of ever coming close to God who may go down the steps of the Temple of wisdom secretly illumined in his darkness. There are many earnest, magnanimous, but unbelieving scholars who, without knowing it, have often discharged a kind of secular apostolate on our campuses. The work of the Lord is not infrequently accomplished by those who are reverently slow to say, "Lord, Lord." A Protestant theory of the university demands no creedal commitment, nor a system of theology or Christian world view to be communicated to each generation of students.

A Protestant conception of higher education naturally concentrates on the small, homogeneous denominational college, but it recognizes also the important place of the mixed, though often incorrectly styled, "secular university;" for a Protestant-Sectarian theory of higher education should be content to find its scholars reverently at work amidst the provisional and fragmentary character of knowledge, insisting only that the whole of their *scientia* be seen within the epic and the cosmic perspective of that biblical vision of the truth which begins with the created order, searches for meaning in human history, declares that it was precisely in a man — a person like ourselves, not in some impersonal force — that God was most clearly manifest in his reconciliatory action within creation, a perspective finally that holds ever before them the question of that invisible goal towards which we hasten. Needless to say, the Christian scholar and the Christian student in the mixed university of our pluralistic commonwealth no less than in the denominational and religiously homogeneous college will be especially attentive to the meaning of history.

Within the memory of our older faculty members, geology and biology have been the critical fields of the Christian college. Today the critical field seems to be biblical and ecclesiastical history and the problem of history in general. What was once called sacred history as the realm of God's public providence has now been either flattened out as ordinary history or distilled by specialists as the theology or the philosophy of history. But biblical and ecclesiastical history remain in between — often, to be sure, threatened by complete assimilation on the part of the secular historian as successive aspects of selected epochs of general history or on the other side so theologized that biblical history may be in danger of being once again with-

drawn from the ordinary rules of historical evidence and exposition. The view that I have of biblical and ecclesiastical history from Eden to the ecumenical movement (to take one "theological" discipline as an example of the work of the scholar *simul praescitus et scrutator*) is that it must be studied and expounded as any other branch of history but that there yet remains a difference in emphasis and perspective.

The Church is a community in time as well as in space. In its collective memory a David, an Amos, a Paul, an Augustine, a Luther, or a Wesley are, by reason of our creedal avowal of the *communio sanctorum* and the *una sancta*, possessed of a contemporaneity within the venerable community of faith often more potent than the living — a contemporaneity of influence which ordinary kings, lawgivers, and writers of bygone and alien nations and cultures exert on none save the specialist. The same contemporaneity is true of the biblical and patristic texts which may be recited and sung by heart, preached upon and enshrined in luminous windows, while in contrast the comparably basic but much more recent texts of a civil constitution are known only to the legal specialist and by others on consultation. The continuous refraction of the ongoing life of the community of faith through the begemmed prisms of the remembered past justifies the biblical and ecclesiastical historians in their specialization within the general art and science of historiography.

To be specific, the ecclesiastical and the general historian can readily agree, say, on the importance of John Wesley in the history of the British eighteenth century, and up to a point their two accounts may well overlap, but the general historian need not, in order to present a plausible analysis and valid narrative within the framework of even a monographic secular interpretation, tarry with certain elements which the ecclesiastical historian will perforce stress because of what I should like to call the principle of luminous particularity, of the concretion of event within event like some chemically complex organic compound.

For example within the heart strangely warmed at the Aldersgate meeting on May 24, 1738, was the echo of Moravian Peter Böhler's experience, doubled now by the resonance of Luther's *Commentary on Romans*, which in its turn resounded with the joy of Luther's *Turnerlebnis*, itself a re-enactment of that juxtaposition of legal dutifulness and grace experienced by Saul on the road to Damascus, which as Paul he interpreted in a phrase purporting to re-echo the still more ancient word of the prophet Habakkuk. This chain of influences, direct and indirect, would be largely irrelevant even in a footnote of a general historian's account of the place of Wesley in the eighteenth century. But this concretion within concretion, this imaging and typology, this re-enacting of re-enactments, though they have their parallels in the history of art, literature, and philosophy are nevertheless notably biblical and ecclesiastical configurations and give a distinctive cast to the historiography of the Bible and the Church. Biblical-ecclesiastical history and general history might be compared respectively to organic and inorganic chemistry. The basic elements are the same in both, but the clusterings of historical events which are picked

THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE TODAY

up for scrutiny and analysis by the ecclesiastical or biblical historian are often much more complex than those scrutinized in secular history. Think of the Synoptic narratives with the frail debris of earlier texts within texts, faint echoes within echoes of oral tradition. Moreover the operation of the Spirit as a fluid or force or catalyst in binding and loosing these increasingly complex historical compounds may be taken as a legitimate hypothesis of inquiry into the history of the biblical and ecclesiastical community, the more so for the reason that they, whose life and work are being chronicled and interpreted, themselves took seriously the operation of the Spirit. At the same time just as there is no hard and fast line between the two kinds of chemistry, since many of the hydrocarbons produced by the life processes can also be prepared in laboratories of the inorganic chemist, so also there can be no fundamental line drawn between the two approaches and emphases in humane historiography.

It needs scarcely to be added that in pointing at once to the universality and the mysterious depths of history and especially the history of the ongoing community of faith, while at the same time stressing the luminous particularity of person and event and chosen people, I am arguing that biblical and ecclesiastical history have a notable contribution to make to the curriculum of both the denominational college and the mixed university.

B. The Sectarian Principle of Fellowship and the Christian College

President Nathan Pusey in his baccalaureate sermon during the commencement exercises of the second class to have completed their four collegiate years under his presidency at Harvard University spoke movingly of "the enlightenment and joy of belief" as a high objective of college studies. It will be entirely appropriate for some new "Protestant" theory of college education to develop on American soil as a consequence of the current theological revival and a theological reconception of the Sectarian principle in the realm of academic fellowship.

The Sectarian principle, it will be recalled, supplements the Protestant principle by combining the venerable paradisiac and the martial motifs and thus stressing the ethical and the self-disciplinary aspects of the quest of knowledge in the fallen world. The Sectarian principle is paramount when we talk of collegiate tutelage, as is the Protestant principle when we talk of research. The already mentioned dominant role of sectarian ecclesiology with "lay" control upon the charters and constitutions of American colleges makes the Sect itself a plausible category for the reinterpretation of the Christian College from a theological no less than from an historical point of view. "A university cannot be built upon a sect." But James Luther Adams, before a convocation in the very university where the foregoing slogan was very early made academically constitutional, drawing precisely upon selected Sectarian impulses such as dissent, protest, and committed fellowship, recently drew attention to the uses of diversity in the university and the college.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

A Christian theory and program for higher education has a place both for abstract research and personal tutelage.

Ordinarily, partly by contagion from the name itself, we think of the university as primarily concerned with the extension of the frontiers of universal knowledge by reason of its greater facilities for research, and we think of the college as primarily concerned with the tutelage of the whole man, not only by means of course work but also through the fellowship and the extra-curricular activity of campus life.

The relative merits of academic specialization and professional concentration over against general or what was once called classical or liberal education are being much discussed in educational circles, indeed with mounting intensity, as the whole of the American educational system faces the challenge of the enormously successful secular specialization and hence impressive professional competence being achieved in the Soviet Union. The temptation has already been largely resisted so to stress professional and scientific specialization in a crash program that our traditional liberal arts and sciences would be scrapped or undercut. But the temptation will be ever before us; and it is perhaps at this very juncture in the development of American higher education that the Christian college acquires a renewed charter of responsibility.

More and more American universities will inevitably continue to specialize and professionalize like their Western European, not alone their Soviet, counterparts. Coherence in ultimate meaning therefore, as distinguished from comprehensiveness in the realms progressively subjected to the specialist's onslaught, can scarcely be, as once it was in a measure in the Middle Ages, the regnant principle of the modern university — often called for that reason disparagingly a "multiversity" — because of the overriding needs of specialization. And in the degree to which this process is accelerated, the Christian colleges and the colleges within these great universities must refurbish their conceptions of classical or general or Christian education and moral tutelage in keeping with their traditional stress upon full collegiate life in the disciplined community of knowledge, centered in the college green, the campus, the commons, the *aula*, and the chapel — to recall in conclusion the paradisiac, the martial, the transferential, the critical, and the christological themes or motifs in the history of the theological idea of learning.

In our prophetic, Protestant, and dissenting traditions of Christian education in a pluralistic democracy, we can be helped to a fresh understanding of the role of our denominational colleges if we think of them as a congeries of semi-autonomous centers of regional, personal, and denominational attachment but spiritually united in their relationship to the larger Church and the work of the Kingdom in a way roughly comparable to the schools under the various Roman Catholic orders — with just that amount of rivalry and local pride to keep them

THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE TODAY

ever poised for fresh experimentation and solid achievement but never again so divided, as was once alas the case, that they be found withstanding each other harder than the vast wilderness of ignorance about them which ever threatens to overrun our academic grounds.

The faculties of Christian colleges might, incidentally, find a special mission during these difficult days for the staffs of our public schools in helping to re-establish a sense of solidarity with them as fellow citizens of the Republic of Letters, jointly engaged in transferring knowledge from generation to generation. In earlier days the college was often called the Academy, while in living memory many of our high schools went by the same name. Christian professors and high school instructors should find occasions to come together academically to help especially the latter renew their sense of membership in the ancient guild of tutors and scholars and to reconceive and sharpen their sense of vocation within and conformable to the constitutional limitations of our religiously neutral public school system.

Christian theology and the churches and the colleges of these churches must do all that can be done to maintain and strengthen rational discourse among all men of good will and guard against contributing inadvertently to the relativism and to the bewilderment of our age by a failure as Christians to agree on certain basic postulates.

Christian scholars must reach a consensus. They have a special charge laid upon them in this age of the atom and automation with all its dread and promise—with man taking control of himself and human destiny through manipulation of everything from the atom and the gene to the moon and Mars.

Lest, like primal man in the garden, in our quest for knowledge and the control of cosmic law hanging now almost within our grasp, we should again be tempted to violate the very law of good and evil implanted in our being, we must in a freshly relevant way reinterpret the moral aspect of knowing inherent in the biblical account both of the Fall and of the Restitution in Christ, the *logos* incarnate. We must underscore it for ourselves and our colleagues perhaps by judicious reference to the cruel distortions and disfigurements of science wrought even in our own time among the most learned of peoples to whose universities the world had been so long in debt. Warned and warning by this ghastly example of a satanic pseudo-science of manipulation and experimentation which presumed in the laboratories and the law books of the medical and legal faculties to pluck at the very souls of men, we shall be made ever alert to strive against the recurrence of that most grievous lapse of the learned. By reason of our christologically sanctioned freedom and responsibility and our morally motivated sense of the solidarity and the universality of citizenship in the academic world, we may help to prevent the blindness of frantic, purely utilitarian specialization which could once again transform into a wilderness of ethically bewildered savants the trimmed and cultivated paradise of humane tutelage and scholarship dedicated to a Truth supreme above the Church, the University, and the State.

The Christian College in the Life of the Church

HILDA NEATBY

This very broad subject must be treated in a brief paper either narrowly or superficially; in fact the author can hardly avoid committing both faults. The special concern of this conference is with the Christian colleges of the United States and Canada, and these must receive first attention; but their story cannot be separated from that of the whole Christian Church of the West. The material on the subject is plentiful but scattered and, so far, insufficiently examined from the viewpoint of the Church. In our secular age we have been much more concerned to pay a courteous tribute to the contribution of the Church to secular learning than to study the all-important but contentious role of the institution of pure learning in the life of the Church.

The question of definition itself presents a problem to the historian. What is a Christian College? A definition both positive and negative emerged from the deliberations of the last Quadrennial Convocation of Christian Colleges. A college is not Christian merely because it uses the name of Christ or because it has a formal connection with the Church or because it requires chapel attendance or offers courses in religion. "Rather the distinctive mark of the Christian college is that it finds its integrating faith and philosophy in the Christian religion. . . . [It] may be defined as a school of higher education, meeting the needs of contemporaneous culture, verified by the knowledge and love of God, guided by the teachings of Christ, and employing all means required to develop a Christlike conscience."¹

This clear statement of an ideal is helpful but it is hardly necessary to say that it does not quite solve the historian's problem of defining his subject. In this paper it seems necessary in discussing the Christian colleges of the past to accept tentatively "all who profess and call themselves Christian" and to leave to more exact scholarship the delicate task of determining which of them may be said to have achieved or at least approximated to this undogmatic but exacting standard.

I propose to offer a speculative generalization, not as a dogma but rather as a means of approach to my subject. The Christian college has always had to meet the

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¹ David B. Sageser (ed.), *What is a Christian College?* New York: Commission on Higher Education of the National Council of Churches, 1958, p. 13.

THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH

attacks of three foes, sometimes one by one but frequently all at once. These may be termed secularism; barbarianism (either Christian or pagan); and sectarianism in the sense not of a particular creed or creeds but of a state of mind in the believer.

The opposition of secularism is sometimes obvious, sometimes concealed, but always present within the walls of the college as well as without. Learning, it is argued, is good and it is secular. It has to do with man's reason operating on the things of time. It has nothing to do with faith which concerns itself with eternal values. Faith may have its place in the whole of life, but it can only clog and confuse the operations of reason on matters purely secular. It is important to bear in mind that this has been the attitude of many Christians as well as of non-Christians, particularly in modern times when education has increasingly become the responsibility of the state.

The barbarians also oppose the Christian college. The position of the non-Christian barbarian is simple enough. He opposes all learning, Christian or otherwise. The Christian barbarian is a more difficult opponent because like the secularist he has so much right on his side. Faith, he argues, here supporting the secularist, is not dependent on reason. It comes by divine grace. The truly humble believer must set aside and even despise his learning. It cannot help him; it may well hinder him. Not many wise, not many learned are called. If learning is not essential to salvation and if it may conceivably be hurtful to the faith, surely, if it is allowed, it should at least not be encouraged. The pious barbarian has been with the Church from the beginning. Believing as he does that the essence of Christianity is its quickening power in the individual soul he is dubious both of the personal and of the social task of the Christian College.

On this continent sectarian opposition to the Christian College has been most remarkable, but in the sense in which I use it it is not confined to our continent or to our age. The sectarian admits all learning as good but insists that it must be defined by faith in the shape of dogmatic interpretations and dogmatic tests. This "sectarianism" can be present in any Christian College and certainly was to be found (along with secularism) in the schools of the great western Church of the middle ages just as surely as it may be found today in the smallest school of the narrowest sect on the frontier. And as with secularism and barbarism, its strength lies in its truth. It is always perilous to scorn the guidance and the protection of dogma if by dogma is meant a clear and uncompromising definition of the ground of faith.

Christian learning since the days of the early Church has picked its way perilously between these opponents, each one alert and dangerous because each has held the weapon of a partial truth. The historian of the Church tells proudly how in the old world from early times Christians met the challenge of all. They attended pagan schools but pagan schools were not enough. The early catechetical schools culminating in the great school at Alexandria met the challenge of the secularist.

"They might be described as denominational colleges at a secular university, colleges in which a determined effort was made to produce a synthesis of Greek learning with Christian revelation."² The determined association of faith and reason, of sacred and secular learning, has been maintained from then through the recent great age of secularization to the present day.

The barbarians have also been countered with the great tradition of piety with learning handed down from pre-Christian times. "Piety and learning (among the Exile Jews) were inseparable; whoever could not read was no true Jew."³ The tradition carried from the early Church through the dark ages to the time of Abelard and of Aquinas when the Church, faced with the vast and rich pagan culture of the Moslem world, had to choose between the perils of pagan learning and the perils of obscurantism. The choice was made: reason in the nature of things cannot be contrary to faith but must be embraced for the illumination of faith. And so on into the age of the Renaissance, the fifteenth century when the pious Dean Colet (one of many) returned from Italy, that almost pagan centre of the new learning, with a fresh and moving insight into the Scriptures which he could not (humanly speaking) have achieved without this learning. And then into the great age of the Reformed churches when the Protestants asserted once again that piety and education (or at least literacy) were essential not for some but for all.

The enmity of sectarianism was more subtle and more difficult to meet. The issue of "academic freedom" in the universities was a real one in the middle ages. What may perhaps be called one of its most dramatic manifestations was the response of Luther to the demand that he recant his recent teachings: "Unless I am convicted by Scripture and right reason I neither can nor will recant. God help me. Amen."⁴

It is not a question here of whether Luther was right or wrong. He had revealed sharply a problem ever before the Christian Church and particularly before the Christian College. The college cannot escape the obligation of some dogma which must be defined by some one. How confining must this dogma be? How much liberty may it permit? There is no general answer to this question, I suppose, except the one answer: confidence that in any given situation light will be given by the Holy Spirit.

Luther's however was a special case the notoriety of which may obscure the steady demand of the medieval university to something like an autonomous place in the Christian Commonwealth. In the terms of medieval symbolism it was argued that wisdom is an attribute of God along with power and goodness. Each is essential

² L. Millar, *Christian Education in the First Two Centuries*. London, 1946, p. 26.

³ L. Millar, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁴ Preserved Smith, *The Age of the Reformation*. New York: Henry Holt, 1920, p. 80.

THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH

and each should be expressed in a Christian society. How better could wisdom be expressed than through the university mediating between and in a sense instructing both the Church (goodness) and the State (power)?⁶ "The task of the University is to make it possible for reason to show clearly what constitutes faith, 'for if there were no theological science faith would not be known; if it were not understood, it could not be protected, and after that, without too much of an interval, it would perish and cease to be'."⁶

This conviction crossed the Atlantic with the Puritans whose leaders, it is said, "felt deeply the New World mission of their University as corporate heir of all the ages in the communication of Veritas."⁷ The result of their conviction was Harvard College. The pleasant stories of its foundation are well known. How in England in 1584 Queen Elizabeth's Chancellor of the Exchequer founded at Cambridge the Puritan College Emmanuel (God with Us) and how Elizabeth in wrath challenged him with having erected a Puritan foundation. He replied with much tact. He would not, he said, countenance anything contrary to her laws but he had "set an acorn, which when it becomes an oak, God alone knows what will be the fruit thereof"—so, it seems, explaining the pious Puritan name which had aroused her suspicion.⁸ A generation later as the chronicler records, "After God had carried us safe to New England and we had builded our houses, provided necessities for our livelihood, reared convenient places for God's worship and settled the Civil Government one of the next things we longed for and looked after was to advance Learning and Perpetuate it to Posterity; dreading to leave an illiterate ministry to the churches when our present Ministers shall lie in the Dust."⁹ Thirty-five graduates of Emmanuel College Cambridge had come to the colony. In 1636 a committee drawn chiefly from their members was appointed to set up a College; two years later John Harvard, also of Emmanuel and a man of some property, died bequeathing to the college his library and half of his estate.

Most modern historians boasting of the astonishing ambition of the colony that founded such a college sixteen years after its own beginnings rejoice that it was able to free itself from religious control and to become a great, and for a time at least, a neutral centre of learning. Until recently, I think, the Church might have sympathized with this attitude. Our viewpoint is however changing. A recent study¹⁰ reminds us of the exalted ideas of the Mathers, Increase and Cotton, on the

⁶ I have attempted here a very rough simplification of what I understood to be the argument of G. H. Williams, *The Harvard Divinity School* (An Excursus). Boston: Beacon Press, 1954, p. 325f.

⁷ G. H. Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 336-7.

⁸ G. H. Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

⁹ S. E. Morison, "Harvard's Past" in *A Tercentenary of Harvard College*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937, p. 48.

¹⁰ Quoted in H. A. Faulkner, *American Political and Social History*. New York: Crofts, 1944, p. 62.

¹¹ G. H. Williams, *op. cit.*

role of Harvard. It was they who insisted that it was more even than a training school for ministers. Mindful of the existence of Roman Catholic seminaries in Canada and Mexico, the Mathers were anxious that Harvard should achieve the full dignity of a university in "this protestant and puritan country." They were also concerned with maintaining its freedom of action against encroachment by the established Church of England, by the State, or by those independents who denied the necessity of learning to the clergy or even to the faithful. Increasingly, I think, Christian historians are coming to perceive that the Christian beginnings of so many institutions of learning are not merely historic accidents but belong to the very nature of our civilization and of its institutions of learning.

It is possible to discern two chief functions of the Christian College on this continent. One is to represent learning as an essential aspect and function of a professedly Christian community. The other is to serve as a missionary arm of the Church, an invaluable instrument in bringing Christianity to pagan peoples, such as the Indian tribes, or to the many primitive communities of the frontier. It has been suggested that Harvard itself was a frontier college, and this is true in a sense. On the other hand it may be argued that the Roman Catholic colleges of New Spain and New France and the New England Puritan colleges are rather a normal expression of fully formed, coherent, and self-conscious Christian communities which happened to have moved overseas and that they saw themselves in this role.

If this is true of Harvard, it is even more true of the younger university of Yale. Yale like Harvard was created to meet what was deemed an emergency within a Christian community. If the founders of Harvard feared to lose their Christian ministry through death, those of Yale strove to preserve Christian truth in the face of prosperity and of eighteenth century Enlightenment. Roland H. Bainton in *Yale and the University* points out that three great Christian themes, theology, piety, and social concern tended to part company in the eighteenth century because the two great movements of the age, the Enlightenment and Pietism or Methodism, disparaged the theology of the Reformation. Only in southern New England were they held in balance, largely due to the work of this remarkable institution. Yale was founded in 1701 partly as a result of some disappointment at developments at Harvard, partly from a general desire to stir men from the prevailing religious laxity. Its foundation was however also the expression of a positive plan of long standing "for the training up of youth in this towne that through God's blessing they may be fitted for publique service hereafter in church or commonweale."¹¹ Yale's act of foundation proclaimed the institution to be "For the educating and instructing of youth in good literature, arts and sciences; That so by the blessing of Almighty God they may be the better fitted for public Employment both in Church and in Civil State."¹²

¹¹ John Davenport, quoted in Roland H. Bainton, *Yale and the University*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1957, p. 7.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH

It was later that Jonathan Edwards urged that the need was not so much that men should "have their heads stored as their hearts touched."¹³ This attitude, typical of the Great Awakening, revived, stimulated, shocked, even divided Yale. It is surely no disrespect to the truth preached by Jonathan Edwards to suggest that his teachings in the mouths of lesser men could have encouraged the ever-present foe of Christian barbarism. Yale survived this danger and, its historian boasts, maintained the essential synthesis of theology with piety and social concern.

Harvard and Yale then may perhaps be accepted as typifying on this continent the first of two principal roles of the Christian College. This role was emphasized (as has been suggested) by the Mathers, Increase and Cotton, who saw the university as a necessary part of any Christian community. The university was the wisdom of God in society, joined with the goodness and the power of God (exemplified in Church and State), and concerned with them in the common task of preserving religion, morals, and learning.

This conception of the complete and coherent expression of a true community was never entirely realized and was ultimately broken down by the chronic opposition of religious dissidents to anything like an establishment and also by the onslaughts of the freethinkers. The fate of King's College (New York) is typical of conditions in the new world. It was, one might say, moderately dogmatic. It was founded in 1754, aided by a royal grant of land. The President was to be a member of the Church of England and the liturgy was to be used in morning and evening chapel services. There was however no intention of imposing "on the scholar the peculiar Tenets of any particular Sect of Christians; but to inculcate upon their tender Minds the great principles of Christianity and Morality, in which true Christians of each Denomination are generally agreed."¹⁴ The intentions sound well enough, but neither the society nor the times were right for such a College. King's College involved in sectarian and political strife, dissolved in the Revolution and emerged, secularized, as Columbia University. Never again could wisdom in the university undertake officially to instruct goodness and power in church and state.

By this time however the Christian College was becoming increasingly prominent in its other and more specialized function. On a primitive frontier or among pagan peoples it was one arm of the Christian missionary who must not only train clergy to preach but must also present Christian society in its wholeness to those who might have forgotten it or who were strangers to it. Every early Christian College was aware of some such missionary function, but it seems to come into very special prominence with the Great Revival of the Middle Colonies in the 18th century. William Tennent, in his first "log college" founded in 1726, trained his own three sons and fifteen others and sent them out as "flaming evangelists." The

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

¹⁴ W. W. Sweet, *The Story of Religion in America*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1930, p. 146.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

enthusiasm inspired by the "log colleges" helped to produce (among many others) the College of New Jersey, later Princeton University, which, established as a revival centre, "admirably served the purpose of its founding and poured a stream of zealous young men into the ministry of the Presbyterian Church."¹⁵

This missionary enterprise and zeal carried over into the 19th century and expressed itself in the rapidly moving frontier of the Middle West through the American Home Missionary Society, founded in 1826. A group of Yale graduates sent out by this Society established Illinois College and many others in the West. Yale and Andover men also co-operated in the foundation of Iowa College, later Grinnell College. The small denominational college became a typical frontier institution. It was not primarily a theological college. Most of the seminaries were founded in the eastern states. The denominational colleges however, closely supervised by the churches and often staffed largely by ministers, could offer education preliminary to a theological education and could also on the raw frontier strive to fulfill the old ideal "the training up of youth . . . that through God's blessing they may be fitted for public service . . . in Church or Commonweale."

It would be impossible to imagine the extension of the Church on the frontier without the church school or college. And equally no one can think of the history of the American state universities in the West without remembering their small and venturesome precursors. Nevertheless the Christian College soon after the mid-century began to fall into difficult times. It suffered from all the enemies mentioned at the beginning of this paper. Barbarians, Christian and pagan, were plentiful on the frontier, and the Christian College had to cope with each in turn or with both together. Its principal enemies however were the other two which have been mentioned, sectarianism and secularism.

The sectarian problem was inherent in the situation. The early missionary work on the frontier was chiefly carried on by Presbyterians and Congregationalists, but the Baptists and the Methodists soon overcame the early prejudice of some toward an educated ministry and "every state its own Baptist College" became a slogan in the west as in the east. This very enthusiasm was inevitably accompanied by a certain sectarian narrowness. Moreover it was clear that a poor frontier community could not afford adequate support or provide enough students for more than one or two university foundations. The fear that piety might be the enemy of learning was expressed for example in the suggestion in 1837 at the time of the founding of the University of Michigan that the State exercise its right to control education by withholding charters from private colleges and denying them the privilege of conferring degrees.¹⁶

¹⁵ W. W. Sweet, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

¹⁶ W. C. Murray, "University Development in Canada", *Trans. Royal Society of Canada*, 3rd Series, Vol. 16, 1922, p. 104. . .

THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH

There was however no need to go to such lengths. The increasing and to our own day ever-increasing cost of education joined to the growth of secularism has sent popular support more and more to the great state-controlled and state-supported institutions. The complete secularization of public elementary and secondary schools has prepared the public mind for believing that secular education is not only necessary but that it is absolutely the best. Not only does it avoid the evils of sectarianism and emphasize the common life, it also gives to reason a more adequate nourishment than piety could or would afford. It is important to remember how many serious Christians believe or have believed that a completely secular education is not only adequate but excellent.

The many Christian colleges themselves which survived and grew rich testified to the increasing secularization of the times. There is no need to spend time on a familiar story. Colleges must offer a good education for their day. Clerical professors gave way to laymen. Laymen, if they were to be efficient, must be paid adequately. Clerical presidents gave way to businessmen skilled at detecting and captivating generous millionaires. And generous millionaires, unwilling naturally to see their money ill-spent, encouraged the development of administrative capacity on boards of governors. This is not to say that efficiency is the enemy of piety. It would be fairer to say simply that the small Christian College, forced to adapt itself rapidly to the demands of a new and increasingly secular age, very often unconsciously compromised the intentions of its original founders. I speak of a general tendency without prejudice to the admirable work of countless Christian colleges in this country today.

The story of Christian colleges in Canada parallels in some measure that of the United States. Certainly the influence of the older community on the younger has been most important, directly and indirectly. In Canada as in the United States, particularly up to the middle of the nineteenth century, there was a strong sense of the essential partnership of religion and learning. "A university in which learning should be sound and education religious" was the ideal of one religious and educational leader.¹⁷ The Canadian Christian colleges also had to meet the foes of sectarianism, secularism, and barbarism, but particularly the first two. And the two great functions of the college in Canada as in the United States were seen first as fulfilling an essential role in the Christian community and second as constituting a special arm of the missionary enterprise.

On the other hand there are very important differences between the two countries. In Canada there has been no Harvard, no Yale, no Princeton. Protestantism came too late to a country with a very old Christian tradition. It was the Roman Catholic community on the banks of the St. Lawrence that established in the seventeenth century the "petit" and the "grand" seminaries for the training of young men

¹⁷ Bishop Strachan, quoted in Henry Patton, *A Sermon . . . on John Strachan*, Montreal, 1868.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

(French and Indian) as priests for the community and as missionaries for the vast area to the southwest, the west, and the northwest claimed by the Church as its field. These have been followed in the province of Quebec by the "collèges classiques," small colleges which make it their purpose to offer sound Christian (but not theological) training from the beginning of high school to the university degree. They are definitely under clerical control, although they now admit non-Roman Catholic students. The professors are generally Roman Catholic clerics, but they may be laymen, occasionally even Protestant laymen. It is difficult to estimate the importance and the influence of this strong community church and its educational institutions on Protestant Canada. In the past the two cultures have gone their separate ways; Roman Catholic clericalism in education may well have encouraged Protestant secularism. It is possible on the other hand that it has presented a challenge which may be responsible for the close affiliations existing today between some state universities and Christian colleges.

Two other differences between American and Canadian experience are important. In Canada for certain historical reasons sectarian differences have had a profound effect on the history of the Christian College; and the missionary motive has been of special importance. A detailed examination of these two characteristics gives, I think, a very fair picture of the Canadian Christian College.

The sectarian problem was peculiarly difficult in Canada first because of the political and social bond with Great Britain and second because of the economic and social bond with the United States. Almost the first Canadian Protestants were the Loyalists who from about 1780 to the end of the century flocked into the Maritime Provinces and the Niagara Peninsula. As early as 1783 five clergymen in New York prepared a memorial urging the establishment of a school or college in Nova Scotia, and many other similar memorials and petitions followed. The Maritime Loyalists were, many of them, people of property and education. They claimed from government the benefit of a good education and of a Christian education for their children. Many of them no doubt honestly feared the supposed atheistical influences of republicanism. There was therefore at the beginning a definitely political flavor in their Christian colleges. The clergymen who urged the erection of a college in Nova Scotia pointed out that "The influence of religion on political institutions as well as on the moral conduct of men, has been universally acknowledged by the best and worst of men. Experience has also shown the conformity and eligibility of certain modes of worship to particular forms of government, and that of the Episcopal. . .has been thought peculiarly adapted to the British Constitution."¹⁸

Here indeed was an attempt to link wisdom with power and goodness although perhaps not with the complete autonomy for wisdom that might have been wished. The precedent of the College of William and Mary in Virginia and of King's Col-

¹⁸ Quoted in W. C. Murray, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH

lege, New York, was definitely in the minds of the planners. Christian colleges were established and given some state support in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and in Central Canada. Later four of them, seeking independence of the local legislatures, secured royal charters and were known as King's Colleges. In all these colleges the Church of England had a privileged if not an exclusive position.

However not all Loyalists were Anglican and many more non-Anglicans crossed the border after the Revolution. The leading New York Loyalist, Chief Justice William Smith, neatly linked Canadian with American history, for he and his friends had taken a prominent part in the Presbyterian opposition to the Anglican King's College of New York, and he maintained the same position in Canada.

It is true that there was a peculiar difficulty in dislodging the state church from its privileged position, especially in the Maritimes where the connection with Britain was particularly close. Other denominations however founded their own colleges there, and a modern-minded governor in Nova Scotia established also a secular university (with government funds) in 1818.

There is no ground for denying the good work of many of these small colleges in the Maritime Provinces or the value of the Christian training which they may have provided. The fact remains that they have to this day persistently refused any form of union in an age when the increasing cost of education and the growing poverty of this part of the country has made the maintenance of sound learning very difficult. Nor has poverty protected them from the inroads of that secularism which has affected all colleges, Christian and otherwise. The Church must, I think, acknowledge that in the Maritimes sectarianism has injured the cause of sound learning without proportionately promoting that of piety.

In Central Canada (Ontario and Protestant Quebec) the story has been rather different, but here also the Church of England and its somewhat politically-minded supporters tried to use the Christian College to counteract the dangerous political influences flowing across the border, with results not always to the advantage either of piety or of learning. There was a serious concern for education among the Protestant groups of the St. Lawrence Valley and the Niagara Peninsula. The best organized of these were the Church of England and the Presbyterian Church. Other groups however and particularly the Methodists streamed across the border from the state of New York and elsewhere. These at first maintained constitutional affiliations with their brethren in the United States. Later they were joined by many other Methodists from Britain and in 1828 they set up their own independent Conference.

As in the Maritimes Anglican leaders were most anxious for religious and for political reasons to establish Christian colleges, and not unnaturally perhaps they assumed their right to state support and even to exclusive state support for these colleges.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

It was Bishop John Strachan, a Scottish Presbyterian turned Anglican, who was perhaps the leading figure in the campaign for a Christian Protestant college in Toronto in Upper Canada. In 1827 he secured a charter, and an endowment from Crown lands which had been set aside for the support of religion. His King's College admitted students of every faith but required all professors to sign the Thirty-nine articles and left the general conduct of the college securely in the hands of the Church of England. This was too much for Strachan's many opponents — for he had many. He was opposed generally by radicals and reformers because he was a firm supporter of the rather arbitrary conduct of the political administration of his day. And in a religious sense he had to meet fire from two sides: from secularists deeply imbued with principles of Jacksonian democracy who wished to see a public system of education entirely divorced from religion; and from the many godly folk whose piety could by no means endure the teachings of the Church of England.

After a long struggle King's College was secularized and renamed the University of Toronto. Meanwhile however the Methodists, Presbyterians, and English-speaking Roman Catholics had founded their own colleges. Strachan himself on the secularization of King's College immediately began to raise funds for a new Anglican foundation in Toronto, Trinity College. So firmly was the principle of the Christian College fixed in Upper Canada (Ontario) that the University of Toronto was for some years only an examining body. A small secular college, University College, accepted liberal arts students but was long over-shadowed by the denominational institutions. In 1887 began the agreements for federation with the Christian colleges which resulted in the present University of Toronto, "a unique combination of sectarian and secular education." Three important universities exist outside the federation: Queen's (Presbyterian), McMaster (Baptist), and Western (Anglican). These are now officially secular institutions and yet all in greater or less degree are influenced by their origins.

Bishop Strachan has been greatly abused by historians of education who quote with much glee his protest against the bill for secularizing his King's College: "(placing) all forms of error on an equality with truth, by patronizing equally within the same institution an unlimited number of sects, whose doctrines are absolutely irreconcilable: a principle in its nature so atheistical and so monstrous in its consequences that if successfully carried out, it would utterly destroy all that is pure and holy in morals and religion, and lead to greater corruption than anything adopted during the madness of the French Revolution."¹⁹ Strachan is reviled for having cluttered up education with a pretentious sectarianism and so having delayed the growth of university education by a generation or two. It might be fairer to remember that (guilty as he was of sectarianism) he did stand for sound education with religious teaching; he did inspire or provoke a number of excellent Christian

¹⁹ Quoted in H. H. Walsh, *The Christian Church in Canada*. Ryerson Press, 1956, p. 194.

THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH

colleges; and finally he was not at heart so arrogant as he seems. Writing in a private letter about his King's College during one of its earlier storms he remarked sadly, "It is so easy to do evil, and so difficult, often to do good."²⁰

From the beginning of Canadian history the missionary motive has been very strong in the work of the Church and particularly in its educational institutions. The tradition was established in the first French colony on the St. Lawrence which in the seventeenth century was almost as much a missionary outpost as a fur trading centre. This work was carried over much of the continent. After the Conquest in 1763 the native Protestant churches were at first fully occupied with their own local problems and, as has been suggested, with their own sectarian squabbles. Moreover until 1870 the great Northwest was the preserve of the Hudson's Bay Company, directly under the British Parliament, and linked with the Canadian provinces only through the interests of the Montreal fur traders and later through the ambitions of Upper Canada land-seekers. The nineteenth century was however the great century of missionary activity in Britain. It was missionaries from the old country (chiefly Anglicans) who in the first half of the century established churches and schools in Winnipeg, the gateway to the great Northwest and who strove to match the efforts of the Roman Catholic Church in their ministrations to the Indian tribes beyond. The white population in the West remained small until near the end of the century. In Manitoba and in Saskatchewan not only the Christian colleges but the provincial universities must trace their earliest roots back to seminaries set up for the training of clergy to minister especially to the Indians.

With the coming of the settlers to Manitoba in the 1870's and 1880's Anglican and Presbyterian colleges vied with the old Roman Catholic college, St. Boniface, in offering a general liberal arts training. Ultimately these were affiliated with the state-endowed University of Manitoba, but each continues to offer its distinctive training although graduates receive their degree from the provincial university. A Baptist college at Brandon preserves complete independence and grants its own degrees.

In the three other provinces of Western Canada, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia, the situation of the Christian College is somewhat different. Here the territorial government was well established before there was enough population to warrant institutions of higher learning. In view of the vast variety of race, language, and religion anticipated among the incoming settlers it was determined that the probable sectarian competition and strife and the consequent lowering of educational standards must be forestalled. In these western provinces therefore the provincial university is the only degree-granting institution authorized by the province. Independent Christian colleges do exist, and some grant degrees through affiliation with institutions outside the province. Most however confine themselves to Junior College work under the supervision of the University.

²⁰ Quoted in A. N. Bethune, *Memoir of the Right Reverend John Strachan*. Toronto, 1870, p. 137.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

The specific contribution of the Christian College in the present day will probably be made in another way. At the University of Saskatchewan for example a Roman Catholic college maintains a chapel, library, and club rooms on the campus. Its small faculty, giving instruction in certain junior classes, is recognized by the University, and its members, as individuals, are members of the university Faculty of Arts and of the University Council. This arrangement is, I believe, unique, but I think it is safe to say that it could be duplicated by any Christian institution prepared to offer adequate instruction according to university standards. Its only Protestant parallel so far consists of a Presbyterian dormitory and chapel and club rooms maintained at British Columbia. These western universities also maintain a regular arrangement with theological faculties for combined courses which involve the acceptance of theological credits for the Arts degree. Four theological colleges are now affiliated with the University of Saskatchewan; one, Emmanuel College, is the oldest university institution in the province. The contribution of these colleges to Christian life and witness on the campus is invaluable. It is encouraging to be able to report that they offer a living protest against secularism and against sectarianism.

David Riesman in his well known work, *The Lonely Crowd*, traces the development of social attitudes from the early 19th century to the present day. He suggests that in the days of well-defined class structure young people inherited certain clearly understood and rigid external standards to which the well-intentioned strove to adhere; in the Victorian Age, the heyday of Liberalism, they were guided rather by firm general principles implanted by their parents and teachers and applied by them, more or less successfully, to the various situations of life. Today, he says, young people are adrift. Without fixed behaviour patterns, without firm principles they are furnished only with a very sensitive radar equipment which enables them to detect perhaps which way the crowd may go next so that they may follow. The idea of any fixed mode of conduct, still more of any solitary stand for a thing called truth, is alien to them.

It is this lonely crowd that must be served by the Christian College of today. Christian colleges were originally founded on the assumption that man was made in God's image. For long they lived and flourished in communities which generally accepted this assumption. Though many have survived and have done noble work, all have known suffering and bewilderment in this age of secularism and skepticism. Now surely they must accept the suffering but throw off the bewilderment. They must see what they are in the light of history: no longer institutions growing out of a society having a common faith, but rather communities living in and serving a community where the assumption of man made in the image of God no longer prevails but has given way to concepts of social engineering at which not only Christians but even secular humanists shudder. In our great state and provincial universities power has allied itself with learning in a fashion which can be terrifying unless both can be informed by that wisdom which comes from above.

Christ and Today's Campus

DAVID J. MAITLAND

Within the broad topic, "Christ and Today's Campus," I have chosen to concentrate on the subject of Christian evangelism at our colleges. While I believe that the situations, and therefore the evangelistic task, are not significantly different at the public and independent schools from what we know on our campuses, I acknowledge that it was the Christian college that I had primarily in mind as I prepared this paper.

When I refer to the *campus* or to the *Christian college*, I am thinking primarily of the faculty and students and the more or less common work in which they engage. While it is sometimes necessary to distinguish between these two campus elements, since they do not represent identical needs or problems as far as the Church and Christian evangelism are concerned, for our present purposes they can be grouped together. Also when I refer to *students* I usually mean faculty as well as undergraduates. I am deeply convinced that campus evangelism may not be discussed with much profit if either the teachers or the pupils are ignored. If there are those of you who feel that campus evangelism is a concern involving students only, I remind you of a recommendation made recently by Dean Harold K. Schilling. Speaking to a group of college-town clergy and campus workers he said.

First of all I would say the Church should speed up the reorientation of its work in the university community toward placing greater emphasis on and concentrating more systematic effort upon faculty work and relatively less on student work.¹

This emphasis was strongly underscored fifteen years ago by Arnold Nash in his book, *The University and the Modern World*, and has been reiterated with increasing frequency and force since then.

In addition to these delimitations it has become apparent to me that a paper dealing with campus evangelism should attempt at least the following clarifications: 1) the nature and relationship of the Christian Church and the Christian college; 2) the nature of evangelism and its practice on campus; 3) a basis for campus evangelism which both derives from Christian faith and respects the peculiar vocation of the college. Such an outline of the assignment should impress you either with the magnitude of the subject or the presumption of the speaker . . . or possibly both!

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¹ *The University and the Church*, Department of Campus Christian Life, United Church of Christ, p. 29.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

I. Church, College, and Evangelism

A reasonably good working definition of evangelism is offered in a recent publication of the National Council of Churches:

Evangelism is making the gospel known to those who do not know it, in hope that they may be turned to God in faith, and making it more effectively known to those who already live within the Church, that their faith may grow in clarity and strength.²

For our purpose this is only a reasonably adequate statement of the evangelistic task because it fails to take account of a formidable contingent of faculty and students with whom we have to deal on some of our campuses: namely those who have known the gospel in one form or another and who have rejected what they know of the faith as at the least irrelevant to the business of higher education. I hope to be able to indicate however that campus evangelism must proceed in more or less the same way with those who have rejected their inherited faith as it must with many who continue to profess Christian faith but who see little relationship between that faith and the academic work in which they engage.

Before we turn to the specifics of Christian evangelism on campus however we must distinguish between the work of the Church and the work of the college, concern for both of which institutions brought us to this quadrennial convocation. While the broad question of the relationship of Church and college constitutes the burden of all of our meetings here at Des Moines, I believe that an important distinction can and must be made between these two institutions as far as their respective responsibility for Christian evangelism is concerned.

There is in my mind no uncertainty about the Church's responsibility for evangelism: "... to make [God] better known to folk both inside and outside its own membership ..." is one of the two central works of the Church. To say however, as one writer said a few years ago, that "A Christian college is a college that makes every department support and defend the Christian faith"³ is, I believe, to fail to distinguish sufficiently between the nature and work of Church and college. While there are many conceivable relationships between churches and colleges, I do not subscribe to the notion of the college as merely an arm of the Church.

It might therefore be appropriate to offer a qualifying addendum to the passing remarks made this morning by Professor Neatby about the extent to which the American colonial colleges thought of themselves as missionary outposts for the conversion of the Indian. While there was undoubtedly some such sentiment among individuals at the pre-revolutionary colleges, and New Hampshire's School for the Indians did much good work in this regard, I believe that it can be demonstrated

² *The Good News of God: The Nature and Purpose of Evangelism*. New York: Department of Evangelism, National Council of Churches, 1957, p. 16.

³ W. B. Easton, "Rethinking the Christian College," *Christian Education*, December 1945.

that there was at least as much opportunism in the colonial educator's professed desire to convert the New World savage. The colonists, although limited in resources (an old story apparently for those presidents among you who can take comfort in historical precedent!), wanted their own colleges and were unwilling to subject their sons to the cost and the hazards (both of the seas and of the political views they might imbibe abroad in mid-18th century) of an English or a continental education. There were unfortunately few people in the mother country — at least among those with means — who sympathized with colonial ambitions at this as at other points. The British Christian heart and pocketbook did open however to appeal for funds to further missionary work with the Indian. Without committing myself to a judgment as to which motive was dominant in a situation clearly involving mixed motivations, I can only refer you to the resentment of other college presidents, among those newer colleges who could no longer get their hand into the public till, over the financial successes of Eleazer Wheelock's visit to England and the British West Indies. The reason for the Dartmouth president's success in the 1760's was one Samson Occam, a *bona fide* American Indian convert to Christianity whom Wheelock was wise enough to take along with him. Whether Eleazer was the only president with a premature Madison Avenue sense of the appropriate or the only one with a product to demonstrate is an issue for further research. In all events it is necessary, even for the Christian College of the American eighteenth century, to qualify a characterization of it as "... one arm of the Christian missionary."

This is not to deny that Christianity may well be given a central place in the life of the Christian college. It is certainly not intended to abdicate responsibility for evangelism among college people. It is however intended to indicate that, for the proper accomplishment of its work as a college under God, the college must have a kind of freedom which does not characterize the Church. While it is true that there have been important historical connections between Church and college and that there are many similarities of aim and duplication of personnel, Church and college should not be equated. The Church exists by virtue of its claim to bear witness to the revelation of the ultimate nature of God and of his relationship to the nature and destiny of men. The college, however much it may have been founded by and may continue to have among its members many who affirm that faith, must be free to examine every formulation of that faith and to engage it in dialogue with its many contestants. It must, I am convinced, have such freedom for its own sake as a place of higher learning and, I believe, for the sake of the ultimate Truth which Christians see in the revelation of Jesus Christ. Anything less than this would be a violation of its nature and task as a college and would be a disservice to the Christ who claims to be the Truth as well as the Way and the Life.

Such an understanding of the college obviously raises problems for what some might consider to be the work of campus evangelism. These problems, while not insurmountable, are especially acute for the Christian college. With such a dis-

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

inction between Church and college one cannot avoid asking how far the Christian college *qua* college may go in lending its support to the Christian cause. To be sure, there are many ways in which Christian colleges encourage Christian belief and life on campus. Although all of the following need not be practiced at any single school, there are often for example on our campuses (required) services of public worship, (required) courses in the department of religion, a requirement of Christian profession by faculty members, emphasis upon ministerial recruitment and the Church's missionary tasks, efforts to achieve inclusive and mutually respectful human relations and restrictions upon forms of collegiate social life. Many of these and other means by which colleges seek to enhance Christian life on the Christian campus are fruitfully discussed in the preparatory pamphlet, *What is a Christian College?* Christian folk are often quite satisfied if such largely external conditions obtain at the Christian colleges. I suppose that by enrolling their sons and daughters at such schools they feel that they have put their children into a safe environment!

Much less frequently do we ask ourselves whether these familiar emphases — important as we usually consider them to be — have any direct bearing upon the real business for which colleges exist: the work of the mind. While I do not wish to be understood to be a spokesman for the rationalist equation that man is mind nor to seem to be urging that academic work is the only responsibility of the college, I am convinced that something special must be central to the life of a college, and that this "something special" is its role as a community of intellectual inquiry. This is certainly what the community-at-large thinks colleges are doing. Just the other day over the back fence our local bank president, who happens to be a Carleton alumnus and an active churchman, referred to the college as "the knowledge factory." Although I would probably not use my banker-friend's words anymore than I would subscribe to some of their connotations, I am persuaded that it is to an intellectual task that God has called us in our colleges. I am further persuaded that, to the extent that we minimize or overlook this dimension of the vocation of the Christian or any other college, we have not only stepped out of the mainstream of western education but we have created a situation in which campus evangelism has little or no relevance to the work of scholarship in which most of the community is or should be engaged. Such a situation can only result in the possibility of a partial evangelism, a Christ for half a man.

In his study of *Art and the Reformation*, C. G. Coulton observes that the early Gothic buildings possessed an integrity and a beauty which the later adornment-conscious Gothic buildings lacked. He writes,

This, in fact, is characteristic of all the best Gothic, that its ornamentation is mainly structural . . . Gothic art began to decline as soon as ornamentation became superficial rather than structural; rather a veneer than an essential constituent of the building itself.⁴

⁴ *Art and the Reformation*, Vol. I: *Medieval Faith and Symbolism*. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1958, pp. 11 and 12.

Similarly the integrity of a college derives from its understanding of and commitment to its central purpose. Its structure, its grasp of its vocation, is its best ornamentation and is, I am convinced, the basis upon which one may engage in responsible Christian evangelism on campus. Christian evangelism which ignores the basis of the life of the college in scholarship freely pursued may result in individual declarations of faith in God and even in the atoning work of Christ, but it will not involve men and women to serve God in the work, present and future, to which He certainly calls them.

II. *Evangelism and Campus Evangelism*

I have been saying that, however much we believe Church and college to be related to and necessary to the well-being of one another, we must distinguish between them. Although each exists under God and he certainly may be served in both, they do have different functions in the world and the differences must be both recognized and respected. Very simply, perhaps too simply, the Church has been given and witnesses to the Truth revealed in Jesus Christ. The college on the other hand searches for knowledge both of man and nature. The complication of course which throws off this simple differentiation is that Christians insist that God's revelation is relevant to all of the activities of men and that Christian theology is especially relevant to certain curricular areas. How this relevance works out in the several academic disciplines may merely be noted here as a major problem for other phases of this convocation and for each of us in his particular field. We have neither the time nor the competence to deal with it now.

What may be said is that evangelism as such, "making [God] better known to folk inside and outside its own membership," is the mandate of the Church. The same may not be said of the college. To do so would be to destroy the freedom of inquiry which is integral to the college *qua* college.

I take this to be the position advanced or at least implied in the brief mention of evangelism in the study pamphlet which came out of the Denison Quadrennial Convocation and was prepared for this convocation, *What is the Christian College?* At one point the pamphlet states the following:

In its philosophy of education the Christian college will have a concern for evangelism, but *in methods of evangelism it is limited by its nature as a college*. It is obligated (at least in its curriculum) to present all aspects of recognized truth and to not disproportionately emphasize nor neglect the Christian view of truth, *leaving the student free, under God, to make his own choices*. The evangelism possible for a Christian college is that of the contagion of the life and faith of its Christian faculty and administration, that of the spirit and atmosphere of its whole campus life, and that of the extra-curricular activities developed by Christian organizations and groups. . . .³

³David B. Sageser (ed.), *What is a Christian College?* New York: Commission on Higher Education, NCC, 1958, pp. 14 and 15 (italics added).

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

At least two phrases in this statement would seem to be particularly relevant to the evangelistic task on campus as I see it. Having presented the truth as fully and persuasively as possible, the college must leave "the student free, under God, to make his own choices." To do anything less, e.g. to present the truth only as Christians see it, would be a disservice to the student and would be, in the words of Daniel T. Jenkins, a subtle admission of one's inability to believe that God is able "... to commend Himself as true in the only way which truth can commend itself — in free encounter with all that seems to contradict it." We cannot, even in the Christian college, assure parents or alumni or other interested parties that all students and faculty will be overwhelmingly grasped by the truth of Christian faith. What we can and must do however is to respect the freedom in which God has created each of us, trusting all the while that, as we are faithful to him in the exercise of our academic vocation, he will make himself known persuasively to those whom he chooses.

Still another phrase needs to be lifted out for approval and examination: "... in methods of evangelism [the Christian college] is limited by its nature as a college." There is something in its work as a college which influences the nature of campus evangelism. This, I take it, is not to assert that evangelism is inappropriate on campus. Every Christian will, as the Spirit enables him, give evidence on and off campus of his certainty about God. As William Barclay writes, "When a man has found the good news, he has not truly found it until he wishes to share it with others."⁶ It was to this fact that our original statement referred when it said, "The evangelism possible for a Christian college is that of the contagion of the life and faith of its Christian faculty and administration [and of its students]. . . ."

But the question remains as to the particular way in which Christians with an academic vocation will give witness to the faith *in the course of* their scholarly life. It is the intellectual enterprise which is the central business of the college, and a profession of faith or attempted evangelism which is indifferent to this business will not achieve the desired results. For what we seek on campus is that men and women, faculty and students, should both acknowledge Christ's Lordship and go about serving him in their life as scholars. This is the goal of campus evangelism, for Christ may not be served on campus apart from the central work in which students are expected to engage. Professor Marjorie Reeves has put the issue very sharply: "... either we serve God in the very pursuit of knowledge itself, or our talk of Christian vocation in the university is hypocritical."⁷ This is the imperative and the context for campus evangelism. The question facing us now is, How shall we go about our task?

⁶ *A New Testament Wordbook*. London: SCM Press, 1955, p. 43.

⁷ *Three Questions in Higher Education*. New York: Commission on Higher Education, National Council of Churches, 1958, p. 12.

III. *Christ, Students, and the Christian Student*

The major deterrent to the relevance of Christian faith to the campus life of both faculty and students is our failure to recognize that the work of the mind is precisely the work to which God has called us. While there are undoubtedly many important cultural factors and attitudes, such as Professor Jacobs has delineated in his important study, *Changing Values in College*, which are inimical to Christian faith and inhibit the work of campus evangelism, the condition which makes such trivialization of the faith possible is the widespread absence among Christians of any sense of their academic vocation. This is not to say that there are not Christians who are vigorously dedicated to the life of scholarship and who make significant contributions to research and to higher education. Indeed! there are many such. It does seem however that there are relatively few Christian faculty or students who relate this work meaningfully to their Christian faith or to what they do in their churches. While there is some carry-over among Christian academicians from their faith and practice into their on-campus life, this carry-over is largely confined to such areas as a concern for persons in the counselling relationship or to the desire to help students see their responsibility for social and political questions. That such concerns are wholly relevant goes without saying, but it must be said that they are not enough. And they are insufficient because they fail to help us in the task which Miss Reeves designates as the first imperative of Christian scholars today: "... to restore the reality and meaningfulness of the intellectual quest for truth, as a fulfillment of the command to 'love the Lord thy God with all thy mind' . . ."⁸ What we need in our Christian colleges and as a basis for all campus evangelism in which we would engage is a new dedication to "... the worthwhileness of the [academic] enterprise on a theological basis." While this is certainly not to claim that Christian faith is the only basis upon which a case for the liberal academic values can be made, it is to assert that Christians must see and must demonstrate that *for them* it is their Christian faith which commits them to the central work of the college. Christ calls us to love and serve God not with hearts alone but with our minds as well.

It is, I believe, the absence of such conviction which most seriously handicaps Christian evangelism on campus. Most of our students and faculty who become indifferent or hostile to Christianity do not defect because of convictions that the faith is untrue. While there are some, in the tradition of the early Augustine, who resent the moral restraints which Christian faith may impose, the serious abandonment of faith among the collegiate is by those who have come to feel that they may be indifferent to Christianity because it is irrelevant and possibly inimical to the academic interests which they have developed. As some of them say, "You don't have to be stupid to be a Christian, but it surely helps!" To Christians who lack a sense of academic vocation who press others on campus for a Christian commitment, the non-believer who subscribes to the central business of the college might well reply, "What you *are* talks so loudly I can't hear what you are saying." Our inattentive-

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

ness to our academic vocation drowns out what we might be trying to say about Christ. Christians on campus who lack personal religious commitment to the work of the college are, to those who stand outside the faith but appreciate the collegiate vocation, the strongest arguments against Christian evangelism. Such avocational Christianity simply will not do as the basis for evangelism on the campus of the Christian or any other college.

There are, I am confident, many ways in which one may speak persuasively of Christ to those who do not know Him, ways which will also be helpful to those who need to have their Christian commitment deepened. To speak to the campus of Christ however in ways which are not germane to the business of the college is to be both misleading and irrelevant. Misleading because it may cause the believer to feel that there are substitutes for responsible service in the academic work to which God has called him, that he may for example substitute in his weekly offering to God work with the Sunday School or with the Christian Association for the disciplined study in which he should have engaged. Such a depiction of campus Christian alternatives is irrelevant too because, for the intellectually awakened student, it has no bearing upon the important work to which he has given himself.

Campus evangelism is not the only nor is it the normative evangelism. I hope that I am not misunderstood on that point. But, given the topic, "Christ and Today's Campus," we may not ignore the fact that it is to the campus that we would make him relevant. We must also remember that the campus, however much it draws its personnel from and returns them to the world, is a peculiar community and that its peculiarity derives from the special work, the particular vocation, to which it has been called. Christ therefore must be presented in terms which suggest His relevance to that work.

Evangelism, we said originally,

... is making the gospel known to those who do not know it, in the hope that they may be turned to God in faith, and making it known more effectively to those who already live within the church, that their faith may grow in clarity and strength.⁹

In applying such a statement to the campus I take it that, with those who profess Christian faith, we must help them to understand and commit themselves responsibly to the academic vocation to which God has clearly called them. Without claiming any superiority for their special calling, Christian students have primary responsibility to serve God with their mind's work. During this past week I received a letter from a boy who graduated from Carleton College in June. Something of his competence is suggested in the fact that he was one of three people from his class elected to Phi Beta Kappa in the junior year. Going on to graduate study in mathematics, he wrote in part the following:

⁹ *Op. cit.*

CHRIST AND TODAY'S CAMPUS

I look upon my college life as serving the purpose of opening my eyes to the world around me. Now, I want to work even harder at developing my mind and my perspectives. I want to serve God with my whole mind.

Such service to God will call for the widest possible examination of material and viewpoints in pursuit of the whole truth by which alone God can be properly served. This will involve dialogue with fellow Christians and with those outside of the Christian community, not simply in the interest of converting the non-believer, but of listening to him and hearing what he has to say about the Truth. While Christ is for us the Truth, we must not claim that we have him wrapped up in our little systems nor must we ignore the fact that he chooses whatever instruments he will to disclose himself to men. Humility, which need never be confused with insipidity nor docility, will be an important resource of the campus Christian. Repentance too will come alive in the context of responsible student life.

To bring Christ to those on campus who now reject or are indifferent to him will not be an easier job. It may not however be appreciably more difficult. Actually we are dealing with the reverse sides of a coin. Christians believe in Christ but often lack awareness of his relevance to their work. They have the calling to faith but not as yet the calling to responsible work in the world. The non-believer may be committed to his academic tasks, but he does not have this work ultimately grounded, as we believe must finally be the case, in the Truth which is God in Jesus Christ. It is often also the case that the academically responsible non-believer is little concerned with the world's needs to which his knowledge may be relevant. The Christian scholar on the other hand should be one who serves God with his mind's work and who, both in the academic work and — for the undergraduate — in his calling beyond commencement, desires to serve the neighbor with the fruits of that work. While this is not to say that the Christian intellectual is always looking for ways to put his knowledge to serviceable work (what a bore!), it is intended to underscore the conviction that, for the Christian, knowledge is clearly not sought for its own sake (this so often — should I say inevitably? — yields either utopianism or despair), but knowledge is pursued for God's sake and for the sake of society. The Christian scholar is neither so obsessed with the desire for knowledge that he cuts himself off from the world, nor is he so impatient to serve the world that he lacks the understanding or the skills which make such service possible. Rather loving God and the neighbor in response to the love he has himself received, he desires to serve both God and society presently in the academic vocation to which he has been called.

To the non-believer we must, in Christ and with humility appropriate to such belief, demonstrate our commitment to the mind's work. We *may not* be religious imperialists, for we acknowledge the limits of our own grasp of the truth and our personal faithlessness to our calling. We need not on the other hand, however much we desire conversation with those who profess world-views other than our own,

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

submit to an ultimate pluralism. Claiming Christ's all-sufficiency, we need not make the same claims for ourselves. Acknowledging our ultimate faith in Christ the Truth, we need not identify this with what we know of him or are able to articulate.

I have for some time been impressed with Luke's report of the Pentecost event in Acts II. In particular I have been impressed with the importance for evangelism of Peter's handling of men's reactions to the ecstatic events that day. There were those, you will recall, who were prepared to dismiss the work of the Holy Spirit with the charge that the disciples were drunk. According to the report left to us, Peter did not fume and fulminate nor did he attempt to club his detractors into submission by arguing from the as yet unproven unique event. Rather, keeping the doors of conversation open in order that he might relate Pentecost to the Person of Jesus Christ, he dismissed the charge on the level of its own flippancy. While Luke does not tell us whether or not the persons who so accused the apostles were among those who repented and were baptized that day, it is important to recall that Peter kept contact with the Jews at Jerusalem in order that he might at the proper time speak to them of the faith to which he knew himself called and which he believed was for them also.

Our business as evangelists on campus is not to overwhelm the disbeliever; it is not to impress. Our aim is not merely to win arguments, however much argumentation is central to the life of the college. I have the suspicion, based partly upon what I know of myself, that in much of our so-called Christian evangelism we are motivated more by the desire to win over an opponent to *our side* or by the desire in argumentation not to lose face ourselves, than we are to witness persuasively to Christ in order that non-believers may be brought to him and conceivably in the process our own relation to Him might be deepened. I hardly need remind you that the consequences of such motivation are not exactly ignored in the Gospels! Our vocation is to witness to Christ in such relevant ways, to root our scholarship in our faith in him, in order that others may join with us in our repentance and in our baptism. With the confidence that God is able to commend himself as true in free encounter with all that seems to contradict him, we must in our academic calling so relate ourselves openly to our fellow students that some may be turned to God in faith while the rest find their faith growing in clarity and in strength.

The Christian College and American Higher Education

JERALD C. BRAUER

The Christian College in American higher education is undergoing today its severest test. It is questionable whether the so-called Christian college¹ in America can or ought to continue to exist. This is not the first time in American history that the Church-related college finds itself under critical pressure. During the mid-nineteenth century when so many Church colleges were founded, the mortality rate was astonishing.² Throughout that century most of the pressure was economic and the primary question was that of solvency.

Today the situation has changed. Though the question of economic stability is of great importance, it is not the fundamental issue. The center of the contemporary crisis for the Christian college involves the integrity of the conception itself and therefore the entire role of the Christian college in American higher education. It is no longer true that the Christian college provides a distinctive emphasis, to say nothing of positive leadership, within American higher education. This was once the case, but it is no longer so.

The temptation of the Christian college today is to rest its case primarily on three factors. It argues that it is contributing something distinctive in that its education participates in a Christian atmosphere. Seldom is this demonstrated beyond the usual statements that chapel is an integral part of the campus life, that courses in religion (seldom called Christianity) are offered, and that the professors are upright, moral men and women. Also these Christian colleges point with pride to their smallness as proof of a distinctive contribution to American education. Meanwhile most of them move heaven and earth, and frequently their campus, in an attempt to grow larger. Finally, the clinching argument is advanced that the growth in population with its accompanying pressures for higher education make imperative the continuance and expansion of the Christian college. If this is the best the Christian

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¹ Christian college as used here means an institution under ecclesiastical or denominational control. It is not because this makes such institutions more "Christian." It is only because such institutions have the obligation and opportunity to relate the Christian faith in a systematic and sustained fashion to the life, methods, and problems of higher education. In this way it can play a distinctive role in the educational scene.

² Daniel G. Tewksbury, *The Founding of American Colleges and Universities Before the Civil War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1932.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

college can do, it does not deserve the support of the churches or the public because it is no longer true to itself. Either the Christian college should play the creative and distinctive role in American higher education it once played, or it should cease to exist. By "cease to exist", it is not implied that such institutions go out of existence, only that they become transformed into institutions that do not pretend to be what they are not.

However I do not think the point has yet been reached where the Christian college no longer can play a distinctive and creative role in American higher education. It is dangerously close to the point of no return but has not yet reached it. The contemporary situation, like most historical situations, provides opportunities to move in either direction. The next quarter century might well determine whether the Christian college can or should continue to exist in American higher education.

A few generalizations on contemporary American higher education must be made in order to understand the situation in which the Christian college is called upon to make certain decisions concerning its nature, task, and role. It has been stated that the historical situation provides the opportunity for the Christian college to move either in the direction of complete absorption in the educational picture of the moment or to struggle for its own integrity and thus for its uniqueness.

Among the several things that mark American higher education today is the unparalleled pressure of the numbers of young men and women demanding a college education. Forty-five per cent more students are enrolled today than were enrolled only six years ago in America's colleges and universities. In one decade this number will again increase by 100 per cent. Such figures, though unheard of in other western nations, are not strange in the United States where the ideal in education has been for all men and not for an elite group. As Professor Daniel Boorstin pointed out, "a profound truth about our culture lurks in Bliss Perry's facetious suggestion that the ideal of American education could most easily be attained by awarding every American citizen the degree of bachelor of arts at birth."³

This situation in higher education presents the Christian college both with an opportunity and a temptation. The opportunity is only too clear, and already many Christian colleges have rested their defense on the fact that they can help to serve the vast numbers of young people demanding a college education. The temptation is not so clear, in fact it is quite subtle. Never in the past has the Christian college defended its reason for existence primarily or purely on pragmatic grounds. Pragmatic reasons were always given as part of the defense but never as the center of the argument. To be sure the Church through her educational institutions wished to reach and help as many people as possible. But the reason behind their motivation to education was never that all men by nature deserve a higher education.

³ Daniel J. Boorstin, "The Place of Thought in American Life", *The American Scholar*, (Spring 1956), p. 141.

THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE AND AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION

When the Christian college was founded and flourished in America, its reasons for existence, even its form, coincided neatly with the needs and demands of higher education. Its reasons for existence were clear. The Christian college sought to perpetuate a learned ministry, to prepare godly men for professions, to contribute to the morality and quality of citizenship, and to see to it that learning and useful arts flourished under God. Numerous articles and pamphlets were written by various Congregationalists and Presbyterians, the two primary founders of colleges in the early and mid-nineteenth century, detailing these arguments.

The form of the college was also clear. The colleges were small and scattered across the nation following the people westward. They were to be the bearers of Christianity and civilization and were to synthesize the two in life, and they reflected the strength as well as weakness of their churches. They did not play a unique role in American higher education — they *were* American higher education.

It is to be remembered that the founding of the Christian college did not simply reflect the contemporary needs for higher education. It understood such needs and sought to fulfill them but always from a perspective consistent with the vision, faith, and nature of the Church in that day. Standing in such a heritage, today's Christian college cannot defend itself on the grounds that it provides additional educational resources at a time when demands are almost insatiable. In fact by its own nature the Christian college ought to be challenging such demands.

An additional factor of vast importance for the Christian college in higher education today is the fermentation at work throughout the educational world. The Church college has the opportunity of either standing by while formative decisions are made or plunging into the discussions by bringing to bear a unique perspective of its own. Unfortunately until recent years the Church colleges appeared content to ride the educational tide of the hour. This is no longer the case, though it still remains to be seen whether the Church college has sufficient creativity, determination, and joy of risk to incarnate any of the rich insights that have recently erupted from within its circle.⁴

Among the many forces contending in higher education today is a truly creative debate over the philosophy of education. It has been intensified and widely publicized by the launching of sputniks. It is nothing short of astonishing to note that the past thirty years have witnessed two major revolutions in educational theory and that we might be at present in the midst of an emerging third point of view. John Dewey marked the beginning of the first revolution in which the methods and ends of education were radically reconceived. Stressing thinking as primarily a problem-solving activity that is tested by consequences in the social order, Dewey operated with a clear and discernable view of human nature and human destiny. This has vast consequences for the way education is undertaken and what its goals are to be.

⁴ For a genuinely creative attempt, see H. Hong (ed.), *Integration in the Christian Liberal Arts College*. Northfield, Minn.: St. Olaf College Press, 1956.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

It is interesting to note that the Christian college made little or no attempt to come to grips with this point of view. By and large it simply adopted the methods and often the ends of Dewey without so much as a preliminary discussion over his conception of nature, man, and God. Whether a Christian college could or should adopt or adapt Dewey's educational philosophy and method was hardly asked or, if asked, was asked only spasmodically and in a whisper. Meanwhile the Church college curriculum looked like the curriculum of any Dewey-influenced institution and even the content in many divisions and fields had a distinctly pragmatic flavor. This happened not only at so-called "liberal" Christian colleges but also at those that adhered to a faith utterly at variance with Dewey's understanding of life.

It now appears that the second major revolution in the 1930's by the former Chancellor of the University of Chicago, Robert Maynard Hutchins, is just beginning to make its impact on the Christian college. Hutchins' insistence, that education is concerned primarily with the discipline and the refinement of man's intellect and judgment, leads to a radical rethinking of the curriculum. This is inevitable because it reconceives the nature and end of education. From this point of view there are central and peripheral elements in education. There are basic principles and premises that underlie the nature of thinking in a variety of fields. To become educated one must learn to think in a disciplined and systematic way. In that way one can continue to learn and have grounds for critical judgment as to ends and goals. As in the case of Dewey's revolution, so in that led by Hutchins there was but slight effort on the part of the Christian college to participate critically in the movement.

A third stage in the revolution is probably already underway. It is symbolized by the fact that even the secondary schools are beginning seriously to question the adequacy of progressive or pragmatic education. Christian colleges are probably paying more attention to curriculum problems and to the nature and end of their education program than they have for the past half century. The fact of this conference is adequate proof for the generalization. President Pusey's efforts at Harvard University to elucidate possible relations between Christian faith and higher education is symbolic of the new epoch. Whether he succeeds in working this out even as an alternative at Harvard, though many of us have hopes, is not the point. Once again the Christian colleges have failed to provide the leadership in this fundamental problem. Let us hope that they take courage at what Mr. Pusey has attempted in secular Harvard and now risk some attempts in Church-related colleges.

Several things now appear obvious. If the Christian college is to play a formative role in higher education, it must have something distinctive to contribute. What this is cannot be unrelated to the central issues in contemporary philosophy of education. Even if the Christian college determines to go along with a particular philosophy of education this ought not be done on an unexamined basis. If the unexamined life is not worth living for the individual, this is doubly true of an educational institution.

THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE AND AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION

In the contemporary battles on the nature and end of education all points of view are deeply concerned with the problem of fragmentation and unity. The problem is unavoidable because it is such an obvious weakness of modern education. It arises primarily from two facts. First, the increasing complexity and rapid expansion of human knowledge has led simultaneously to the unending proliferation of subjects and the demand for ever greater specialization. Secondly, the absence of any unifying faith or comprehensive system of ideas has intensified the situation of fragmentation. The situation is serious not only because it is virtually impossible for so-called educated people to converse together in order to learn from one another, but also because education itself presents a picture of life that is essentially meaningless because it lacks a unifying center.

In face of this double threat education offers many possible answers to the specter of meaninglessness and fragmentation.⁵ The arresting fact is that most institutions of higher education, Christian or otherwise, do not operate with an explicit philosophy of education that seeks to provide a rationale for their program. This is typically American in that we tend to express ourselves through institutions *in actu* rather than through abstract systems.⁶ Nevertheless this does not mean that we operate without philosophies of education. It means rather that we tend to use them implicitly rather than explicitly.

This is one basic reason why the Christian college in America fails to relate explicitly the Christian faith to the educational program it pursues. Later we will also point to theological reasons for this omission. However it is precisely at this point that the Christian college can make a genuine contribution to higher education in America. If it were to attempt to correlate Christian faith with its program of higher education, the Christian college would seek to demonstrate its own understanding of a unity in higher education under the conditions of obvious fragmentation.

Such an attempt cannot possibly be made apart from the contemporary attempts to make sense of the educational process. It will however have consequences both in a negative and in a positive way. Negatively it should mean that the Christian college has a perspective from which to appreciate yet dismiss all attempts at a premature identification of the unity in higher education. The Christian faith should so open the mind of the college that it is constantly alert to the implicit faith lurking behind many an attempt at unification in educational theory.

Though a Christian college is always concerned to educate responsible citizens for democracy, it can never agree that in the face of fragmentation in modern education the final unifying end of all education is democracy. From this point of view the test of all educational programs and processes is whether they do or do not enhance a democratic society, and this is to be determined by their actual conse-

⁵ Joseph Brewer and Donald Heiges, "The Search for Unity in Higher Education," *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol. XVI (January 1946), p.21 ff.

⁶ D. Boorstin, *op.cit.*, p.144 ff.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

quences in that democratic society. A Christian college cannot agree that democracy is the final end of man or of education and so cannot organize a curriculum or present content from that unifying point of view. The Christian college will have to look upon such a theory as a temptation to idolatry, for the final end of man is not the state or society but is God. There is a vast difference between a positive appreciation of and contribution to democracy and identifying it as the unifying factor in life.

The same can be said about those theories of education that affirm all truth is one and that therefore there must be a common approach to all truth or at least a fundamental underlying method of apprehension of truth. Reason, defined in a variety of ways, is usually judged to be the unifying way to truth. Christian colleges should be the last to deprecate truth or reason, but they cannot avoid the Christian insight that man is more than reason, a complex creature who transcends reason, especially where his own personal welfare is involved.

These two inadequate illustrations merely serve to point up the fact that the Christian college must always beware of any attempt to arrive at an over-simple theory of unity in educational theory. At the same time the Christian college cannot rest content with the fragmentation in education and the total lack of inter-relationship between many disciplines. The very nature of the Christian faith as well as educational theory demands that this issue be confronted.

It seems to me that the Christian college has a positive contribution to make at this point. It seeks to provide a unifying point of view for its educational program through the Christian faith. This can be attempted in a variety of ways depending upon the interpretation of Christian faith; however all these interpretations will build on certain common insights of the faith.

The Christian college should stand unashamedly for the belief that life involves commitment and that such commitment is to a particular point of view that seeks to make life meaningful and significant. At this point the Christian college is in the midstream of current educational discussions concerning the rule of presuppositions in so-called objective thought. To be sure this will not in itself provide a hierarchy of disciplines each inter-related through a consistent unifying principle. Nor will it necessarily commend itself to all educators as the answer to the terribly complex problem of the fragmentation of knowledge.

What it will do is provide the Christian college with a point of departure to seek out the inter-relationship between disciplines in this complicated modern world. The unifying element is founded on the faith that all truth, though partially apprehended and fragmented under the conditions of existence, is not unrelated to the Truth revealed in Jesus Christ. The Christian faith makes the strange assertion that in Jesus Christ believers have encountered the ultimate truth about themselves and their universe. He made the claim that he was the Way and the Truth. This cannot be thrown in the face of culture or of education.

THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE AND AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION

In what sense is Jesus Christ the Truth and in what way does this relate to truth as it is discovered and apprehended in and through education? This is what the Christian college must consider and evaluate. It begins with the assumption that the ultimate meaning of life is founded on the nature and will of God as this has been encountered in history and witnessed to through his people gathered as a holy community. From this perspective the Christian college seeks to understand both the relation of academic disciplines to the faith and the relative autonomy of the disciplines because of the nature of the faith.

Though the modern educational search is in reality terribly fragmented, the Christian college cannot avoid believing that each discipline has a dimension that points beyond itself to its ground, source, and judge. This must be so from the Christian perspective because ultimately no truth is final or ultimate in itself — only the Truth is ultimate and this is apprehended in faith. It is from this vantage point of faith that the Christian seeks to understand the ultimate purpose of all disciplines and the relation of each discipline to the ultimate meaning of life.

In this sense the Christian college boldly affirms that in higher education it does operate with a faith as to the ultimate meaning of life and that all disciplines involve at one point or another concern with the ultimate. Thus its motto is, as it always has been, faith seeking knowledge. From this perspective the Christian college seeks to understand the height and depth, the complexity and startling simplicity, the richness and the stark nakedness, the consistency and the impenetrable paradox of reality as revealed by the manifold paths of the educational search.

Such a point of view can have no illusions about the ease with which a unification of the educational process is to be achieved; nevertheless it will stubbornly cling to the ideal that at some point an effective belief in ultimate unification will bring a tentative order and continuity out of a seemingly chaotic enterprise. Josiah Royce said that you cannot think the truth without loving it, and the Christian college affirms that you cannot love God without seeking to think the Truth.

Perhaps this is the basis for a distinctive contribution of the Christian college to American higher education. Because of its belief in the nature and will of God as ultimately revealed in Jesus Christ, the Christian college can never finally flee from an encounter with Truth, so it can never flee from the assumption that it stands in a unity that demands a search for unification in the educational realm. The nature of the faith demands that it seek to love God with the whole heart, soul, and mind and, through this, the neighbor as the self. To love God with the mind is a task indigenous to the Christian faith. Faith by its nature demands it; so not simply theology but all Christian efforts in education partake of this effort. To love God with the mind cannot remain an emotional assertion when the Church through institutions of higher education is actually involved in disciplined thinking. Education seeks to deal with all the levels of human experience that impinge upon the discipline of the human mind and vitalities in order that man might be free and responsible

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

to achieve his fullest potentialities in relation to significant and meaningful goals, under the limitations of this life. If the Christian college is engaged in such an activity, how can it divorce this from its vision of the love of God? It is through this particular activity that the Church seeks to love God with the mind!

It is the love of God as revealed in his creation, judgment, and redemption that has driven the Church into higher education. It should be this faith that undergirds the search for truth in all academic disciplines in the Christian college. Because of the unsearchableness of the depth of the love of God for man, because of the richness, the complexity, and the contradictions of this life — all of which exist as a mask behind which God encounters and undergirds man — the Christian college cannot be content with a superficially profound unification of the educational task.

But because the Christian college lives on the faith that there is an ultimate meaning behind all the diversity and the complexity, it must constantly seek to point out and symbolize the unity that is and is to come. In this sense the Christian college unlike educational utopias will not prematurely identify and pin down the unity nor unlike so-called realists give up the search for unity in the educational process. To assert prematurely or to defect in the face of obvious difficulty is to deny the Christian faith and to cease in the endeavor to love God with the mind. Eschatology is a relevant category even for higher education.

If then the Christian college has the possibility of playing a truly creative role once again in American higher education, it can only do this through a concerted attempt to understand the Christian faith in relation to the curriculum and to the totality of college life. This point of view must be made concrete in the program of studies, in the teaching and learning process, in faculty and in student life, and in that vague but important reality called ethos.

Perhaps one can be more concrete than this. The point of view previously expressed should lead to an era of concentration where the realities of the hour dictate a serious and disciplined effort by the Christian college to participate in American higher education in such a way that a distinctive contribution is made clear. The problem is that the Christian college is still trying to be all things to all men, not in order to witness to the vitality of the faith but in order to keep the doors open. This cannot go on. Why should a student take commerce, secretarial work, or even a teaching certificate in a Christian college when the quality of work (and frequently the services of the campus religious foundation) is of a much higher order in a state or private institution? The answer is quite simple — the Christian college has had to add these things, unexamined, to its curriculum in order to survive. Survive for what, when it is no longer engaged in a distinctive effort?

There is one thing that the Christian college has done and can continue to do in distinctive fashion for higher education in America — education in the liberal arts as the background for professional or graduate study. It is precisely at this point

THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE AND AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION

that the major debates in higher education now rage; it is here that the implications of Christian faith can be most fully articulated; it is in the liberal arts program that the Christian college should concentrate.

Because of the nature of the Christian faith, the Christian college should take an unambiguous stand with those who contend that a liberal arts education is the basis of all sound education. It should go much further in an attempt to work out an education in the liberal arts that is expressive of the disciplines and insights of the arts and sciences yet in a framework that seeks to understand their constructive significance from the perspective of the Christian faith.

This is no easy task, but the Christian college cannot avoid it. To avoid it is probably to miss the one really creative opportunity still open to the Christian college. The opportunity is so great because it comes at a moment when professional and graduate education are deeply involved in discussions concerning the true nature and goals of professional and graduate education. The fact is that a sound disciplined liberal arts education within an explicit Christian framework deals concretely with many of the needs of a top professional or graduate education.

At an address last week to the American Association of Theological Schools Provost Elliot Dunlap Smith of Carnegie Institute added to his previous penetrating statements on professional education.⁷ He asserted that today professional education is concerned to equip its students in three ways in order that they can lead creative professional careers. First, they must be thoroughly grounded in disciplines that underlie and make up their profession. They can only practice from a perspective of depth. This is increasingly true in an age of specialization. Secondly, they must understand and practice their profession with a genuine breadth in order that its creative inter-relationships with the totality of life are evident and operative. To fail in this is to fail to be a true professional man and to be only a technician or practitioner. Finally, their professional education must equip them to be alert and to learn in the very process of practicing their profession. Thus they continue to grow, to learn, and to be creative within their profession.

It is obvious why Provost Smith stands for a sound liberal education at the basis of education. Increasingly this is true among most sensitive leaders in all the disciplined professions. Some educators probably first demanded a liberal arts background for a particular profession primarily because they wished to add more years and therefore prestige to that particular profession, but that can no longer be defended. The very danger of over-specialization in the professions compels them to rethink the basis of their education and the aims of their profession.

I submit that the Christian college stands in a unique position to relate to the new and growing concern in professional education for men equipped to view and

⁷ This summary of Provost Smith is made from memory as there was no opportunity to check a manuscript of the address.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

practice their profession from a wide and dedicated perspective. This arises from two primary factors. First is the conception of truth and the unending search for unity in education that was described earlier. Given preparation in the liberal arts from this perspective, the student should prepare for a profession aware of the interplay of various disciplines and concerned with the relation of an ultimate faith to these efforts to make sense of life.

It is through the liberal arts that the pre-professional student encounters the precision, clarity, and discipline of the mind necessary to search for truth. But it is also through the liberal arts that the same student is confronted by the utter mystery and rich ambiguity of the stuff of life that breaks through and uses the precision of mind in totally unexpected and creative or destructive ways. As my colleague, Professor Joseph Sittler, said, the mission of liberal arts is "to let real cats out of phoney bags . . . and to liberate a man from individual life for personal life, to liberate into involvement in his human heritage, his own rich ambiguity."⁸

It is this kind of education that best equips the pre-professional student to undertake a profession both with a genuine breadth and with the possibility that he will continue to learn and grow through his profession. It is not an easy task to prepare men with this perspective. The temptation is to use each discipline as a stepping stone to the profession or as a necessary requisite hurdle to be conquered for admission to professional studies. Such a student is already immune to the kind of professional education Provost Smith envisages.

The pre-professional arts program itself must have a goal beyond the preparation for professional education. In fact that goal and not pre-professional education must be central. This in no way denies sound basic preparation, it insists on it as absolutely essential. However it asserts that the way the liberal arts are taught and understood will determine if the student can pursue a profession in a truly responsible and creative way.

Thus liberal arts must be taught within a framework that is concerned with ultimate issues of life as confronted through the arts. Issues such as the significance of the individual, the ideal and actual forms of political life, the relation of state to society, the question of the freedom of the will, the problem of harmony and incongruity in nature and in human life, the relation of means of production, distribution, and consumption to the questions of justice and equality — these are the issues that the professional student must confront because these are the center of life in which he will practice his profession. To ignore them is to ignore life and so to prostitute a profession to one's own narrow, selfish ends.

Somewhere the student must have an implicit faith in terms of which he can confront, live with, and learn from the liberal arts. A Christian college

⁸ Joseph Sittler, "The Wood's in Trouble," *Discourse: A Review of the Liberal Arts*, Vol. I (July 1958), p. 151.

should seek to make this explicit from the perspective of the Christian faith. This cannot be done in a way that binds or constricts.⁹ It must be done with conviction yet with openness to the very truth that the Christian college seeks because it has been grasped by the Truth. To fail to provide such a framework is to ignore the concerns of the Christian faith, opening the door to a surreptitious unifying point of view (such as the profession itself) which goes uncriticized and often tends to misuse the liberal arts, or it invites chaos through the labyrinth of fragmentation.

The Christian doctrine of vocation is a second important reason why the Christian college is in an enviable position in relation to the new type of professional education now demanded. It is strange that the Christian college has not made much more out of this basic Protestant insight. The doctrine of vocation asserts that in everything that one does, he lives out the consequences of his faith. One lives responsibly, actively, and in service. Out of deep gratitude and genuine joy at the love and mercy of God extended to him, the believer seeks to serve God through all of his daily activities.

Though it is exceedingly difficult to determine exactly how the believer is to serve God in various activities, the important thing is that one has this perspective on his activities. From this perspective one works with the double motivation of joy and serious responsibility and with a vision of the totality of life as an organic unity that seeks to serve. One's profession becomes a means through which one exhibits faithfulness and gratitude to God. It should never remain dull, boring, or routine.

A vocation represents a total life in its various relationships and activities, never just part of a life. To be sure each person usually has an activity that is the organizing center for his life, but that can never become his total life. A human being is called to be faithful in all his activities. A man should exhibit his faith not only through his profession but also through his being a husband, a father, a citizen, a church member, and a member of society.

It seems to me that one of the particular tasks and opportunities of the Christian college is to educate young men and women from this perspective. This is not done necessarily by having special classes. Rather this is the unifying point of view that lies behind the professors' and the students' approach to the humanities, the social sciences, and the natural sciences. It is because of this perspective that the professor can stand honestly within the academic disciplines and let them speak to him. Through such professors students become sensitized to the deeper issues and vitalities of life that flow beneath the surface of academic life.

Perhaps this can be made clear by the total attitude of an institution as reflected through the faculty, administration, and students. This is not necessarily vague. A

⁹ The Christian college must be careful not to misuse the liberal arts by making them a pulpit from which to preach Christian faith. The various disciplines with liberal arts do have a relative autonomy of their own, and the Christian must acknowledge and understand this.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

Christian college should clearly reflect the fact that all the members of the college community are engaged in a common calling. This does not ignore basic and important differences. It is to affirm that the student too has a calling — to be a student with all of its manifold possibilities

It is precisely this kind of education that should best prepare a young man for professional education. Because it takes the liberal arts seriously it brings discipline and openness into the life of the student. It allows the height and depth of human life to be encountered through the arts and sciences. So the student is prepared to work in a systematic, disciplined way, yet always in a broad context. Because the student in this kind of Christian college works within the framework of life understood as a calling or vocation from God he is prepared to view a profession in a broad, responsible context. Apparently this is the kind of view of profession for which competent and sensitive professional leaders are now pleading. On this task of liberal education preceding professional and graduate study, the contemporary Christian college should stake its future.

In fact it might well be considered by the Christian college whether it should do anything but the liberal arts program undertaken in the context of the Christian faith. That should be the special vocation of the Christian college in contemporary American higher education. It will be difficult enough for the Christian college to concentrate on this task so as to make a distinctive contribution. It is impossible for the Christian college to do everything that state and independent schools do while at the same time seeking to wrestle with the problem of correlation with Christian faith.

One ground of defense must be denied the Christian college. It cannot be allowed to argue that the inclusion of courses in religion and the presence of chapel, voluntary or compulsory, create an ethos that produces a "Christian" education through osmosis. Worship emerges out of a living religious experience and in turn nurtures and sustains such experience. If the Christian college is identified by a singleness of purpose expressed through its teaching, its academic and its communal life, then the worship service can play its role. It can never be a substitute for the content and method of the educational process as it is pursued within the context of the Christian faith. Nor can the academic quest completely dispense with worship in a Christ college. However the Christian college in America must be honest and admit that its failure has not been in upholding the necessity of worship service. Its sin has been and is the failure to provide a relevant enough academic life to offer the proper setting for worship in a Christian college.

Thus the Christian college faces the challenge of contemporary American higher education. There are hopeful signs that it is preparing to play again a unique and creative role. But to do this the Christian college must make certain basic decisions about itself and its task. It must assess its resources and its obligations. It will have

THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE AND AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION

to give up certain things in order to concentrate on necessary and possible goals. Will it have the courage, patience, and foresight to take the required risks?

The Christian colleges alone cannot answer this — only along with the Christian churches that brought them into being and sustain them can they seek answers. It is understandable why the churches have had difficulty in dealing with their colleges on problems such as have been discussed in this paper. The fact is that the churches and their colleges operated within a theological understanding that was inimical to confronting the basic issues. Most of these colleges were founded at a time when pietism held sway in the nation and the churches. It was basically concerned with religious experience at an emotional level that eventuated in particular kinds of moral actions. It was suspicious of the role of the mind in religious experience and largely unconcerned with fundamental theological discussion and analysis. Higher education in the Christian college reflected this theological outlook.

As my colleague Professor Sidney E. Mead has pointed out in a series of discerning articles, the churches in America settled for their role in public life on the basis of the rationalistic movement's defense of separation of church and state.¹⁰ That is, what differences were exhibited in basic theology were understood to be private and quite permissible because they were supposedly of no real consequence. Churches were of consequence for the public good and for the nation insofar as they all inculcated the basic moral virtues necessary for social and public life. On this basis each church could pursue its own theologizing, which had no real consequence for life, and meanwhile provide the necessary moral underpinning for society.

The fact is that pietism, rationalism, and the total American situation combined to play down the critical and constructive role of theology in the churches and played up the active, moralistic, and emotional side of the faith. Christian colleges founded in this period still perpetuate much of this attitude. Religion is largely divorced from the basic intellectual work of the community or is preserved in fairly watertight compartments.

But the situation has now altered radically. The American frontier with its supposedly limitless space no longer exists. Both pietism and rationalism have been transcended by new movements in Christian theology. We now recognize that theology does have profound consequences for political, social, and economic life. Piety and the mind cannot be divorced any more than one can absorb the other. Thus the Christian college standing within the context of the contemporary Church lives in a new series of relationships that not only make it possible but demand that the college reconceive the relationship between faith and education. It is at this point that the Christian college can enter a new epoch in American higher education.

¹⁰ Sidney E. Mead, "Denominationalism: The Shape of Protestantism in America," *Church History*, (December 1954), p. 23 ff.; "American Protestantism Since the Civil War, I. From Denominationalism to Americanism," *Journal of Religion*, January 1956), p. 5 ff.

Christian Higher Education in India

P. T. CHANDI

A story is told of a hoax once played by some mischievous undergraduates at the University of Oxford. They announced a public lecture on "Snakes in Iceland" to be given by a distinguished Professor of Zoology. The appointed time came, a large and eager audience had collected, but no lecturer arrived. As the patience of the waiting crowds was running out someone appeared on the platform and said "Ladies and Gentlemen, there are no snakes in Iceland." According to some unfriendly critics of education in India the proper way to deal with my subject is to declare that there is no such thing as Christian higher education in India and that what passes off as Christian higher education is neither Christian nor higher education.

There is one thing that I have discovered in my recent travels in this country, that while there are many differences between the present moods in India and America there is one interesting similarity. There is at the present time in both countries an irrepressible outburst of scathing denunciation of educational policies and programmes. Hardly a day passes without caustic references being made in the press and over the radio about the inadequacy of our systems of education and their wastefulness and fruitlessness. In regard to the maladies of education everybody considers himself an expert doctor — be he businessman, lawyer, grocer, or garage mechanic — he thinks he has the correct diagnosis and can prescribe the correct remedies. In both countries the present fashion of sweeping condemnation of education methods has been set off by hurt national pride (and pride is what often makes you want to do the right thing for the wrong reasons). In this country it started with the Russian launching of the *sputnik*; there was injured vanity at the realization that Russia had outstripped the U. S. A. in scientific and technological skills. In our country the examination and fierce criticism of education has emanated from a national pride which would want to eliminate any forms and patterns that could remind us of the days of political bondage which only recently we have been able to shake off. So through much unthinking and sentimental revolt and agitation against existing patterns comes the legitimate criticism that our higher education is unrelated to the culture of our land, unsuited to our immediate needs, and not in keeping with future aims.

What is the India of today like? I am going to give you a picture of India as seen through Indian eyes or, shall I say, through one particular pair of Indian eyes. I think this business of perspectives and points of view is more important than we realize. It may interest you to know that the only comment that Khrushchev,

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our distinguished visitor from Russia, thought fit to make when he saw the Taj Mahal — that glorious dream in marble — was, "This was all built by forced labour."

It is an India which has only recently emerged from the sheltered existence of political slavery to a freedom which has brought with it terrifying responsibilities. It is an India that is proud of her glorious past, of her ancient civilization which has maintained a continuous tradition, changing but fundamentally unbroken from the days of Mohenjodaro and Harappa to the present day, of her spiritual heritage of the illustrious company of her sages, seers, and prophets, of Gautama Buddha, Sankara, Mahavira, and Mahatma Gandhi. It is an India therefore who, for the solution of her present problems, often seeks inspiration and guidance from her past. It is an India whose doors have always been kept open to all the winds of culture that blew. Gandhiji said, "I do not want my house to be walled in on all sides and my windows to be stuffed. I want the culture of all lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible." It is a country which perhaps more than any other country in the whole world is subjected to incessant bombardment of cultural and ideological propaganda. It is an India that is very proud of her freedom and of the way in which that freedom was won and is fearful, suspicious, and resentful of any approaches, overtures, and offers of help from other nations which might conceivably lead to the abridging of that freedom and to the damaging of her self-respect. It is a country that is poor, weak, backward, and underdeveloped but is ambitious and eager to catch up with the other great nations in economic and material prosperity and has in the face of overwhelming odds made slow but significant progress toward a better life for all her citizens. It is an India who, while she has to operate under the pressure of a frightening urgency in a situation where delay spells disaster, has committed herself to the halting, stumbling, and slow moving methods of democracy in preference to the glittering competence and spectacular shortcuts of totalitarianism. History seems to have chosen India for a crucial experiment. It is an India who in international conflicts and tensions has chosen to take a position of dynamic neutrality (in present usage the adjective "dynamic" is sufficient to redeem any word however vicious or innocuous), a neutrality which does not mean apathy or indifference or a refusal to make moral judgements but fair play and objectivity which of course in academic courses is the highest virtue. This position of non-alignment which India has taken is no easy one. It is open to all kinds of misunderstanding. This position has been dictated not so much by enlightened self-interest as by the conviction that such a stand is the only creative contribution that she can make to the easing tension and the promotion of peace and that this is the only stand consonant with her spirit and moral genius. For an India such as this, faced with frightening and seemingly unending problems, called by destiny to play a significant role in world affairs at a juncture in history which is so fraught with crisis, danger, and opportunity, what is her greatest asset and her greatest need? Many people think of India's greatest asset in terms of the tens of billions of tons of iron, coal, manganese, oil, and uranium. But to

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

my mind our greatest asset is the tens of millions of human beings who are beginning to learn what self improvement and dignity can mean. The greatest need of India as of any other democratic country is men, men of intellectual alertness and vitality, men who have been trained to think for themselves, clearly, constructively, and fearlessly, men of integrity of character, who will love great causes and think little of themselves. All the well thought out plans for national development, all the heroic efforts of the government, all the generous assistance given by friendly countries will count for little if we do not have the men who can take an intelligent and imaginatively creative part in the affairs of their country and are able to subordinate all selfish interests to the common good. Our political leaders are becoming increasingly conscious of the need for such men and are looking to the institutions of higher education to produce such men. It is in the shaping of such men that the Christian colleges, by the excellence of their work and the high quality of their atmosphere and by pioneering and creative leadership in many fields, were able to attract some of the best students and have sent out outstanding leaders into the life of the Church and of the nation. That many of these colleges still enjoy a high reputation and enjoy the confidence and good will of the Indian people is beyond question.

Before I go on to look at some of the distinctive and definitive characteristics of Christian colleges in India and the possibilities they have of distinctive Christian service, let us frankly admit that they have fully shared in the common failings of all educational systems which are largely un-national and too utilitarian and which still bear the indelible marks of a westernizing policy which was augmented, if not initiated, by the "singularly tactless and blundering championship" of Macaulay. In the case of Christian colleges this last characteristic is, in the view of some critics, heightened because of the foreign connections which these colleges have had in the past.

Let us now briefly examine some of the conditions and limitations under which Christian colleges operate which make it difficult for them to function effectively as Christian colleges. Under the existing university structure very little initiative or freedom of experimentation is left to the individual colleges in the framing of courses and syllabuses and in the determination of the content of education. There is a kind of deadening uniformity in the pattern of courses all over the country. Deviation from long established and traditional modes is not encouraged. It may be mentioned in passing that in one university, largely through the efforts of American trained educators, a provision has been introduced in the University Act to permit the functioning of what has been termed autonomous colleges which would have the freedom and initiative to develop their own curricula. It has been the policy of government to support private colleges financially by annual grants without interfering with their administration or the ordering of their lives. Of late however a tendency has become noticeable of government through its agencies wanting to impose restriction in regard to faculty appointments and in other vital areas

CHRISTIAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN INDIA

of college administration. Then there is the pressure growing in volume and intensity with ominous rapidity to increase enrollments in colleges. Larger and larger numbers of students are wanting higher education and that in spite of the alarming numbers of men and women with university degrees remaining unemployed or under employed. An index of the increasing demand for higher education may be found in the fact that, whereas in 1947 the number of colleges in the country was 450, today there are over 1100; the student population in higher education increasing during this period from 250,000 to over a million. To off set the deterioration in the quality of work produced by the rapid increase in number, the theory is propounded that any kind of education is better than no education.

The mood and temper of the students is another important factor to be taken note of. In India, as in Asian countries generally, the student has to live and work in an atmosphere of frustrating insecurity which creates in him a state of meaninglessness and purposelessness and distrust of himself and his fellowmen. Hedged in by harrowing poverty and tormented by the fear of unemployment, he is seldom able to give of his work. He is never at leisure from himself to indulge in the luxury of the real enjoyment of cultural pursuits. He can see no rewards in the whole program of education except the passing of examinations and getting of a degree and the dim and doubtful prospect of some employment. What he needs most is to find some real meaning in life and the restoration of faith in himself and his fellowmen. The unseemly demonstrations and mob hooliganisms in which many groups of students allow themselves to be caught up are indications of this deep seated malady. The political movements which started with such exhilarating moral idealisms but which in a short while have degenerated into corrupt organizations, and the international situation where one crisis rushes into overtake another, have brought to the student mind disillusion and cynicism. Religion has little or no reality or meaning for the average student. He knows that religion played an important part in the lives of his parents and grandparents. Even in his own life religious observances intrude frequently in the shape of religious holidays. Wherever he turns there are temples and shrines and mosques and stupas and churches, and these speak of the country's spiritual heritage and the aspirations of his forefathers for spiritual realities. He has also in his own lifetime seen and known at close quarters some of the most horrible crimes committed in the name of religion. In the case of most students religion has not so far spoken in meaningful terms to his needs.

The situation of our country, some aspects of which I have described in sketchy terms, is the setting in which Christian colleges have to work. It is also the challenge and the opportunity of Christian higher educational work.

What are some of the special marks and emphases that distinguish Christian colleges from other colleges? First and foremost is the conscious intention on the part of a Christian college that it should in and through all its activities bear witness

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

to him who is the way, the truth, and the life. The vocation of a Christian individual, community, organization, or institution cannot be conceived in any other terms than as a witness to him in whom and by whom they live and move and have their being, in whose spirit they are to function and by whose grace alone they can be what they are ordained and commissioned to be. (For the Christian witness means his saying through life and thought and action, "thank him" both for what he is and what he has done for Jesus Christ. In their early history the Christian colleges in India were thought of as the spearhead of the Church's evangelistic outreach among the country's intelligentsia. Not only were the colleges to prepare the minds of the students by the ordinary processes of western higher learning for the proclamation of the Gospel but also to make direct and persistent efforts to have the students confronted by the claims of Christ as personal Lord and Saviour. The Christian college was thus regarded as a direct evangelistic agent of the Church. But as time went on a new concept of the area and range of the witness of a Christian college emerged. A significant reorientation of emphasis was evolved. The direct preaching of the gospel and the assessment of its effectiveness in the terms of conversion statistics ceased to occupy the position of importance that it once had in the program and purpose of the college. This change came about partly because of the continued ineffectiveness of that program to produce the spectacular results apparently expected of it and because of the realization that the eagerness to count success in terms of scalps betrayed an unchristian impatience with God's methods and that the focusing of the energies and resources of the college on the preaching of the gospel led in most cases to serious deterioration in academic quality and to the college ceasing to be a college. The new emphasis was on Christian witness in terms of academic work of the highest excellence, of teaching informed and illuminated by the Christian world-view and Christian insights, of teachers whose Christian commitment was expressed in unwavering dedication to the highest standards of teaching and research and to an uncompromising reverence for truth however inconvenient, humiliating, and unsettling it may appear to be and wholesome in their lives. The new emphasis was to be on the realization of a distinctive Christian community in the college, a community not merely in the sense of unity of intellectual motivation but a community of mutual reverence, love, and concern, of holding one another up to the highest and best, of provoking one another unto love and to good works, a community whose very center is lit up and warmed by worship. The new emphasis was to develop what was called research and extension, in which the intellectual resources of the college were to be placed at the service of the Church and of society at large, in which research would be directed towards the better understanding and analysis of the problems and situations that confront the Church and society, and in which the results of such study and research were to be interpreted and mediated to the areas where they were needed.

An essential element in the witness of a Christian college is the Christian teacher. It is impossible to overestimate the influence of a good teacher. In several

CHRISTIAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN INDIA

of the cities that I have visited on my recent tour I have come across old students of some of our Christian colleges in India. Whenever they have referred to their college days they did so in order to pay a tribute whose sincerity was unmistakable, a tribute touched with reverence and deep affection to some of their professors who in ways not fully known and understood by them had made the profoundest impression on their students' lives. The Christian teacher is one who has a sense of mission, of calling. In one of the continental museums there is an ancient *astrolabe* on the edge of which are inscribed the following words: "The astrolabe is the work of Hussain Ali, mathematician and craftsman and a servant of the most high God."

A Christian teacher is one who has the humbling vision of himself as a servant of God and a co-worker with the grace of God in his attitude to his students as someone God has committed to his care, as someone with possibilities and potentialities he cannot fully fathom, who cannot be fully summed up or comprehended in neat scientific categories. A very real temptation for a teacher is to browbeat and dazzle his student and to exploit him and to win him over as a satellite into the orbit of his own influence. The only corrective for such a temptation is to develop the sense of reverence for the personality of the student. There is nothing more fundamental, it seems to me, in this era of tremendous technological advances and of the discovery of the explorable new dimensions of the physical universe, in this era of man's inhumanity to man, of brutalities which were unleashed by two great world wars but which have become so enmeshed in the pattern of our lives that they no longer trouble people's consciences — there is nothing more fundamental than to have a soul-gripping understanding of the words of the Psalmist, "When I look at thy heavens, the work of those fingers, the moon and the stars which thou hast established; what is man that Thou art mindful of him and the son of man that Thou hast care for him." A Christian teacher has also a genuine concern for his student and a sensitiveness to his needs in every plane of the student's existence. In addition to his responsibility as a teacher he has also the responsibility of being a pastor. In ancient Hindu tradition education was imparted in what was termed the *Gurukula* — the family of the teacher. It was in an intimate family relationship between the teacher and the students where the teacher and the students lived together that education was carried on — education in the arts and sciences as well as in the art and science of living. For the Christian who believes that the essence of all true education is a meeting of persons can find such an ideal of special significance. A reverence and a genuine concern for his student and a sense of vocation will demand of the Christian teacher an unwearying pursuit of the highest possible academic competence in his field. Such a pursuit will involve "scorning delights and living laborious days as serious as a child at play and as happy as a martyr at the stake." It will also mean that he seeks to know how his knowledge and understanding of his field may be related to and illumined by his knowledge and experience of his Christian faith.

Something more vital to the witness of a Christian college than the individual witness of the Christian teacher is the witness of the community which the Christian

college has to be. The Christian college must be regarded as more than an institution which renders educational service. It is more than a means of getting into touch with people whom we want to evangelise. It is more than an agency for training leadership in the Church. It has to be regarded as one mode of the life of the world which must be brought into the captivity of the obedience of the Christ. The life of the college is an area where Christian obedience must be so lived as to make visible that new dimension of community which is a distinctive and peculiar mark of true Christianity. The community we are thinking of is a community of academic vigour and freedom in which there will be constant discussion, exploration, inquiry, and sharing of experiences. It is a community of truth in which truth is revered not merely in the lecture rooms and in the laboratories but also in human relations and in all the details of the common life. The community that is sustained, inspired, and constantly built up into a real unity through worship. Worship is central to the life of a Christian college. It is that which gives meaning, direction, and true perspective to its life and activity and expresses its dependence on God, and above all else it is that alone which can knit together the members of the college community into a real and organic unity. Communion and fellowship which are part of the givenness in Christian life can be fully realized only in corporate worship.

In order to make possible close relations between teachers and students and to be able to realize true community, Christian colleges in India have steadily set their faces against bigness. They have tried to keep their numbers small and the faculty-student ratio high. Economics have a way of playing havoc with ideals and it has not been easy for many colleges to stick to the policy of keeping numbers down. Dr. Speer of the Board of Presbyterian Missions is reported to have declared that a Christian college must be small and poor; otherwise it will not remain Christian.

That it should remain small, I am convinced. That it should be "poor in spirit" in the New Testament sense is beyond question. But that it should remain poor in other respects is open to serious question.

Another aspect of the witness of the Christian college which has made a significant impact on the non-Christian world in India is the social concern which they have displayed. They have through their social service programmes expressed in forms that have been easily understood a Christian sensitiveness to the need and sorrow and shame of the suffering millions of India. In the struggle for the removal of untouchability, in the raising of the status of women, in adult literacy, and in the survey and study of various social problems, the Christian colleges have a creditable record.

In and through these programmes the Christian colleges have sought not only to reflect the compassion of Christ but also to relate the learning that is imparted in the class room to the stark facts of the social economic and social situation in which we live, to imbue their students with a spirit of selfless service and to help them find

CHRISTIAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN INDIA

a direction and purpose for their lives outside of their own, narrow selves. At a time when there is a strong tendency to explain our neighbors situation in learned scientific economic and religious categories and explain away our responsibility to our neighbor it is very important that the Christian answer to the question, "Am I my brother's keeper," is worked out in thought and action.

A new area of the witness of a Christian college is under careful exploration. Opportunities are being sought for conversations with non-Christian colleges on such basic and fundamental questions as the aim and purpose of a university and the responsibility of the university to truth. Such dialogues will provide occasions for the university's presentation of Christian truths and insights in a form and in a context where they are assured of a favorable and friendly reception and a sympathetic hearing. This kind of programme calls for a penetrating show of the implications of the Christian faith for higher education.

On behalf of the Christian colleges of India and of other countries in Asia which have found in their recently won political freedom as well as new and bewildering responsibilities, I want to make an appeal to the Christian colleges in this country. Your colleges and our colleges have the same tasks and the same responsibilities. Our world is one. The most important front in the "Lord's battle" in this day and generation is to be fought in the minds of men whether in this country or other countries. Any help that you can render in the work of our Christian colleges in this critical juncture in the history of our nations will be more significant than you can possibly visualize.

Whatever you can do to strengthen the Christian colleges in the lands of rapid social change in the way of finding scholarly recruits with true Christian commitment for their faculties, in the way of helping them to pioneer in new and meaningful forms of Christian witness, in the way of providing opportunities for the sharing of experiences and the exchange of ideas between them and colleges here, in the contemporary context, and in the way of strengthening and enriching the academic quality of these institutions will help in the broadening and strengthening of the ecumenical witness of the Church the establishment of a social order based on the dignity of man which alone can bring in true world peace.

A Fresh Look at the Vocation Of The Christian College

JOHN D. MOSELEY

The very purpose of this entire Convocation is to get a fresh look at the vocation of the Christian college. Each section in its preparation and discussion has from its own point of view been taking such a fresh look. Where are we in this process? What has been our emphasis?

So far it seems to me we have been taking a critical look at the theoretical and theological position and at the shortcomings of the Church college. We have found it difficult to be articulate concerning the Christian college's role in contemporary American higher education, especially at the point of any distinctiveness of such a role. We see an increasing number of people weighing the standards and effectiveness of the Church college. This trend will probably mount as more researchers examine the college; as students and parents, in making the college decision, become more astute through better information and tools for making judgments. Businessmen, foundations, and corporations, as they give to the support of Church education, are asking many questions about the colleges. Some faculty members are beginning to ask searching questions, and the churches themselves are looking at these colleges as probably never before in the past. This Convocation however serves not only to point out the need for the fresh look, but should also look positively and at concrete college situations.

Maybe it would help if we made two adjustments in our thinking. First, let us rephrase our theme to be "The Christian Vocation of the Church College." This puts the emphasis on our concept of Christian vocation, of call and response, of the personal nature of the Christian vocation, finding purpose for life in terms of the wholeness of life. This may raise some questions as to whether an institution can really be called Christian or whether it is the acceptance of this Christian vocation that becomes the central concern of such a Church college.

The other point that may help us is to think less in terms of hypothetical situations and more in terms of a concrete or specific college problem. The courts of our land do not accept hypothetical cases and for good reason; on the other hand the law schools use them consistently in sharpening up issues and distinctions to be made in arguments. We must go through the exercises of the theoretical and the hypothetical, but we also must think in terms of practical college situations, how these theories and commitments affect the college program and how it should be structured.

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A FRESH LOOK

Suppose someone here should take seriously these discussions — where could he start? It is easy enough to say we want this college to be a vital Christian college, but how does it happen? It is not in a single choice; it is rather through choices made in literally hundreds of concrete situations, in attitudes and actions, that the Christian college can become a reality. We must start with the question of objectives, with an attempt at synthesis or balance of program, and arrive at action.

If one were to begin thinking of the objectives required in the Christian college situation, the first step would necessarily be his own personal sense of Christian vocation and commitment to the task at hand. From that point then, out of the person's churchmanship and his theological and educational understanding and from the relationships implicit in these fields, there must emerge an idea, an ideal, an image of the distinctive role for a particular college. Different colleges will therefore give different emphases, but it seems to me in any such college committed to the Christian vocation there must be a major vital thrust of high quality scholarship, responsible freedom, and Christian commitment and concern in the whole of the college community life. Note some of the elements that we will attempt to include in the structure later in our discussion: (1) vitality, (2) scholarship, (3) freedom, (4) Christian commitment, (5) community. Also note here a limitation. It must be understood that the college is not trying to be all things to all people, but it is dedicated to a single major task. Those students who want this particular kind of education and seek a part in it will be welcome; others who want another type of education will go elsewhere, thus strengthening both the individual program and the diversity of the higher education system.

Before we can begin to put these ideas together we must make some distinctions between the colleges to which we refer. I should like to classify these institutions into three groups, according to their approach. First, the university approach. It is more than a name; it is an organization, a size, a diversity, a specialization; it is a whole psychology or approach to the task of education. This was partly expressed by the new president of the University of California, Dr. Kerr, when he said, "A university is nothing but a collection of departments and colleges connected by the plumbing." If one takes the university approach, then this major thrust must be carried out in ways which differ a great deal from those of other institutions. Decisions on such matters as curriculum, diversity of views of faculty, on faculty and student responsibility, admissions, religious programs, would be quite different from the college with a different approach. I believe it is possible to have a vital major thrust in the university situation, and certainly we need Christian universities. But it will experience its greatest difficulty when it attempts the creation of community. This may be done in smaller units within the university more easily than in the university as a whole. There is a unique contribution to be made by the university that accepts and acts on the concept of Christian vocation.

The second approach is the limited college. This is the college that may be limited in size, academic program, quality, finance or facilities, or by

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

doctrine or specialized views. This is the college that most of us here have been criticizing. Some of these are quite small, while management engineers tell us that a college must be a certain size to be able to carry on an adequate program of breadth and quality. This may also be the college that has a specialized view, which would rule out certain curricula or certain approaches. We need to be more articulate about the standards of the limited college and its role in higher education. Many of these have the opportunity in the years immediately ahead to improve their situation. We may find that this type college performs a useful function in the whole system of higher education. There are certain students who need this type of institution; they will not be able to be successful in some of the others. Also money will be available for such, and they may have a satisfying kind of Christian piety. However this still is not what I mean when I refer to a vital Christian college, one that has taken seriously the totality of the Christian vocation.

The third type of college approach is the liberal or free college. This is a residential college of between 500 to 1000 students. But more important than the magic of numbers is the sense of community and other significant qualities of this type college. It is small, not just to be small but because it can have a community feeling which is essential, because it can demonstrate a personal interest in and concern for its students, because it is committed to the wholeness of life as a major part of Christian vocation. It is this college I should like us to consider in terms of a practical and concrete example of the Christian vocation of the college.

But before we leave this point let me note that there are two groups within these classifications that have special problems. In the twilight zone between the liberal or free college and the university there is a group of strong liberal or free colleges which will be greatly tempted to move over into the university approach. Great pressure will be exerted on them, and they may succumb to be a less good university than their previous college role. Still another group will be tormented because they cannot move from the limited group to the liberal or free college classification. The market in students is available. I believe many of these limited colleges can move into more freedom, but it will take courage and work, not only by the college involved but from all of us to help such an institution understand the issues and the climate necessary for such a decision.

Turning to some of the elements or structure necessary for the liberal or free college we recognize that at the center must be the concept of Christian vocation. We must continue to dig more deeply into its insights. We must recognize that this has to do with people, not program alone. It is the finding of a life's purpose, the development and growth to one's capacity in order to fulfill that purpose. This gives wholeness to life; it has to do with the growth of the mind, body, and spirit, with the person's relation to his fellows.

If this concept of Christian vocation is central, it seems to me that in the decisions of program we can expect this liberal or free college to so structure its

A FRESH LOOK

program as to confront students admitted to the community with the opportunity for realistic growth in each of these areas of concern.

I would propose for such a liberal or free college a structure of its program to include three main thrusts. The first and primary thrust is the academic — the growth of the mind. Here it is obvious and imperative that the quality of the academic must be the highest. A concept of Christian scholarship is essential. This concept should apply to both students and faculty, especially as they see their Christian vocation as scholars, as teachers, and as students. In such a concept I would include all that Marjorie Reeves means when she makes the distinction between the scholar as scholar with his tools and the scholar as a Christian making his interpretation and labelling it by his Christian view. I would include the injunction that we must go the first mile with any other scholar, plus the second mile of an adequate articulation of one's own Christian faith or theology. I would include the motive and perspective of seeking truth under God. Such a scholar would not be satisfied with "we don't know" but would be haunted by his task of trying to find out, the willingness to subject everything to a free inquiry, including one's own faith, but would work on the assumption that high quality scholarship and Christian faith are not incompatible and that one's Christian faith will be sustained, and some understanding of losing of one's self in a task larger than one's self with a humility inherent in the integrity of responsible scholarship.

Christian scholarship is surely all of this and more. Here we need scholars to explore, to be more articulate with theory and practice, and to help us understand the impact and meaning of Christian scholarship. Here is an area for faculty Christian fellowships to find exciting and relevant discussion and exploration. Church colleges should be in the forefront in such discussions.

Some of the unique academic opportunities of the liberal or free college involve facing the educational problems of expanding knowledge, its high obsolescence factors in these times, and the need to deal with essentials. Challenges in the field of interdepartmental and interdisciplinary work are tremendous. In the M. D. Anderson Lectures at Rice Institute, Theodore M. Green, after discussing the requirements of a two-year science program, stated, "No courses which fully satisfy all of these requirements have been devised; they remain a challenge for the inspired teacher of science." Not only science but the social sciences and other areas of knowledge give wonderful opportunity for such inspired teachers. Because of the common denominators of Christian concern, because of implications of Christian scholarship it would seem that the liberal or free college committed to Christian vocation could profoundly affect all of higher education in this field.

Another area of unique contribution of the liberal or free college is to make some discriminative judgment of the essentials for a person in a given field of concentration. What constitutes a major in a given field? Why should such a small college offer more courses than required for such a major? A university obviously

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

must have a wide variety of courses. Does the liberal or free college have the courage and discipline to limit itself and to handle a limited curriculum with quality? A rotation of courses may offer real possibilities for the solution of problems of work load and salary. Provision must be made for the gifted student to move more rapidly; the consistent challenge to such students is an essential concern for such a college. The prevailing view today relegates teaching, as distinguished from research, to the small college, while research opportunities lie almost exclusively in the large universities. The absence of such research has often lulled us into dull teaching.

There are also opportunities in co-operative programs with other institutions. The exchange of teachers with like colleges, with state institutions, and with foreign colleges can add flavor and stimulus to all members of the campus community. For those who are imaginative and alive to the opportunities of the Christian vocation and of higher education in these times of crises, the potential for the liberal college in the academic area is tremendous.

The second major thrust would be in terms of religious maturity and literacy. Have you ever weighed what we in the Church college say about our concern for the religious maturing of our students against what we invest in staff time and money toward this end? I would estimate that most Church colleges do not assign to this task a full-time staff person for the whole of the student body.

If we mean what we say about the vitality of religion, about its being the integrating force of life, then perhaps we can structure a program so that the students are at least confronted with the issues and opportunities in this area of growth as they are in the academic area. To head such a program, I should like to see someone such as Dr. Howard F. Lowry described at the Convocation at Denison four years ago; he might be called Dean of the Chapel, being in charge of it and supervising the student program; he would also be a Vice-President in charge of keeping the entire campus community on the cutting edge of Christian concern.

The structure of the religious maturity and literacy program might take the following form: There would be two types of chapel, one gathering the entire college community for worship and inspiration and for the examination of contemporary issues in the context and witness of the Christian faith. The second chapel would be a meeting by classes, giving within the framework of the chapel talk a planned curriculum over a four-year cycle. This would move from the freshman concerns of campus ethics, Christian vocation, and Christian scholarship through the sophomore awakening of the mind and meshing intellectual growth with the relevance of the Christian faith, to the junior's and senior's development of a layman's theology. This would not be indoctrination, rather a confrontation of the problems and issues and a delineation of a Christian position. This would follow Cuninggim's definition of chapel as the place where the college takes a stand. This also attempts to accept the challenge of Waldo Beach in his new book *Conscience on Campus*: "... the

A FRESH LOOK

perfunctory mumbo jumbo of 'chapel' would need to be drastically revised, and the sense both of the holiness of the secular and the relevance of the holy be renewed, so that chapel would be transformed from a museum piece into the real center of the campus, as central intellectually and emotionally as it may be architecturally."

In order that a truly world view might be a part of the college understanding, in realistic issues both domestic and international, a series of visitors would be a part of the religious maturity and literacy program. These people would be selected because of their experience, insight, views. They would be on the campus for several days, and the impact of their views and personalities would be made through various contacts and speeches. These visitors would include Christian laymen, outstanding spokesmen; some would be non-Christian — all confronting the college community with the realities of the world crises of both Christian and non-Christian views.

As a part of the structure of the religious maturity and literacy emphasis there would be a program of churchmanship, recognizing that the college is not the Church and should not usurp that role. Instead the college would have an active and integrated relationship with the local churches, especially those denominations of major student participation. This would provide opportunity for understanding and serving a normal church program, avoiding the pitfall of a highly artificial "student" situation that fails to prepare for sound Church relations after graduation.

A major portion of the churchmanship opportunities would come through student religious organizations as they operated denominationally through the churches and ecumenically through various campus and interdenominational groups. Special emphasis should be given to the relation of the student to student Christian movements in this country and the World's Student Christian Federation as well as through service in the more specific opportunities in the local church. It is a harsh comment on our self-satisfaction to compare the interest of students on state college campuses with those in Church colleges in the leadership and participation in student Christian movements. Why shouldn't the real ferment and leadership of student Christian thought come from vital Christian college campuses?

Such a total religious maturity and literacy program as outlined here could do much to stimulate that concern, but it merits the very best of staff, facilities, and attention if it is as important as we have been saying it is. It has the potential of providing a vigor and motivation that could easily permeate not only areas of religious activity but also the academic and every other phase of campus life.

The third main thrust would be in terms of the campus life of the college community. It is a common complaint on many campuses that the social and recreational activities interfere with the academic and seriously compete for the time and energies of the student. Is it possible to rethink, together with students and faculty, the social, recreational, and living arrangement so as to be consistent with the objectives of the college and to acknowledge that these areas too are of educational value? The problems ahead for our students, with more leisure time in the midst

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

of a faster and faster pace of society, with more hazards for mental and physical health, point sharply to our re-examination of this part of campus life. Can our program be restructured to provide opportunities for choices and creative social expression?

Some studies show that physical training classes do not develop a person so efficiently as a good intramural program. What skills at play have long-range as well as immediate value? Where is the place of athletics and its contribution to college life? How does the student develop patterns of courtesy and socially acceptable customs? The question is whether opportunities of social and recreational life will be educational and constructive or competitive. This is an area where imaginative student leadership, through the framework of a responsible student government, could make a significant contribution to the operation of a vital Christian college. These students must have assistance, understanding, and willingness to experiment from the administration and faculty. This does not aim to create a program of conformity for each and every student. The quality of this thrust in campus life will be determined by two conditions: (1) if it is consciously structured to give the right opportunities and pleasures; and (2) if in the choice students make in response there is reflected a growing Christian understanding and concern or whether they insist on remaining irresponsible and juvenile. Here is a constructive frontier of experimentation for the Christian college — the impact of which may be much greater on the campus community than we dare think.

These then are the major educational thrusts which could help bring about a sense of community in the life of the college. Let us now turn to a list of even more specific problems and issues that must receive action consistent with the Christian vocation commitment of the college and the structure of its program. It must be kept in mind that a college is a tremendously complicated operation if looked at as a whole. It deals with many peoples and publics, with various fields of knowledge, with buildings and finance, with housing and food, with study and play, with past and future. Thus we are not likely to find easy and pat answers to these college problems.

A liberal and free college, committed to the Christian vocation, must examine its recruiting, admissions, and scholarship policies and program, for these are key areas in determining the capacity of the college to obtain its goal. The manner in which students are handled in their first contacts makes important impressions about the character of the college. Undoubtedly recruiting will continue, even during periods of excess applications. Selective admissions will be a necessity, but here are important policy questions. Will the selection be on academic standards alone? Will the selection be from a ranking of the top down until the class is filled? Can you justify this, especially when the top group is drawn entirely from the top five to ten percent of high school classes or test scores? What does this do to a college program? Some colleges following such a policy are beginning to question the

A FRESH LOOK

practice. How can selective admissions still serve the Church constituency to which the college is related? What consideration should be given the alumni? What other standards relevant to the student's success in college should be used in admissions?

Would factors such as these be consistent and helpful in determining admissions? (1) the student's capacity for success (high school grades, test scores against comparable ones of successful college students); (2) the student's general interest and leadership potential; (3) his understanding of and desire for the program and education offered; (4) his willingness to submit himself to the personal discipline required for success in the program.

Can the Church college lead the way in some experimentation with admissions that looks at a good minimum of capacity which has the potential of success but puts the emphasis beyond that on motive and other such factors about which we know very little at present but which we know are often more determinative than ability? Here may be an avenue for a unique contribution to student understanding.

Scholarships, and by this I mean grants or other student aid, are becoming one of the biggest problems of American higher education. The issue is not only political but also a mark of social status for the recipient and his family. Much of the problem has been and is still being created by the colleges themselves in a fierce competition for top students, whether the "top" be brawn or brains. Some colleges are "buying" specific professional students for science, engineering, ministry, and other fields. Because of the difficulty of administration, many contend the only criterion for scholarship aid should be ability. Most people respond to this call of the college in raising money — "to help a student through college." It is akin to the orphan appeal. Yet many colleges then automatically give scholarship aid to candidates for the ministry, athletes, valedictorians, musicians, etc., whether or not they come from families that can afford the cost of their education. How do we justify collecting from one person and giving to another — unless there is real need on the part of the student? Are we saying we must buy our students, and we pay what we must on the current market? We have long heard the cry of the faculty concerning "buying players"; is it more justifiable to "buy scholars"? Especially important is the psychological impact on these students; they are made to feel they are pretty good and there is a free ride for them if they can just find it. They want no responsibility of debt for their education even if many times that education is directly related to their later income capacity. Loan funds have gone begging for years although there is now some new interest in them. In some cases the pressure for scholarships is actually greater from parents than from students; it is a proud father who can casually comment that his son has a scholarship from a certain college. One father who was desperately seeking a scholarship for his son was known to be in at least the fifty thousand dollar salary bracket. If we are not careful, we will arrive at the point of considering education a basic responsibility of the state with the attendant expectation: a free education as far as one wants to go.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

It seems to me the Christian college here must search its conscience in the matter of buying students. I feel personally the only real justification for student aid is "need." I know it is difficult to determine; undoubtedly there will be some inequalities. Could the Christian college in facing the problem say:

(1) We will neither bargain with nor try to buy a student. He must want to come to this college for its program and for what he can get and give to that program. Once this decision of admission is made, then . . .

(2) The college expects the student to bring his financial resources, abilities, and energies to bear on the cost of his education. This means his family resources and his ability and willingness to work.

(3) The college in return pledges its co-operation in helping such a student meet his financial needs with the funds that friends of the college have placed at its disposal to help students and with job opportunities.

If we are not careful in the years ahead, the Church college is going to be tempted to use as an admission standard "Can you pay the cost?" and thus serve an economic class and kind. Or in its attempt to obtain its objectives it may seek to "buy" the kind of students it needs. We run grave danger in this area; we must keep high-cost Christian education available for those who want and need it. I am convinced a vital Christian college will neither have to buy its students nor serve a particular economic class. If it has the program and operation that makes sense, students — the right kind of qualified students — will want to come, will understand and respect such policies, and people with funds to invest will make them available to help those students who have need. It will take more than a fresh look: it will take action and experimentation and undoubtedly will be somewhat unpopular and misunderstood in the initial period. A vital Christian college must take that risk.

Now look at the student from another standpoint: as the person on the campus to learn, to grow, to play, to become prepared for and involved in a lifetime of learning. The student should be considered as a responsible interested person. The Christian college has a right and a duty, once having admitted such a person, to expect many things of him. This does not mean putting him in a mold of conformity but freeing him in a community of responsible freedom, exposing him fully, helping him to find himself and develop to his fullest capacity. Such a freedom that stems from both self-discipline and commitment is one of the key lessons the Christian college offers. If really obtained as the pattern of community life, it is potentially one of the distinguishing features of a Christian college and one that both size and purpose make difficult, if not impossible, in other colleges and universities.

I would certainly agree with students in their criticism of the nonsense of petty rules and regulations of many Church colleges. I am shocked at stories of authoritarianism and injustice that have come from some. The college, to be vitally Christian, cannot tolerate such. Its view of the student as a person to be respected,

A FRESH LOOK

as a responsible person, must pervade the entire campus life. If we believe what we preach of the Christian faith and of the democratic principles for living together, we must not practice the reverse in campus affairs.

However I cannot agree with some students who see as the only answer the removal of rules and regulations *per se* to gain freedom. This permits mere looseness, and often the response is irresponsibility and even rationalization of impolite, if not immoral, conduct. I do not believe the Christian college can long tolerate irresponsibility; too much is at stake. The entire college community cannot be allowed to suffer at the hands of a few. Here we are not talking of conformity of ideas but basic necessities of conduct required in community living. If the Christian college community can start with a common denominator of high motive, of self-discipline and responsible freedom, then the potential levels of attainment of scholarship, of understanding the world and its people, of new insights into Christian faith and practice are tremendous and can be a part of the distinctive contribution of the Christian college.

At this point it is so easy to be misunderstood by those not familiar with the paradox of the Christian faith: of the surrender of self to find freedom, of losing one's self to find meaning to life. It is this same kind of commitment, the acceptance of personal responsibility and self-discipline, that is the essence of the new freedom that can belong to the student. Let me try one example: if the student ever really understands the challenge of Christian scholarship — the rewards of inquiry, the excitement of learning — then grades as grades cease to be the goal and may even stop causing the tension present in many students. Such an approach changes entirely the view of cheating and scholastic integrity.

This raises several important moral, ethical, and social justice problems of the campus which in many cases cannot be suddenly corrected but which nevertheless must be faced and worked at constantly and with Christian conviction, love, and action. The whole question of scholastic integrity, of which an effective honor system is evidence, must be a major concern of faculty, students, and constituency. This is so symbolic of the major thrust of the college that it should be without question, yet the academic processes, the emphasis on grades, makes it most difficult. Faculty are often as responsible for the lack of such a system as students. It will take much work, patience, understanding, and time to make such a system work.

Another such area of concern is that of racial discrimination. This is one that also must be faced, understanding that it is not enough to admit a student in order to say one does not discriminate and then practice in the campus life even more insulting discrimination. Here again people, their emotions and attitude are involved. This will take time, but it must be faced honestly in terms of the commitment of the college to the Christian vocation.

Other areas of social justice and fair play must receive the careful attention of students and faculty in such areas as fraternities, sororities, campus politics and

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

activity. I am convinced if students understand the objectives of the college and respond, if faculty and administration deal with students as reliable men and women mutually concerned with the seeking of truth and purpose for life, the vitality and freedom of the Christian college can make it truly distinctive. This would imply co-operation and mutual concern over the changing problems of a campus community, students and faculty sharing views and seeking answers together. Here again is a frontier of democratic and responsible community life in which the Christian college can lead.

A fresh look at the Christian college today would be merely visionary if it did not include Finance, Management, and Development. It must suffice here to say that all of the vigor and consistency of the vital Christian college community must be felt in the operation of its business affairs and in the development of the college as pervasively as in the faculty. It is in fact one community with a single commitment and standard of concern and operation. Obviously it must be efficient and must be planning for its future in practical terms.

A more serious problem is raised by a fresh look either by the Church at a determined vital Christian college or by such a college at its relation to the Church. There are important technical questions here, but the overriding issue is: will the Church support, will it permit such a vital Christian college as we have been discussing in this Convocation? Will the Church see it as an important resource to its own life and work? Will the Church answer yes, but act negatively? The answers here are not yet in, and they may depend on the kind of understanding that flows from this Convocation, the follow-up and understanding gained in the churches through the National Council's Commission on Higher Education, the National Committee of Church Men for Church Colleges, the newly created Council of Protestant Colleges and Universities, and the denominational boards. These speak without the vested interest of a particular college and are important voices to be heard on the crucial issues. Each college then must be counted on to be articulate about its role, its plans, and the vitality of its program. Any progress one college or one denomination makes helps all the rest. The potential impact of the colleges represented here is hard to imagine should they all return from this Convocation determined to take a fresh look at the Christian vocation of the college and put the best they know into operation.

But in the final analysis this is a personal issue. Are enough people — faculty members, students, administrators, trustees — personally committed to their Christian vocation to work unceasingly in the vineyard so that the potential of the distinctive new role in American higher education may be realized by the Church college? The opportunity is there; the task is ours. The future depends more than we realize on our response and action.

The Christian College and the Contemporary World

KATHLEEN BLISS

I am indeed grateful for this opportunity of being present with you during your discussions of the vocation of the Christian College. The educational systems of the U.S.A. and Great Britain diverge most markedly at precisely this point of the relation of Christianity to education. Superficially our situations are utterly different, and the differences are so complicated and so illogical that we seem to be moving in different worlds and to have little to say to one another that can really help. I say "illogical" advisedly: for what is more illogical than that in the United States with its crowded churches, representing a church affiliation on the part of over 60% of the nation you should be in two or even more minds about the place of religion in public education, while in England (where you don't need the figures you can't get to tell you what is clear to the naked eye, namely that churches are half empty) religious instruction and religious worship are compulsory by law in every state school in the land. Confronted by this, which is only the most striking of many differences between us, do not let us break off relations and go our own way with no more than a friendly wave of the hand. What it means is that none of us possesses an institutional embodiment of the relation of Christianity to education which arises from the present in response to present needs. All are legacies from the past, and all of us alike are forced back behind our institutional patterns to ask more fundamental questions about our task as Christian educators and our effectiveness in performing it.

All of us are trying to conduct Christian education in a world which is rapidly bringing to birth the first universal culture ever known. Since the rise of Christianity, says Herbert Butterfield in his book, *The Origins of Modern Science*, nothing compares with it in magnitude as a transforming event in human history. In its onward rush this new universal culture, based on science and technology, is destroying ancient communities and transforming not only men's outward lives but their very way of thinking about human life and destiny. This culture produces new elites and these elites are formed not by birth nor by wealth but by education. In a sense undreamed of a hundred and fifty years ago, knowledge is power; the pressure on the educator is terrific. What do the communist governments of eastern Europe do to those who resist their purposes? For some there is imprisonment or banishment, but for many there is a new punishment — to debar their children from

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entry into high school, technical school, or university. And this is a terrible punishment because education is the key to every door in the modern world.

The educator cannot pursue a quiet life in a quiet corner with a bunch of pupils. His activities are of vital importance to governments and to all citizens. First comes the pressure to provide for every boy and girl the chance to get as far up the ladder as he possibly can — equality of opportunity. But this rush of individualism can and often does destroy social cohesion; so another demand is made on educators, that they shall create social equality, using the school to iron out the differences between person and person by creating common social norms. "Adjustment" is the word. Then comes the cry, again addressed to the educator, "Give us back our lost values: repair the damage done by two centuries of eroding and destructive analysis of ourselves and our beliefs, two centuries of preoccupation with the conquest of nature and the using of her secrets to create wealth." What hard-working Christian teacher could refuse what seems to be an open invitation to do one's proper job and to be thanked for it at last?

But what does the contemporary world really want? To keep all it has, but to have it made safe; to have a still continuously rising standard of living which technology makes possible, but not to have it threatened by other products of that same technology; to have overwhelming armaments, but never, please God, never have to make the decision about their use; to have a moral law in the universe to which one can appeal against one's enemies without and all those who disrupt the community within, but never to have its sanctions turned upon oneself. What ought we to be doing? Helping people to live in this sort of a world, to get into the right job, to marry the right partner, to overcome their fears and so create some sort of island of well-being inside this insecure world — is that our task? If so, we are reasonably successful with many individuals, especially (dare I say it and risk being called a snob?) with those who are not going to form the elite of this modern world. Supposing the call of God to us were something different, namely that we should build up men and women who don't want to find a way of settling down in the world as it is but want to change the world?

A distinguished British educator, Sir Eric Ashby, Principal of the Queen's University, Belfast, recently made a speech on "Technological Humanism." In it he said, "modern technology is confronting us with an exceedingly perplexing biological problem. It lies in the field of human ecology. It is the problem of how men and communities can adapt themselves to an environment which is changing with unprecedented speed." These words summarize a point of view very widely held among thoughtful men and slowly permeating through the whole of society. The environment of which he speaks is not nature, not something other than man; it is man's own achievement through technology; and this man-created environment is seen as taking on a direction and momentum of its own. Man has set in force processes which he cannot control; he must learn to live with them. Now of course these words are true. Look at what happens when oil is discovered in a desert

sparsely populated by nomad tribes or when a great river is harnessed to make electricity. People then leap through all the stages of the industrial revolution at a single bound. But ask any educated African or Indian what he is going to do with his life and you are very unlikely to get an answer which is even a paraphrase of "I'm going to adapt myself to my changing environment." He will tell you that he is going to *change* his environment, that he and his fellows are only too eager to take all that the West can give of science and technology, but that they are going to use it to shape their own destinies and make their own lives.

In regarding sciences and technology as the most important factors in shaping the modern world, are we looking at the genuinely contemporary world or at a world already becoming yesterday? Should we change our perspective and see that the growth of science and technology is not inevitable? They flourish only in certain conditions which are partly mental and spiritual, namely that men passionately believe in and care about science and devote their lives to it, and partly social and political, namely that they create by deliberate intent the conditions and the institutions in which it can flourish. Are we being driven back to see once more the primacy of the political (in the proper sense of the word) over all other human activities in society? If governments cannot govern, decay sets in; none of the skills and techniques of Frenchmen could save France from disaster. What is shaping the destiny of the Middle East? Oil? Or the passionate outburst of Arab nationalism which finds its focal point in Nasser? Nationalism has already transformed the Far East; it is a driving force in Africa; it is reasserting itself in Europe where it had its origin. Is it not also a powerful factor in American life?

What is the root of nationalism? It is the twentieth century form of the revolt of ordinary men; revolt against being dragged along into the wake of great powers; revolt in the name of one's own territory, language, race, or religion. It can be irrational, bitter, and destructive. It can feed on race hatred, on historical memories which will never forget, on religious bigotry, and then it is a terrible thing. It can be something else — a power drawing men out of their individualism into a larger community; it can include the warmth of loving and the will to sacrifice; with malice towards none, it can be built into a rich and diversified internationalism.

Intellectualism cannot sustain life; only passion can do that. Loving and suffering, believing and acting, these are the stuff of life; and the educator's task in the modern world is that of directing those passions which can change the world towards goals which are chosen by moral decisions and disciplined by reason. The Christian educator and the Christian institution of education belong to this contemporary world and are part of it; but they belong also in the Church which, if it is alive, is in constant tension with the world. To our clamant conflicting nationalisms, our disrupted communities, and our fear-haunted ambitions, the Church must speak her Lord's message of judgment and grace and call her servants not to adjustment to the world but to committal to Christ.

The Challenge

E. FAY CAMPBELL

This is not a summary. It follows the findings of six groups of people who have spent several hours together. What I have to say is a footnote to those findings and the addresses which have been given here these last few days. It would be impossible for me to do more than make some remarks about the program and about our Protestant Christian college program.

The Churches and the public-spirited citizens of this country are ready to support our colleges when and if the colleges have a significant program. This is very clear. But the important thing for the colleges to realize is that they must have a clear-cut institutional purpose. So many colleges do not know where they are going. Colleges with purpose and a sense of destiny can get the backing they need.

In this country we have made much of the Board of Trustees of the college. Any convocation, such as this one, should deal with this fact. When I came to my present position with the Church, I had visions of work with faculty and students. I had spent my life with them and knew something about them. But in our system the Board of Trustees becomes very important. In fact it has been my experience in almost every case where there has been trouble in a college that the Board of Trustees was not prepared or qualified for the job in hand. The Board of Trustees has a very great responsibility. It must set the policy, adopt the budget, and see to it that the college does what it claims to be doing. One of our mistakes is to assume that money-raising and finance are the only jobs of the trustees. This is far from true. We must do a better job of educating our trustees and training them for the work they must do. I suggest that any Board of Trustees needs to be made up of three major classifications: ministers, educators, and other public spirited citizens, either business folk, lawyers, doctors, or free-lance men and women.

About one-third of the membership of the board should be taken from each group. In my opinion four or five strong educators drawn from the university and college field may prove to be the strongest trustees. Reference was made in Dr. Noble's introduction to my many years at Yale. Let me report that the major advances in the academic life of Yale during my years there were certainly on a large measure due to the imaginative and creative work of three members of the Board of Control, namely Dr. Henry Sloane Coffin, Professor William Adams Brown, and Bishop Henry Knox Sherrill. Professor Brown was a teacher of theology, Dr. Coffin was a busy city pastor and president of a seminary, and Bishop Sherrill was presiding Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church. Of course they won the support of men of wealth, and they relied upon the great business ability of other men, but these men were ready to co-operate with the administration and faculty when

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THE CHALLENGE

new and big ideas were presented. We make a mistake not to include the best of our educators and ministers in the policy-making phase of our work.

The program of our colleges must be bolder and more exciting. What excitement have we had in American education in recent years? It is a sobering thing to reflect — after forty years on the campuses of this country — that our faculties and student bodies have become conventional and tolerant to the point of being indifferent to the world's tragedy and not really concerned about the terrible softness and decadence of our own people. Professor Baker of Princeton has just written a book entitled *A Friend in Power*. It is a most soothing book. He has made clear his tolerance of alcohol and his intolerance of all those who are worried about the awful evils that go with drinking. Many things in his book are good and wholesome. It is good to read it after reading Stringfellow Barr's book entitled *Purely Academic*. He has been around the academic world a long time. And now he has poured out his disgust with the whole business. Not one person in his book is admirable. No one can be trusted. Here are two books from leaders in the liberal arts colleges of this nation who give us no hope that the college has any significance for our day.

We will do well to read these books and learn from them. Why are we so timid? Where is the spirit of the Revolution? Where are the students to do for our day what anti-slavery groups did in our New England colleges in the first half of the nineteenth century? Students and teachers in other parts of the world seem to be alive to the day in which they live. Why not our students and faculty?

In a world which has fought two world wars and is prepared to annihilate itself, it is rather depressing to realize that the U.S.A. — born in revolution and the struggle for human freedom — has become a prosperous nation which seems to be content so long as we can maintain a high standard of living for ourselves and enjoy our academic leisure. Archibald MacLeish had a sentence in his article on the Yale College program when the new College Plan was adopted. He said that Yale was now ready to produce country gentlemen at a period in history when the world will not tolerate country gentlemen. Russia thinks she can become the imperialistic colonial empire of the twentieth century just as the Western European nations thought they could rule in the nineteenth century. The U.S.A. thinks she can ignore the world. And so the two most powerful nations on earth are being by-passed by the people. It is not comfortable to be a citizen of one of the most reactionary nations on earth when that nation is wealthy, supplied with excellent colleges and universities, full of strong Christian churches. Neither the churches nor the colleges dare to say what needs to be said. Do they not understand the times in which they live?

It has been my privilege recently to be very close to a young man throughout his college course. He went on to theological seminary. He attended what is generally considered one of our best liberal arts colleges. He had a good academic average and was an active worker in the Christian fellowship of the college. So far as I could discover, neither the college classroom nor the Christian Association did

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

much to awaken him to his sense of responsibility for mankind. He lived the true "Ivory Tower" existence. Only after he had been in theological seminary for a few weeks did he begin to see his duty as a Christian citizen. How can this happen? It is not true in other countries. It was not formerly the case in this country. Do our colleges not have any theory of responsibility? If a student happens to go on to a good graduate school or professional school, he has a chance to wake up. But is this not the job of the college? I remember an interview between a teacher and a student a few years ago. The teacher had been a very good friend of mine. He was a social radical when I first knew him as an instructor. Then he developed a course in the English department that became very popular. He became very famous and influential. One day he told a student what he was trying to do. He said that his teaching was strictly "liberal," strictly "arts." He was not one bit interested in preparing his students to make a living or to interpret the day in which they live. He said that what he tried to do was to make the reading of English literature so exciting that the Wall Street man would come home of an evening and find his greatest joy in reading great books, not in going to poor shows or playing bridge. In other words for my friend the college had the job of giving the student a taste for good books. All of us will go with him that far, surely. But is it far enough? How the student made his living and what Wall Street did for the human family had nothing to do with education. How can a man really read and understand the greatest in the writings of our English masters and so completely miss what they were saying?

Our colleges need to re-examine their programs and attempt new adventures. If we only had a few more colleges and universities to which we could point with pride, colleges where the students and faculty are excited and leading us on to new things! Instead we are either cynical or contented.

When I entered college in 1914, a group of students soon got hold of me and got me into the Yale Society for the Study of Socialism. We found friendly teachers who cared about injustice. We read books which were not studied in the classrooms. Also there was a group of pacifists. By the spring of 1916 we had an active group of the Fellowship of Reconciliation. Faculty members supported us. My life-long commitment to non-violence as a Christian vocation started in that group in college. Hundreds of students worked together to influence the first disarmament conference in Geneva. We sent a delegate there to express our concern.

We have learned so much since 1914. Have we given up the struggle? Are we ashamed of the "missionary character" of all great education? If our trained minds are not trained to serve and guide and lead, then let us realize how insignificant education is. I am pleading today for a bolder program in our colleges. Racism, poverty, war, alcoholism, the drab existence of so many in industry — all of these issues demand able leaders and the colleges should produce them.

We must think more deeply about our attitude toward the Bible. It has been stated frequently in this Convocation that a college is not really a Protestant Chris-

THE CHALLENGE

tian college just because it has a Bible Department and compulsory chapel. I am sure we all agree. But it must not be inferred from this that the Bible is not essential in the educational life of the Protestant Christian college. We need to take another look at the Bible situation.

We have gone through a long dry era in Bible study. For over fifty years now the theological seminaries have been fighting about it. On the one hand we had the literalists who had all the answers. They knew exactly what we needed to believe about everything in the Bible. If we disagreed with them, we were not Christian. On the other hand we had the so-called modernists or liberals who taught the Bible as a beautiful body of early literature which we all should look at. The "Bible as literature" school was really worse than the fundamentalists. They were more smug and more sure of themselves. And they more completely misunderstood the situation. In any case the literalists and the modernists called each other names, theological schools were tagged in one camp or the other. The teaching of the Bible in the colleges was dull and cautious like the preaching in the pulpits.

In my judgment the greatest single event of the mid-twentieth century is the rediscovery of the Bible by the Protestant Church. Today we do not line up the seminaries as was done twenty-five years ago. Princeton Seminary and Union Seminary are saying essentially the same thing about the Bible. Here is God's Word and man neglects it to his peril. I repeat that the rediscovery of the Bible is the greatest single event with which we must deal. Our teachers of Bible in the colleges today do not dodge real issues. In my contacts with colleges and universities I do not know personally a teacher of Bible who is defending old-fashioned literalism. I do know a very few who are still teaching the modernism of the 1920's. But it is very important to realize that our colleges are working hard to teach the truth as revealed in the Bible, and this is the best hope we have in our time.

The point I am trying to make can best be made by stating here what Professor J. L. Hromadka of Czechoslovakia said some years ago. The Student Volunteer Movement was holding its Quadrennial Convention in Toronto in 1941, just three months after the Second World War broke out in Europe. Professor Hromadka had been forced out of Czechoslovakia by the Nazis. He was teaching at Princeton Seminary and was asked to speak at the Quadrennial on the conditions of the Church in Europe. After his address he was asked what had caused this second great war in Europe. He gave an answer which the educators had better heed: European culture and civilization had been rooted in the Hebrew-Christian tradition. Modern European men no longer believed in that tradition. There was nothing to hold Europe together. So the people were at each other's throats. He said that whatever of culture and civilization we had in Canada and U.S.A. was due to the influence of the Old and New Testaments. Modern man on this continent no longer believes in the Bible. Therefore, he said, "your culture and your civilization are doomed." That is sound Biblical theology, good sociology, and the truth. We

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

have no roots. My friends, my argument is simply put. The Christian Church and the Protestant Christian college must accept the responsibility for raising up in every nation on earth a core of intelligent men and women who understand the Bible and live in it. We have heard here at this Convocation about the emerging world culture. Our world will be a slum, not a civilized place at all, unless the Church and college perform the task of making Biblical truth intelligent and relevant to educated people all over the world. We neglect the Bible at the peril of everything we hold dear.

We do well to think further about the Christian perspective of the faculty. Some of our papers and discussions in the Convocation have implied that the Christian college would be more exciting educationally if there were non-Christians in the teaching staff. Or perhaps the idea was that it should not be necessary for every teacher to be Christian in order for a college to be Christian. This debate has gone on and will go on. I am thankful for it. Some of our Christian colleges with a staff composed of convinced Christians do not seem to be very significant, and surely some of our colleges which pay very little attention to the matter of Christian convictions on the part of the teachers are dull. I would be ready to bet my life on the proposition that a college with a clear-cut institutional purpose that was avowedly Christian which had a staff of able dedicated teachers who were Christian and also profoundly committed to the Christian enterprises in the modern world would be about the best place in the world today to get a sound liberal education.

The Christian scholar never avoids facts he cannot understand. He is eager to learn from Marxists and all others who have something to say. He will welcome controversial issues. But it still holds that a community of Christian scholars who are excited about learning, who love to teach, and who have brains will be the most open-minded adventurous people in our world. At least no one has yet found any place more creative so far as I know. For the best education in the Western world today, it is my guess that you will go to the strong theological seminaries rather than to the graduate schools and colleges which claim to be unfettered. The Christian knows that he is a slave and that only as Christ's slave can he be a free man. Men who fool themselves into thinking they are free and without prejudice, who serve no master, do not fool anyone else. The greater the master, the more consistent the loyalty to him, the more understanding and generous the person.

Finally, a word about the Council of Protestant Christian Colleges and Universities. We have taken another long step here in developing this Council. At this Convocation we have invited Canada to join with us. This is splendid. We have had a study section on the Christian college in other countries. It is my hope and prayer that a few years more will see a Council of Protestant Christian Colleges and Universities that circles the globe. Ours is a world problem. Educated Christian men and women know no national boundaries. Learning is a world concern. Let us go back to our colleges dedicated to great and vital education in a world setting.

The Theological Foundations of the Christian College

Section One

I. General Considerations

What is the theological justification of the Christian college? Historical investigations into the origins of Christian schools and colleges in North America and throughout Christian history have caused some scholars to conclude that the primary motive was the training of Christian leadership, both lay and clerical. Was this motive theological in character or pragmatic? Or can a pragmatic concern be a theological foundation at one and the same time?

From one point of view, Christianity is an intellectual religion. If it is to continue to maintain its preaching and public worship, if it is to teach, and if it is to continue its mission in all lands, then it cannot dispense with a certain minimum of literary culture. Christian life may survive and has survived among an illiterate and uneducated laity, but it can hardly be conceived as surviving without a ministry that possesses at least the essentials of a basic education. Christianity, and especially Protestantism, has striven for enough education for its people to enable them to read the Bible and understand the doctrines of the faith, and enough education for its ministry to preserve a knowledge of the scriptures in their original tongues and an understanding of the church's history and doctrine.

For this reason at least the Christian Church has been involved in education. In the earliest centuries, particularly in countries on the frontiers of the Roman Empire which had little or no culture, Christians set up religious schools on the pattern of Jewish rabbinical schools (and incidentally produced a series of national literatures and cultures). After the decline of the Empire, the Church established and maintained monastic, episcopal, and parochial schools in Europe. These schools served the Church's educational needs and in time helped to produce medieval civilization. When the Christian Church moved into new or barbarian lands, as in North America, when the resources of an established educational system were not available, it found itself compelled to found schools and colleges.

The pre-convocation study commission on this topic had the following members: J. Edward Dirks, Co-chairman, Yale Divinity School; Bernard M. Loomer, Co-chairman, Federated Theological Faculty, University of Chicago; Robert M. Brown, Union Seminary; Nels F. S. Ferre, Andover-Newton Seminary; Joseph Haroutunian, McCormick Seminary; Donald M. Mathers, Queens University, Canada; J. Robert Nelson, Vanderbilt University; Albert C. Outler, Perkins School of Theology; Jaroslav Pelikan, Federated Theological Faculty, University of Chicago; J. Coert Rylaarsdam, Federated Theological Faculty, University of Chicago.

At the convocation the above prepared study document was accepted by the study section which also added its further statement: Bernard M. Loomer, Chairman; David E. Henley and Elwyn E. Tilden, Jr., Associates.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

The Church's need for education for its people and ministry, and its founding of schools and colleges to provide this education where no other educational resources were available, is one thing. But the Church's maintenance of an independent educational system is another. In the early centuries of the Church, when it lived side by side with the developed civilization of the Empire, it did not attempt to produce its own religious type of school as something quite separate from the classical pagan school. Even when Christians were most critical of pagan society around them, condemning its defects and trying to break free from it, they allowed their children to be educated in the pagan schools and hoped to counteract the non-Christian influences by the training given in the Church and at home. Perhaps this situation had a theological justification or rationalization. Perhaps it was a matter of practical necessity that the early Church was unable to sustain an independent school system. But it is curious that the attempts that were made (e. g., under the academic persecution of Julian the Apostate) were not successful.

The situation in North America is somewhat different. Here the Church founded schools to provide education where no other was available, but they have survived into a society which has an elaborate educational system that is neither Christian nor pagan but religiously pluralistic. In this context the question persists: what is the rationale for these colleges continuing to operate as Church-related colleges? And can this rationale become theological in character?

Several good but not necessarily theological reasons can be given for the continuance of these Church-related colleges.

Today, with the tremendous increase in the student population, the need for educational facilities far outstrips the supply. Since we do not spend a sufficient amount of our national income for educational purposes, it could be argued that the churches should go on supporting these colleges as a form of the Church's service to culture, even when they no longer have any distinctive educational or religious function. This justification does involve the practical and strategic question as to whether the limited financial and personnel resources of the churches could be better used elsewhere.

But if these Church-related colleges have no distinctive educational or religious function, then it may be objected that the Church has no business (theologically speaking) maintaining colleges that possibly could be as well or better run by secular agencies. Church leaders may be tempted to abandon non-distinctive Christian colleges which are in difficulties. They may also lose control of successful but non-distinctive Christian colleges which no longer largely depend on Church financing.

A second reason may focus on the increasing anonymity of life in the large university, whether private or public. A small but good liberal arts Christian college can and does attract students and teachers of high quality even though salaries may be lower and conditions less opulent than elsewhere. This point should not be mini-

THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE

mized, but its proper evaluation depends in part on a judgment regarding the consideration just mentioned.

Again, the Church has invested heavily in its colleges. This investment is in the form of money, men, and creative energy. Much of this money is in the form of trusts and endowments. These trusts cannot be easily (or even with difficulty) abrogated, either legally or ethically. This consideration may contain elements of inertia and become a prime reason for the continuance of these colleges even when they are indistinguishable from colleges operating under quite different auspices, both private and public.

Finally, it can be said that Church-related colleges should continue to be supported because they may act as bulwarks against threats to intellectual and academic freedom stemming from economic, political, and social forces within our culture. This point assumes that the Church has a concern for academic freedom, which may be more true in theory than in practice, and implies that these colleges have theological resources to enable them to withstand these pressures coercing us toward conformity.

These considerations are not meager in their import, but they do not constitute a decisive theological justification for the continued existence of Christian colleges. They are good but not sufficient reasons, and their practical cogency may rest in part on relatively temporary pragmatic factors in our cultural situation. Therefore the question recurs: Can there be a theology of the Christian college, or must the Church think in terms of relating itself to academic life whether this is in a so-called Christian or secular college?

If one rejects the notion of a "theology of the Christian college," how will one define the primary and distinctive mark of a Christian college? For example: is it a manifestation of a personal community, or does it consist of a distinctive philosophy of education? Under either alternative some theological foundation or justification must be given, whether or not this constitutes a "theology of the Christian college."

II. Theological Considerations

This subject lends itself to at least two major forms of treatment: 1) the study of theological principles to determine whether or not the Christian Church *per se* has a mandate and rationale for establishing and maintaining institutions of learning; and 2) the study of theological principles and education to determine the relationship of Christian faith to the academic enterprise.

The theological justification of the Christian college would possibly result from the study of the Christian faith and life with a view of finding a mandate and rationale. Such an inquiry would include a consideration and evaluation of the prag-

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

matic and functional reasons for the establishment of colleges by the Church in the United States, as noted above. Such an inquiry should be undertaken, and the Study Commission recommends that this task be committed to a larger group of theologians for intensive work over a period of several years.

Faced with a limitation of time, the Study Commission set for itself the more modest task suggested by the second form of treatment. It is apparent that there is a relationship between Christian insights and the academic enterprise, a relationship that has not been fully explored in recent years. It decided to do this in terms of the traditional theological doctrines of creation, fall, and redemption. In what follows below, the meaning of each doctrine is briefly stated together with some of its educational implications. In each case the statement was written by a member of the committee from his notes taken during the general discussion.

III. Creation

In traditional theology the doctrine of Creation sets forth the Christian view that the universe was brought into being by a free act of God, who is therefore called the Creator. Everything that is not God is created by God and is therefore called a creature. This doctrine might seem to be an obvious example of the worst kind of speculation and dogmatism about a supposed event in the past concerning which we have no scientific knowledge. But it is not a statement about an event in the past, but about the relationship between God and the universe, and it has the most practical consequences in everyday life and in education.

Perhaps one can see best what the doctrine says by seeing that it involves:

(a) Belief in the knowableness, goodness, and purposiveness of the universe. Since God is good, his creatures must partake in his goodness and rationality. This is vividly borne out in Genesis by the repeated affirmations that God saw that his creatures were good.

(b) Respect for material things. Since God made them we cannot take a low view of the body, or food, or possessions. We must treat them with reverence and discipline, not abusing them, but having a sacramental view of them and seeing them as bearers of the mercies of God.

(c) Belief in the centrality of personality. Since God is personal and the universe is the result of a free, personal, loving, creative act, personality in man is not an accidental occurrence in an impersonal universe. When man is most fully personal, he is most like God. Man is primarily a loved soul, and he can be said to be in the image of God when he is sustained in personal relatedness to others and to God.

(d) Belief in man's humility as well as his dignity. For all his great gifts, man is not God. Man is finite, limited, and contingent. He finds the ground for his meaning and his very being beyond himself.

(e) Belief that man is a creative creature. "The God who created must wish us to create" as Mr. Eliot says, and we feel that we participate in a creative process and even have a certain lordship over the other creatures which we must use in respect and love and not merely as objects of exploitation.

Some educational implications of the doctrine may be suggested:

As many philosophers have argued, there is a close connection between the doctrine of Creation and modern science. E. L. Mascall writes: "Whether or not they are connected *de facto* — and this is a matter for investigation by historians — there is at any rate a very close connection *de jure* between the Christian belief in a God who is both rational and free and the empirical method of modern science. A world which is created by the Christian God will be both contingent and orderly. It will embody regularities and patterns, since its Maker is rational, but the particular regularities and patterns which it will embody cannot be predicted *a priori*; since He is free, they can only be discovered by examination. The world, as the Christian conceives it, is thus an ideal field for the application of the scientific method, with its twin techniques of observation and experiment." (*Christian Faith and Natural Science*, p. 132)

Respect for the body and for material things, because they are God's creation, should save us from any tendency to think that practical studies are less dignified than theoretical. Perhaps our temptation in these days is the opposite: to have a "materialistic" attitude to education which is interested only in its cash value and its practical results. But our defense against this false materialism should not be any counter-balancing "spiritualism" or false intellectualism, but rather a reminder that since material things are of God's domain, we must use them reverently to his glory, and not exploit them or subject them to our own selfish ends.

Belief in the centrality of personality should remind us that we teach not only subjects but people, that the teaching relationship should be personal and the college a community of persons.

In his creatureliness man has a dignity, but a humble dignity. Just as in science we must proceed by the lowly path of observation and experiment, so in other branches of learning we must observe a similar humility. Our thinking will be dependent on presuppositions which we cannot escape and should be willing to acknowledge and examine. Our culture will not be the bearer of its own meanings; our history will raise problems which cannot be answered from within it. We will see ourselves as inescapably relative since only God is absolute. The absoluteness of God provides some of the clues and presuppositions upon which the Christian scholar bases his work. He will know that these clues are received and held in an act of faith. He will remember that belief is a responsible act, and that therefore he must accept for his thinking the moral standards of honesty and integrity.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

The faith that we are (or can be) creative creatures has its own relevance for education. It is not by accident that, when we speak of artists, scientists, or philosophers as being creative, we use a word borrowed from theology. We are creative when we participate in the creative act of God and serve His creative purpose.

IV. The Fall

By the doctrine of the Fall, Christian theology means that it has somehow become second nature for man to oppose the will of God and so to break the harmony which should exist between himself, his fellow men, and God.

(a) Fallen man in rejecting God seeks to make himself or some other creature the center of meaning and so becomes an idolater, absolutizing the relative.

(b) Fallen man, lacking an understanding of his limitations, becomes a prey to the sins of trespassing upon the domain of God and his neighbor. In ceasing to confess God, he loses the capacity to confess his sins in relation to God and his fellowmen.

(c) Having lost his relatedness to God, fallen man loses his relatedness to other people and to himself. For him it is not only true that "Hell is other people," but life with himself becomes a kind of Hell. The one relationship which is truly personal and truly creative — love — becomes impossible. Because he will not allow himself to be loved by God, he becomes unable to love or to be loved by others.

(d) As men lose a living faith in God, they direct their loyalties and trust to pagan or secular gods as a means of facing life. When one point of trust fails, they seek another. When the objects of trust are found to be unreliable, cynicism and disillusionment follow.

It is not hard to see ways in which this applies to the life of the college.

For the academic man, idolatry usually means that some system of ideas is made absolute. Messianic claims are made for science or education or liberalism or something else as though they will solve all problems and save the world. Religion itself can be the chosen vehicle of this sinful arrogance. When it is claimed for instance that Christian theology as a system of ideas has the answers to all our problems, this also is idolatry and a denial of God. As one sin leads to another, this leads to fanaticism, unreasoning and extravagant zeal, and the refusal to accept criticism.

Since academic people are usually highly conscious of the failings of others, they are strongly tempted to overlook their own. But the simple sins of pride and greed, envy, ambition, and self-centeredness can be as prevalent in college as elsewhere and more prevalent if these attitudes are not recognized and confessed. We place proud reliance on our earthly treasures of wisdom and knowledge. Teachers are tempted to judge all learning by their own field, to show off in front of their pupils, to claim knowledge which they do not have, to avoid criticisms that they

ought to face, to maintain themselves in a dishonest security. The real mark of sin is that not only do these things happen but we try to deny that they happen and react to criticism like guilty persons.

A jealous suspicious collection of scholars, who cannot live and work happily together but are forced to inflict themselves on one another — this is what sin makes of an academic community. We withdraw into ourselves and our own ideas, we are discontented with ourselves and yet wish to be left alone. We do not dare to be open to others. We cannot accept contradiction, nor yet live with different opinions. We hide from the good that could save us, because we cannot face its condemnation.

The unhappy progress from utopianism to disillusionment is too well known in the intellectual world to need description. In the light of Christian faith, it can be seen that gods fail because they are false gods. It is turning away from the true God that turns hope into illusion and realism into cynicism. Only a few honest people can face the desperateness of the human situation in a godless world without belief in God and draw courage out of their despair — the atheistic existentialists. They have no hope in God. In their desperation they seem to echo a central Christian affirmation — "that only through the darkness of the Cross with its cry of dereliction can hope ever be reborn." (Evanston Report)

V. Redemption

The doctrine of Redemption means that through his relation to God in the context of a reconciling and reconciled community (the Church), the individual becomes a different kind of person, a new being, a transformed creature. Relatively but not absolutely he is redeemed from the sin of his self-centeredness, his self-love and his pride. He is also redeemed from the burden of the law. That is, he is relieved of the yoke of trying to prove himself worthy to be accepted and forgiven. He has relinquished his self-defeating voluntaristic struggle to justify himself and to gain merited approval in the sight of God and his fellow. He is thereby increasingly freed from the subtle and tenacious forms of defensiveness by which he barricades himself from open and creative relations with others.

To be redeemed is to respond in repentance and gratitude to God's reconciling love. In being forgiven the individual is empowered to accept himself and others more fully and freely. He receives a greater courage to acknowledge his doubts and weaknessess, to come to himself and to recognize himself for what he is. In this movement toward self-consciousness he is more able to encourage and support others in their search for self-identity. He comes to see that the life of the suffering servant is the deepest embodiment of maturity and the final exemplification of what it means to be human.

To experience the gift of God's grace is to be dedicated to a total trust in the Author of our renewal. The members of the Church come to realize a greater

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

wholeness and integrity within themselves. They come to appreciate that faith is a total commitment involving all the dimensions of their lives. Because of their mutual support and encouragement, they are loosened from their moral complacency and intellectual lethargy. Their spirits are released for creative work.

The doctrine of redemption as a result of God's continuing love and forgiveness has several academic consequences and implications. They all center around the notion of community. The academic community of a Christian college must ultimately partake of some of the essential qualities that define the religious fellowship itself. More especially it should become a community of acceptance and forgiveness and not just a "community of scholars" in the usual sense. This requirement is laid upon Christian colleges for the sake of academic and intellectual as well as human considerations.

The term "community" is not to be understood in a sentimental or soft sense. The notion that we are or should be members one of another does not mean that community symbolizes "niceness" or pleasant atmosphere. True community does not occur where tolerance, polite indifference, or easy tranquility are the order of the day. Community means acceptance and forgiveness, but these elements have reference to the conflict and unrest that are the inescapable ingredients of creative academic life. A community of acceptance, dedicated to genuine inquiry and provocative teaching, and committed to the furtherance of penetrating intellectual inter-relatedness, will become a situation that will arouse the anxieties, contradictions, rebellion, and emptiness that are in each one of us. It will bring to the surface elements in our intellectual and personal existence that we would prefer to repress. It will tend to force us to confront ourselves in ways and at levels that we would like to avoid.

This kind of community is needed on our college campuses where the faculty are suspicious of the administration, where the administrators fail to provide adequate and imaginative academic leadership, where the faculty are divided and dispirited, and where all groups lack the courage to be their honest and best selves. The primary responsibility of the administration is to initiate and nurture this kind of academic community. This role requires courage and imagination. The administration can exemplify this role in part by being a bridge of communication and interpretation between groups within the faculty. In this context both students and faculty can become more conscious of who they are, more aware of their strengths and weaknesses, and more cognizant of the principles by which they live.

The freedom that is consequent upon acceptance and forgiveness is a release from the blocks and inertias that impede our intellectual growth. A free mind can become a strong and creative mind. But a free mind requires a free self which in turn presupposes self-acceptance and acceptance by another or by others. It is possible to have a brilliant mind without its being a free mind. But brilliance by itself can be brittle and distorted. A free mind is internally motivated to explore and to

THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE

move beyond its present understanding. It is able to initiate and sustain critical and disturbing inquiry. The freedom that comes from acceptance probably will not increase a student's inherent intelligence. But it will enable him to realize the intellectual abilities that he does possess.

The doctrine of redemption implies that a Christian college should be an independent center of radical criticism. Conformity, whether religious, intellectual, or social, should be the least of its temptations. Academic freedom cannot be preserved by political enactment, important as this line of defense is. For the Christian college the roots of freedom of inquiry lie deep within the nature of Christian faith itself. All ideas, doctrines, principles, people, and institutions are criticizable in principle as well as in fact. Doubt and skepticism are part of our Christian heritage. But the cutting edge of doubt and the power of free critical inquiry are not "givens." They are maintained only in their incarnations. They derive from the internal readiness of faculty and students who exemplify the competence, openness, and motivation of disciplined inquiry and discussion. This kind of criticism should cover the whole range of the major intellectual, cultural, and social concerns. This kind of climate should be one of the hallmarks of Christian institutions.

The wholeness of faith in the experience of redemption implies that a Christian college community should illustrate more than a minimal concern for the student's growth toward intellectual integrity. Integrity involves an inter-relatedness, even a systematic inter-relatedness, of the several basic disciplines that constitute the curriculum. This concern should be a dominant feature of a Christian college, unless it is assumed that faith and reason are mutually indifferent or that faith applies only to a segment of life.

The initiative for this growth toward integrity should reside in both the students and the faculty. Integrity must be struggled for. It cannot be handed over ready-made to the student. Also wholeness has an individualistic coloration. In the jungle of today's intellectual chaos the student needs competent tutorial help. This assistance should not be extra-curricular or dispensable in character. In some sense it needs to be incorporated within the formal structure of the curriculum itself.

If growth toward integrity is to be one of the dominant characteristics of the student's academic experience, the faculty cannot be appointed solely on the basis of specialized competence, indispensable as this is. At least a sizable number of the faculty must manifest an intellectual concern about the possible inter-relatedness of the major disciplines. The faculty cannot ask of students what they do not demand of themselves. This concern will help shape the academic community itself.

Additional Statement of Section One

The topic assigned to Section I was "The Theological Foundations of the Christian College." The Section accepted the Report prepared for it by its Study Commission. It became aware that the report of the Study Commission was not intended to constitute a full and direct theological justification for the existence of the Christian college. The Study Section accepted this limitation of the report and realized that probably it could not accomplish this task in a satisfactory manner either. Nonetheless in its deliberations it came to feel that it had made at least a beginning in the direction of stating the theological foundation of the Christian College.

The Section voted that the chairman and others of his choosing be authorized to prepare a statement summarizing the discussions of the Section with the understanding that this statement should not be interpreted as having been approved by the Section.

It seemed to this reporting committee that in a significant way the Section approached the theological foundations of the Christian college through various theological tensions or polarities.

The first tension concerned the notion of the Christian college as Church on the one hand and on the other the Christian college as distinct from, though related to, the Church. It was a clear and strong contention in the discussion that the Christian college is the Church in the sense that it is a community of acceptance and forgiveness realized through the grace of God in Jesus Christ. In this community its life is basically dependent upon unsentimental corporate worship. The life of worship is recognized to be one of the chief ways in which the grace of God is mediated to the community. By virtue of this relation of God to his people, the members of this community, which is at once the Church and the college, are free to accept themselves for what they are and to receive and forgive others as they have been received and forgiven.

In this communal existence the members should be increasingly released from the fears, compulsions, and defensiveness that block full human and intellectual development. The point here is that a free and creative intellect presupposes a free self and that a free self is possible only in a community of acceptance and forgiveness.

On the other hand the Christian college is *not* the Church in that there are many people, both students and faculty, who may not share the Christian college's concern for worship as the core of that community and who not only may not, but do not, regard themselves as members of the Christian Church in any sense. Also there are members of the college community who are dedicated to the intellectual calling with its high sense of integrity, competence, and openness to truth and who do not conceive of these qualities as having any necessary or intrinsic Christian rootage.

THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE

Furthermore, the college is distinguished from the Church in that the work of the college is primarily intellectual. This intellectual concern is not the essential characteristic of the Church.

It was recognized that the intellectual life contains an ambiguity in its very essence. On the one hand intellectual effort can be highly egocentric and vain. It can be used to glorify the self esteem of the individual scholar. On the other hand intellectual inquiry pursued out of a deep devotion to truth and characterized by costly self-discipline may itself be one of the God-given means of grace. Through this endeavor the individual may be released from preoccupation with himself. It may lead to a healing of his sense of estrangement or emptiness or even brokenness.

The second tension arises in holding together the notion that on the one hand the final truth has already been disclosed in Christ and on the other hand the notion that the college in its essence is committed to the search for truth.

We know that God's grace with respect to his forgiveness is deeper than all our searching; we also know that the truth is not our possession. It possesses us; and all our formulations are marked with tentativeness and are subject to distortion and corruption by sinful men. Moreover our understanding is marred by its partiality and incompleteness. Therefore the demand of the given truth of the Gospel requires that we stand open and receptive to all formulations of truth as set forth by those who undertake with deep seriousness the intellectual inquiry. Thus the Gospel provides the charter of freedom for the Christian college. Therefore non-Christian scholars should be able to find a congenial place within the community of the Christian college. The openness involved in the Gospel means that non-Christians should never be used as foils or devices. They should be treated in terms of their full human dignity and their viewpoints permitted full play in the intellectual enterprise of the college.

At this point the doctrine of creation means that in the setting of the Christian college Christians and non-Christians stand on a common human level in their encounters. In their discussions together they ought to address each other in terms of their common humanity. The Christian doctrine of creation provides for a common human relatedness wherein we are literally members one of another regardless of the presence or absence of religious beliefs. This relatedness makes possible, and even mandatory, free and open discussion within the Christian College. This relatedness also makes possible the witness of the Christian college in the total setting of higher education. This relatedness also should bring in upon the Christian college the stimulus, challenge, and judgment of all communities of learning.

The third tension can be seen in the contrast between the need for specialized competence and the demand for intellectual integrity in the sense of organic wholeness. Intellectual wholeness requires that there be a systematic inter-relatedness between the various academic disciplines. The Christian college has long had as a

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

stated aim a concern for the wholeness of the individual student. But this concern for wholeness has not always seen the necessity for *systematic* inter-relatedness between the several disciplines of the academic curriculum. Therefore the concern of the Christian college for wholeness has often been more sentimental than academic. Intellectual wholeness is not possible as long as the student remains at the level of introductory understanding symbolized by survey courses.

Intellectual wholeness requires specialized competence in addition to general understanding, but specialized competence cannot be simply technical in nature. It must have the quality of depth, and depth means that one has reached through his discipline an encounter with the basic human issues.

The pursuit for specialized knowledge on the other hand can become a preoccupation with trivial knowledge, and such preoccupation results in the trivialization of the person so engaged. Also a preoccupation with knowledge as a kind of power may result in the fragmentation of the person so committed. In this respect the Christian college should not idolize the patterns of intellectual life carried on in our universities. Furthermore the capacity for wisdom may atrophy from a prolonged involvement with purely technical forms of knowledge. There are other forms of knowledge not characterized by utilitarian motives that need to be stressed. These kinds of knowledge partake more of the quality of participation than of control and manipulation.

In order that the Christian college may be true to its stated aim for wholeness it must see the creative possibilities that inhere in this tension between breadth in curriculum and competence in depth through specialization.

The fourth tension resides in the contrast between the Christian college as it is and as it ought to be. These two poles of tension appeared frequently in the discussion, though as separate issues. The resulting tension, it may be said, was sensed rather than delineated. It is possible however to gather a few quite clear implications as to what the Christian colleges are and ought to be.

First, the Christian college as it ought to be would be in essence a two-fold reality: an academic and a Christian community, at once restlessly searching for truth and resting its life in the worship of God who has disclosed himself in Jesus Christ. It would give through its faculty an example of high intellectual competence and concern. It would expect of its students, as they lived in fellowship of the Christian community, a life of intellectual excitement, endeavor and achievement. It would manifest in its life an attitude of free and open respect for ideas. It would, again in freedom and out of the richness of Christian community, scrutinize the social, political, economic, and intellectual dimensions of our common life. As a part of the Christian community of faith it would dare to be a college, a part of the Western tradition of the University. As a college it would dare to be a Christian community.

THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE

With reference to the Christian colleges as they actually are, the group was not ready to enter into a wholesale condemnation of them. On the other hand probably no one in the group would give unqualified approval to the state of things as they are in the colleges, either with respect to the academic or the Christian character of the community. Within the group there seemed to be a wide divergence of opinion concerning the realization in strength and depth of both the academic and Christian aspects of the Christian college.

Out of the discussion of these tensions the Section dealing with "The Theological Foundations of the Christian College" (in line with the recommendation of the Study Commission) unanimously voted to recommend to the continuing committee of the Protestant Council that a diversified committee of theologians and other educators be appointed to study the theological foundations of the Christian college during the next four years and to report to the next Quadrennial Convocation of Christian Colleges.

In voting the above recommendation the section urges that relations be maintained with student groups studying the same subject.

Bernard Loomer, Chairman
Charles Forsyth
Elwyn E. Tilden, Jr.

The Relation of Church and Campus

Section Two

I. *The Legacy of the Past*

The relations between the Church and institutions of higher learning have a long and venerable history. The highlights of that history will help us see the present relations of church and campus in perspective, and will clarify to some extent the major issues which confront them both.

The original universities, to which all modern universities and colleges trace their descent, came into being in the twelfth century under the aegis of the Church. Most of them originated in cathedral schools which the Church had earlier established. They differed however from those older schools not only because they fostered the pursuit of learning beyond the elementary stage, but because they arose as a spontaneous expression of the shared experiences and common aspirations of men whose devotion to learning had been quickened by an intellectual revolution — the revival of philosophical studies stimulated by the recovery of most of Aristotle's works. Although they were therefore self-generated communities of learning, the Church from the first accepted them as important agencies of Christian society and, at a time when its disapproval might have stifled their development, extended them its blessing, protection, and support. Indeed, as George Williams' *The Theological Idea of the University* so ably shows, the medieval church worked out an elaborate apologia for the existence of universities and so not only justified its own concern for them but made fundamental contributions to the idea of the university. The medieval church thus consecrated learning and the institutions of learning and transmitted both to religion and to secular authorities a lively sense of the importance of the universities.

The settlers of New England brought with them this inherited concern for learning. After they had provided for the worship of God and for civil government, they took measures "to advance learning and perpetuate it to posterity, dreading to leave an illiterate ministry to the churches." As the frontier advanced, colleges appeared just behind it in great profusion. Most of them owed their origins, at

The pre-convocation study commission on this topic had the following members: Alexander Miller, Chairman, Stanford University; Ernest C. Colwell, Southern California School of Theology; Arthur C. Coons, Occidental College; Marc Curtis, UCLA; Frank Fagerburg, Baptist Church; Harold D. Fasnacht, LaVerne College; Cyril K. Gloyn, Occidental College; Theodore S. Greene, Scripps College; Georgia Harkness, Pacific School of Religion; George Hedley, Mills College; Franklyn D. Josselyn, Occidental College; Gordon D. Kaufman, Pomona College; Paul S. Kearns, Presbyterian Church, U. S. A.; Ganse Little, Presbyterian Church, U. S. A.; Robert Rankin, Claremont Colleges; Mrs. Alvin H. Scaff, College Church, Claremont; John von Rohr, Pacific School of Religion.

The prepared document was considerably revised by the convocation study section: Alexander Miller, Chairman; Harold D. Fasnacht and James Pain, Associates. The revised version is published here.

least down to the passage of the Morrill Act in 1862, to the various sects and denominations of the Church, for only the Church had in these areas sufficient vitality, cohesion, and concern for learning to care for the provision of education. Before the Civil War more than five hundred colleges, most of them Church-related, existed in sixteen states. Of course not all of them survived; and many of them never approached, despite all their pretensions, the stature of good secondary schools. Yet their appearance on the edge of the wilderness marked the persistence — indeed the revitalization from the upsurge of Evangelicalism — of the traditional Christian concern with higher learning.

It is not enough however to note that the Church has traditionally founded universities and colleges. This marks only the beginning of the problem of the relation of church and campus. Nor will an examination of the motives that lead to the establishment of any or all of these institutions help much with the understanding of our present problem. What is of importance is another feature of the long history of church and college. As Hastings Rashdall says in his *Medieval Universities*, they were at the moment of their origin the institutionalization not only of a religious purpose but also of an intellectual ideal. By protecting the first universities and by founding other universities and colleges, the Church has created free communities whose nature, despite their ties to the Church and their place in the purpose of God, demands primary obedience to the law of their own being. This fundamental law, however much they may have fallen short of it from time to time, is freedom of the intellect, a principle which, as Robert Calhoun has put it, is rooted "in the fundamental fact that [man] actually is free — as observer, inquirer and critic of his environment and of himself."

Obedience to the law of intellectual freedom has forced universities and colleges on occasion to criticize various manifestations of the Church which gave them nurture. Even more significant, it has been the source of a progressive tendency in the history of the relations between church and campus: for from the beginning free communities of learning, informed by their own principles and ideals, have been drawn toward a life independent of the needs and purposes of the Church.

In the Middle Ages, despite the control of the Church and the acknowledged supremacy of theology as queen of the sciences, the liberal arts course was in origin, as it has remained to the present day, a *body of secular learning*. Its medieval professors proclaimed its right to independent prerogatives with the proud boast that it was *fons et origo ceteris* (the fount and origin of all the rest).

In the period since the Reformation, in spite of the needs of the Protestant churches for a religiously instructed laity as well as for a learned clergy, the universities and colleges have persistently developed along the independent lines which were announced, if not attained, in the Middle Ages. Harvard College, founded with the hope both of advancing learning and of leaving to posterity a literate ministry, changed into a modern institution of higher learning under the guidance of the principle that "A university cannot be built upon a sect."

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

Further, it is only honest to admit that this tendency to autonomy has frequently been reinforced by the need to overcome the hindrances which the Church itself has placed in the way of the free development of intellectual life. In part this need to escape the confining influence of conservative religion, as well as the secularization which accompanied a broader base of financial support, has led even Church-related colleges in the twentieth century to grow away from their founder, the Church.

This whole development has left many of the colleges with only the most tenuous connections with the denominations which founded them. In some the only links are a representation on the Board of Trustees and a small contribution to the finances of the institution. In others, the link appears to be little more than dedication to certain "moral and spiritual values" which are at best very attenuated versions of Christian thought, belief, and worship. In still others a college church and a department of religion, both peripheral to the primary life of the institution, maintain some semblance of a tie with the sponsoring body. In all of them doubt, uncertainty, and anxiety about the proper relations between the two communities strain the links that remain.

Certain aspects of the contemporary situation may however be considered both as signs of a more hopeful future and as marking the conditions for a more creative relationship. The significant difference between the relations of church and college today and their relations in the Middle Ages arises from circumstances outside them both. In the Middle Ages and for several centuries thereafter the Church and the university existed in the social context of a relatively homogeneous society whose ideals were self-consciously Christian. Today both exist in a heterogeneous society some of whose dominant sets of values, if they may be dignified by that term, are dubiously related to the essential purposes of church and college.

This may well be the time for the Church and the college to join forces in earnest once again; and in particular, when intellectual freedom comes under attack from secular forces, for the Church to revive and proclaim in modern terms the theological justification for free communities of learning. The college for its part, when the Church by its involvement in the world seems to be put into a false position or to run into the danger of too-easy compromise, may help the Church recover a firm footing in its tradition and faith.

II. The Nature and Task of Church and College

The Christian college is in the somewhat anomalous and certainly difficult position of standing somewhere between the Christian Church and the explicitly secular academic community, seeking to participate in and to be loyal to both. It is not surprising therefore that the Christian college is frequently misunderstood and suspect by both parties. In the Church there is the suspicion that the college is really but another secular institution, no matter how publicly the college flies the

THE RELATION OF CHURCH AND CAMPUS

Christian colors; in the academic community there is the suspicion that the Christian college teaches a "party line" and does not open itself to free inquiry on all subjects. In order to clarify the role of the Christian college and its relation to the churches, we have sought in what follows to suggest briefly the tasks of the Church and of the academic community in relation to each other; thus the mutual and possibly inevitable suspicion of each other may be better understood, and especially their mutual *need* for each other may become clear.

The Church

While the Church is always profoundly affected by the culture whose life it shares — for example the number and character of American denominations is partly the result of the particular history and sociology of the American community — yet the Church is always conscious that it is more than a purely cultural phenomenon. It understands that its existence derives from the activity of God himself. It is not an intellectual community nor a political community but a community of faith in Christ. Its members are joined to one another not by intellectual or political agreement but by a common commitment which is the response of love to God's love in Christ, which binds them to him and to one another by bonds most dear and makes them witness to that love in the academic community as in every area of life.

The same love which binds Christians each to the other in the fellowship of the Church generates also in them a deep concern to put their powers of mind and hand at the service of God and at the service of men both within and without the Church. They have learned to have a particular responsibility to maintain and improve every enterprise which promises to enrich the lives of men. Political citizenship is one form of their obligation; but they have learned to care also for the maintenance and advancement of sound learning. They know that the powers of men's minds and the wealth of human culture are good gifts of God to be gratefully appropriated and rightly used. This breeds an urgent concern with education not only in the schools related to the Church itself but in every area and in every institution where the work of the mind is done.

The Church has established colleges "of its own" partly in response to historic situations which have already been discussed. The Church conserves and seeks to improve its colleges because they offer one way in which the Church may preserve and advance the work of liberal learning as a service to the community of mankind, make real to successive generations of students the intimate concern of the Church for the best kind of scholarship, and affirm in the context of the demand of Christ upon the total life of man that such scholarship is the veritable service of God.

Christian members of the academic community have access to resources in the Gospel and the community of faith which, if rightly used, guard against the peculiar sins to which the academic flesh is heir — in particular the sins of intellectual pride and pedantry. The College for its part has done and can do the Church great

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

service by standing guard against the characteristic sins of the pious — excessive dogmatism, spiritual arrogance, hypocrisy, and intellectual timidity.

The College

The college, whether it be related to the Church or not, has its own place and purpose which the Christian would understand to be a place in the purpose of God. It has its own particular commitment which is to preserve its character as a community of free inquiry. Its business is to deal with the whole heritage of culture both in a positive and in a critical way, to appropriate it, to discuss it in all its variety and contradiction, and to improve it by new discovery. Whereas membership in the Church is by profession of faith in Christ, membership in the college calls for a commitment to deal gratefully and diligently with the tradition of scholarship, to be a good citizen in a community of inquiry, and to follow the truth which commends itself as true to the inquiring mind. The good college must be, as William Blake said of the mind of man, "a thoroughfare for all thoughts and not a select party." It conducts a traffic in ideas in which nothing is contraband but everything is permitted and where truth is to emerge, in so far as it does emerge, not by excluding error but by the clash and conflict of contending views.

The Church-Related College

In this connection the Commission finds itself confronted with two recognizable sets of presuppositions. They are not mutually exclusive, but they cannot readily be reconciled and it seems best simply to set them out for consideration.

1. Certain members of the Commission think about the relations of church and college somewhat as follows: They take the community of faith and the community of learning to be two given orders of life ordained by God for specific functions (just as is the state in its own role) and therefore having their own inherent obligations and their own inherent logic of life. In the Western tradition they are always related but never completely conjoined, and their separateness is the condition of their service each to the other. They exist in creative tension, serving in the one case faith, in the other reason. They are obligated to be fair each to the other in terms of their common obligation to the one Lord. By the accident of American history or by the providence of God, these two orders of life are brought into a relation of peculiar intimacy in the so-called Church-related college; but the fact that they here live on the same ground does not obliterate their separate roles; they are still obligated to be totally fair each to the other and to honor their respective and distinctive functions. From this point of view the Church owes to the college the conditions of its full existence, specifically total freedom of inquiry even where such inquiry offers a *prima facie* threat to the Church's cherished convictions and even to the faith of its members.

2. Other members of the Commission tend to think of the Church colleges as created by the Church and existing for its ends (in this connection they use phrases such as "the college is an arm of the Church"). The colleges are, as it were, estab-

THE RELATION OF CHURCH AND CAMPUS

lished within the Church and function as instruments for Christian nurture. Inquiry is free but is to be conducted under Christian direction, so that the truths of reason are always related to the truth as it is in Jesus. The logic of the latter position calls for a faculty committed to the Christian faith, an arrangement which would be regarded by adherents of the first position as inimical to a full academic experience. (The Commission agreed that a third position be recorded as held by a minority and not fully represented under 1 or 2, as follows:

(God has made Christ Lord over all. All principalities and powers are under his dominion. Education (the learning community) is recognized to be one such "power," like the State. In teaching and free inquiry, the community of learning renders service to man for whom Christ died. In relation to education the Church is not primarily concerned with the relationship between the community of faith and the community of learning nor the relationship between faith and reason. Its primary task is to remind education of its service to mankind whatever the results for the Church. If the community of learning is an "order" with its own status, then it tends to serve reason rather than Christ.

(On the other hand the Church which seeks to keep education under its direction by Christian ideas or principles or by organizational control makes a claim to superiority that obscures the Christ, as Lord over all. When the Church uses education for its own end, then the proper end of education as service to man for Christ is adulterated.

(The Church exists for the sake of Christ's on-going work; it must continually risk its life. The role of the college is to witness to Christ's work in the world also. The Church-related college has a particular role to play in this mission. In fulfilling the command of Christ to be obedient even to the risking of its life and in recognizing Christ as Lord of its academic community, the Church-related college witnesses to the whole educational world concerning the true goal of education.)

The close relationship of church and college is testimony to the fact that they have much in common. However they also exist in tension with each other, a tension which may at any time create a problem. Perhaps the deepest of these tensions arises out of the suspicion which each institution naturally and in a sense inevitably tends to have about the ultimate objectives of the other. For example the Church naturally fears to put its young people in the charge of an institution which makes questioning and doubt a primary obligation. On the other hand the academic community is committed to the proposition that no presuppositions must go unquestioned, not even those most precious in one's personal life. It is natural, even inevitable, that the college will be suspicious of the Church's insistence that men live by a faith that transcends all the knowledge with which they habitually deal and indeed all possible knowledge — especially when such a faith may so easily slip into dogmatism and obscurantism. Each community's suspicion of the other arises properly and naturally out of its own deepest convictions.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

The two communities may exist fruitfully together in the degree to which these difficulties which each has with the other are understood though they can never be fully overcome.

III. What Can the Church Contribute to the College?

The Church,¹ after calling colleges into being, has a continuing responsibility toward these institutions that is not discharged by the initial founding, financial support, nor by adopting uncritically the routine justifications of the Christian college which assume too easy a continuity between the purposes of the Church and the ends of education. Church support of Christian higher education is justifiable if a working theology between faith and learning exists and if there is a situation in which every learner is confronted with the importance of Christian faith in relation to the learning process.² It is not justifiable if "a Christian context" means only the wholesome atmosphere of the school, orthodox attitudes on the part of the faculty, or simply the encouragement of church activities and the provision of Bible courses.

This means a constant rethinking on the part of the Church of its own attitude toward the academic enterprise. As long as it calls these colleges its own, the Church must have good and valid contemporary reasons for this relationship. "Time makes ancient good uncouth," and the reason a Church college was founded on the frontier may have little relevance for its present existence in the metropolitan area that has grown up around it. By examination however the Church may find an even more compelling justification for the presence of the Christian college in American higher education. Some hold that the extension of state prerogatives in the field of education is making the Church college progressively less necessary. In spite of the fact that there is a very good state system of higher education, yet the Church's involvement is justified in order to prevent a monolithic pattern of education. State prerogatives need to be offset by a varied pattern of educational enterprises, including Church colleges, in order to provide education of high quality in a wholesome variety of settings.

There is opportunity for Christian colleges to be vital "pilot projects" in higher education. With the tendency to put too much reliance on conformity, the tendency to exact conformity "from below," the tendency of educational practice to be subject to whim and fashion (as for example the present danger of an over-emphasis on science and the development of scientists), the Christian College has the possibility and the responsibility of preserving the conditions of a free and

¹ The reader will note that the word "Church" usually refers to the "body of believers" or, more often, to a given denomination or "branch" of the Church, or rarely, to an individual congregation. The reader can depend upon the context to provide the proper connotation.

² For an expression of a "working theology" see Section I of this report.

THE RELATION OF CHURCH AND CAMPUS

liberal education. Such conditions would serve both as an example and as a training ground for those who will carry the concern for liberal education into the community in general and into public education in particular. A special responsibility of the churches is to maintain the independence and integrity of their own schools so that the optimum freedom for critical inquiry may prevail.

The Church, through its Boards of Education or Mission, should share with the colleges a responsibility for clarifying the Protestant theory or theology of education. The Church has the added responsibility of expressing its theory in such matters as the judicious distribution of resources and the sound development and maintenance of standards. A wise policy, consistently and courageously applied, would put a premium on creativity rather than conformity, on academic excellence rather than struggling mediocrity, and on such institutions as demonstrate theological understanding in all their educational activity.

In addition to these basic obligations of the churches for their colleges there are a number of effective strategies which the churches might well adopt. Among them we call especial attention to:

1. A consistent philosophy which justifies the Church's involvement in higher education needs to be shared by college administrators and Church executives and by a growing constituency in Church and community. Increased awareness among Church members of the Church's deepest concerns in higher education cannot be left to the public relations staff of the colleges. It is the task of the Church to define its mission in every sector of society, including higher education, and to stimulate the Church at large to a sense of this mission. It will use many ways to keep higher education concerns before its constituency, including such observances as National Christian College Day and Student Recognition Sunday and will try constantly to improve the theological understanding of education.

Without this widespread understanding the college is shackled and restricted in its Christian witness and obedience. To many members it often does not seem natural for the Church, committed as it is to the promulgation of the Gospel, to accept and encourage liberal education. Yet this of course is precisely what the Church must do. The Church to be true to her calling must, in spite of risks, encourage without reservation sound and liberal learning, always remembering that her loyalty is to Christ, not to herself or other institutions.

2. As its members come to understand this they will give to the Christian college both the freedom it needs and the respect it deserves. From such an informed and concerned constituency will arise also the necessary financial support. It is the Church's responsibility to contribute financial support intelligently, consistently, and generously. Such support must be an integral part of the benevolence budget and involves other financial efforts on the part of the whole Church.

3. While, in an honest concern for the variety of individual plans and needs, the Church will find occasion to direct young people to public or private universities and colleges, yet as it counsels with young people about their vocational and educational plans, it will keep before them the special character of the Christian college and will direct to the college those students who will be most likely to contribute to and benefit from this kind of college experience.

4. The Church must lead parents as well as students to an understanding of the sort of educational experience the Christian college offers. Parents may expect students in such a college to be challenged to order their lives according to Christian ideas of service and usefulness both in the Church and in the world. No parent should send a son or daughter to a Christian college unaware that this challenge may be fully presented.

5. Out of its own life the Church will nurture leadership for the important offices of college trustee, administrator, and teacher and urge members to bring to these responsibilities a compelling sense of Christian vocation. Thus the Church, which is enriched in its intellectual life by the college, in turn seeks to provide educators committed both to the community of faith and to the community of learning.

6. Just as the Church speaks to society and to its membership on political, social, and economic issues, so it also speaks to the college, charging it to demonstrate that its practices in such matters as race relations, fraternity life, athletic policy, and financial policy are consistent with Christian standards. The Church has the right to expect that its understanding of the significance of these issues in the light of the Gospel is not misrepresented by a Church-related college.

7. Students, faculty, and administrators are called to *be* the Church in the context of academic life. Here the Church has a responsibility to nurture a community of faith within the college, to provide for worship on the level of the best in the Church's own tradition and liturgy, and to create opportunities for the expression of voluntary religious life in the academic community. Too often it has been assumed that campus Christian life finds its own expression simply because a college calls itself Christian. Even in those cases where a college takes seriously the responsibility to provide for worship and develop a community of faith, the Church needs to share in these concerns and to find ways to relate its life on the campus to its life outside the campus.

8. The fact that campus expressions of Christian faith will vary in form need not disturb the Church. There should be no attempt to dictate form or structure. Indeed the Church may well encourage the college to be most creative at this point, seeking new structures and new patterns in which the Church may express itself in academic life. The Christian college is often, by reason of the intimacy of its life and the varied character of its constituency, in a position, subject to any denominational loyalty by which it may be bound, to develop forms of ecumenical community.

THE RELATION OF CHURCH AND CAMPUS

And yet the patterns and structures which emerge must not be allowed to be isolated phenomena but rather should be a self-conscious part of the Church witnessing within the community of learning. The Church and the college will also encourage Christian associations and student fellowships in a conscious relationship to the student Christian movement in this country and the World's Student Christian Federation. With creative experimentation and responsible relationships this activity can be on the frontier of the life of the Church. The Church can assist the college in these concerns by thinking clearly concerning its understanding of its mission and by encouraging its members to creative participation in the body of Christ.

9. The Church should examine its own educational and congregational life to ascertain if it is adequately preparing its children and youth for the experiences of college life and to determine whether it is making effective use in Christian life and witness of those who have returned to it from the college or university campus.

10. A final major contribution that the Church can make to the college is to face squarely certain issues of its own life. Too often its concern with denominationalism and social conservatism blocks or hampers constructive contributions to its own colleges or to higher education in general.

IV. What the College Can Contribute to the Church

In a variety of ways the Church draws significantly from the life and work of its Christian colleges.

A first item of such contribution is found in the pursuit of the educational task itself. The pursuit of truth is ordained of God and is therefore incumbent upon all men. Acknowledging that the employment of reason which is one of man's highest endowments is the gift of God, the Christian college serves the Church in stimulating and channeling the exercise of this talent in dedicated stewardship. The Church needs educated men, and the colleges can provide rigorous academic study and inquiry into all branches of knowledge and all varieties of truth. Indeed it is important to remember here that in the Christian understanding all knowledge is knowledge of God's world and thus is related to him. There is no purely secular knowledge, and the college's achieving of its educational goals is therefore also a furtherance of the Church's ministry among men.

This educational contribution becomes still more specific and precise when one thinks also of the Christian college's special concern for transmitting through its academic disciplines the biblical, historical, theological, and ethical content of the Christian heritage itself. Whether this be done through separate departments of religion or through courses in other departments which reflect the hearing of the Christian faith upon these academic disciplines, the Christian college at this point makes more intelligible for Church members the essential content and relevance of the faith which they possess. And it is important that this be done in a collegiate

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

atmosphere, as well as within the normal educational programs of the Church itself. The context of academic earnestness, scholarly research, and precision of thinking which the college provides helps to make this process of "Christian education" thorough and perceptive. Here then is one of the important means by which careful and critical scholarship which illumines and interprets the faith can find its way into the life of the Church.

Secondly, the Christian college can serve the Church by providing college communities pervaded by a Christian ethos. In the college setting young people live several of the most significant years of their orientation to society and their world. These decisions are influenced by peer group attitudes, by personal relations with faculty and administration, and by the total setting of college life. The Christian college strives to create such a living community as will be conducive to the development of mature intellectual, spiritual, and moral commitment.

That these aims are valid ones is a basic assumption of Christian education. Because of the pervading secularism of our day, the college must be aware of the danger of giving lip-service to the idea of the "Christian college" without this idea being the motivating force in its corporate life. There will be an inevitable tendency for the ethos of the college to be no more than an extension of American democracy, of the accepted moral and spiritual norms of contemporary civilization. The Christian college may tend to think that because it has denominational connections or support or because it includes religious exercises or courses in its program it is therefore Christian. Therefore the Christian college must be alert to adventure in the formation of a distinctively redemptive ethos of faith and life in its own community. The college should make apparent the integral relationship which exists between a Christian doctrine of life, the foundations of American democracy, and the value structures of western culture and civilization.

A third way in which the college serves the Church is by establishing an atmosphere conducive to the development of creative churchmanship. Programs of the Christian colleges are consciously designed to foster an understanding of the nature of the Church itself, of the meaning of stewardship, and of the total responsibility of the individual as a member of the Body of Christ. The college further serves the Church by its very being as a community of scholarly persons committed to God as he is known in Jesus Christ. Such a community of committed Christians will serve the Church by leading in the continuing consideration of the deeply significant, ultimate questions of man's existence. In so doing the college may call the churches to confront more effectively the culture of our day. The campus Christian community, while recognizing the distinctive contribution of each denomination, will foster a unity in Christian witness which speaks with a clearer voice to the needs of the Church Universal. Thus the college serves the Church by encouraging an evaluation of the Church and of all things religious, even to the extent of providing the occasions for conversations between those who are not

THE RELATION OF CHURCH AND CAMPUS

actively identified with the Church and those who are members of the Christian community. The Church can learn much from its critics. Such conversations also help the churches face their responsibility to express the Christian faith in language which is relevant to our time and understandable to thoughtful men and women.

In the fourth place, the Christian college can, does, and should use its particular resources to provide certain special services to the churches: assistance in its religious education program for the training of lay leaders, young people, and children the life and work of the Church; its great reservoir of scholarly Christians who provide leadership in many aspects of the life of the Church, specifically in the ministry and related offices; professional services such as those of psychologists who assist the Church in understanding and performing its pastoral ministry, of sociologists who with research skills help the Church understand and serve its community, of social psychologists who interpret the Church's work with individuals and small groups, of political scientists and economists who help relate the Church meaningfully to its society and the world; in religion and the arts where colleges aid so greatly in developing critical appreciation of the fine arts and their service of the Church, for developing the qualitative judgment and skills of church members in using aesthetic expression in the service of God; vocational outlets for Christian scholars so that the Church may have the services of theologians and teachers in many fields serving its common life.

Finally, a Christian college should continuously examine its present structure and functions in relation to its Christian commitment. The following questions are suggested as relevant to such a process of self-examination:

To what extent are the policies formulated by the Board of Trustees, administration, faculty, and students influenced by and consistent with a Christian view of life?

Are the financial policies of the college in keeping with Christian principles?

Are admission policies consistent with the aims of a Christian college?

Are faculty selected with consideration for both their academic competence and their understanding of the Christian purposes of the college?

Is there freedom of expression in presenting varying viewpoints of the Christian enterprise?

Are faculty loads adjusted to permit Christian scholars freedom to continue creative activities and personal growth in their chosen fields?

Do faculty members accept responsibility for participation in student-faculty relationships which build a Christian community?

Are counsellors employed who are technically competent and who are committed to and able to communicate the Christian faith?

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

Is the academic concern for religion made integral to the entire curriculum or is it restricted to the department of religion?

Does the department of religion provide leadership in developing faculty understanding of the theological foundation of the Christian college?

Are religious practices consistent with religious teaching?

Does the Christian concern for the character of interpersonal relations between students, administration, and faculty have implications for the size of the college?

How do the aims of the college effectively influence the peer-group attitudes among students and motivate student life in both its organized and informal aspects?

Does the college provide trained leadership, facilities, and opportunities for Christian worship, fellowship, and personal enrichment? Should attendance be required?

Does the academic community contribute to participation in local churches? Is the present organization of student religious work (be it a denominational fellowship or college church) really effective in producing devoted and intelligent Christians and active churchmen?

Does the Christian college prepare students who continue graduate study in major universities for a relationship with a Christian fellowship in the graduate center?

Does the Christian college create an awareness of the concerns of students throughout the world with a sense of responsibility for constructive and co-operative action in areas of greatest need?

Does the college provide an atmosphere conducive to the discussion and appraisal of current social issues and provide encouragement for continued participation in the solution of contemporary problems following graduation?

The Responsible Intellectual Community

Section Three

The ostensible reason for this document is provided by the fact that colleges and universities are not always as intellectual as they propose to be, nor are they as responsible as their austere roles in our society seem to suggest. Sometimes they, like people, are non-intellectual and unresponsive. It is the purpose of this document to draw attention to the facets of responsibility that bear directly upon the role of colleges and universities and most particularly upon the role of the Christianly oriented college.

Because being responsible is a noble attainment and because being responsible is the achievement of that which is proper and fitting for the human scene, it is essential to note that responsibility is not actually a burden. Instead it is a joy, and it conditions the finest satisfactions open to human beings. Therefore this document proposes that an inquiry into the limits and nature of responsibility is the open season to a more fitting accomplishment and also to the freedoms and the joys which come from doing what we ought. Thus all of these things are applicable to those whose vocations are found within the Christian colleges; and it is hoped that what is said herein will straighten conviction and reflection so that the real responsibilities can be joined.

I. The Problems of Responsibility

By the word "responsible," this document will mean "answerable," "accountable for," and "liable for." It will be assumed that an intellectual community (and especially a college or that group of colleges which make up a university) owes something in return for its creation and sustenance and for the effort and time persons give it. In this respect then an intellectual community can be viewed with expectancy. It can be expected that such a community owes something and is therefore subject to criticism. If an intellectual community is responsible, it, like a responsible person, can be held answerable for certain kinds of activities and performances; if such a community is derelict, either in not knowing the limits of responsibility or failing to be responsible, then, again like persons, such a community can be legitimately criticized.

The pre-convocation study commission on this topic had the following members: Howard C. Kee, Chairman, Drew University; Edmond LaB. Cherbonnier, Trinity College; J. Harry Cotton, Wabash College; John W. Dixon, Jr., Dickinson College; E. H. Harbison, Princeton University; H. R. Holcomb, Colgate-Rochester Divinity School; Paul L. Holmer, University of Minnesota; Robert G. Mickey, Franklin and Marshall College; Harold K. Schilling, Pennsylvania State University; Lee O. Scott, Dension University.

The prepared document was considerably revised by the convocation study section: Paul L. Holmer, Chairman; John W. Dixon, Jr. and Robert G. Mickey, Associates. The revised version is published here.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

However it is important to recognize that a college or university cannot settle for any definition of responsibility which suggests that *responsibility* is only towards those agencies which have created and support it. Just as it is a slander upon the dignity of a person to make him responsible by multiplying the external controls, so too it is a malfeasance in the intellectual order to restrict the freedom to discover the limits and nature of responsibility by declaring them in advance. For this reason educational institutions demand and need freedom from immediate controls. It must be remembered that economic, cultural, and political pressures are always present. However men also sin boldly in the name of God. The intellectual communities always need to be protected against the intrusion of anything alien to patient inquiry and the probative value of evidence.

Furthermore there is always the danger that an educational institution shall be asked to be responsible for immediate ends and proximate goals. However zealous its sponsors, no intellectual community can be expected to produce directly good men or victories in war, citizens of heaven or the amelioration of social evil. Though education must surely be relevant to those who are to be educated, it cannot be directly productive of the goals men may or may not choose. An intellectual community must be content with the limited aim of being preparatory to the ideal *polis*, to the blessed community and even the kingdom of Heaven; and it can never be asked to be these things.

These factors are testimony to the need for the continual re-examination of what we are doing. In this sense we need a theory of education. It is part of the dignity of man that he not be so limited in doing his task that he be unable to see and contemplate what it is that he is doing. Surely this is the one function of a theory in any field. Perhaps we are now past the day when the colleges can content themselves with the melancholic reflection that they are so busy with pioneer tasks that no occasion for the theory is yet present. For without the spectator glance at ourselves, we are not able to criticize ourselves, to judge our needs and limits, or even to discover our responsibilities within the educational economy.

Also it may be appropriate to ask whether we have not been content with too little — or content perhaps with the wrong thing — which our colleges, and often those which claim to be most Christian, have produced? Where are their distinctive contributions to research? Have we misdefined the responsibilities of our smaller and Church-related colleges in order to have some contentment therein? Have these intellectual communities been responsible to the task of discovery, of definition, of creativity, all of which are intrinsic to minds in whom the sparks really fly? Maybe we need a long look again at the distinction between teaching and research, for there must be undeserved equanimity granted some professors who latch on to this distinction as if they are to be saved the toil of discovery and personal encounter with the unknown in virtue of the toil in communicating what is already known. However there is no substitute for the former. Essaying the limits of knowledge, whatever the field, is the only way to possess firmly what one honors. To be curious,

THE RESPONSIBLE INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY

to want to know more than one now does, to be tormented by ignorance — these are character traits of a good teacher. Research in such a sense is not beholden to extraordinary facilities and massive sums of money.

If we declare our worth to the world and ask its support, we ought also to be prepared to answer the charge of those who say those difficult things which insinuate that mediocrity characterizes the intellectual efforts of our Christian colleges.

II. The Locus of Responsibility

It is widely agreed that responsibility is a non-natural and acquired characteristic. Common speech is replete with acknowledgments of the fact that children are non-responsible because they are young. Only brutish and thoughtless people level the same liabilities at children as they do at the mature. Responsibilities are learned but inadvertently. There is no direct process by which men can be brought into the first-person singular sense of responsibility. Indeed the very meaning of morality and the quality described by the word "character" are intimately connected with "being responsible."

Responsibility does not attach to people in virtue of being described. It does not come about, either, in virtue of evidence or any kind of sophisticated deduction from doctrines, religious or otherwise. The sense of responsibility (for it is the "sense" or obligation of which we here speak) emerges in the life-history of a person. It is an emergent and an acquisition, not a native endowment. Furthermore it is exceedingly important to know that there is severe competition for souls going on in this world. In terms appropriate to the present discussion, one might say that there are conflicting claims and obligations demanding the attention and devotion of men. There are even endeavors to make all responsibilities of the individual simple responses to the engines of a society. However, just as Protestantism protests the right of an individual conscience even against that institution, the Church — which ostensibly represents God's interests — so too does learning and self-consciousness cause men to see that responsibility is not extrinsic. Responsibility is not produced by fiat and command but rather is intimate and emergent in the life-history of personality.

The insistence here upon the intrinsic and emergent character of the sense of obligation does not mean a denial of the fact that persons learn something from being subjected to norms and requirements laid upon them by others. But whatever the efficacy of one person's authority over another, it is still the case that becoming responsible means developing a sense of obligation for oneself. Being responsible requires furthermore that imposed duties be judged before their obligatoriness be granted. This is not to deny that pedagogy in these matters is impossible; but it is to deny that being responsible is a simple consequence of that pedagogy.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

Responsibility is intrinsic to the intellectual life

There is a sense of responsibility which emerges in becoming self-consciously knowledgeable. The criteria of thought — namely truth, validity, coherence, system, meaningfulness — are all interior to thought itself. Another way to say this is to note that by *thinking* we establish the fundamental criteria of our thinking. Even the control that the factual order has over thought is a consequence of the intellect's recognition of the significance of evidence. But the consequences are something new — the disclosure of standards for reflection and the obligation to uphold them. However responsibility here is not guarded by external punishments or sanctions. In fact, a little lying, a little nonsense, a bit of illogicality and self-contradiction — these and other infractions of intellectual rules are highly acceptable in the everyday world and are often assumed to be the mark of being an average person. This is all the more reason for making the college or university an exceptional environment where rewards are dispensed, if at all, only for the rare integrity open to a knowing person.

A little intelligence is perhaps enough to cause us to see that "what is" is not always or even frequently "what it seems to be." The history of learning again is clearly on the side of asking persons to forsake the obvious and the cursory in favor of what is really so. The obligation to "what is" therefore sometimes separates a knowledgeable person from the group mind. To be dismayed by this fact is to be dismayed by the very methods by which our world can be known. Not only this though, for another obligation inherent to intelligence is to consider one's self and one's views corrigible. For it is a discovery, now safeguarded by the word "objectivity," that the knowledge of what-is-the-case about almost anything you please can only be achieved if the knowing-subject practices some discipline and refuses to let his proclivities obtrude. To be objective, to have a kind of impersonal temper of detachment, artificial as it is, is already a correction of the native state of wishful musing and gentle opining.

Corrigibility goes even further. If Christians believe God alone is eternal, everything else, even our own truths, might be temporal. But if such a reflection seems too abstract, we only need remember again the very structure of our intellectual life. All of our conclusions are from partial evidence; every hypothesis is only tentative and probable; objective uncertainty is large and recourse to it tempers our air of certitude. The willingness to be corrected and the willingness to criticize and to correct — both are essential of course — are not artificial and transitory poses; they are instead the tokens of obligation and responsibility intrinsic to the exercise of intelligence.

An enthusiasm for the life of intelligence does not have to be created by any aristocratic society nor even by one which believes that learning might enhance military and political prowess. Indeed it might even be dangerous to the intellectuals to have their dignity assured from the outside. For there is after all another conviction, one that is native to the process of replacing error with truth, ignorance

THE RESPONSIBLE INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY

with awareness: namely that dignity is inherent to the possession of knowledge. Our responsibilities even in large communities are not realized until we recognize this kind of dignity and honor those abilities in ourselves and others by which such dignity is achieved.

Responsibility is intrinsic to social existence

Social existence is hedged from the beginning with a net of commands and imposed modes of behavior. Still it must be insisted that becoming responsible is not simply a matter of obeying; rather it is incumbent upon every individual to choose those commands he will obey, to cause again the emergence of those obligations in his own life which will define his relations to all others.

As free as the intellectual community must be from standards imposed from without, still it is true that members of a intellectual community must be responsible, liable, and patterned respecting their behavior toward other men. There is no immunity from social responsibility, though there are limits of applicability of the rules by which social responsibilities are stated. Direct connections between intellectual pursuits and social obligations are difficult to isolate. Knowledge has a kind of neutrality which makes it available to everyone. The wasters and the savers use the same arithmetic, and the defenders and attackers use the same geography. In virtue of this same characteristic of knowledge we must admit therefore that knowledge does not create a social obligation or even directly persuade the knower. Again it must be insisted that obligations between people grow out of intricate interpersonal relations and are not finally brought to them from the outside, not even from science and scholarship.

However there are numerous connections between the intellectual life and responsible social existence. For one thing knowledge cuts through society's artificial devices to sharpen awareness of the enormity of evil. Surely many persons are secure in their trivial mode of existence simply because they are oblivious of the monstrous extent of deprivation, of suffering, of hunger, of ignorance, of pain among one's fellows. Our need here is for more objectivity, more facts, more detail, so that the state of affairs can be made clear. True, we cannot create an obligation by the facts, but certainly partiality and diffidence do not create obligation either. What responsible men of knowledge must never forget is the fact that knowledge does (for some people, sometimes) what personal encounter does (for some people, and only sometimes) — namely it serves as the point of departure into a sense of liability for other men's lives.

Despite the timidities of the learned, knowledge has become a real power in the world. The intellect has been praised in the past for being the instrument of contemplation, for giving rather exquisite pleasures, for being a means of exposition and understanding, for extending by discovery the curiosity of the human animal; but now it is clear that the intellect is the very means by which our complex

societies achieve their ends. The subsidy of education by social bodies is fraught with all kinds of potentialities. A primary responsibility of the learned is to examine *always* the relations between knowledge and the ends proposed. Social obligations are also corrigible. The claims laid upon us by the government, by tradition, and by law always seem too encompassing to be either examined or resisted. But a little thought shows us that social obligations, even if they are concealed in terms of sanctions offering life or death, are ultimately a product of interpersonal relations. Every man is both an agent and the doer of the law.

The responsible intellectual community can refuse neither the obligation to examine the roots of our social responsibilities nor the obligation to treat other men responsibly. To do one without the other is a mistake. For if we do the latter only, we make knowledge only a tool for obligations we take for granted; if we do the former only, we make our inquiry for the sake only of others, thereby forgetting that we too are social beings.

Responsibility is intrinsic to commitment to God in Christ

Part of the Protestant teaching which is indeed difficult to take seriously is the notion that the relation between God and man is actually reflected in an individual's conscience. In effect this means again that the responsibilities that are the Christian's are not given him chiefly by the Church but rather that the primary Christian responsibilities are derived from the individual's commitment to God in Christ. For again it is appropriate to insist that responsibilities are not external and are not imposed, even by an institution which might claim to be divine. The responsibilities of a Christian indeed grow up within the Church as a community of believers. But they well up and become secure because of prayer and worship, repentance and faith, and any other way in which a person addresses himself to God in Jesus Christ. They are not created directly by theological claims about Jesus as much as they are in the worshipful life of a believer.

As the Gospel teaches, so too the life of Christian concern shows increasingly that believing in Jesus Christ means being obliged by Jesus Christ. This becomes, as devotion increases, the primary obligation. Indeed as the love for God increases, the obligation towards the neighbor becomes firm too. For the obligation towards and love for God orders all of one's obligations. The result is that the mad chaos of competing liabilities is tempered by this commanding responsibility to Christ and one's neighbor.

There is nothing anti-intellectual about this at all. Just as obligation towards others is turned to affection and love with the help of grace, so too do the obligations to think straight and truthfully get deepened by the awareness that God loves the feeble reed that a thinking man is in actuality. Responsibility to God, once accepted, gives us a new weight, a weight of glory. Everything corrective of man, including thought itself, can be understood as bearing the healing of grace.

THE RESPONSIBLE INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY

To save the intellect from error is perhaps a slight salvation, but to be able to do it with powers that are implicit adds a touch of irony that Christian faith does not disparage. Grace and truth are compatible. The obligation to make them complementary arises in Christians as an impetus by which creation, or at least a part of it, is made whole.

This is to assert too that Christianity is not sentiment alone. But neither is Christianity a matter of impersonal obeisance. Instead it must be stressed that the obligation to Jesus of Nazareth, which is a consequence of the choice to follow him, also seems like the greatest of gifts. And the entire panoply of emotions to which hymnody and scripture gives testimony is a clue to the rich motivational side of this matter. What begins as a command allows the peace that passes understanding, and what seems like a restrictive duty of following Jesus Christ becomes eternal life.

III. The Dynamics of Responsibility

In the actual course of our lives, the forms of responsibility, while distinguishable, continually affect and qualify one another. Since being obliged to Christ is an option and neither a natural endowment nor an acquired virtue, two familiar questions come to every Christian. The first question is one which expresses the standard distrust of our academic communities: can a man be totally committed to Christ and at the same time be free to accept whatever truths reason and experience may bring? Does not Christian commitment in fact perform major surgery upon the very criteria of intellectual responsibility and moral integrity, shaping them into amiable masks which smile a "yes" to faith's conclusions? When one's heart's desire dictates the conclusions in advance, isn't all talk of "free inquiry" an unconscious lie agreed upon? The second question is: Isn't this obligation to Jesus superfluous, failing to add anything to the intellectual and visual virtues? Isn't it easily dispensable or at best a stimulating bit of garnishing for those who like that sort of thing? To both questions, the committed man's response is a "no," and the only way he has of making his response intelligible is to point to the nature of his commitment and to the character of the truth which he claims.

Christian commitment relates to freedom of inquiry

Christian commitment rests upon a confessional basis. Every Christian confesses that he has received truth which he neither discovered nor deserved and which he could not have come upon in virtue of a clear intellect or a heroic moral life. The truth of Christ thus attested to is redemptive, something never correctly claimed by either moral or intellectual truths.

Paul's triumphant words about nothing separating us from the love of God in Christ are preceded by the joyful announcement that the ancient longing of creation is being answered and the world is being set free from bondage to decay, sin, and death. All men are summoned to come to their true estate, to be sons and

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

heirs of God, and to receive the liberty of the children of God. They are to rejoice in it and live in the strength and power of it. In effect, since salvation rests in God and not in any conjunction of true propositions, one freedom of the Christian man is that of accepting *any* conjunction of well-tested propositions as truths relative to the evidence on which *they* rest.

The nature of the God believed in requires an openness toward the order of fact. When we look closely at the biblical affirmations about the ways of God toward the world, we find that what is affirmed there requires an openness on our part toward the whatever facts men can discover and muster. For example to affirm that God is Creator is to acknowledge that his act in creation was a free act which grants the world a relative independence. This alone makes it forever impossible for either theology or faith to short-cut the tasks to which the moral and intellectual disciplines are devoted. No amount of knowledge about our world allows us to chart the mind of the Creator, and there are no theological maps of the mind of God from which we can deduce particular facts about our world. The fruits of faith do not include metamorphosis into angels, and as men we seek truths under the conditions of our natural existence.

Moreover the Bible speaks of the Creator as a hidden God, the Holy One whose nature has depths never exhaustively displayed even to those who serve him with a whole heart. All precise interpretations of his will are in principle open to question. Remembering the perennial temptation of the Church to confuse God's will with local churchly goals, Christian commitment obliges us to give a serious hearing to the embarrassing thrusts of those who stand outside the Church.

Again the mode of revelation is that of reconciling love, which is never coercive and always runs a double risk, namely that it will be either found incredible and rejected or accepted and misunderstood. No Christian has the right to reduce either risk one whit, especially not by transposing revelation into acceptance of a set of propositions to which one must cling to the face of everything that counts against them.

The first critical question mentioned above asked whether a committed Christian could engage in free inquiry, and the hearing of everything said about faith points to this: the freedom of the Christian man is that of one who can be open toward all the facts, because he knows to whom he belongs. This is an echo of the apostle's theme of "all things are yours" — so long as you first confess what you are and to whom you belong. Confessing the truth of God's grace in Christ does not turn us into arrogant masters of the truth of God's purpose toward his whole creation, and we are to listen to our neighbor outside the Church and learn from him as well as serve him. Being committed means being called think with the mind of Christ, and then the possibilities are as wide as the grace and love of God as revealed in the Scriptures.

THE RESPONSIBLE INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY

Christian commitment qualifies intellectual and moral responsibilities

But our second critical question was, does all of this really make any difference? Is there anything in all this business about faith in God which indispensably qualifies what a responsible non-believer might find in the intellectual and moral orders?

One thing, which should accompany a Christian's knowing to whom he is committed, and his consequent freedom toward all orders of existence is his liberty to call the bluff of our normal pride and pretensions in the intellectual and moral life. Protestantism at its best always has a shrewd eye for idolatry, that is, the giving of one's final allegiance to anything less than God, and this is no merely negative principle. When a man no longer finds it necessary to furnish his own salvation through either knowledge or the moral life, he can sit lightly on the facts. "Love God and do as you please" has its obvious dangers, but it indicates a sane lightheartedness toward all pretentious moralizing about ethical absolutes from which men can allegedly deduce the good life. Its correlative might be a nonchalant yet serious "love God and follow the facts," indicating that one who has entrusted himself to God no longer has everything at stake in any given conceptual system. When we have to cling to a given moral or intellectual position, because to lose it is to lose oneself, we are no longer free to follow the moral and intellectual criteria wherever they lead. If we do not require moral and intellectual criteria to serve as substitutes for God, we are free to play by the rules, giving any hypothesis its due consideration, assessing it as justly as we can.

Clearly the freedom in point here is freedom from ourselves. Only in so far as we are free from bondage to ourselves, from the faces we see as we toss fitfully in dreams, are we free for truth. The Christian faith holds that this kind of freedom comes only from a forgiveness which allows us to acknowledge the unimportance of our own self-assessment high or low, in the light of God's grace toward us.

The intellectual and moral virtues are qualified when lived within a community of hope wherein the image of man is that he is called to be son of God and co-worker. Accepting the Christian's defining framework of what is possible for men gives a structure of action and thought without dictating details of action or particular conclusions of fact.

Our language about "responsibility" tends to obscure the fact that the Apostle Paul found something joyful in the freedom of the new man. Luther's "Be Christ to your neighbor" was not said as a sombre injunction to do our Christian duty but as a glad expression of gratitude and pleasure found in a gift from God. It qualifies all moral principles — for example the rule that every man shall count as one and no man as more than one. Similarly the intellectual life is a gift to be received gratefully and exercised in the pleasure of its own fruits.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

Ways of relating Christian commitment to intellectual responsibility in Christian colleges

One general view of the relation between faith and intellectual responsibility has been outlined in this paper, but as a matter of historical fact Christian colleges have construed this relationship in many and sometimes opposite ways. A few of these ways, stated in extreme fashion, may serve to illustrate the ways in which the Church has understood its two-fold responsibility. The sketches also suggest that there are very practical implications for the life of a college in the way it understands its role at this point. No actual college is described, only a few types, but it might prove profitable for discussion to see whether one's own college approximates to any of the types.

a) One familiar mode of meeting our problem is found in colleges which take the Bible as normative for faith, practice, and all forms of knowledge. Religious knowledge is comprised of descriptive statements, and theology is a science of the higher truths revealed by God to faith and capable of corroboration by unprejudiced scholars in the academic disciplines. The Bible leads the way to all truths, in physics, biology, cosmology, as elsewhere. Archeology supports the Bible, and fossil remains simply indicate that a previous world came into being and was destroyed between the events mentioned in the first two verses of Genesis 1. The Resurrection is proved to be an historical fact by the strictest use of historical evidence. Miracles show that God uses natural laws as yet unknown, and the latest discoveries in embryology are evidences that the Virgin birth exemplifies a higher biology. The principle here is that secular knowledge, being man-made, can confirm but never refute the God-given truths of Scripture.

No attempt will be made to weigh the truth of this view or of any of those which follow. One practical implication for the life of the college is obvious and should be noted. Conversation and intellectual give-and-take with non-Christian scholars is rendered difficult by the fact that they are bound to be regarded as either confused, prejudiced, or flatly incompetent in their own fields. Moreover it would be foolish to invite such men to join the faculty, and non-Christian scholars are in fact conspicuously absent from the faculties of colleges of this type.

b) A second type of Christian college is one which does not take the Bible as a source book of infallible truths in all areas and does not regard theology as a science of higher truths. Rather the Bible is *the* record of man's encounter with God, and personal religious experience is the ground of religious truth. The Christian faith is a well confirmed hypothesis about reality, but it is not to be judged by criteria extrinsic to faith. The personal life of the Christian is the one area relevant to the truth of the faith. Traditional doctrines about the birth of Christ, Atonement, and Resurrection are true in our experience of Christ, but all interpretations of them as events in the world are fallible and subject to change. The sciences, history, and philosophy are treated as welcome autonomous disciplines

THE RESPONSIBLE INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY

which can neither corroborate nor undermine the faith. The one area open to common argument is whether any other world view can do as much justice to the facts of personal life, including the sin and tragedy and apparent meaningless in history, as does Christianity.

In this college non-Christians can hold honored places on the faculty, and there are areas of conversation with their Christian colleagues. There is no way for the faith to be touched at its heart by any deliverances from the secular disciplines, and an amiable division of truth is agreed upon. The chapel and private devotions are the spiritual laboratories where Christian truth is gained and confirmed, just as other orders of fact are mastered in other laboratories across the way.

c) A further split between faith and knowledge is typified in a third mode of relating commitment to intellectual criteria. Faith is a fundamental decision to obedience in Christ and is our existential witness to the scandal of the crucified and risen one, he who is forever an absurdity to the intellect and an offense to human moral rules. Faith is not a matter of cognitive assent to true propositions because faith is not primarily cognitive and is not a matter of assent to propositions at all. Theologies, no more than philosophies, offer us cognitive value; they are ethical and religious in that they, when chosen, provide a way of taking one's basic stance toward the world. All theology goes beyond the evidence, and nothing of religious importance about our lives is deducible from any theology. There are corrigible statements about Jesus of Nazareth, relative to the historical evidence available, but when I accept Jesus Christ as Lord and Savior I am not weighing evidence at all: I am accepting him as defining the possibilities of my life.

The principle here is to make the intellectual criteria as neutral and as religiously non-significant as possible and to insist that revelation and probably knowledge move in different planes. With no strain, one can be a radical New Testament critic and at the same time a theologian who affirms that the creeds of the Church Fathers best express his relationship to and understanding of Christ.

In a college where this view is dominant, there is wide open freedom to all disciplines to search out any and all truths relevant to themselves. Let biology be biology, and let faith be faith, and let no man confuse them even in their outreaches. The only basis for conversation here is to try to understand each area of the academic community on its own terms, correcting the incipient imperialism of each.

d) A fourth type of Christian college moves back toward the first but with a difference. Here no split of faith and knowledge into different planes is recognized. Every Christian affirmation about God and Jesus Christ and the biblical revelation is a true or false proposition, open to confirmation or refutation by the same canons of evidence appropriate to other disciplines. Every Christian doctrine is an

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

hypothesis with concrete implications testable by the facts of history or mental life or ethics or cosmology or whatever is relevant. No Christian in a college has the right to refuse to play by the rules of the intellectual game and even less the right to supply his own rules. A man can be passionately in a ball game but retire if he strikes out. The Christian must admit that it is at least possible for him to strike out or he has no right to enter the game.

In this view, no holds are barred in conversation and debate or in the interchange between Christian and non-Christian with the price being paid of making faith a matter of probability.

e) A fifth possibility suggests neither the subservience of faith to reason nor reason to faith as contained in (a) and (d) nor the varying degrees of discontinuity and amiability of communication in (b) and (c). It suggests rather a more active and creative relation between the faith and the work of the intellect, each being nourished by insights engendered from the other. Faith (via the propositions implicated in it) can be relevant to the intellectual disciplines taught in the curriculum. This type also envisages the Christian faith as a live option in the student's search for meaning and wholeness. The obligation to this search should be impressed upon the student, through honestly presenting to him the major alternatives operative in history and pressing him toward some commitment functional to his own thought. Such a college centers on a powerfully informed, vigorously disciplined and committed faculty, consciously operating as a community of the Church, "bought with a price." Such a dedicated group, having its life in the antiphony of work and worship, could expose the student to a responsible Christian intellectual community of a unique kind. This type defines not *the* Christian college but a special type of institution performing an indispensable function in the life of the Church. And, it must be added, this kind of college does not seem to exist as yet. But there is a point at least to its projection as a pattern for action and realization as an instance of a responsible Christian community.

It is undeniable that several kinds of Christian do in fact exist. It is a moot question however whether all of them, including that last one above which is only a projected possibility, are equally consistent with the notions of responsibility previously adduced. In actual practices no colleges is perhaps a pure type. Most colleges have several types represented. But it is pertinent to ask at least whether more exacting considerations of our responsibilities might not both circumscribe our varieties somewhat and discipline our plural modes of accomplishing our goals. This is a matter for detailed consideration on the part of those who are occupied with the concrete matters of college life.

IV. Some Manifestations of the Practice of Responsibility

Four points can be made here by which a community can be both intellectual and responsible.

THE RESPONSIBLE INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY

Research can and must be done. There is nothing irreligious or un-Christian about new truth. There are two kinds of ignorance. One is the kind of ignorance native to a person, where the removal of ignorance is contingent upon acquiring the already available knowledge. Pedagogy is primarily the business of directing human efforts so that knowledge replaces ignorance. But there is another kind of ignorance, that of the entire race, where no one knows and where ignorance is generic and not specific. Here pedagogy is not useful, for the gap is between knowledge and ignorance. The world becomes amenable to man's existence when it is known. Surely a manifestation of intellectual responsibility is to take seriously the absolute ignorance of the race as well as the relative ignorance of individuals.

Christian colleges also have the responsibility for etching out, ever anew, the features of the Christian view and way of life. And this for two reasons: first, confusion continually arises on these matters, and the majority of men do not know what Christianity is unless its nature is described for them. If no one else does this, the responsible Christian community must. Christianity is a way to be. A person can think this "option" without "being" it; therefore it is important that someone "think" it and especially as it polemically relates to alternative ways of being a person. But second, it is also the case where Christian colleges ought to be the places in which sophistication is practiced on behalf of the Christian life. Among other things, bodies of doctrine and Christian theology itself are attempts to show the Christo-morphic difference that Jesus has made. Against attempts to construe everything anthro-morphically or mechanico-morphically, by analogy with men and machines, Christians try to construe everything in relation to Jesus Christ. Providing one does this with modesty and care, this task instructs anyone concerning both the meanings of faith and the powers of the human mind.

Perhaps this is the sense in which it ought to be claimed that the Christian colleges are responsible for the intellectual life of the Church. "The Mind of Christ" need not be an idle phrase. Amid the complexities and oft-times irreconcilable points of view, the welter of pretended truths, the busy *ad hoc* decision-making there is plenty of cause for seeking a calm and detached analysis. Our colleges again must resist the temptation to be like all the other institutions in society. They are places for criticism, reflection, detailed judgment, cohering of views, and even the justification and/or invalidation of what men think. It is in this sense then that the Church of Jesus Christ needs the intellectual community. Catholicism has long recognized that not everyone can do everything. Perhaps it is time for Protestantism also to make room for the differences in function and task. The Christian college, though not a cloister and not a seminary, surely does not lack opportunity.

Not every Christian is able to address himself to the fundamental tensions that criss-cross our social and individual existence. It would seem that the Christian college ought to be the place where all of the opponents find their best expres-

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

sion. This means that a certain tolerance and openness of discussion must obtain. Christianity is defined against worldliness. Therefore every Christian community of scholars, faculty, and students has to be schooled to the awareness that men, including Christians, are subject to sin and error. The corporate life of Christians is supposed to be characterized by forgiveness and love. One would like to hope that a college community might seek such a state of affairs if indeed they can't actually find it! But if non-religious universities have found that truth-seeking is augmented by differences, perhaps Christian colleges can also admit that the encounter with other points of view is not only the occasion for love but more than this — it is the mode in which truth becomes evident.

The Responsibility of the Christian College for the Student's Sense of Vocation

Section Four

I. Prevailing Cultural Values among College Students

While we have no exactly comparable data for earlier college generations, we have been made increasingly sensitive in recent years to the power of a living culture to register the dominant values by which it lives upon the minds of all who live within it. This truth is impressively underscored in the provocative study by Philip E. Jacob, *Changing Values in College*. "American college students today tend to think alike, feel alike, and believe alike," concludes Dr. Jacob. He says that the "great majority seem turned out of a common mold, so far as outlook on life and standards of conduct are concerned." The students are not made this way in college. This is the way they *come* to college, and for the most part this is the way they leave college. This striking homogeneity of basic values is all the more remarkable, "considering the variety of their social, economic, ethnic, racial, and religious backgrounds, and the relatively unrestricted opportunities they have for freedom of thought and personal development."

Clearly then we see in the students' attitudes a mirror at a particular point of our larger American life. In this broader background the rapidly changing face of our American society is to be discerned. The changing values are in part at least the offspring of new technological and cultural forces.

The surging tempo of contemporary American life is characterized by the technological breakthrough of automation (the "second Industrial Revolution"); by a multiplicity of massive organizations which synthesize the work of men and machines (what Kenneth Boulding calls "the jungle of hugeness"); by a dazzling network of mass communications media; by an economy of abundance and leisure, oriented towards the consumption of goods rather than their production; by the increasing role of advertising in image creation and manipulation, not only in business but also in politics and the growing exploitation of depth psychology in

The pre-convocation study commission on this topic had the following members: Howard R. Bowen, Chairman, Grinnell College; Jerald C. Brauer, Federated Theological Faculty, University of Chicago; Elmer F. Cope, United Steel Workers; R. H. Edwin Espy, National Council of Churches; Roy W. Fairchild, Presbyterian Church, U.S.A.; Leland Gordon, Denison University; Cameron P. Hall, National Council of Churches; Hartland H. Helmich, United Church of Christ; David E. Henley, Earlham College; Philip E. Jacob, University of Pennsylvania; William H. Kirkland, McCormick Seminary; Robert Michaelson, University of Iowa; Albert T. Rasmussen, Pacific School of Religion.

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THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

this advertising; by a mushrooming of peer-groups; by a population explosion and a rapidly increasing mobility on the part of our people.

With such dramatic changes in the material bases and contours of our society, not to mention the crisis-compounded international scene, we should not be surprised to see marked changes also in the primary values which are being repeatedly featured today in our popular culture. The new stress upon the values of harmony, unity, and tolerance tends to subordinate the values of integrity, diversity, and controversy. Individuality (in the authentic sense) is subtly suppressed. The scaling down of ambition and the diminishing sense of meaning that is found in one's work — these are the attitudes that are more frequently reflected today.

These new values and characteristics, seen against the background of the "organizational revolution" and observable in what has been provocatively called "the organization man," are at many points evident and in some instances strikingly silhouetted in Jacob's profile of college students. Dr. Jacob estimates that this profile holds true for about 75 to 80 per cent of today's students, and he believes that it is as true, by and large, for students in Church-related colleges as it is for students in other types of schools. However it is necessary constantly to remind ourselves that when we speak of any generation of college students we are talking about individual, unique, ultimately unanalyzable persons.

Some of the spokesmen of the college generation themselves agree that college students and the younger generation in general are more conforming, less internationally or politically minded, and on the surface passive and indifferent. Their outward conformity is the means by which they come to terms with a world that is shot through with moral absurdities and hopeless incongruities. Despairing of any organized social protest these youth of today conform in order to keep society at arms length. By their passive and indifferent attitude, they are able to preserve a small area of freedom in which they may pursue their own personal search for meaning in their own way.

From all these considerations however it is obvious that whatever critique the Christian faith and ethic bring to bear upon the values of today's students would apply with equal force to the values of our American culture and to all the institutions reflecting these values — including the college and the Church. Therefore in our concern for the student's sense of Christian vocation we cannot ignore or underestimate the pervasive power of this larger culture nor the extent to which its values have penetrated into the inner life of the college and of the Church. The student culture is a mirror of the national culture, a mirror which may be modified in varying degrees by its exposure to the aims and purposes of liberal arts education as interpreted by the different Church-related colleges.

Yet the student culture on each campus offers a most strategic target for efforts at transformation of student attitudes and values and indirectly of the values of society as well. If the educational program of the Christian college is to deal

THE STUDENT'S SENSE OF VOCATION

with the student's sense of vocation and values, a thorough study of the local campus culture, with an eye to discovering what it communicates and transmits from one student generation to the next, may be the first important step in moving towards an upward revision of student values and commitments. This is not to minimize the possible need for drastic curriculum or policy revisions, but it is to suggest a pliable locus of action to consider when any changes are indicated.

II. The Christian Doctrine of Vocation

The Christian doctrine of Vocation is one of the key doctrines of Christian Ethics, for it ties together the theological and the ethical. It is an effort to describe how God and man interact, how man responds in his daily living to the call of God.

Definition

It is our conviction that God calls man to response, that there is a call and a calling, that stimulus and response are part of the very make-up of the universe. The spirit of God confronts individual men and women as well as communities. God moves supremely in Jesus Christ. In and through him the summons is issued. And this call entails a response which is both individual and collective.

Vocation in the broadest sense refers to the totality of one's response to God in daily living. This includes work but historically has not been confined to work alone. Vocation means exposing all of life, including work, to the clear bright light of God's revelation in Jesus Christ.

Individual and Collective Nature of Vocation

In the Bible vocation is understood both as individual and collective, but always the individual response is related to the life of the group. The servant of God lives and grows among the people of God; the person develops within the community.

The calling is particularized or made individual, especially in the writings of Paul, in two ways:

- 1) Within the community or *the people of God* there are apostles, prophets, teachers, workers of miracles, healers, helpers, administrators, speakers in various kinds of tongues (I Cor. 12:28). Paul used the figure of the body with many members. From the very beginning within the community of Christians, men were assigned special tasks.
- 2) In terms of one's state, for example married or not, slave or free, circumcised or not, and one's work or occupation. One's state becomes a means of response to God, a way of answering the summons of Jesus Christ. It becomes an assignment from God. This designation of one's state as an assignment and a calling is especially evident in I Cor. 7:17-20 and 24.

A Protestant Position

Protestants especially have stressed that vocation refers to all of life and not only to the calling to a special task within the Church and that it refers also to all people in response to God, not just to the especially set-aside — the "religious." Protestantism has been critical of Roman Catholicism for falling too easily into a dual standard situation where the standards of counsels of perfection are applied to one group (the "religious") and a second best standard to the other (the layman). Protestantism stresses that all alike live under the responsibility and the opportunity to respond to God no matter what one's particular status or calling may be.

Protestantism, in theory at least, also has been very reluctant to establish or to accept any hierarchy of callings. Practically Protestants do tend to regard some occupations as being better or cleaner or closer to the Kingdom of God or more Christian than others. However Paul's position implies that no condition that is not obviously immoral or degrading is excluded from God's call, from his assignment. ("Let every one lead the life which the Lord has assigned to him, and in which God has called him." I Cor. 7:17) Paul also was frequently critical of those who were puffed up with feelings of superiority because of their unusual or exalted gifted or conditions. Furthermore Jesus did not hesitate to call men in many different types of occupations and walks of life and he made it quite clear that no one was to feel better than others in his relationship to God.

Context of Vocation

The Christian doctrine of Vocation, as a defining motif of Protestantism and as a basic guide to Christian living, has special relevancy in clarifying the purposes of higher education in the Christian perspective. Christian vocation lifts occupation out of the sheer means of earning a livelihood, out of the limited routines of job specialization, and ordains it with response to the call in Christ to serve God and neighbor. It lays the high call of ministry on the layman as well as the clergy. The world of discussion, of negotiations, of responding to the claims and frustrations of others in the context of daily interaction becomes the field of Christian responsibility in which the expression of witness and devotion takes place.

The notion of alternation should not lead us to believe that men are necessarily serving God more fully when engaged in worship or study than when engaged in work. God works in the field of flowing events and lays upon men what they ought to do as they confront actual alternatives and see by grace the opening possibilities and as they sense the dynamic claims of love and justice.

The point of decision becomes the point of response to God. True worship is not escape but concrete encounter and personal response in that encounter. Faithfulness to God is expressed in sensing and acting upon the hidden and difficult

THE STUDENT'S SENSE OF VOCATION

possibilities that open through the existing limitations, in active concern for the good of others in all their relationships and in the inter-relations as God's children.

Religious life is therefore neither separated nor immune from social processes but reflects them, operates within them, and must respond to them. The Church's contact with and involvement in society is both the basis of its accommodative vulnerability in which it is always being tamed and assimilated and also the channel through which it exerts its influence and struggles to respond to its Lord. Christian action must enter into the processes of decision in which policies are formed as the basic Christian witness in response to God. Christian life consists in *acts, responses, or decisions* borne out of faith consistent with beliefs and intellectual affirmations.

Every decision is made in a contextual situation of organized human relations and pressures. The way that the Christian ought to act is determined not by an abstract principle imposed unyieldingly upon others in a context but by standing in the context and attempting to understand the alternatives and make the choice in response to God. The really formative policy decisions however are not individual but are made in organizations through the negotiation of many interests and ethical points of view, they are cooperative or adjustive (sometimes called compromise) decisions.

If Christians are going to participate in social guidance, they must enter the processes of decision not as solitary men but as members of the Christian community with the support of common loyalty in Christ and a corporate responsibility. This view then holds that entering the struggle for righteousness and justice demands two things: a comprehensive understanding of the social context in which negotiated decisions are to be made and the manner in which they are formulated, and an understanding of how the Christian faith and ethic can infuse and guide such decisions.

III. *The Contemporary College and the Christian Perspective*

The liberal arts college has made the traditional claim that it is something more than an occupational training school preparing young men and women for technical job specializations. The higher claim usually takes the form of declaration that a liberal education requires an eager search for values and life-centering meanings and purposes. Often this goal is stated as the active pursuit and dissemination of truth in a community which provides a free and untrammelled exchange of ideas in which no area of exploration nor source of insight is forbidden ground. Ideas, principles, and presuppositions are to be subjected to scrutiny and are to be challenged and defended from all possible perspectives and are to be accepted or rejected on merit. Truth should struggle with error, and error should elicit research, reformulation, and deeper understanding of truth.

In regard to self criticism and the awareness of prejudice and arrogance, the Christian perspective drives deeper than the postulate of liberal humanism and

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

sees man entrapped in his own limited career, his own finiteness, and the class values and cultural ethos of his times. Goals of self-integration and maturity or social accommodation and conformity which become blockages for the highest search for truth and provide grounds for easy capitulation are viewed in their basic inadequacy for the creative and critical life. Continuous response to God in the areas of decision and sensitive acceptance of the claims of the neighbor, both near and far and in the community of neighbors, constitutes the path of inquiry for the Christian.

The Christian faith, with its consistent refusal to attribute unmixed truth or unquestioned absoluteness to any of the theories, perspectives, or values of the flux of human change, can be at the same time more radically skeptical of all finite truth claims and more devoted to the search for the ultimate truth relation. Therefore the Christian perspective holds a derivative view of truth, as existing only in God and as never fully known to men. It recognizes the fact that there is no undistorting glassy eye from which human beings can view hard facts as infallible truths. It insists that the inner perspective or frame of reference or value system held by any man is a determining ingredient in what he sees and how he interprets it. It holds further that man has a deep pervading capacity to distort relations, to deny and falsify the claims of others, and to stack evidence in his own favor or that of his own group.

The notion of rational objectivity in regard to values and purposes can be one of man's most arrogant illusions. Perspective enters into the description and meaning of the whole world of physical existence as well as into his loyalties and values. Therefore perspective, commitment, and direction of the human search for truth, value, beauty, love, justice, and purpose are determinative and basic.

A liberal arts college that stands in the Christian tradition ought to do more than dogmatically assume the classical rationalistic creed that the inquiring mind in an inquiring atmosphere finds hard truth to live by. It ought at least to present the other great alternatives of human history, especially the Christian alternative and its origin. This should not mean that arguments for secular scientism or rationalism or any thought system should be suppressed, since they are live alternatives in our secular world with passionate devotees. The Christian college ought to present the premise of a creating and redeeming God as revealed in Christ as the foundation of interpreting man's suffering, error, purpose, and destiny. The college ought to question the confidence in all partial and limited solutions to the human dilemma and final explanations of man's destiny. It ought to recognize how far love as revealed in Christ transcends legal and social moralism and opens new possibilities. It ought to present the community of faith, in which Christians join in the pilgrimage of decision and truth seeking as the context of interaction and encounter with God.

THE STUDENT'S SENSE OF VOCATION

The college ought to call the individual to take his own stand as he struggles with inadequacy and the dilemmas of coherence and purpose and as he meets the claims of the Christian alternative. It seems doubtful that a Christian college justifies this title if it does not present the Christian alternative in its most appealing critical light and by those who stand within its perspective.

The Christian view of education, whether liberal arts, professional, or technical, then does not undermine or close the search for truth but opens it to the dimension of transcendence in loyalty to God. This view removes the search for truth from the search for abstract propositions which are sterile and makes it an active pursuit of meanings in relation to the perspective of supreme loyalty. It avows that nothing can be known absolutely. Even God is partially hidden to finite eyes save in His revelation in Christ. Truth transcends the facts of limited relations in abstracted systems. There are no packaged world views and value systems merely to be transmitted. Every man must confront God and reality on the Damascus road of inquiry and encounter. A Christian's academic community charges the atmosphere with the purposiveness and vocational commitment that such a spirit engenders. This is in deep contrast to the kind of deadening discipline imposed by the sheer routine of mastering the requirements for a specialized technical field. It is increasingly difficult really to believe in the positivistic ultimacy of biology or mathematics or business administration, etc., as containing the intrinsic ends of a life career, much less of final devotion.

IV. Realization of the Christian Doctrine of Vocation

Each of the several groups which go to make up a Christian college bears a responsibility for the fulfillment of the sense of Christian vocation which should characterize its life and program. These groups include the following: the administration, the faculty, the students, the governing body, the denominational or other constituency, and in some cases the immediate community in which the college is set.

The Christian college will be characterized by a distinctive ethos or climate

The Christian college takes care to present the Christian point of view in both its curriculum and its daily life. It will seek ways in which Christian values and presuppositions may affect all that it does. In its search it will take into account the prevailing values of American culture. Attachment to peer groups on the part of students for example may be transformed to provide a concerned response to the judgment and grace of God. All of the organized centers where values are created and perpetuated will be considered as the college approaches its task of realizing a sense of Christian vocation. Such groups as fraternities, dramatic clubs, science clubs, and athletic organizations will in the Christian college be among those places where the transformation of values occur.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

Specific proposals for the consideration of the colleges

Members of Section IV suggest the following as examples of steps which may be taken if a sense of Christian vocation is to be realized:

1. A Christian college will have a statement of goals and objectives. Such will not be stated in dogmatic fashion but will definitely reflect the Christian assumptions of the school.

2. Faculty members and students will be made aware of these stated goals and objectives upon their affiliation with the institution.

3. The faculty and staff of a Christian college will consist of persons who express a sense of Christian vocation in their own lives and work. This will be cultivated by participation in such activities as the Faculty Christian Fellowship and those retreats and conferences where the Christian religion is studied and discussed.

4. A Christian college will have a high quality of integrity. Faculty members in their teaching will demonstrate intellectual integrity. There will be mutual respect among members of faculty and administration. Other tests of the integrity of a college are to be found in the way in which it uses its funds, the interpretation of itself in public relations, and the expectations it creates in prospective students. The manner in which a college uses scholarship funds for the recruitment of athletes, musicians, or otherwise gifted persons is still another mark of its integrity.

5. The presence of religious counsellors and leaders of student religious activities are helpful, but in a Christian college not all counselling will be relegated to the professionals. We would encourage broad faculty participation in student counseling.

6. The college will through its chapel services seek to express the conception of Christian vocation by relating the Christian message to the world as the student experiences it.

7. The Christian college will seek ways in which students may participate meaningfully in the decisions affecting the life of the college. In some schools this has been done by the appointment of students to membership on all of the college committees including those of curriculum, finance, etc. The opinions of students will be received with respect by faculty and administration.

8. The college will bring to its campus from time to time Christian persons whose sense of vocation is clear and contagious to meet with faculty and students.

9. Finally, the budget of the college will reflect its concern for advancing the Christian religion on its campus. The relative size of expenditures for a religious program may be an index of the school's concern for the realization of a sense of Christian vocation.

The Christian College and the World

Mission of the Church

Section Five

I. The Christian College by Its Very Nature is Involved in World Mission

The Inter-relatedness of World Culture

Prime symbols of our era are the cryptic designations UN, SEATO, WHO, SPUTNIK, NATO, WCC, ICA, FAO, IGY. All of them point to one fact: we now live in a global society, and every concern of human beings has world-wide implications and repercussions. Even the laboratory and the library, if ever they offered the possibility of an ivory tower for the withdrawn and the detached, no longer do so. Indeed every institution of genuine learning is on a sensitive international frontier.

For a college is concerned with human culture. And every aspect of culture is now shaped and fertilized by an intense universal encounter. The day of folk art and literature, of provincial music and architecture, burgeoning in innocent unawareness of other ways of life and expression, is gone. Teaching and learning in all the arts demands a world perspective.

In the sciences of society and nature it is no longer enough to know what Americans or Europeans have done and discovered. Pioneering and crucial research is being done in Japan, India, China, Russia, as well as in the West. Our history cannot be understood unless it is put in the context of Muslim history, Asian and even African history, as well as European history. Economic theory which attempts to deal with the problems of a national economy in isolation from world trade and the standards of living in Philippine and Burmese villages is an anachronism. Every

The pre-convocation study commission on this topic had the following members: David M. Stowe, Chairman, American Board of Commissioners; J. Maxwell Adams, Macalester College; Tai Akagi, PARS Group, Union Seminary; R. Pierce Beaver, Federated Theological Faculty, University of Chicago; Arthur L. Carson, Higher Education in Asia; Paul Dettman, Harvard Divinity School; William P. Fenn, Higher Education in Asia; Edmund C. Ilogu, PARS Group, Union Seminary; James W. Kennedy, Protestant Episcopal Church; Wilmer J. Kitchen, World University Service; F. Bruce Morgan, Princeton Seminary; Richard Raymond, Institute for International Education; Masao Takenaka, American Board of Commissioners; L. Newton Thurber, Student Volunteer Movement; Frank T. Wilson, Presbyterian Church, U. S. A.; Herrick B. Young, Western College for Women.

At the convocation the above prepared study document was accepted by the study section which also added its further statement: Charles N. Schutt, Chairman; Arthur L. Carson and J. Maxwell Adams, Associates.

department of an honest college has become a department of International Relations in one way or another.

Over-arching this world context and concern of contemporary education is the most significant fact of all. The truth toward which all learning aspires is one and is universal. Every college on every continent must bow daily toward this Mecca — that ideal understanding which must be the same for every mind which has seen far enough to perceive it. In the adolescence of world-mindedness the discovery of the variety of cultures suggested a facile relativism, as if truth were dependent on history or geography. Now it becomes clear that the physical truth which nations can use to put rival satellites into space is the *same* for all. And so are the truths about man and society and God, though we may seem to have a less sure grasp on these.

The World Involvement of the Christian College

A few years ago one leading publicist looked ahead and thought he saw an "American Century" coming. He was phrasing the sense of messianic destiny which had for some generations been in the minds of a few leaders of the American people. Yet on the whole we have been the most isolationist of the great powers; and even now it is extremely difficult to get political support for programs which express a mature and adequate American involvement with the world.

Within the American society however there have always been those for whom the conception of a radical involvement with the world society is taken for granted. They have been concerned about Teheran, Indochina, Baghdad, and Korea for a long time. "One can find groups of elderly ladies in little country churches who will tell how, in their youth, Aruppakkotai and Pungo-Ndongo were household words among the members of the congregation," Charles Forman notes. This is because the Christian churches have always had a sense of world mission. Long before a publisher phrased the "American Century," the "Christian Century" had been the leading journal of American Protestantism. Indeed the Revolution was barely complete when New Englanders launched an American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions to carry the gospel to the ends of the earth. When recent stresses of war made it imperative for our government to find specialists who understood the languages, the lands, and the life of a hundred far-off peoples, it was among those who had been involved in this world-wide enterprise of the Christian community that such experts in the universal were found.

Thus the Christian college by its very nature is doubly involved in a concern for and a responsibility to the whole world. Simply as a college, an honest and lively place of learning, it must teach and study in all its departments with a global perspective. But as a member of the Christian community it shares in an even more

specific and powerful tradition of international concern. It belongs to a fellowship of Christians who have always understood, however dimly, that the God they serve is God of the whole earth and of all peoples. They have sensed that the meaning of the whole Christian epic is that "God so loved *the world* that he gave his only begotten Son." The truly Christian college has glimpsed, at least, the fact that its responsibility is to no privileged elite of students and their parents, nor to a sponsoring denominational community; but rather to the whole human family of the one God whose only truth they seek to know and to express.

The Kind of World the College Faces

What are some of the leading characteristics of the world toward which the Christian college by its very nature is inexorably oriented? Leaders of the World's Student Christian Federation have recently summarized some of these in a helpful way. They point out that the entire world is undergoing revolutionary changes in this generation. Their report lists important aspects of this upheaval as:

- (1) The ending of Western political domination ("colonialism") and the emergence of new nations (more than 700 million people have achieved political independence since the end of World War II).
- (2) The renaissance of ancient religions, often as a cultural and spiritual dimension of the new nationalism just noted, and hence infused with a tremendous dynamic and sometimes a frightening parochialism.
- (3) Advances of science, including the development of fearsome weapons of absolute annihilation; and also peaceful uses of atomic power, immensely enlarged capabilities for food production, vast developments in public health and in transportation and communication.

Thus paradoxes confront us: vastly enlarged populations — or the end of the human race; possibilities for abundant livelihood for all — and increasing contrast between rich and poor peoples; increasing interdependence — and increasing chauvinism in default of a genuine world ethos.

- (4) The transformation of agricultural into industrial and urbanized society with all the major adjustments in family and social life and the economic and political transformations involved.

- (5) The struggle between communism and liberal democracy, with their respective orbits of power and the continuing threat of limited or total war.

In many ways these characteristics of twentieth century global society determine the particular character of the world mission of the Church today and of the share in that mission which properly belongs to the Christian college.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

II. The Christian Church Has a New Sense of Mission, Which Gives the Christian College a New Sense of Vocation and Direction

The Character of the Christian World Mission

One of the most perceptive spokesmen of the world Christian community, speaking from the perspective of a British family and education, decades of responsible experience in an Asiatic church, and extensive travel, has ventured this interpretation of the ferment of contemporary society:

We are witnessing the process by which more and more of the human race is being gathered out of static or cyclical patterns of culture into that single world history whose center is the Cross and whose end is the final judgment and mercy of God. With the Bible in our hands, we are to interpret this vast and various process as part of the unremitting action of God in Jesus Christ, whereby men and ultimately the whole human race are being brought to the final issues of faith. (Bishop Lesslie Newbigen)

Such is the broad perspective in which the Christian Church is beginning to see its total mission to the world. Its implications might be summarized in three propositions:

- (1) God is at work in all strands of human history to bring in His Kingdom of justice, peace, righteousness, and loving community.
- (2) The Church exists simply and solely to serve that dynamic, historic will of God. In other words *the Church is a Mission*. It is an enterprise of outreach, of service, of witness to truth and justice.
- (3) In its total mission the Church must be concerned for all aspects of human need and for all the opportunities of human development which the action of God creates.

With such a generous and far-reaching conception of the Christian task the Christian college cannot but be in sympathy. Within the concrete structures of this vast Christian mission the college can find a very significant role to play and a substantial, distinctive contribution to make. In order to specify these affirmations it will be useful to glance at a few of the leading characteristics of the Christian world mission in our day.

New Aspects of Mission

There are two poles in the encounter of the Church with the world in mission: the individual Christian whatever he is and the corporate Christian community.

The individual Christian embodies and expresses the life and message of the Church throughout the whole range of his daily work and life. It has become crystal clear in recent years that in just this way the Church is most effectively

CHRISTIAN COLLEGE AND WORLD MISSION

and pervasively in contact with the world. A vastly increased attention to the role of the layman has marked recent Christian missionary philosophy.

It has been discovered for example that the American government has some 40,000 civilian employees scattered over almost the whole face of the globe, and along with these are several times that many military personnel. American business maintains some 24,000 employees and family members abroad in scores of countries. And there are today more than 11,000 American teachers and students involved in overseas programs of study, teaching, and research. (These figures are from a report prepared by the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. Omitted from the figures are members of the families which are also abroad.)

Obviously many of these persons are active Church members and people of Christian conviction in their home communities. But most of them probably fail to see that they can and must make a comparable witness to their faith and give service to their adopted communities abroad. Yet the experience of some has shown how great the opportunities are for this kind of service. Adherence to personal ethical standards, participation in community projects, the cultivation of inter-racial and international friendships, service in local organizations for all kinds of good causes, active membership and service in local Christian churches or missions — these are but some of the ways in which lay Christians can contribute to the Christian mission abroad.

Clearly many of these Americans overseas are college-trained. As the Christian colleges from which many come develop awareness of the kind of service their graduates may be in a position to render, these institutions can do a much better job of preparing them for such a role. They can develop more courses explicitly dealing with world issues; and they can develop the global implications within the existing curriculum. A Christian perspective in the teaching of history, international relations and economics, of social and personal problems, will give light and guidance. Visits by representatives of other countries and reports by skilled international observers should play an important role in campus life. Participation in exchange study programs, in inter-college "links," all help shape young lives for international usefulness. For those interested in an interdenominational or a non-sectarian approach, there are a number of experienced agencies which operate on such a basis. A partial listing will be found at the end of this paper.

Not less important than its mission carried on through individual Christians is the witness of the Church in its corporate aspect. In our time the Church has learned to speak for God and for man, not by virtue of established political power and privilege but of moral authority within a pluralistic and democratic society. And this voice of the Church has been significant. On international relations for example the Department of International Affairs of the National Council of Churches has given valuable insight and encouraged constructive policies. On other social issues, including race relations in this and other countries, a comparable contribution has been made.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

Christian colleges ought to help the Church do sound, penetrating, and constructive thinking in such areas. Mere good will does not fit bishops or Church assemblies to pronounce on complex issues. By helping the Church think hard and straight, Christian institutions of learning can aid it and aid the world toward which it seeks to address a significant and relevant message.

Of course a massive contribution of the Church comes simply from its vital spiritual life, from worship, theological study, prayer, and loving fellowship. In this way the world is reminded that man does not live by bread alone and that man's soul is restless until it finds rest in a spiritual reality beyond gadgets and entertainment. The Christian college ought to be, in one way or another, a worshipping as well as a studying community. Indeed it has unique opportunities to confront students with meaningful worship and profound preaching within its voluntary or official religious programs. Here again the college may make a substantial contribution to the Church as a mission to mankind.

The gist of the matter may be this. For any great cause to sustain vitality from generation to generation there must be a meeting place where youth and experience can come together in mutual understanding, not only for the passing on of a cultural heritage but for fresh examination in the light of all pertinent knowledge. Something of this process should go on in every Christian home and in every congregation. The unique contribution of the college is to enlarge horizons and to provide facilities for organized learning. If this can be done in simple integrity, if devotion and the discipline of thought can be maintained in proportion, if the gospel can be seen in a realistic world perspective, and if institutional smugness can be kept dissolved in the warmth of the living spirit — then the Christian college may continue to claim an indispensable role in the Christian mission.

III. The Christian College and the Organized Missionary Movement of the Church

Kerygma (Proclamation), *Koinonia* (Fellowship), *Diakonia* (Service) — these have been a great tripod on which the mission of the Church to the world has rested. They are expressed both through the lives of individual Church members and through the corporate work and life of the Church. And since the Church is now understood to be in essence a mission and since it exists to minister to the whole range of human needs in the whole world, it might seem that the days of old-fashioned "missions" as one branch of Church activity were over. Indeed in a sense they are. The organized missionary movement carries on its work in a very different spirit and with radically altered techniques from those which have obtained at some times in the past.

Nevertheless the Church has found that for the most effective implementation of its three-fold mission, especially in its world-wide dimensions, the Church still has need of special instruments. To represent it in broad programs of social service,

CHRISTIAN COLLEGE AND WORLD MISSION

relief, and reconstruction, and to carry forward the proclamation of the gospel on the frontiers, the Church still requires the mission board or missionary society. It is to the specific responsibilities of this organized missionary movement and its relation to the Christian college that we now turn.

The missionary movement has two great functions. First, it serves as a specialized task force of the Church for carrying on its total world mission at many points which would otherwise be unreached. Neither individual Christians on their own nor the corporate influence of existing Church communities are in a position to minister in many areas of great need. Organized missions from this standpoint are the arm of the Church by which it reaches out to frontiers of strategic importance and peculiar difficulty. They may or may not be geographically remote; for organized missions today are directed to the internal as well as the external frontiers, so to speak, of Christendom.

Second, the organized missionary movement has the task of building up the Church itself, in extent of territory, in size, in strength, and in capacity for effective action. In traditional language, it has the job of evangelism, conceived in the most broad and generous sense. The simple fact is that today the Christian community is by no means in a position to serve with maximum effectiveness as an instrument in God's hands. While its nominal membership comprises some 600 to 800 million, all but a small fraction of these are concentrated in the Americas and Western Europe. And most of these are merely nominal members. In the tremendous concentration of human potential in Asia, the Christians number more than $\frac{1}{2}$ of 1%. In Africa they are more numerous, yet even south of the Sahara the proportion is probably not more than 15%, and the Church is very young and weak. In the great Muslim world Christians are few. Hence there is continuing need of a concentrated, ably organized and staffed effort to build up the strength of the Church, particularly in these areas of relative weakness. Only so can it perform an effective mission.

In connection with this task of building up the Church it should be noted that the life of worship and of fellowship in Christ which is the life of the Church has an intrinsic as well as an instrumental value. Thus the organized missionary movement also finds its proper place in the total effort of the Church to bring men everywhere into the orbit of Redemption.

Just as renewed understanding of the missionary aspect of Christian discipleship has had a marked impact on the life of the Church in general, so too it is making its influence felt in the organized missionary movement. Missionary bodies are ministering to the human needs of men and women throughout the world by means of an extensive program of welfare activities: educational, medical, social, and economic. At the same time the work of building and strengthening indigenous churches is being pursued with renewed vigor and with an increasing awareness that it is upon these churches that the responsibility for carrying on Christ's mission to the non-Christian world ultimately rests. As a consequence, a two-way

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

partnership between younger and older churches is replacing the old regime of unilateral initiative from the West.

Moreover denominational missionary societies are channeling more and more of their activities through specialized "missionary" organizations which are supported by a number of Churches and which can command therefore highly competent technical leadership and facilities. Such organizations as the various Bible Societies and the audio-visual, literacy, and relief activities of the specialized agencies of the National Council and World Council of Churches immediately come to mind. Nor are these new forms of interdenominational cooperation largely confined to activities in the West, for they are matched by a growing tendency in operations in "mission" lands to pool resources in union institutions rather than to elaborate separate systems of denominational schools and hospitals.

In the carrying forward of this missionary movement, as of the Church's mission to the world, the Christian college has its own unique and indispensable contribution to make. This contribution is particularly obvious as it involves Christian colleges in non-Christian lands where the life of the college community is a particularly significant force in building the Church. But now that the distinction between Christian and non-Christian countries has become somewhat blurred, the distinction between Christian colleges located within Christendom and those in "mission lands" is no longer as meaningful as it once was. In other words the essential role of the Christian college today is more than ever the same everywhere, although the practical ways in which this role is played may vary from one country to another.

The corporate life and work of the Christian college exerts powerful influence in deepening the commitment of the Christian members of its staff and student body and in drawing the non-Christian members into a Christian perspective on life and even into membership in the Christian community. This influence is brought to bear not only in the academic message which comes through the application of Christianity to the philosophy and subject matter of learning but also through the interpersonal relationships which make up the totality of collegiate life, particularly that comprised in worship and extracurricular service. Moreover, although its impact is most directly felt intramurally, the witness of the Christian college carries over into the life of the Church and society in which it is located, ministering to and strengthening the Church, and commending the Gospel to the unbelieving world.

In addition to this general contribution, the Christian college has certain special contributions which are of vital importance. The most important of these is the development of trained Christian workers. Mention has already been made of the great contribution to be expected from thoroughly competent Christian laymen in their work throughout the world. Quite specifically however the Church also needs full-time professional leadership of the highest quality. Ministers for churches here and overseas and specialists in church administration, pastoral care, theology,

CHRISTIAN COLLEGE AND WORLD MISSION

medicine, social work, agriculture, education on all levels, religious education, mass communication, and a dozen other jobs within the orbit of the organized missionary movement are desperately needed. Young people of promise and consecration must be found and enlisted for such service, then trained for maximum effectiveness.

The college campus, particularly that which bears the name "Christian," is the most strategic single source of such personnel. The greatest days of missions have been days of high student interest. Most candidates for overseas service are still recruited on campuses. Certain colleges have remarkable traditions of inspiring and preparing their students for such service, either for a limited period of years or as a life career. Here is a fundamental question for each Christian college to face: can we send a stream of young people into international service through Christian agencies in a healthy proportion to the graduates sent into professional and business careers?

Secondly, if the Church is to carry on its missionary movement effectively, it needs knowledge and techniques with which to understand and grapple with the manifold social and cultural complexities which characterize the life of the world in which the gospel must be preached. In other words the Church Militant needs an intelligence arm. The Christian college is just such an intelligence arm, able to perform this function because the very nature of its scholarly work builds up within its portals a widespread knowledge of culture and society upon which the missionary movements of the Church can draw.

Thirdly, and perhaps paradoxically, the college serves the missionary movement by criticizing the life of the Church. The Church's theology, worship, and ministry — both in themselves and in relation to society — are a proper study for any college since they are a part of the totality of life disciplines. But the Christian college is not interested in the Church merely in a detached academic way, for the Christian college is at its best a part of the Church as defined above. Thus the Christian college is not only in a position to study the Church but on the basis of that study to criticize the Church by the Christian standards which both share. The college consequently, because it understands the Church and shares its life, can provide the sympathetic but at the same time exacting criticism which the Church needs if it is to flourish.

These then are the general and special contributions which the Christian college can make to the missionary movement of the Church. To be sure, the detailed manner in which these contributions can best be made will have to vary from college to college and from country to country. For example colleges in non-Christian countries have a particularly vital role to play in making the life of the Church indigenous since only the kind of close study of the surrounding non-Christian culture which such a college naturally undertakes as a part of its academic work can provide the guidance which the Church needs to express its Christian life

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

in terms of that culture. The Christian college and the graduate schools in the West have a particularly vital role to play in ministering to the needs, spiritual included, of students from non-Christian countries. The Christian among these should be helped to deepen their understanding of the commitment to what they believe, and the non-Christian should be encouraged to appreciate and even accept what they do not come believing. But wherever the Christian college is located it has its own particular work to do, work which God has given it and which, if that college refuses to do it, will not be done.

IV. The Christian College Discovers Its Own Meaning in Relation to the World Mission of the Church

The final upshot of all this is that the Christian college finds a primary clue to the meaning of its existence in its participation in the mission of the Church. Here it is not merely a question of the college recognizing that, as a matter of historical fact, it was established as a manifestation of the growth and outreach of the Church. It is a question of recognizing one of the facts of its ongoing life — the fact that the Christian college lives as it gives itself in a ministry to the world and to the Church. The world in all its cultural depth, as well as in its full geographic extent, is the interest of the Christian college. And interest is not merely a detached interest in "what is going on." It is an interest which involves participation and responsibility as well as inquiry. The world must be served for the sake of Christ as well as studied with the mind of Christ.

So too the Church must be served for the sake of Christ as well as studied with the mind of Christ. For the Church cannot carry out its mission to the world unless it is at the same time strengthened for the sake of this mission. The Christian college then exists not for its own sake but for the sake of Christ's Church and, through that Church, for the sake of the world which Christ came to save.

But we must be clear that Christ's Church is not this or that particular denomination, the denomination which founded a particular college and with which it may still be connected. Christ's Church is the ecumenical Church, the Church of the whole inhabited world, a Church which proclaims the Lordship of Christ over all human relationships. It is in the context of the life of this ecumenical Church that the Christian college finds fulfillment, not in any particular denominational order or piety. The ecumenical Church must awaken us after a sleep of centuries. Christ calls us to gather together the broken fragments of His body. But thus far the spirit of reunion seems to have had little impact on the separate existences, the isolationism, of Christian colleges. Is it too much to hope that the time is close at hand when an ecumenical movement will begin to leaven the lives of Christian academic communities?

CHRISTIAN COLLEGE AND WORLD MISSION

Appendix

A variety of pioneer projects have been carried on over the years by certain American institutions. The list which follows is not exhaustive, but only by way of example.

1. Learning about other peoples.
 - (a) Courses on world conditions and international affairs — "Area Studies."
 - (b) Collection of study materials — libraries, exhibits.
 - (c) Opportunities for direct observation — study tours, seminars abroad.
 - (d) Ecumenical work camps.
2. Faculty and student exchange — as at Western College for Women, Occidental College, Stanford Associated Students, Macalester College, and Amherst College.
3. "College links"—such as Yale-in-China, Princeton-in-Asia, Oberlin-Shansi Memorial Association, Carleton-in-Japan. (A study of such relationships is included in the scope of the Institute of Research on Overseas Programs at Michigan State University.)
4. Participation in standard missionary programs: denominational, inter-denominational, and nonsectarian but Christian.
5. Recruiting for Christian service overseas.
6. Preparation of students for future service.
7. Participation in organizational activities in the homeland — the college as host to mission conferences, possibilities of a continuing section of a U. S. college organization on the world mission.
8. Bringing the lessons of the world mission to bear upon problems of the homelands of colleges, with enrichment of life and influencing of public opinion and national policies.

It will be noted that these categories overlap. The list is only suggestive of activities that are now going on in American institutions. Not all are necessarily recommended by the committee. Certainly they are not of equal weight.

Every American college ought to be doing something under the first heading. Students exchange on the other hand needs careful planning and could conceivably be overdone. There is a real question as to the advisability of transplanting many students to the American scene for undergraduate work.

Additional Statement of Section Five

The Development of Christian World-mindedness

A major aspect of the vocation of the Christian college is the responsibility to develop informed Christian world-mindedness, dedicated to justice, brotherhood, peace, and the best possible life for all people.

From the beginning of the Church, Christian persons and Christian institutions have been under a missionary imperative to seek the welfare of the whole world in the name and spirit of their Lord. The contemporary world situation makes this search a matter of life or death for the human race. We must face the new inter-relatedness of all peoples, the clash of color, the tensions between the "haves" and the "have-nots," and the possibility of total extinction in nuclear war. Unless we learn to live together as brothers, we may die together as the common victims of our ignorance, self-centeredness, and greed.

The development of informed Christian concern for the peace of the world and the welfare of all people is a divine calling to the Christian college. The response to this call is not proposed as a substitute for intellectual competence and leadership or for any of the other major responsibilities which constitute the Christian vocation. Yet, unless this development is accomplished, there may be little time left for the other responsibilities.

This will involve an emphasis on the understanding of and concern for the rest of the world in every phase of college life: curriculum, admissions policies, extra-curricular programs, and relationships with the larger community (especially in respect to minority groups). The Christian college has a vocation to be a friendly critic and an imaginative stimulator to the churches in their world mission; to encourage students to discover their vocations in the light of the needs of the whole world; to produce well-qualified personnel for overseas service with governments and businesses as well as with churches; to participate in the search for alternatives to violence in all human relations; to acquaint students regularly with the best corporate thinking of the churches on these issues; and to make available to the churches the best corporate thinking of the college.

Christian colleges that already feel this concern are using such methods as: courses on other cultures, on world conditions, and on international affairs; thoughtful incorporation of students and faculty members from other lands into campus and community life; special convocation and chapel speakers; participation of students and faculty members in study tours and work camps abroad; special links with Christian colleges overseas; and co-operation with the missionary-education programs of the churches.

Charles N. Schutt, Chairman

What is the Ongoing Role of the Christian College in American Higher Education?

Section Six (Students)

We speak of the question of the ongoing role of the Christian college in American higher education from a unique position — as students presently involved in higher education. Unlike faculty, administration, and trustees we are yet apprentices while being also responsible participants in quest of truth. We speak as Church members recognizing our responsibility in influencing the direction of the Church's present and future involvement in higher education.

We speak as students who will soon be alumni of these institutions, now and the coming years guiding many young people in their choice of college. We are therefore concerned that the Christian college be the kind of educational institution in which we in good conscience can encourage coming generations to enroll. Some of us speak as potential teachers, scholars, trustees, administrative personnel, or university pastors in these institutions. Hopefully all of us speak as future leaders and responsible citizens of this nation and the world.

It is necessary in understanding this report to be aware of the assumptions upon which it was written. We assume that the Church is called of God to a missionary task in the world, that of proclaiming Jesus Christ as Lord of all life and Saviour of all men. In carrying out its mission the Church has worked and continues to work in and through structures and institutions. These institutions have in many cases been established and continue to be supported by the Church and are thereby related to the Church. Nevertheless these institutions are not churches. In our work therefore we have assumed that a college is not a church. Rather a Christian college shares in the Church's work in the world: it is in itself an expression of this work.

The pre-convocation study commission on this topic had the following members: Mary Jeanne McKay, Co-Chairman, University of Michigan; V. Bruce Rigdon, Co-Chairman, Wooster College; Harriet Adamson, College of Emporia; Donna L. Anderson, University of Nebraska; Donald G. Cramer, College of Puget Sound; Sue Edgar, Alma College; Joseph W. Pickle, Jr., Chicago Theological Seminary; Paul Rogness, Augustana College; Waldron A. Rosheim, Luther College; Laura V. Smith, Kalamazoo College; William M. Stark, Jr., Northwestern University; Jane Stetzer, Wheaton College; Charles Storslee, Augustana College.

The prepared document was considerably revised by the convocation study section: Harold Viehman, Chairman; Harriet Adamson and Donna Anderson, Associates. The revised version is published here.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

Let us define the Church-related colleges as those educational institutions presently sponsored by denominations. By Christian colleges we mean those institutions which recognize their responsibility under God to seek truth. It is the basis and confession of the Christian college that God in Jesus Christ is sovereign in and over his world, that all truth is in and of God, and thus that his sovereignty includes the sovereignty of Truth. The Christian college recognizes God as Lord of history, constantly at work in his world: creating, judging, redeeming. It further affirms the goodness of creation. The Christian college stands with all men and institutions under God's judgment and seeks to participate in his redeeming work through calling man to use his mind responsibly in the search for truth.

The central affirmation of the Christian gospel is that God loves, forgives, redeems, and transforms through Jesus Christ. The Church's nature, as a community of redeemed sinners called to be obedient to God in the proclamation of the good news of man's reconciliation and redemption accomplished once and for all by Christ, is constant in every age. While the Lordship of Christ over all creation, the nature of the Church, and the Gospel are unchanging, the world in contrast is continuously changing. Therefore the Church in every age is called to re-examine its life and mission in terms of the particular situations to which it must address itself.

At this time in history the urgent crisis in higher education demands a radical re-examination of the Church's life and mission in relation to this particular situation.

The Crisis and Responsibility in Higher Education

The problems which contribute to the crisis in American higher education have become more and more evident to us as we look critically at our society and its educational institutions. Ever larger numbers of young people are entering institutions of higher education in already crowded situations. Therefore continuing community life becomes increasingly difficult. The possibility of sustained personal relationships between students and faculty members is increasingly hampered. Much of higher education is characterized by a sophisticated detachment which pretends that commitment to truth as it becomes known to the searcher is not important. It may indeed even be hostile to commitment or afraid to raise the question of responsible use of power and knowledge. Education has undergone an extreme fragmentation through the rise of experts and specialization. Numerous attempts to integrate the various fields of knowledge are at present being made in higher educational institutions; but this is yet in the experimental stage.

Political pressure on state institutions does inhibit a free and unrestricted educational community. Again our freedom as students to respond, revise, accept, or reject views which differ from those of the majority of the people of our society has been denied by the "gag-rule" which permits no speaker to lecture on campus until he has been approved by a reviewing board. A society characterized by con-

THE ONGOING ROLE OF THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE

formity, indifference, anti-intellectualism, specialization, and apathy influences the life of higher educational institutions in this country both by its members in the college community and by the pressures of financial or political influence on the college. The implication of this is that student generations may be unconcerned with the central questions of the world situation and unprepared to deal with them.

We seek here not to find a *unique* role for the Christian college in our time. No role which is merely unique can justify an institution. Only as we seek to discover a role *legitimate* in the Christian college's affirmation of the Lordship of Christ and in its dedication to the task of scholarship can we hope to justify its existence. The crisis in the Christian college is much more basic than merely the loss of uniqueness. The crisis is in the lack of purposefulness, the fear of creativity, the refusal to be truly committed to the freeing gospel of Christ. We must ask and answer the question, "What does the Lord require of us in this generation?"

Church-related colleges are not necessarily Christian colleges. Being concerned with the ongoing role of the Christian college, we affirm that its life as an intellectual community under God is of primary importance. It must first of all be an institution of academic excellence. It can be this only if freedom and openness in the search for truth are maintained. The Church therefore must so love its Lord that it can love the Christian college and thus permit it the freedom of untrammelled search for truth. The Church can witness to the sovereignty of God and the fearless search for truth by granting its colleges autonomy to be what they must be — free and open educational communities.

Our understanding of Christian freedom in the academic pursuit — that God will make his will and purpose known and that he is free to use whomever he wishes in so doing — permits, indeed demands, an open encounter in which Christians and non-Christians in the college can be in dialogue with one another. This dialogue, this confrontation between Christian and non-Christian persons and ideas must exist in a truly free academic community. "The Christian vocation of the mind is not a call to think ideologically and play for safety but to think freely and throw away defences. All truth is of God."¹ Therefore Christians, both students and teachers, are not only permitted but are under the imperative to expose their systems of ideas to the possibility of new truth. They must also, as a Christian duty, seek to articulate the premises which they bring to a field to study. Articulation is basic to intellectual integrity. In this confrontation others will be called, indeed commanded, to make clear their premises. There promises thereby to be an intellectual community with greater integrity, honesty, frankness, and excitement in the Christian college than is possible in an educational institution which is restricted and inhibited by claiming that neutrality and noncommitment are the standards and methods of education.

¹ Marjorie Reeves, *Three Questions in Higher Education*. New Haven, Conn.: The Hazen Foundation, 1955, p. 18.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

The dialogue between Christians and others in the academic community provides an opportunity for vital Christian witness — a witness relevant to the actual crisis in the modern world's problems. The identification of the forces which bear upon the life of the community as an educational institution is of primary importance, and responsible action an imperative. The members of the Christian college can accept responsibility with more concern for honesty, justice, and integrity than for conformity. The openness in the educational community where dialogue takes place can foster the vital, critical, and freely responsible life of the intellectual in face of the pressures and problems of our age.

The churches and the college administrators must resist the temptation to use the colleges to indoctrinate, to exert ecclesiastical pressures, or to perpetuate a doctrinal line. Restrictions imposed upon administrators concerning whom they may choose as faculty, restrictions imposed upon faculty in what they may teach, and restrictions imposed on the student aimed at producing conformity in certain religious practices destroy the academic freedom necessary in an intellectual community of integrity. The professor must be free to teach what his studies have led him to believe to be the truth regardless of where his search for truth has led him. He must be free to encounter his students with all forms of knowledge, even those which oppose his own beliefs. The Christian college calls the faculty member to integrity of scholarship and high responsibility in the use of personality and influence in the teaching task. This does not mean that he will be called to be silent about his opinions. Indeed he must make them clear, at the same time respecting the students' freedom to accept or reject, even being willing to listen in humility, recognizing that wisdom or knowledge may come from unexpected sources. The Christian college understands personality as man made in the image of God. This means that the teacher must not attempt to manipulate the student in any way by demanding subtly or overtly that students adhere to his ideas.

We have been referring in this statement to education as a search for truth. We do not intend to imply that we understand this to be the whole process of education. Wholeness of education includes the learning of already known and accepted truth, investigation upon the frontiers of knowledge which may require a re-evaluation of known truth, and experience in the extra-curricular life of the college.

Education as the dissemination of truth must be taken seriously by students also. Inasmuch as we are compelled both in obedience to our faith and as responsible members in the academic community to search for truth, we are also compelled to fulfil our calling as students in another way — the demand and adventure of learning.

The Christian college is particularly concerned with the wholeness of education. Its special claim to wholeness is its understanding of the unity of truth in God and its response to God's call that men be responsible in the world. The responsibility of the Christian college in the liberal arts then is to a wholeness in its liberal arts

THE ONGOING ROLE OF THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE

program. The Christian college, recognizing man as made in the image of God, will seek to safeguard against violating or inhibiting the individual's wholeness.

We suggest that its liberal arts program ought to include the humanities, social sciences, natural and physical sciences, education, and the arts. We shall consider briefly why each ought to have a place in the liberal arts program of the Christian college.

To give directions to present cultural formations, for a clearer understanding of man in the world and the complexities of it, a new depth and breadth must be sought in the humanities and social sciences. We have all been awakened to the importance of the natural and physical sciences if we were not aware of their importance already. The question of power and use of the discoveries of the sciences is a matter on which Christians can and ought to raise their voices. The pertinent use of education, if Dr. Asa Knowles is correct when he says that education is increasingly becoming an instrument of national policy, is again one of power.

Besides the proper use of education, another problem is raised. What is the effect of this utilitarian approach of education to the method and content of education? It seems to us that the Christian college ought to be involved in the educational field precisely because of these problems — because the Christian understanding of the nature of education has something to say to its methods and use. For instance an area which is commonly recognized within the liberal arts is that of art. What of art in advertising? The employment of psychology in commercial art raises grave ethical problems in the advertising field. The artist should be called upon to face these issues in the use of his art. The Christian college can be involved in the liberal arts as a responsible means of confronting various pertinent cultural problems.

Relationships in the Communal Life of the Christian College

Besides the acceptance of responsibility in the search for truth, those within the Christian college are called to act both freely and responsibly within the college community. The atmosphere of the Christian college must be one where free expression, encounter, and creative community life can help students and professors to accept responsibility and find wholeness. This is imperative so that those within the community can respond to what God demands of them and accept responsibility for their actions to God and to each other. With "indifference, self-centeredness, and apathy" used to describe our student culture, we are called especially as Christian witnesses to accept the challenge which has been placed on us to be cognizant of the infinite value of all individuals.

In the Christian college we have real purpose in building personal relationships. Within the college community we recognize the problem of lack of communication between faculty and students. Student-faculty discussion groups in faculty homes

THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR

or campus gathering places which further personal relationships ought to be encouraged.

We must as Christian witnesses be creative in the values we affirm and those we reject. The challenge of specific issues demands Christian responses on the part of groups as well as individuals. For example we can take action in the area of student government in exploring the possibilities of an honor system, supporting self-government, and planning extra-curricular activities.

The college must recognize that the responsibility of the total life of the community must be shared by the administration, faculty, and students. We see the need for student representation in all areas which affect the total college community. This includes policies on academic standards, scholarships, curriculum, and social and religious programs. When we evidence sensitivity and responsible attitudes toward campus issues through opinion and such organs of communication as the newspaper and radio, we demonstrate our interest in the communal life of the college and all the factors that bear upon it. The Christian college cannot claim to be witnessing to its reconciling Lord if it does not welcome into its community those of any race or nationality. Admissions policy and scholarship aid are specific areas where the Christian college must meet this challenge.

In its affirmation of freedom the Christian college will allow students a community life exempt from moralistic rules. Rules on such matters as smoking, drinking, and dancing do not contribute to the students maturity or sense of responsibility. Indeed they have the opposite effect. To encourage the development of students' maturity there must be provided an atmosphere of creative community life where students and professors accept responsibility for their corporate life.

The Christian college and the Church must respect the being and integrity of each other. Each has a distinctive function, yet each must serve the other. We affirm that it is the responsibility of the Church to provide a ministry of the Word and the Sacraments to the Christian community within the campus. To insure this ministry is part of the mission of the Church.

When a church establishes an educational institution it has not fulfilled its mission. It has rather only started it. The ministry of the Church is not the responsibility of the institution which the Church has established as an autonomous academic community. A college which provides for its community a ministry of worship must seriously re-examine this policy. It is assuming for the academic institution the responsibility of the Church. The churches must take this responsibility to provide the ministry of worship, nurture, and pastoral care. The Christian college will encourage but ought not to interfere with the churches or with the Christian community in the campus. To require worship, when worship is the free response of the person to the loving God, is to deny the freedom which God has granted his creatures that they may love him.

THE ONGOING ROLE OF THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE

The Christian college in maintaining an open college community will be giving opportunity for free discussion and fruitful dialogue where a dynamic Christian witness can be made. The Christian community within the Christian college must always make its witness relevant to the very heart of the college — the scholarly quest. The Christians, both students and faculty, must constantly live the life of the reconciled community in Christ, participating in God's work of reconciling the world unto himself.

The Christian college must attempt to make its students aware of the complexities and tensions of the world since it is in the world, involved in its problems. It must show itself responsible to its primary task as a serious intellectual community. However it must also respond to the world by encouraging all students and faculty to act responsibly, giving voice and taking action both now and in the future.

Thus the Christian community cannot withdraw from our society which is highly industrialized, urbanized, organized, technical, and mobile. Our society, further characterized by conformity, indifference, anti-intellectualism, and apathy, must be met and dealt with by persons concerned with the central questions of this society and the world. The Christian college must not respond by withdrawal or isolation. Furthermore the college must not only remain within the world, but it must speak to the world on the basis of its affirmation of Christ as Lord of the whole of life. We must speak to our present society, for example when it denies human personalities through policies of discrimination and segregation, by being ourselves communities open to all.

We speak to the ongoing role of the Christian college as students who are eager for the kind of education which we envision. We are ready to accept the responsibilities placed upon us. We would invite serious Christian students and faculty to do likewise. We wish to raise with other members of the Church-related colleges the urgent question as to the meaning of Christian obedience for these colleges at this time. If together we are willing to venture into a future which in creative thinking and daring action means Christian obedience, we as students commit ourselves to this future. If together we are not willing so to venture, we cannot honestly believe that the Christian colleges have an important future as educational institutions. As Church members we cannot affirm the churches' continuance of institutions of higher education which are anything less than excellent.

Resolution of Thanks

When since Dunkirk have so many owed so much to so few? We cannot pay our debt, even if words became the coin of the realm, but we say a decent "thank you."

The attempt to include the names of all to whom gratitude is due always fails. So we single out for special commendation only three men who have clearly done more than anyone else to bring this convocation to pass: Dr. Hubert C. Noble, Dr. Cecil Lower, and the Rev. Robert Mickey. These men may wish to pass on some of this credit to others; we encourage them to do so.

To President Harmon and the Business Manager, Mr. Snow, we say, "thank you" for the excellent services and facilities of Drake University.

With our convocation speakers and section leaders we register our deep appreciation for their contributions.

We thank also those generous members of the six study commissions who prepared the grist for our convocation mill.

The background of imagination, prayer, dedication, and sacrifice which has led to this consummation beggars description. The Danforth Foundation made the convocation possible with a grant of \$10,000. Some churches made special gifts to underwrite and promote this meeting. As a result none of us is pulling his own weight; we are each the guest of some one. To our sponsors and benefactors we say a hearty "thank you."

Respectfully submitted,

Elmer G. Million, Chairman

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for the Convocation of Christian Colleges

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